

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

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Chapter 1 Introduction

The harvesting of knowledge

A wet afternoon in Eastleigh, Hampshire, England. We've just finished a 3-hour depth interview with a police beat constable and a civilian crime reduction officer, discussing a project they have conceived, planned and implemented to tackle a local problem of drinking and disorder by young people. To put it mildly, we're overwhelmed by the amount of thought and action they achieved, with little if any expert guidance. They had devised and implemented thirteen distinct interventions working through diverse causal mechanisms, and ranging in practical terms from removing a raised planter where young people sat and drank illegally and rowdily, to installing a youth shelter, to running a healthy living centre. The action involved nine sets of collaborators, ranging from parish and borough councils to local shopkeepers and residents; and necessitated addressing a raft of implementation issues ranging from maintenance to exit strategy and revival plans in case problems flared up again. And from evidence we'd obtained and analysed, the project appeared to have worked. More to the point, though, the team are pretty astonished with themselves: they hadn't realised the extent of their accomplishment.

Even more to the point, neither had anyone else learned of all this work, let alone emulated it. So, apart from the brief report that alerted us to the project originally, all the experience gained could have remained tacit and unshared. Some enquirers might have visited the team (if they had known to ask about the project). But the team would probably have been unable, in a brief meeting, to list what they had done, or take their visitor through the evidence and reasoning; to highlight the principles, the conflicting considerations to be balanced and juggled, the contextual conditions necessary for successful implementation and impact; and to distinguish the newsworthy from the commonplace. Eventually, the team members would have moved on and split up with the possibility for detailed recall lost.

A chilly January day in Limerick, Irish Republic. In a youth centre in a run-down housing estate are gathered the centre director and her deputy, a probation officer, two local Gardai (police), and an administrator from the Youth Justice Service. Following a semi-structured schedule we're having a lively discussion on practice issues ranging from the sources of information on crime problems and problem youngsters; to the individual, family and community-level causes and

*consequences of these problems; to the principles and methods underlying recruitment of young members and the interventions once they are through the front door; to the practicalities of obtaining insurance for outdoor activities; to the heartfelt advice to **never**, when travelling with kids from a rough estate, visit a small village shop for everyone to buy lunch; to the difficulties of balancing welfare and justice approaches; to how continuity is maintained, especially where the centre has been founded by a charismatic leader.*

After two days and ten visits to centres in Limerick and Dublin, some 120 learning points both tactical and strategic have been gathered, and ideas organised and made over to the Irish Youth Justice Service. The interest and the eagerness to discuss, reflect and share good practice is striking but not untypical. Neglect of these points of practice and theory and others like them may lead to failure, whether through the public embarrassment of a wrecked baker's shop or the wrong interventions applied to the wrong young people in the wrong context.

A detailed, diagnostic, report of an attempted evaluation of a new kind of security clip, designed to help customers in pubs and cafes safeguard their bags against theft. The evaluation didn't work: we want to know at what stages and why, in order to get it right and cover risks the next time, and to draw more general lessons from failure.

A set of practice recommendations on partnership in crime prevention by an international committee of experts for the Council of Europe, based on clear, agreed definitions in depth.

A trial system for capturing good practice in Western Australia in ways which aid intelligent replication in-context.

A rewrite of process evaluations of burglary projects from the national Crime Reduction Programme in England and Wales in a standard format and language, aiding retrieval of individual practice elements and comparison and synthesis between cases.

A common systematic way of researching, and reporting, process evaluations of CCTV trials under the same programme.

A schema adopted by the Swedish National Crime Prevention Council for systematically shaping local bids for national funding; this fosters a clear, logical rationale, which aids selection, development of proposals and performance.

What have these in common? They are all intended to improve the performance of practice in crime prevention, community safety and security (hereinafter 'crime prevention'). They all work through mechanisms of *knowledge management* – a term also covering *knowledge transfer* – and relate to the conduct and utilisation of research and evaluation. And they all draw on elements of a suite of evolving definitions and frameworks for capturing and refining that knowledge, and helping practitioners select, replicate and innovate action which is both appropriate

to their problem and context, and consistent with available evidence and tested theory. The frameworks are:

- The *5Is*, a process model loosely equivalent to SARA of Problem-Oriented Policing but far more detailed (especially on the ‘Response’ task): *Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Involvement, Impact*. *5Is* can be used both to capture and organise practice knowledge during and after preventive action, and prospectively, whether in replicating specific ‘success stories’ in new contexts or in a more generic approach to undertaking preventive action.
- The *Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity*: a more detailed and inclusive equivalent of the Crime Triangle covering 11 immediate *causes* of criminal events centring on offenders and their situations, and counterpart principles of *intervention* in those causes. This contributes to *5Is* especially under *Intelligence* and *Intervention*.
- A set of systematic and clear *definitions of preventive actions and institutional settings* in which crime prevention, community safety and security are conducted.

Common to this suite of frameworks is a concern with *clarity, precision, consistency, integration and completeness*. This contrasts with much put forward in the name of *supporting* crime prevention, but in practice *hindering* it: superficial ‘muddling through’ and sloganeering; weak definitions; overlapping, confusing concepts. There’s a concern, too, with *adaptability to change* within crime and crime prevention, and in the wider world; with an understanding of *replication as innovation* rather than as slavish cookbook copying; and above all with the ability to handle the *complexity* and messiness of crime and its prevention, which defies attempts to rigidly define tasks and to put them into strict linear sequence. Extending earlier versions of *5Is* there’s now more effort to combine a purely descriptive approach with an evaluative one, covering both impact and process.

Why do we need such a suite of frameworks? Primarily to help improve performance in crime prevention. That performance has, throughout the world, been repeatedly shown to be seriously constrained by three things:

- Failure to *know what works* and to share that knowledge nationally and internationally;
- Failure to *implement* what we know to work, in a world containing increasingly diverse contexts of operation, and where multiple drivers and tradeoffs (such as inclusiveness and sustainability) must increasingly be addressed when tackling crime;
- Failure to *anticipate and adapt* to emerging challenges from adaptive offenders exploiting social and technological changes, whether these involve new forms of antisocial behaviour, new ways of stealing cars, new forms of criminal organisation or new techniques of terrorism.

These failures have occurred in both top-down mode (evaluation and theory into practice), bottom-up (articulating, capturing, filtering and refining elements of

the enormous reservoir of practical experience accumulated on the ground) and in horizontal, peer-to-peer mode (where brief descriptions of *possibly* successful projects are supplemented by contact details for team members who will undoubtedly be too busy to talk in depth and who may well have moved on). We've made considerable progress in knowing what works over the last two decades; but in a practice and policy world that aspires to be evidence-based, limitations of that knowledge, and how it's gathered and organised, are still significant.

This book will identify those limitations and suggest remedies. Implementation failure has many causes, but this book focuses on those stemming from the inadequate way we've managed and transferred knowledge of practice. Anticipation and adaptation require a certain capacity to analyse causes and the crime consequences of current and future changes in those causes; and a counterpart capacity to innovate faster than offenders, based on generative theory and research evidence. This book presents an approach that aims to support these capacities, and which itself is intended to adapt, evolve and expand. We must also improve *applied research* in this field, especially process evaluation and the integration of currently fragmentary theory, concepts and terminology. This book aims to contribute here, too.

The need for managing knowledge of crime prevention and using this knowledge to plan interventions is recognised internationally. The United Nations (United Nations, 2006: 298-9) compendium of standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice, recommends that Governments and/or civil society facilitate knowledge-based crime prevention by, among other things:

- Supporting the generation of useful and practically applicable knowledge that is scientifically reliable and valid;
- Supporting the organisation and synthesis of knowledge and identifying and addressing gaps in the knowledge base;
- Sharing that knowledge, as appropriate, among researchers, policymakers, educators, practitioners from other relevant sectors and the wider community; and
- Applying this knowledge in replicating successful interventions, developing new initiatives and anticipating new crime problems and prevention opportunities.

Ways have been developed for managing knowledge of crime prevention; unfortunately, most are simplistic, narrow and haphazard. The frameworks and concepts presented in this book spring from attempts to deliberately *design* them to be fit for purpose to serve local, national and international requirements. Here I seek unashamedly to reverse a trend of the last two decades: oversimplification of knowledge, thinking and communication. My key contention is that *it's futile dumbing down knowledge into slogans and superficial examples to facilitate communication to practitioners, if this material can't inspire actions sophisticated enough to do good and avoid harm in the complexities of crime prevention in the real*

world. Smarter tools, if well-designed, *simplify* the task of handling that complexity and repay investment through improved performance. Bearing in mind practical issues such as readers' 'comfort zones', and a commitment to cumulative progress of the discipline of crime prevention, wherever possible the framework builds on, and is compatible with, the terminology and structure of previous frameworks – although I never shrink from criticising these where appropriate.

Who needs these frameworks? The frameworks have been designed primarily to handle knowledge at the *practice* level, but practice can range from clearing bottles and bricks from the streets outside a football stadium before the match, to disrupting and dismantling an international organised crime network or designing a crime resistant mobile phone system. A practice focus also serves as a firm platform for building upwards to the requirements of *delivery managers* responsible for the performance of practitioners, their projects and services. It supports what *policymakers* can hope to achieve in setting out realistic and well-planned policies and programmes; and in planning and establishing the infrastructures of education, guidance, operational resources and organisational structures, processes and cultures necessary to make them work. *Researchers and evaluators* should also find 5Is useful. It doesn't, perhaps, add hugely to the theory of crime and crime prevention, but the 5Is suite as a whole makes the *practice* of research easier to undertake (for example providing a systematic map of process to help plan and report on process evaluation) and the *products* of research easier to articulate, integrate and retrieve.

The origins of the suite of frameworks lie in some 30 years of personal experience beginning during the formative years of modern crime prevention in the UK and covering research, theorising, implementation, evaluation and documentation; and drawing on British, North American, European and Australian ideas and practice. The scope covers both situational and offender-oriented prevention and the wider reaches of community safety and security.

The book aims to make a strong case for the *need* for a new knowledge framework; to use the identified deficiencies in crime prevention knowledge and knowledge production processes to develop a *Specification* for the design of a framework fit for purpose; and only then, to actually present, and illustrate, my own candidate for meeting the Specification, the 5Is suite of frameworks.

The book is *not* a 'get smart quick' guide on how to use 5Is, although the summaries of knowledge content headings in Chapters 11-15 are immediately usable, and those readers wishing to skip the argument and just get on with 5Is could start at Chapter 7. Those interested in the design of the frameworks, and in getting a deeper understanding of the rationale and its wider implications for crime prevention, can begin here.

Nor is the book a final and definitive large-scale map of 5Is, because there's much still to develop beyond this indicative vision. Gaps remain, particularly for suitable frameworks to handle developmental prevention. Nor again is it a complete repository of knowledge captured through 5Is, which would be a major, prolonged

effort needing widespread institutional backing. In any case, both the content and the structuring of the content via new subheads and terms are intended to *evolve* as crime prevention, and our understanding and practice of it, grow; and as crime itself continues to mutate. 5Is supports an *improvement* approach both to the practice of prevention, and in its own self-development.

The appropriate response to this book is, perhaps, constructive debate on its diagnosis of the problem with crime prevention performance, its Specification for improvement and its proposed solution. 5Is should become a *collective* asset, so offers to contribute to the next stage of development would also be welcome! That next stage will be to refine, amend and update the Specification and the principles and details of 5Is and to place it online as an open-source system of education and guidance; perhaps, too, to create and populate a working and evolving knowledge base or, more likely, multiple bases for different purposes but using common principles, terms and structures.

The book in outline

Chapter 2 documents implementation failure in crime prevention – the fact, the manifestations and the consequences. It then considers a range of causes of this failure, beginning with everyday ones like lack of project management skills and pragmatic constraints, continuing with organisational and inter-organisational issues and ending on limitations in the professional resources of practitioners. Behind these limitations are shortcomings in the transfer and application of crime prevention knowledge, and in the context in which that knowledge is, or is not, imparted, valued and used.

In Chapter 3 knowledge and its management take centre-stage. I describe limitations on knowledge which hinder the performance of crime prevention. Some of the limitations concern practicalities of knowledge management, others are more conceptual. Some are fairly superficial, such as coverage of the field, others quite deep, such as fragmentation of theory; still others are fundamental, such as the understanding of causal mechanisms and the fitness of process models of prevention. Two themes pervade these difficulties with knowledge: failure to address the *complexity* of crime and its prevention in the real world; and failure to systematically *articulate* what is currently tacit or merely vague.

The pursuit of simplicity in both theory and method has predominated since academics first engaged in action research on practical crime prevention. In Chapter 4 I argue that the simplification tendency has overreached itself; that this is implicated in implementation failure, and has also harmed theory, denying it the chance and the challenge to address complexity; and that we should therefore carefully and selectively reverse direction. Having documented the manifestations of simplification of terms, concepts, education and guidance materials, I hold that we can understand these as adaptations to particular institutional and professional

circumstances. If pursued to extremes, simplification is *maladaptive*. However, driven by the reality of their research findings, even the arch-simplifiers of Situational Crime Prevention have now come to acknowledge complexity as an issue; and agencies like the Youth Justice Board of England and Wales or the Irish Youth Justice Service are increasingly ready to take it seriously. Complexity itself has several forms, covering the merely complicated (variations and combinations) and the truly complex (interactions, emergence, complex adaptive systems). Both challenge knowledge, theory and practice, demanding an appropriate response if the profession of crime prevention is to significantly improve its performance and scope.

Chapter 5 is where we begin to address the central factor holding back that performance: namely, knowledge and how it's managed. In this chapter, I make some fundamental strategic suggestions for how crime prevention and its knowledge framework should co-evolve, centring on the need to build innovative capacity and the concept of 'appropriate complexity'. This reflects the idea that the models we use to understand and address complex problems in the real world, must *themselves* be of sufficient complexity to handle the detail, the interactions and the dynamics. Building outward from this core idea I propose ways to help theory engage with complexity, including the use of causal mechanisms and the wider Scientific Realist agenda; the improvement of process models, and the need for both theory and process to be efficient 'learning engines'; the use of language and education as tools for building the capacity of practitioners to handle complexity; and the application of Piaget's approach to understand adaptive learning both at the level of the knowledge base, and of the individual practitioners acquiring their own mental schema for assimilating and accommodating to new knowledge.

Chapter 6 develops a detailed Specification for a knowledge framework for crime prevention, combining the suggestions made in previous chapters. I employ a *design* approach to identify and creatively resolve contradictions and tradeoffs between simplicity versus complexity, and between brevity and familiarity of terminology versus articulacy, clarity and precision.

Subsequent chapters expound my own response to the Specification: 5Is and its accompanying suite of frameworks, terms and concepts. (For brevity, I'll use plain '5Is' inclusively). Design is a universally-applicable process. Not only is 5Is designed, but *within* 5Is I seek to incorporate design in the tasks practitioners must undertake to generate responses to crime problems. Whereas a significant part of my career has been about getting designers to 'think thief' (Ekblom, 1995, 1997), I now give equal weight to encouraging crime prevention practitioners to 'draw on design', not just by using the *products* of design but by applying design *thinking* and design *processes* to their own efforts. This is the only way to develop workable practical solutions to the complex requirements of prevention.

Chapter 7 gives a first view of 5Is, the process model for crime prevention, community safety and security. 5Is stands for *Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Involvement and Impact*. This correlates closely with United

Nations recommendations (United Nations, 2006: 298-9) that those planning interventions should promote a process that includes: a systematic analysis of crime problems, their causes, risk factors and consequences, in particular at the local level; a plan that draws on the most appropriate approach and adapts interventions to the specific local problem and context; an implementation plan to deliver appropriate interventions that are efficient, effective and sustainable; mobilising entities able to tackle causes; and monitoring and evaluation.

Beneath each of the individual Is comes a hierarchy of subsidiary headings for capturing and organising knowledge in progressive detail. As will be seen, these ‘task streams’ follow a sequence that is only approximate; messy, real-world preventive action may involve a lot of looping and crossing-over. To cope with this, although 5Is is presented in a particular order and with a particular structure, I emphasise its properties as a *language* for describing the complexities and subtleties of action in flexible, generative ways.

The chapter begins with historical background to the development of 5Is over some two decades involving experience from the UK, the wider European scene and North America. Then some major foundations are established. The central purpose of 5Is is described relative to three groups of users – practitioners, delivery managers and policymakers. Moving from function to structure and content, the essential features and descriptive conventions of 5Is are then presented and related back to the Specification in Chapter 6. Where appropriate, the features are contrasted with those of alternative frameworks.

Foundation work continues in the next two chapters. The process model that is 5Is must be supplemented by various ‘conceptual companions’:

- A set of clear and consistent *definitions* of the central concepts of practice such as crime, crime prevention, community safety and security. These must moreover be ‘definitions in depth’. There’s little point developing clear ‘top-level’ definitions if they rest on subsidiary concepts like ‘risk’ that are themselves ill-defined or, taken as a suite, inconsistent.
- A way of describing the *diversity of institutional contexts* in which prevention operates, capable of handling the ever-mutating variety of arrangements within a given country, and of supporting transfer of knowledge to very different contexts internationally.
- A brief orientation of 5Is towards *vision and values*.

These are addressed in Chapter 8, which endeavours to maintain both *continuity* and *distance* from the muddled, superficial and shifting sloganeering of everyday terminology and parochial institutional structures for crime prevention. Given the attention to the deliberate design of 5Is itself, it would be curious if these conceptual companions weren’t themselves subject to similar treatment. Definitions and terms are made to fit together in an integrated suite that meets the Specification in Chapter 6. Some may consider this effort to establish a ‘controlled vocabulary’

overly pedantic but it's instructive to note the care invested in defining, and redefining, terms within medical practice, such as 'primary care' – see the US Institute of Medicine's attempt (Mrazek and Haggerty, 1994) – and 'prevention' (Kutash et al., 2006).

Chapter 8 also presents a statement of the *scope* of 5Is, particularly regarding partnership prevention activity and Intelligence-Led Policing. Its core field of competence should be *civil* crime prevention (with 'prevention' used inclusively to cover community safety and security). It also covers enforcement-based and judicial prevention where these are part of a crime prevention strategy rather than ad-hoc targeting of individual offenders. The *interface* with enforcement and judicial prevention is, however, important in all cases. 5Is began life centring on *projects* with distinct and localised crime prevention/safety objectives, but I've endeavoured here to extend it to case-based services. Action described by 5Is can in turn be based around crime *problems, causes, and risk and protective factors* (risk factors for short).

Chapter 8 also argues that crime prevention *interventions* – what's done to block, weaken or divert *causes* of criminal events – are central to descriptions of preventive action. 5Is therefore needs a versatile and rigorous language for describing causes and interventions in a way that enables the former to be analysed, and the latter to be selected, replicated and innovatively modified, or created afresh from first principles.

An existing, and much-used, framework for causes and interventions within crime prevention is the Crime Triangle (Clarke and Eck, 2003), which centres on the immediate or proximal causes carried by *target or victim, offender and place*. 5Is could readily be used with the Crime Triangle, and some practitioners may choose to do so. However, it has significant limitations for organising practice knowledge. Chapter 9 describes a more advanced framework, functionally equivalent to the Crime Triangle but with greater scope, integration and detail – the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (CCO). (Practitioners more comfortable with the Crime Triangle could still use it with 5Is, despite the limitations.) The CCO framework supplies a map of 11 proximal causal pathways which come together to make criminal events happen, and 11 counterpart principles of intervention which seek to block, deflect or weaken those causes.

The process model of 5Is and the cause/intervention model of CCO have co-evolved over two decades. The attempt, here, to bring them into closer, more formalised symbiosis has necessitated modifications to CCO. This chapter provides the current definitive, updated version.

Chapters 11-15 define and illustrate the detailed headings and features of the individual Is in turn, drawing also on the companion terms and frameworks. Chapter 10, preceding them, addresses some common issues. It first covers structures, formats and headings for 5Is descriptions. Then it describes the kinds of 'content' information to record under those headings. Besides the main information on each

task or subtask of the preventive process, it suggests recurrent themes under each task such as ‘quality’ and ‘improvement’, and the extent of evidence that might be appropriate to support description, prescription and evaluation. After this, it sets out a common structure for each of the ‘I’ chapters. Lastly, it describes the sources of the 5Is illustrations used at various points in the following chapters. The ‘master-list’ of 5Is headings at their current stage of development is set out at the end of each relevant chapter.

Chapter 16 concludes the book. It revisits the issue of complexity and simplicity, examines the process of knowledge capture, contemplates wider uses of 5Is and how we might evaluate the impact of 5Is on performance, then finally considers how to make it happen. It ends with a challenge.

Chapter 2 Implementation failure: the dismal story

Introduction

In the 1970s a conjunction of North American and UK studies on the effectiveness of conventional policing, probation and imprisonment ushered in the era of pessimism known as ‘nothing works’ (Lipton et al., 1975; Clarke and Hough, 1984). Partly as a result, ‘civil’ approaches to crime prevention ranging from situational to developmental and community-based interventions emerged. Attempting to span the division of labour for tackling crime, these commonly adopted a multi-agency or partnership orientation. Demonstration projects testing the new approach had a mixed start (Hope and Murphy, 1983) but by the mid-1980s action-researchers had learned useful lessons and marked successes were occurring (e.g. Forrester et al., 1988, 1990). These began to attract the attention of policymakers and politicians faced with rising crime and falling funds for conventional enforcement approaches.

However, the mainstream programmes that followed (the Safer Cities Programme and the Crime Reduction Programme in the UK), revealed that replication of individual success stories was challenging (Tilley, 1993a; Ekblom, 2002a). Similar limitations of performance applied to locally-initiated work produced by local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (Hough, 2006); and programmes in Australia and New Zealand (Homel, 2006). Indeed Rosenbaum (1986), in an American assessment of community crime prevention evaluations, had earlier found it necessary to systematically investigate the failure to deliver useful results.

The chapter continues with an account of implementation failure in crime prevention – the fact, the manifestations and the consequences. It then reviews causes of this failure, beginning with everyday ones like lack of project management skills and pragmatic constraints, continuing with organisational and inter-organisational issues and finishing with limitations in practitioners’ professional resources.

The sad fact of implementation failure

Like the convict in Charles Dickens’ *Great Expectations*, crime prevention has long been hindered by the dismal leg-iron of implementation failure. From early action research on vandalism in the 1980s (Hope and Murphy, 1983) to projects at the millennium targeted on gun crime (Bullock and Tilley, 2003b), hate crime (Matassa and Newburn, 2003) and juvenile crime (Crow et al., 2004), the risk of such failure has always loomed large. This is amply evidenced across all types and levels of action:

- In individual Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) projects. Studies and overviews in POP continue to document the lack of pervasive adoption of the approach despite decades of effort (Bullock et al., 2006; Scott, 2006; and Goldstein, 2003).
- In partnership approaches to crime prevention (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994a,bc; Pearson et al. 1992; Hough, 2006).
- In programmes addressing risk factors for crime and developmental problems attending young people – as in the UK’s Sure Start programme (Williams, 2005) or Communities That Care (Crow et al., 2004).
- In major, ‘broad spectrum’ crime prevention programmes, like the UK’s Safer Cities Programmes (Sutton, 1996, Knox et al., 2000) and Crime Reduction Programme (Webb and Laycock, 2003; Homel, 2006; Hope, 2004; Maguire, 2004; Tilley, 2004; Knutsson and Clarke, 2006); Swedish and Finnish initiatives (Wikström and Torstensson, 1999; Savolainen, 2005); and those in Australia (Walters, 1996; Homel, 2006).
- In concerns with the quality of crime prevention activity and its evaluation (Marks et al., 2005).

The success stories which continue to inspire programmatic emulation or widespread local replication often occur under ‘hothouse’ conditions. They enjoyed a combination of practice-oriented researchers, and enthusiastic and often highly-able practitioners operating whilst insulated from everyday budgetary and organisational pressures. None of these conditions can be guaranteed in mainstream roll-out. This distinction is well-illustrated by Lipsey’s (1999) meta-analysis of the evaluations of accredited probation programmes in the UK involving a range of offender-oriented interventions (see also Tilley, 2006) for further commentary). He compared the performance of 196 ‘practical’ (routine, real world) programmes with 205 ‘demonstration’ (pilot, experimental) ones, finding the former only about half as effective as the latter.

We shouldn’t be surprised with these disappointing findings, if we acknowledge a distinction the medical world makes, between *efficacy* and *effectiveness* (Lipsey, 1999). The former is closer to a ‘theoretical’ performance, measured by results of tightly controlled clinical trials and expert practitioners; the latter concerns practice in real clinical settings with averagely-competent staff. Here, it faces the vagaries of practitioners’ diagnoses, the variability of treatment context and the vicissitudes of patients’ compliance with the treatment regime.

The manifestations of implementation failure

Shortcomings in performance occur at every stage of the preventive process (see Bullock et al., 2006, and Knutsson and Clarke, 2006 for POP and situational prevention; and Sutton, 1996 for the Safer Cities Programme):

- Collecting information and analysing crime problems;

- Devising interventions that relate to theory, evidence of effectiveness and the problem tackled, not to mention demonstrating innovativeness;
- Implementing these with sufficient quality and without drift of objectives;
- Effectively mobilising or partnering with appropriate agencies, groups and individuals.

Similar shortcomings are documented for offender-oriented or ‘social’ preventive actions (e.g. Crow et al., 2004) which address risk factors rather than problems.

A fundamental limitation in performance is *replication failure*. This is less about the individual processes just described, and more about emulating successful projects as a whole. Tilley (1993a) documented three attempts within the Safer Cities Programme, to replicate the ‘success story’ of the Kirkholt burglary project (Forrester et al., 1988, 1990). None remotely performed like the original. Likewise, offender-oriented programmes by the UK Youth Justice Board have engendered major concerns about *fidelity of replication* of the treatment, considered vital for effectiveness (Youth Justice Board, 2001); and strenuous efforts to assure this fidelity by guidance, training and inspection. Replication resurfaces in the next chapter.

Consequences of implementation failure

Implementation failure has many adverse consequences.

- At the *practice* level, intended beneficiaries including victims of crime, gain nothing, though hopefully aren’t harmed. Participating practitioners become demoralised and careers jeopardised through association with failure, especially in a blame culture (Matassa and Newburn, 2003).
- At the *delivery* level, the implementing organisations squander money and reputation; partnerships may be strained; again, a blame culture limits learning from failure. (Anecdotally, a colleague and I attempted some social engineering by inaugurating a ‘learning from mistakes’ column in the former *Crime Reduction Digest*, a practitioner magazine published by the UK Home Office. After a year in which only one entry was submitted, the column was abandoned.)
- At the *policy* level, not only do the individual initiatives fail to deliver the benefits, but the opportunity to try again, with improvements, may be lost as ministers, councillors and officials, seeking quick success, lose patience.
- At the level of *public understanding and debate*, dashed expectations mean politicians, media and public become sceptical of future endeavours and the climate for innovation degenerates. (Ironically, only the simplistic and often erroneous ideas for crime control beloved of politicians seem unkillable and repeatedly rise from the grave.)

- At the *research and evaluation* level, the evaluators at least still get their publishable results (how else would we know about implementation failure?). But soured relationships with practitioners and other disappointed stakeholders may threaten future collaboration (Matassa and Newburn, 2003). Worse, the central theory of the intervention rarely gets tested because the horse usually falls before the finish. This places limits on both practical and academic progress because feedback on theory only remains possible from high-quality, expert-led interventions. Nor can such evaluations guarantee successful augmentation of knowledge, themselves being risky undertakings (Ekblom, 1990; Ekblom and Pease, 1995).

How long is a piece of string? Some causes of implementation failure

When we review the influences arrayed against success, it's surprising that anything recognisably crime preventive gets properly implemented at all. Some of the constraints on performance are mundane; others fundamental.

'Mundane' causes

Some important but potentially tractable factors include:

- Pragmatic constraints like timing, funding, securing agreement, obtaining access to data, lack of 'co-terminous' territories between agencies.
- Lack of generic enabling resources like project planning and management skills (Brown, 2006), and leadership (Homel, 2006). With programmes, lack of qualified headquarters staff managing the delivery (Homel, 2006) and supporting practitioners on the ground.

Organisational and inter-organisational causes

More fundamental causes together form a resilient web blocking the path to good performance. Many relate to *organisational* and *inter-organisational* issues.

- Mainly in the police, cultural and organisational change to accommodate preventive approaches is slow, with the familiar over-concentration on catching criminals rather than tackling wider causes of crime (Goldstein, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006). Pease (2006) observes more specifically that police culture, training and promotion all centre on treating cases individually rather than as manifestations of aggregate problems.
- Pease (2006) notes the frequent mismatch between the goals of those *promoting* prevention projects (often centrally) and those *implementing* them (usually locally), denying the latter incentives to satisfy the formers' requirements on quality. He illustrates this through local authority

community safety officers defining ‘good performance’ by ‘funds channelled to their district’ rather than ‘crimes reduced’. Similarly, Hough (2006) focuses on a performance management system (in the UK Crime Reduction Programme) with goals set nationally. The local action suffered oversimplification and imposition of populist solutions.

- The original flaw in policing and crime prevention that POP was developed to correct still predominates: compartmentalised, method-oriented thinking, alongside a myopic emphasis on problems internal to the organisation rather than in the real world (Goldstein, 1979; Scott, 2001; Read and Tilley, 2000; Goldstein, 2003). Analytic thinking, and risk-taking inherent in innovation, don’t follow naturally from hierarchical working styles and go unrewarded (Bullock et al., 2006). Historically, the police have sought to maintain order, not challenge it.
- Organisational structures and processes, including top-down implementation of detailed protocols and imposition of detailed objectives and targets, impede attention to problem-solving and routine use of evidence and learning (Nutley et al., 2007). Changing the thinking of individual practitioners through education and training may thus succeed only ephemerally if they are pressured into ‘recidivism’ the moment they return to routine work. *Organisational development* is needed to change the whole organisation in step, including how it learns (Argyris and Schon, 1996). Excessive focus on *project*-based activity (Liddle and Bottoms, 1991; Wikström, 2007) may achieve limited short-term success. Like shooting stars, however, such initiatives sparkle briefly, then vanish without lasting impact on practice when compared to process-based alternatives that embed systems of practice and procedure, and supply necessary infrastructure.
- Whilst organisations serve as the working environment for practitioners, they in turn inhabit the wider environment of public expectation and media criticism, which is not conducive to problem-orientation and innovation. Constraining too are the rules governing public accountability, the way money can be spent, and stifling central micro-management (Homel et al., 2004; Bullock et al., 2006; Nutley et al., 2007). Performance indicators in principle are valuable ‘levers’ for encouraging practitioners to act on research such as repeat victimisation (Tilley and Laycock, 2000), but their narrow and superficial use (‘my Chief requires me to find 5 hot-spots per month’) can be part of the problem and cause unexpected and undesired outcomes (Chapman, 2004; Pawson, 2006).
- Crime problems, causes and solutions often span major societal divisions of labour (Ekblom, 1986, 2004b). Partner organisations must then find ways to pool time, money and knowledge, and link their diverse approaches and priorities to deliver prevention. Sometimes there may be no consensus about the extent, existence or definition of particular crime problems, let alone how

to tackle them. The culture of each institution comprises a distinct blend of explicit and tacit knowledge (Tilley, 2006), hidden assumptions or beliefs, motives and values that are hard to clarify and to rationally connect to partners. Welfare versus enforcement perspectives are particularly difficult to integrate (Gilling, 1994, 2005; Matassa and Newburn, 2003). And Knutsson and Clarke (2006) and Laycock (2006) observe that partnership can be a trap, if established before the nature of a crime problem, and the requisite combination of shared resources for intervention, become fully apparent.

- The political dimension can adversely affect implementation locally (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994a,b,c) or nationally (Laycock and Webb, 2003) via the infrastructure supplied or denied, and by mid-project changes in priorities, organisational remits and funding. While this is the politicians' prerogative in a democracy one would wish for fewer sudden jerks of the steering wheel, and more gentle, consistent pressure and cumulative guidance over longer periods. Politics can also constrain views on causation and responsibility for crime, and the choice of solutions, by locking practitioners and organisations into perspectives dictated by ideology and culture more than evidence (Gilling, 2005; Hughes, 2005; Matassa and Newburn, 2003; Sutton, 1996; Hough, 2006; Wikström, 2007; Crawford, 1998). A major Australian review of crime prevention (AGD, 2004) noted a major disconnect between practice and policy perspectives.

Limitations in professional resources

There are constraints on performance from the 'professional resources' of practitioners themselves: their *knowledge, understanding and practical competencies*. In listing the following limitations, which approach the heart of this book, I don't wish to convey a sweeping picture of the 'inherently dumb or anti-intellectual practitioner' (although we will all have met some). Crime preventers (like offenders) adapt to the organisational and cultural situation they must work within, and the resources given, or denied, for the job. Those relating to professional capacity can explain much of the under-performance of practitioners.

- Homel (2006), reviewing major preventive programmes in UK, Australia and New Zealand, identifies a major cause of implementation failure in the inadequate local supply of people with skills to develop and implement well thought-through projects. There are limitations to the depth and quality of practitioners' understanding of the causes of the crime problems they analyse (Wikström, 2007; Sutton, 1996). This partly stems from predominant 'blame-the-offender' or 'blame society' cultural themes. But there is also a lack of time for that analysis, reflection and learning, and lack of provision for teaching it.

- Career traditions of generalism and ‘moving on’ among police and local government officers adversely affect performance (Pease, 2006). Individuals acquire only limited practical expertise, invest limited time in training for any one job and rarely have time to learn how to apply it, and teach or coach new staff.
- That training which is available is often superficial. Homel (2006) attributes practitioner limitations to complementary deficiencies in central provision of training and support. Modular, toolkit formats (as with the UK Crime Reduction website) help to keep up with changing knowledge. Hough (2006) is critical of toolkits which over-simplify practice issues and predispose practitioners to the kinds of intervention which such toolkits can readily describe. Moreover they are a poor substitute for foundation courses, and inadequate if assembled without a needs assessment, an aim and a set of intended learning outcomes (Ekblom, 2008b; Coester et al., 2008; Husein, 2008).
- Education, training, briefing and mass-media aren’t the only deficient knowledge transfer mechanisms. Laycock (2000, 2001), and Tilley and Laycock (2000) emphasise the lack of contact and cultural common ground between researchers and practitioners which prevents each from understanding, and communicating with, the other’s world. Sherman (1998) makes similar observations.

Summary

It seems no kind of crime prevention programme or project, and no institutional setting, is immune from implementation failure. There are serious consequences for practice, delivery, policy, and public understanding and debate. Research and academic evaluation are similarly affected: pervasive implementation failure means crime prevention theory is rarely tested.

The causes of implementation failure are so diverse it almost appears like the gods must detest ‘civil’ crime prevention. Presumably they prefer a punitive approach. But gods apart, this book focuses on those causes deriving from shortcomings in the transfer and application of *knowledge*, and the context in which it is or is not imparted, valued and used. The next chapter addresses this issue.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 3 Implicated Ignorance and Culpable Confusion: the contribution to implementation failure of deficient knowledge and articulatory

The previous chapter began by revealing implementation failure as a major problem within crime prevention, and ended by implicating knowledge and its management. These now take centre-stage. I identify a range of limitations on knowledge which together constrain the performance of crime prevention. Some limitations relate to practical matters of knowledge management, others are more conceptual. Some are superficial, like coverage of the field, others deep, like theoretical fragmentation; still others are fundamental, like the understanding of causal mechanisms and the fitness of process models of prevention.

On the positive side, however, we now know the enemy. Improving how we manage and conceptualise our knowledge has the potential for greatly improving performance, provided the other constraints, documented in Chapter 2, are simultaneously addressed. (What ‘good performance’ means is addressed in Chapter 15.) It can also boost the flow of information between theory, research and practice.

Limitations in criminological knowledge

The coverage and quality of crime prevention knowledge available to practitioners will influence their performance. The limitations to that knowledge now to be described are thoroughly intertwined in both their causes and effects. Therefore, addressing any one in isolation is unlikely to help.

Deficiency of coverage

The most obvious shortcoming with crime prevention knowledge is that there’s simply not enough available that is sufficiently reliable and valid. Crime prevention knowledge is far wider than merely about causes, risk factors and interventions. To review its coverage we can map its major domains (see Ekblom, 2002a; Nutley et al., 2007).

Box 3.1 Fundamental domains of crime prevention knowledge

- **Know crime** – definitions of crime, disorder, anti-social behaviour, terrorism etc; definitions of specific crime types, in legal or practical discourses
- **Know-about crime problems** – nature, patterns, trends, causes, consequences, offenders

- **Know-what works** to reduce crime – interventions – **what doesn't work** and **what does harm**
- **Know-who to involve** in doing prevention, e.g. partnership
- **Know-when to act** in relation to actions of other projects and programmes
- **Know-where to distribute resources** including targeting
- **Know-why** – symbolism, values, politics, ethics
- **Know-how to put into practice** – process knowledge, including implementation

The first category is well-stocked on the legal definition side at least, and won't be discussed further. But our knowledge in the remainder of these domains is limited, as documented by the following impressionistic review, based mainly on UK experience but broadly applicable to the Western world.

Know-about crime problems

The major domain of knowing-about crime problems focuses more on the basics of *nature, incidence and victims*. It rarely extends to include useful preventive intelligence such as *perpetrator techniques*; nor wider concerns with the *consequences* of crime problems. Harm is important for targeting and prioritisation of preventive action (where it fits the harm-reduction focus of security and community safety) and joining-up of initiatives with other policy areas like education and sustainability.

Knowledge of *causes* is rich but has major limitations concerning integration, interaction and emergence, discussed later. The approach via *risk and protective factors* is well-developed on the offender-oriented side (Youth Justice Board, 2005) where these early correlates of later offending cover individual, family, peer-group, school and community-levels. It remains under-developed on the situational side, though there is a growing body of 'hot-whatever' indicators including the original hotspots (e.g. Sherman et al., 1989), and hot products (Clarke, 1999).

Know-what works and know-what harms

It's some while since Ekblom and Pease (1995) and Sherman et al., (1997) among others, criticised the methodological rigour of impact evaluations; and Sherman et al., (1997) and their more modest UK counterpart (Goldblatt and Lewis, 1998) identified large gaps in the evidence base for policy and practice. *Know-what works* has made major advances, but not a *step* improvement. This is despite, for example, the ambitious UK Crime Reduction Programme, one of whose goals was to increase the evidence base. (In fact, as Laycock and Webb (2003) document, governmental shifts once that programme was underway meant emphasis slid from evidence gathering to simply getting crime down.) Homel (2006) can still refer to a

‘knowledge void’ (2006: 129) with reference to Australia (Cameron and Laycock, 2003) and New Zealand. Wikström (2007: 60) laments this state of affairs as ‘doing without knowing’ and like others (Sherman et al., 1997; Farrington, 2000) seeks remedy through investment in extensive research and evaluation. The Youth Justice Board (2005) continues to decry lack of evaluations meeting requisite standards of design or scale.

At the highest level, namely building the evidence base for national policy, Systematic Reviews of the cost-effectiveness of broad types of preventive intervention have been conducted in several areas under the Campbell Collaboration (Farrington and Petrosino, 2001). An example is on CCTV (Welsh and Farrington, 2008). But Systematic Reviews are expensive and laborious and depend on the supply of raw material from adequate individual project- and programme-level evaluations.

In the mid-range of practice knowledge, individual academic evaluations continue to accumulate. On the situational/problem-oriented side see (Clarke, 1997), the evidence assembled thematically in the COPS series¹ and Weisburd et al., (2008). On the offender-oriented side, agencies such as the Youth Justice Board produce compendiums of professional evaluations (Powell, 2004).

Evaluations conducted by practitioners, however, remain largely disappointing. On several occasions I sought examples for the good practice conferences of the EU Crime Prevention Network (2002-4). Pursuing descriptions of local UK projects on, say, prevention of burglary that were a) successful, b) well-described, c) well-evaluated, d) newsworthy and e) transferrable typically produced barely a dozen national candidates, which were quickly whittled down to a handful, still needing a boost of retrospective evaluation and re-description. More systematic experience with Problem-Oriented Policing projects (Bullock et al., 2006) confirms earlier assessments of the weakness of practitioner-led impact evaluations. This is a serious shortcoming because, for reasons of sheer volume, we can’t solely rely on academic studies to gather sufficient reliable knowledge to cover the field.

Know-what works isn’t the whole story on the effectiveness dimension. As discussed below, practitioners must know the *contexts* within which a given intervention works or doesn’t; and *how* it works (Tilley, 2006; Ekblom, 2002a). The former extends the *number* of evaluations needed to fill this void (and for combinatorial reasons numbers increase geometrically while research effort increases additively, placing a Malthusian limit on coverage). The ‘how’ question demands a different kind of evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Eck, 2005), centring on *causal mechanisms* rather than simple comparison of action and control groups (though adequate evaluation designs remain necessary).

Practitioners must also know what *doesn’t* work, convincingly enough to permanently discourage the flogging of dead horses; and accessibly enough to stop people trying to reinvent, not the wheel, but the flat tyre. Finally, practitioners must

know what preventive action positively does *harm*, like 'Scared straight' (Petrosino et al., 2004). Unfortunately, such knowledge is extremely patchy.

Know-who, -when and -where

Professional crime preventers (principally in police and local government) seldom implement crime prevention interventions themselves, but get other individuals or institutions to do so: for example, householders locking windows or teachers delivering anti-drugs lessons. This challenging sphere of *know-who* knowledge includes *partnership* working, about which much is known (Gilling, 2005; Ekblom, 2004b) and available in practical guidance form (Council of Europe, 2003; Home Office, 2007). But it also covers wider forms of mobilisation, about which knowledge remains piecemeal (see Pawson, 2006).

Know-when is operational knowledge about what other actions are underway or impending in an area: things practitioners must know when planning their own initiatives. The profusion of local and national activity in government, NGO and voluntary sectors is still a challenge to keep abreast of, although institutions like Local Strategic Partnerships in England & Wales² attempt to address co-ordination issues, complete with 'delivery toolkit'.

Know-where is fairly well-served by research on comparative risk rates for localities, types of potential victim and so forth, as fed by crime audits and crime analysts.

Know-why

Know-why covers issues like criminal justice, fairness and symbolism of right and wrong (Ekblom, 2002a; Freiberg, 2001; Adam Sutton et al., 2008). Neglect of these can get even the most rational and evidence-based crime preventive action into difficulty. For example, any youth-centre which offers offenders attractive activities like fishing trips must heed what the 'honest' people in the local community feel about this, and consider equitable distribution of these opportunities; or at least actively explain and justify. My impression (e.g. from Mike Sutton, 1996) is that this kind of knowledge remains largely tacit.

Know-how to put into practice

Know-how – process knowledge – is critical because it threads all the other 'knows' together to generate action. The most clearly-articulated body of know-how in crime prevention is that associated with Problem-Oriented Policing (POP). A website³ contains a wealth of guidance materials, frameworks and case studies, built around the process model known as SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment). POP is largely associated with Situational Crime Prevention although

this is effectively a historical accident. Unfortunately, although good examples exist of POP in practice, its most enthusiastic protagonists concede (eg Goldstein, 2003; Knutsson and Clarke, 2006; Bullock et al., 2006) that getting practitioners to follow the process rigorously remains difficult.

On the offender-oriented side, one process model is incorporated within the Communities That Care approach (Hawkins and Catalano, 1992; Crow et al., 2004), introduced in several countries. CTC is really a ‘process within a process’. Level 1 is the capacity-building process of recruiting and organising local professionals and residents to tackle crime and other social/developmental problems of young people. Level 2 involves the CTC groups thus created, in following a process to systematically identify the local pattern of risk and protective factors among children and young people through a ‘risk and resources’ audit; to draw on a menu of evidence-based interventions for planning action; and to adapt and implement them locally. Unfortunately, the only rigorous evaluation so far (Crow et al., 2004), of CTC pilot projects in England, revealed... substantial implementation failure.

The Youth Justice Board has no single process model underlying the domain it supports (for example via local Youth Offending Teams) but its website⁴ reveals much know-how guidance material aimed at facilitating performance in diverse tasks, like information-sharing, or handling dangerous offenders. Unusually, this guidance is combined with a high-powered inspection and support machine.

Tacit knowledge

Tilley (2006) importantly distinguishes between knowing *what works* and knowing *what is to be done* about a crime problem. The latter resembles know-how as used here. Tilley considers a major constraint on its collection, scrutiny, dissemination and application to reside in its often *tacit* nature. This term (Polanyi, 1958) covers knowledge which can be used by individuals but which cannot easily be communicated between them except through protracted hands-on collaborations.

One drawback of reliance on tacit knowledge is simple waste of experience (especially when expert practitioners move on), leading to ‘corporate amnesia’ (Kransdorff, 1998). Another is sheer inefficiency of communication, when this involves practitioners simply being advised to contact the originator for a briefing. The originator, of course, may be busy, or just unable to communicate effectively. There can be no scrutiny or quality assurance. Nor can tacit knowledge be individually or collectively *reflected upon* by practitioners themselves.

Contrasting with the tacit is the hyper-explicit. Raynor (2004), reviewing probation interventions accredited under the UK Crime Reduction Programme, noted that officers, obliged to follow detailed requirements designed to ensure fidelity of treatment, resisted the loss of professional discretion. Raynor reports that this state of affairs moved the Chief Inspector of Probation to refer to ‘programme fetishism’ (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 2002). Like the Probation Service the

Youth Justice Board similarly sought to address weak implementation by boosting compliance with the detail of interventions (Tilley, 2006). However, a more flexible approach has been adopted since.

Although there are some individual points of encouragement from the development of know-how knowledge, the overall picture isn't good. The above examples together suggest several unwelcome possibilities common to crime prevention. The *operational know-how models* themselves may be deficient. Our knowledge about how to transfer these models to *build know-how capacity* among practitioners may be deficient. Or *external constraints* may limit operational or capacity-building activity so the know-how models can't realise their potential. Probably all apply.

To summarise, knowledge of legal offence definitions is well-developed, but there are major limitations to knowledge about the wider harmful consequences of crime and perpetrator techniques; insufficient knowledge of what works overall, or in particular contexts, and what does harm; and inadequate knowledge of 'deliverability'. Know-who, -where and -when are moderately well-covered but organised knowledge of the first centres mainly on partnership. Know-why knowledge remains tacit. Process knowledge – know-how – is equally patchy and tacit save in particular enclaves (like situational prevention or Problem-Oriented Policing) or on particular tasks and techniques.

Fragmentation

Crime prevention knowledge is fragmented at several levels. The divide between situational and offender-oriented interventions is the most fundamental (Ekblom, 1994, 2002a, 2004a; Gilling, 1994). It is longstanding and wide-ranging, with different research methods, terminologies, theories, timescales, risk models and preferences for intervention. And yet not one single criminal event (with the possible exception of self-strangulation) can take place without causal contribution from both offender and crime situation.

Fragmentation also occurs between the developmental and what might be called the 'proximal causation' perspectives. Criminal careers research is largely separate from both of these. The only academics seriously attempting the mission of theoretical integration in any depth are, I believe, myself (with the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity framework, introduced later); Wikström, with a focus on developmental prevention as it connects with proximal causation of criminal events (for example, Wikström, 2005; Wikström and Sampson, 2006); and Richard Tremblay developmentally and genetically (e.g. Tremblay, 2010).

At a micro-level, crime/crime prevention theories are usually considered only one at a time in planning action. This means *interactions* are often missed. We don't know how, say, the availability of suitable role models for an adolescent offender interacts with aspects of the offender's personality. This limits understanding of the

dynamics of crime causation and mechanisms of prevention. The divide between sociological and psychological perspectives on the causes and prevention of crime exacerbates the ability of both researchers and practitioners to think across levels.

Fragmentation occurs even within fields (Ekblom, 1994, 2002a). Academics at the heart of Situational Crime Prevention, for example, have made little effort to integrate the theories underlying it: Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), Rational Choice Theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) and various forms of Environmental Criminology (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2008). Moreover, the individual principles (like surveillance and territoriality) have surface simplicity, but in fact confusingly overlap. Theoretical fragmentation is even greater on the offender-oriented side of prevention because the range of theories and levels is wider, and the sociological and psychological concepts richer and/or harder to define and operationalise. The one unifying framework throughout offender-oriented prevention is currently the Risk and Protective Factors approach (Youth Justice Board, 2005). Being based on early life correlates of later offending behaviour this is of course empirical, not theoretical; but doubts exist (IYJS, 2009).

Finally, fragmentation also occurs with guidance material for practitioners. The UK Crime Reduction Website opted for a complete pot-pourri of guidance, juxtaposing a medley of different frameworks and terminologies in its Learning Zone.⁵ In part this reflects the above divide between situations and offenders, and the suppliers of guidance material who take one or other orientation. But beyond this, the website commissioners chose to preside over a *laissez-faire* market rather than attempt to impose their own organisation on the field. In my view this made for a Confusion Zone.

Terminological and conceptual inadequacy

The *terminology* currently used to describe causes of crime and preventive interventions is often vague and inconsistent (Ekblom, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002a). As will be seen, terminological confusion shades into underlying conceptual confusion. At the topmost level – the labels describing particular approaches or ‘schools’ – the terms crime prevention, crime reduction, crime control and community safety (Box 3.2) grossly overlap – no way to build a discipline.

Box 3.2 Common labels for approaches to crime prevention

Community crime prevention	Physical crime prevention
Community safety	Risk management
Crime control/reduction	Security
Crime prevention through environmental design	Situational crime prevention
Criminality prevention	Social crime prevention
Defensible space	Tackling the roots of crime

Design against crime	Victim-oriented prevention
Developmental prevention	Reassurance
Opportunity reduction	

Some terms, like ‘roots’ of crime, make heroic assumptions about causality (usually involving cavalier dismissal of situational factors). Others imply spurious contrasts, like ‘situational versus social’ (most situational interventions involve social processes such as deterrence). This helps perpetuate the fragmentation just described.

Attempts to develop typologies of prevention have had mixed success. ‘Natural history’ classifications based on familiar, face-value categories (particularly ‘sweeping’ ones such as ‘physical security’, ‘social’ or ‘community prevention’) have immediate appeal to administrators. But they are too vague and inconsistent to help when it comes to detailed capture and storage of what-works knowledge, and selection and planning of action by the user. Superficial, institution-based categorisation engenders nonsensical contrasts like ‘crime prevention *versus* deterrence’. In a contrary tendency, among practitioners and sometimes others who should know better, loose talk of ‘deterrence’ is used to embrace even target-hardening where presumably *increased effort* for the offender is the primary intervention mechanism (the correct term is ‘discouragement’ – Felson, 1995).

Much confusion stems from labels covering different *facets* of action: *what is done* (such as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design), *who does it* (e.g. police), on *which targets* (e.g. reducing property crime), against *which offenders* (e.g. juvenile crime prevention), in *what setting* (e.g. community crime prevention). These or similar headings often appear chaotically juxtaposed in lists of activities. This is about as logical as finding a basket in a hotel room, which the management’s welcoming blurb describes as ‘containing an assortment of chocolate, sweets, nourishment and snacks’. Arguably, *what is done* – the methods and mechanisms of preventive interventions – should be the central facet, although each of the other facets should be displayed in appropriate circumstances.

One minimalist framework with wide appeal is the ‘primary, secondary, tertiary’ distinction borrowed from public health by Brantingham and Faust (1976). This refers respectively to universal provision, targeting those at elevated risk of crime, and targeting those who have already committed crime. Fundamentally a characterisation of *targeting* strategies, this is even today used as a substitute for referring to the kinds of preventive intervention normally *associated* with those strategies. As substitutes go it’s rather poor but it has been used in a make-do fashion, because demand for terminology exceeded the supply of fit-for-purpose alternatives. (One such alternative is adopted in Chapter 8.)

The ‘primary, secondary, tertiary’ division was modified by van Dijk and de Waard (1991), who cross-classified it by ‘offender, target and victim-oriented action’. This was a significant advance, because at least it emphasises fundamentally different kinds of intervention. But the nine cells thus created are still pretty crude ways of organising what we know about prevention without further expansion into detail. Each of the cells defines a huge area of practice and there is little link to theory or cause.

Academics aren’t immune to terminological inadequacy. For example, Ekblom and Sidebottom (2007) identified four different uses of the term ‘vulnerability’ in a single study of product security (albeit the authors acknowledged the problem). Beyond individual domains there seems little desire among crime prevention practitioners and their supporting cast of academics and educators to develop a consistent lexicon, which is surely a minimum condition for constituting a science and/or a professional discipline. The necessity for this was demonstrated by Antoine Lavoisier, who (before losing his head in the French Revolution) single-handedly turned chemistry into a systematic science by, among other things, establishing a consistent, theory-based framework for labelling chemicals – thus oil of vitriol became sulphuric acid, sal volatile ammonium carbonate, and philosopher’s wool zinc oxide.

Structure of action

Another manifestation of terminological inadequacy is how the *structure* of preventive action is described. Most preventive action involves multiple levels. As an extreme example, Phase I of the UK Safer Cities Programme 1988-93 operated at:

- The whole *programme* level (32 cities);
- The ‘*project*’ level (a team of three practitioners within one city conducting a range of schemes plus management and supporting activity like fund-raising);
- The ‘*scheme*’ level (individual preventive actions linked by a common specific set of objectives, like ‘reduce domestic burglary in Kemp Town’);
- The *method* level, such as ‘target-hardening homes’ (one scheme could implement several different methods in a package, such as target hardening plus a ‘lock it or lose it’ publicity campaign).

Actions would be pursued in parallel at each level. For example, a scheme would not merely be the sum of the individual preventive methods applied, but there would be distinctive scheme-level action such as obtaining funding and generating publicity which supported all methods together. Likewise, part of project-level action may address building capacity in others, as described for Communities That Care.

Beyond the confines of individual programmes, these distinctions are rarely used consistently. The term ‘programme’ itself is used promiscuously to describe any level of action apart from the immediate and local. One person’s ‘scheme’ is

another's 'project'. (I use 'project' for individual preventive actions linked by a common and specific set of objectives, equivalent to 'scheme' in Safer Cities.) Terms like 'method' and 'intervention' are applied indiscriminately. The latter moreover often confuses intervening in the *causes of crime*, with intervening by *getting other people to do so*. For example, one commonly hears a preventive project's intervention method described as a 'publicity campaign', when in fact the intervention proper only occurs when the recipients of the campaign act on it by, say, monitoring their children's Internet activities. On the offender-oriented side particularly one encounters methods of 'working with young people', a vagueness which confuses *outreach* activities with those *treatment* activities occurring once the young people are recruited into, say, a youth centre.

Levels of causation

The *causes* of crime are many, and act at different *ecological levels* such as individual, family, community or society (WHO, 2004, Ekblom, 2007a). Risk and Protective Factors (RPF), developmental *correlates* of later offending, likewise have been identified at similar levels (Youth Justice Board, 2005). Applying an RPF-based approach guarantees that practitioners and those documenting their work record the level at which a given action operates. But the same can't be said for other approaches. To the extent that the originating practitioners are unclear about the level/s at which their own preventive action operates, the quality of intervention is at risk. To the extent that readers of any project description are left to make their own assumptions, then replication is jeopardised.

Knowledge, too, must be organised around these levels, but rarely is. Consider, for example, the humble but effective alley-gate (Bowers et al., 2004). These are intended to prevent burglary by blocking off access to the vulnerable rear of terraced (row) houses.

- At the level of the individual row of houses, the alley-gate must be appropriately placed to create a locked enclosure. This limits access to the rear doors and windows of the whole row.
- Zooming outwards, it may also constrain access to an entire housing block, if there are many interconnected 'rat-run' alleyways.
- Implementation of alley-gates may require establishing agreements among groups of residents, and with the local government and emergency services.
- Zooming in the opposite direction, into further detail, the design of the gate must create a sufficient obstacle to burglars climbing over and under; the lock must be safe and usable for small or elderly fingers and suited to an emergency master-key; and the metal gate must be galvanised... to resist the corrosive sprinklings of dogs.

The last point illustrates another issue with knowledge: importation of expertise. To the crime prevention practitioner installing the gates, galvanisation may be a minor implementation issue, albeit significantly extending the life of the gates and reducing maintenance costs. However, to the industrial chemist galvanisation may be their major professional specialism, with its own body of theory and practice. Likewise, the lawyer drawing up agreements with the householders will have her own field of expertise; and there will be equivalent experts in the field of community activism. Crime prevention practitioners haven't always exploited such external professional expertise, whether out of short-sighted economy, or from misplaced professional autonomy.

Understanding the confusion

A deeper understanding of the confusion in conceptual, cultural and institutional terms can help identify sources of resistance to change, and guide remedies.

Society's attempts to reduce crime and promote community safety are many and varied: from imprisonment of robbers to 'motor' schemes for joyriders, from computer firewalls to moralising puppet shows, from family support to fines, from police patrolling to publicity campaigns urging self-protection. (Wales has Fish Watch.) Policymakers, practitioners and academics within each domain of response to crime have their own characteristic language and concepts. Some focus on criminal events in the community, others on the convicted offender and still others on quality of life. We've already encountered the cultural divide between those pursuing the situational approach and those favouring offender-oriented action (Gilling, 1994). The formal Criminal Justice System rests on concepts of free will and criminal responsibility which sit uneasily alongside scientific causality. Retribution focuses on events past, while crime prevention looks to the future.

There are understandable reasons why these conceptual domains have become established, including pursuit of specialist expertise, development of occupational cultures, and constitutional separation of the judiciary and executive branches of government. But when we seek to combine knowledge within the entire crime prevention field to capture, understand and replicate good practice from as wide a range of activities as possible, the resultant 'Tower of Babel' of terminology and concepts is exacerbated, and perpetuated, by the connection with an equally confusing edifice of institutional settings. We often see crime prevention *contrasted* with detection, repression, punishment or deterrence (as noted, they overlap); or with criminality prevention (the latter is a logical *subset* of crime prevention if it's defined, as below, as reducing the risk of criminal events). The terms 'crime prevention, crime reduction and community safety' are used much less to denote clearly different ideas than to connote impressionistic nuances and flavours, indicate allegiance to particular schools or traditions, suggest a clean sweep in administration or politics, or even to follow fashion.

Conventional definitions and categories of crime prevention are tied to the institutions that usually deliver them (police, courts, prisons etc). This locks them into the present world-view that society holds of those institutions, and within individual countries' parochial ways of working. They therefore inhibit thinking about new ways of assigning responsibility and dividing or combining labour to tackle crime, and limit sharing these ideas internationally where institutional arrangements differ. Confusion over the values underlying prevention (such as welfare or control, accessibility or defensibility) and alignment to the kinds of vision of society that the values and the practicalities imply, worsens the tangle.

Institutional confusion is perhaps inevitable given the extent to which the 'wicked issue' (Stewart and Clarke, 1997) of crime has causes, and requires solutions, cutting across all sectors and levels of society (Ekblom, 1986, 2004b). Confusion is inevitable, too, given the changes seen over the last 30 years in traditional divisions of labour ('crime prevention is the responsibility of the police') through the partnership approach to sharing responsibility across institutions, and wider experiments with governance (Gilling and Schuller, 2007). These changes are ongoing and, given that they involve continual renegotiation and experiment regularly stirred by changes of local and national administration, ceaseless.

Consequences of limitations in knowledge

Experienced practitioners and policymakers 'know what they mean' in this situation of terminological and conceptual confusion, and make intelligent guesses about what their professional partners mean. Most cope with the shifting sands of institutional responsibility, and the shifting currents of values and cultures, as they move between domains or try to make partnerships succeed. They likewise cope with gaps in the coverage afforded by theory and evaluation. But nevertheless there are adverse effects on the mainstream of practice.

- If Wikström (2007) can talk about 'doing without knowing', an excess of the tacit is 'knowing without communicating or reflecting'.
- At the *tactical choice* level, fragmentation hampers practitioners' own understanding and selection of interventions. Solutions to crime problems are compartmentalised and restricted in scope when experience indicates the benefits of synergy, or at least the benefit of the *unfettered* pursuit of the problem-oriented approach. This holds that choice of intervention should be determined primarily by fitness to tackle the problem in question, not by the arbitrary factor of which institution happens to take responsibility for addressing it.
- Beyond the problem-oriented approach, interventions may centre holistically on communities or individual offenders. Here the unclear, overlapping and ambiguous terminology described above can turn potentially powerful actions into a confused muddle that is susceptible to *drift* in implementation and is hard to replicate.

- At the detailed level of *planning, undertaking and monitoring* preventive action, there's a *failure to focus on how, precisely, crime prevention interventions are intended to work* (the causal mechanisms through which interventions have their impact). This fosters weak implementation, weak quality assurance and uncertain integrity of programmes, followed by limited scope for evaluation. (A poorly-specified scheme is difficult to evaluate – and may not be worth evaluating anyway.) The importance, for practice, of mechanisms is revisited in Chapter 5.

Together, these factors spawn two undesirable extremes of practice. On the one hand is the *practitioner as technician* with limited diagnostic skills and limited repertoire of responses, perhaps dictated by a detailed and prescriptive 'high-fidelity' delivery system. On the other is the *practitioner as maestro*, an especially able and/or charismatic individual given an anarchic total freedom of manoeuvre. These may be personally very successful but bring risks of inconsistent quality, mission drift, reinforcement of the tacit nature of knowledge, and discontinuity when they move on.

Adverse effects of terminological inadequacy and fragmentation are also felt on *collective* aspects of practice:

- *Collective innovation* of the kind documented and advocated by Leadbeater (2008) is inhibited if practitioners can't efficiently share and articulate ideas in a common discourse.
- *Partnership-based* working groups, whose diverse members can't communicate efficiently, are hindered from progressing beyond the '*talking-shop*' level and superficial consensus about what needs to be done. Pease (2006) suggests that people can only communicate insofar as they share personal constructs (cognitive structures for understanding the world as defined by Kelly (1950)).
- In the USA the multiplicity and diversity of police forces (see e.g. Ratcliffe, 2008) provides especial scope for terminological inadequacy to inhibit sharing of knowledge within the profession.

Adverse effects also occur at strategic level:

- *Strategic thinking* across local and national crime prevention is inhibited – it remains *compartmentalised* and '*method-oriented*' rather than '*problem-oriented*', without any one strategic decision-making body in central or local government having complete awareness of the range of policy levers at its disposal. In particular the more recent approaches like situational prevention have tended to remain both strategically and operationally isolated from conventional law enforcement and penal systems.

Finally, adverse effects afflict knowledge itself:

- Lack of good-quality local interventions and evaluations reaching a 'minimally reliable' standard starves the supply of 'what works' knowledge. As will be seen, we need knowledge of how well particular kinds of intervention work in many

different contexts, which can't be fully supplied by scarce and expensive researchers. When preventive actions themselves fail, we can't learn constructive lessons if it proves impossible to describe exactly what had been intended to be done, and how it had been intended to work (Eck, 2005).

- Poor specification of causal mechanisms underlying interventions leads to a *failure of practice to test and refine theory* (Farrington, 2000), and *of theory to inform practice* (Laycock, 2001). Attempts to understand *interaction and emergence* are inhibited by the diversity of terms and models and the lack of theoretical integration.
- Together, these failings deny *education and training a coherent basis* to develop a curriculum and core competencies.
- When inputs, outputs, outcomes and so forth are used in different ways in different fields, it's hard to *define and compare cost effectiveness* of different kinds of preventive interventions.
- *Cross-national thinking, communication and collaboration are hindered*. This is a particular problem with international knowledge bases, where translation and inexperienced interpretation constrain yet further. And no lexicon will help if the underlying concepts themselves are loosely defined. As a French report put it (Ministère délégué à la Ville, 2001: 4), 'Making the information exchanged comprehensible, going beyond translation the vocabulary and the concepts of crime prevention vary from one country to another and are vehicles of misinterpretation and misunderstanding.'

Summary

I've argued that the blunt mental instruments available to practitioners lead to woolly, inarticulate thinking and communication, and an excess of the tacit. The bluntness takes the form of fragmented frameworks and unclear, inconsistent and diverse terminologies reflecting equally deficient concepts, tied to a diversity of institutions. Combined with patchy coverage of the various categories of crime prevention knowledge, this limits the performance of practitioners. They cannot undertake well-focused prevention either individually or collectively, or refine and share knowledge; their strategic choice is limited. All this rebounds to starve the supply of knowledge itself. But there's another factor mediating the constraints of knowledge on performance not yet explicitly considered: failure to face up to *complexity*. That's addressed next.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 4 The gift to be simple? How avoiding the issue of complexity contributes to implementation failure

The pursuit of simplicity in both theory and method is a longstanding preference in crime prevention. In this chapter I'll argue that the simplification tendency has gone too far; that this is implicated in implementation failure and has harmed theory; and that we should therefore attempt, carefully and selectively, to change course.

Science rightly values parsimony of explanation...which is not quite the same as simplicity, a point revisited shortly. But practice-oriented academics have also sought to avoid *overcomplicating things* for other audiences: politicians, policymakers, public and practitioners. While self-evidently valid, the pursuit of simplicity hasn't always been consistent with good public understanding and debate, policy, delivery, practice or research. Its adverse effects have stemmed both from the particular *content* of the simplistic views adopted, and from the *mere fact* of simplification.

This chapter begins with simplicity. Inherent in some kinds of crime prevention, the simplicity tendency also permeates the politics and policy world, the public's understanding of crime and crime prevention, and of course the practitioner world. I describe some of its major manifestations, rationales and expediencies, culminating in an account of the case for simplicity. But I then pose the question – can simplicity, alone, deliver? Switching perspective to complexity, I cite researchers' increasingly open acknowledgements that prevention is complex after all, and explore the concept of complexity itself.

Simplicity

The emphasis in this chapter is on the linked domains of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) and Problem-Oriented Policing and Partnership (POP). For it's here that the 'cult of simplicity' has been at its most extreme. But that cult also exists in the kind of 'generic' crime prevention guidance set out by the UK Crime Reduction Website, the EU Crime Prevention Network or the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime.⁶

While oversimplicity is mainly a problem with SCP and POP, offender-oriented prevention's shortcomings arguably centre on inadequate *articulation* of what might be complex interventions. Nonetheless, both issues affect performance in both fields. On the offender-oriented side especially, there's a tendency towards acknowledging its complexity whilst failing to address it, by coming out with obfuscating generalities like 'it's all too complicated to explain'. Pease (2006) suspects much interest in offender-oriented prevention is driven by a concern with

humanitarian values rather than an ability to articulate evidence or rationale. In fairness, this tendency is countered by increasing tolerance and handling of complexity for example in the approach of the Youth Justice Board (2010) and the Irish Youth Justice Service (IYJS, 2009). The SCOPIC approach⁷ involves academic research on the interaction of developmental pathways and current situations in causing crime, but is some way from informing practice.

Intrinsic simplicity

Situational Crime Prevention especially has embraced simplicity as a positive benefit. Clarke (1980), early in the development of the field, argued forcefully that SCP *is* intrinsically simple and can cut the Gordian Knot of the complexities, delays and entanglements of offender-oriented action. POP protagonists suggest this is ‘not rocket science’ (Read and Tilley, 2000). The closely-related field of crime science (Laycock, 2005) has likewise championed the focus on proximal causes of criminal events. On the offender-oriented side, Farrington (2000) suggests the appeal of the risk and protective factor paradigm similarly stems from inherent simplicity.

Simplicity, politics and policy

Hough (2006) alludes to the imposition by politicians, upon crime prevention programmes, of populist frameworks of causation and intervention. This biases what should be free, and hopefully informed, local choices about preventive strategy. Such populist frameworks inform narrowly-conceived and Procrustean regimes of centralised performance management; and bias preferences away from offender-oriented interventions and toward the situational. These regimes have been established in the context of the modernisation of public services (Pawson, 2006; Bullock et al., 2006), imposing further simplification.

The political and policy world is geared up for simplification. The busy generalist policymaker likes simple, one-page answers with wide applicability, of the ‘X is a cost-effective way to tackle crime’ kind often promised by systematic reviewers working for example within the Campbell Collaboration (Farrington and Petrosino, 2001). Moreover, these kinds of messages are easiest to communicate in exporting a crime agenda from Home Office or Interior Ministry to other government departments. And a tendency to micro-manage the politically-sensitive area of crime accompanies limited respect for expert knowledge relative to lay views on causes and cures of crime.

This has meant that, unlike in other professional spheres, theory and research have never strayed far from everyday understandings. And the succession of slogans and changeable political fixes to which crime prevention must continually adjust, has required it almost to follow a random walk across the conceptual landscape, rather than a cumulative progression of understanding which can then be drip-fed back into the political domain.

Simplicity and the public

The public apply the ultimate political pressure and (drawing a rather crude caricature) they supply the ultimate of simplified views, amplified by media practices and the equally simplifying effects of political processes. Furthermore, they have increasingly been mobilised as implementers of prevention or even admitted as partners (for example in the Communities That Care approach). In the last especially, their own, everyday understandings naturally predominate and can't be ignored by practice-oriented academics or professional crime preventers. The public will pop pills with esoteric medical names, but won't swallow highly-technical crime prevention practices.

Simplicity and practice

But the most significant audience we've been concerned to simplify for, is the cadre of *practitioners* with whom academics have, over some three decades, co-developed crime prevention. Initially centring on the police, this cadre has expanded to include professionals in local government, probation, social work, education, health, product design and beyond. Here, the rationale for simplicity has been fourfold.

- First is an awareness of the *culture clash* (Bullock et al., 2006) between police and academics, centring on enforcement versus rational, evidence-based prevention. Any shift of message to an organisation as self-contained as the police must be simple and robust: swimming against the current requires a streamlined body and powerful fins. Attempts to introduce change must respect mental and procedural 'comfort zones' or as Pease (2006) puts it, psychological 'latitudes of acceptance and rejection'. The culture clash also exists on the offender-oriented side. Pease, again, documents how probation practitioners in phase two of the Kirkholt Project, welcomed the move from situational to offender-oriented and community-oriented prevention, saying 'We've moved far beyond that' (2006: 205).
- Second, the police have often previously recruited people with relatively *limited education*, which in combination with a professional focus on *casework*, leaves them, as said, unfamiliar with the kind of analytic and aggregational statistical thinking required for problem-oriented action (Bullock et al., 2006; Pease, 2006). Private security personnel are often retired police and may share similar limitations, although in some circles sophisticated risk-management techniques are applied. Social workers and others on the offender-oriented side tend to have social-science-oriented education, but similarly focus on casework and social relationships and often shun quantitative analysis.

- Third, *specialised training* in the conceptual foundations of prevention has been limited in scope and depth of curriculum and the proportion of practitioners it can cover (Ekblom, 2008b; Coester et al., 2008; Husain, 2008). With police officers in particular, an enormous amount of legal/procedural material must be ingested and applied, taking the lion's share of time for training in a service that accords it higher priority than 'hobbies' (Ratcliffe, 2008) like prevention. Officers usually circulate quite rapidly through new postings and few remain as crime prevention specialists (usually with dismal promotion prospects). Smaller police forces (e.g. some in USA employing a handful of officers) simply can't support many specialisms. The same training and career issues apply to local government community safety officials. This means there's usually limited time for training, limited justification for investment in training in a specialism where the official may only be passing through as part of a wider career, and limited corporate memory. On the probation side, Skills for Justice, the UK training organisation,⁸ lists responsibilities for advanced apprentices that focus mainly on casework with individuals and groups; the tentative exploration of involvement in wider preventive interventions e.g. under the Kirkholt Project (Forrester et al., 1990) now rarely appears in the UK.
- Fourth, related to the previous point, apart from major programmes like the UK's Crime Reduction Programme (Homel, 2006; Laycock and Webb, 2003) much preventive action has been small-scale and modest. There may be little scope for detailed research and planning in such circumstances, hence little return on investment in training.

Some manifestations of simplicity in Situational Crime Prevention/ Problem-Oriented Policing and beyond

The simplifying tendency takes the following forms:

- Practitioner material comprises brief case studies, easy-to-read 'how-to-do' booklets such as COPS guides,⁹ Home Office Crime Reduction website toolkits and simplified documents like 'Passport to Evaluation'.¹⁰ On the situational side there are plenty of catchy sloganised frameworks using advertising techniques to attract attention and stick in the memory. Examples are SARA (Clarke and Eck, 2003), CRAVED (Clarke, 1999), IN SAFE HANDS (Whitehead et al., 2007), and my own mobilisation procedure CLAIMED (Chapter 14). Simple diagrams like the Crime Triangle (Clarke and Eck, 2003) complete the picture along with folksy terms such as Ducks and Wolves; the bibulous CHEERS (Clarke and Eck, 2003); and homely engineering metaphors like 'Getting the Grease to the Squeak' (Hough and Tilley, 1998).
- Academic research and theorising is the least externally-constrained of these domains, given that academics can largely constitute their own intellectual environment. Some writings in SCP and POP can indeed be complex (like

Cornish and Clarke's (2003) discussion of Wortley's (2001) suggested reformulations of SCP; and Pawson and Tilley (1997) and Pawson (2006) on Realistic Evaluation). However, statistical/mathematical sections of papers apart, the majority have confined themselves to simple language and especially to simple and piecemeal *theory*. An extreme example is Felson's (2006) work on crime and nature. Truly leading-edge in conception and execution, this was nonetheless written in a style appropriate for undergraduates, which (I believe) rather blunts its message.

One generic approach to knowledge straddling the situational/offender-oriented divide is the Campbell Collaboration's collection of Systematic Reviews of what works.¹¹ I've argued elsewhere (Ekblom 2002a, 2007a) that such reviews are too one-dimensional in their performance criteria. They particularly neglect issues of *deliverability* (how far successful pilots can be mainstreamed), and fail to identify sufficient *contextual conditions* for success. But the approach is now evolving towards more furnishing more subtle knowledge. A recent offender-oriented example is that by Lipsey et al. (2007) on cognitive-behavioural programmes for offenders. This illustrates the move towards greater complexity in identifying 'moderator' variables which indicate best practice (such as including anger-control elements, and quality of implementation), and/or the most suitable settings for the intervention (prison context appeared equally favourable to parole or after-care). How far Systematic Reviews can differentiate in this way remains constrained by the number and variety of evaluated interventions reaching the minimum evaluation quality standard. And as will be seen, critics like Pawson (2006) suggest the quantitative pooling approach they use (meta-analysis) can never aspire to capture the complexity at the heart of social action, or build cumulative, structured knowledge, without attention to causal mechanism and theory.

Simplicity – an ideal vision?

So from the standpoint of improving both practice and theory of crime prevention, there are good and bad things about simplicity in research, action and evaluation. The ideal vision is that concepts and language should be scientifically parsimonious; simple enough to communicate to busy practitioners who may not be highly educated in researchers' styles of thought; simple and modest enough to convince their managers to invest in limited training and guidance; simple and robust enough to implement by practitioners who have undergone this limited training; simple, self-evident and frugal enough to appeal to funders of preventive action; simple enough to resist superficial and/or erroneous, non-evidence-based views whether from politicians, media, laypeople or practitioners.

From this perspective simplicity seems an *adaptation* both to meeting the intrinsic requirements of some kinds of crime prevention, and coping with the external demands and constraints others place upon it. But present adaptations do not

always enable long-term survival. Beyond a certain level and over a longer timescale the simplification track we are collectively following may be *maladaptive*.

Can simplicity alone deliver?

The key question is, *whether a crime prevention enterprise based purely on simplicity, as much of it has been so far, can deliver*. Plenty has been achieved but we may have hit limits to further progress.

Chapter 2 noted that studies of POP lament its lack of adoption despite long effort. Likewise, those same sources (Bullock et al., 2006; Scott, 2006; and Goldstein, 2003) document how, in those police forces and local crime reduction partnerships where a problem-oriented approach has been officially adopted, embedding it within the organisation and the culture remains limited. And even where POP activity is undertaken, it's often done poorly when assessed against the original model (Read and Tilley, 2000; Bullock and Tilley, 2003c; Bullock et al., 2006.) Most discouraging of all, the detailed study by Bullock et al. (2006) of UK entries to the Tilley Award for POP projects showed *no trend of improvement in quality of entries over the period 1999-2005*, a time of both intensive and extensive effort in communicating, implementing and funding POP principles. As far as I'm aware, there's no equivalent trend analysis of quality on the offender-oriented side.

Those who believe untrammelled simplicity is ultimately adaptive would attribute this discouraging picture to insufficient effort ('one last heave' as British socialists seeking power used to say), and a failure to find just the right way to communicate the simple ideas on offer. Those who think excess simplicity is maladaptive believe we should seriously consider altering course, even if this might involve questioning and modifying some core principles and demolishing some excuses.

Confessions of complexity

However much the academic leading lights of SCP/POP have favoured simplicity, they are first and foremost good researchers. And the cumulative weight of research findings now confronting them is beginning to shift their views. Eck (2003) described the complexity of crime problems and interventions within a Problem-Oriented Policing context. In a major volume on implementation issues in SCP/POP (edited by Knutsson and Clarke, 2006), *virtually every chapter gives prominence to the issue of complexity in one form or another*.

- In their introduction Knutsson and Clarke (2006) state that even seemingly straightforward interventions can be difficult to implement for technical, managerial and social reasons.

- Laycock (2006) describes a complex picture of interrelated rights, responsibilities and vulnerabilities of those institutions and individuals with the potential to beneficially influence the causes of crime.
- Scott (2006) cites the complexity of implementation as one explanation of why problem-oriented initiatives succeed or fail.
- Brown (2006) notes how the evaluation of the government's Reducing Burglary Initiative in England and Wales showed how interventions looking simple on paper could be deceptively complex and time-consuming when it came to implementation.
- Knutsson (2006) attributes the success of his Norwegian case study on controlling illegal taxi services, to, among other things, an unusual absence of technical complexity.
- Hough (2006) refers to systematic misjudgement (among policymakers and delivery managers) about the complexity of the preventive enterprise. He highlights complexities in achieving institutional legitimacy and communicating social meaning within social control agencies and actions, which the 'modernisation project' of government can't handle.
- Homel (2006) suggests an overarching cause of implementation failure in the UK Crime Reduction Programme was simply failure to treat the programme and all its levels as a *system*.
- Bowers and Johnson (2006) refer to the complexity of the implementation process when introducing a risk management framework to help practitioners anticipate and avoid implementation failure.
- Pease (2006) quotes Ormerod (2005) on the complex entities that individuals, firms or government departments must understand in implementing their plans – that is, other individuals, firms and government departments – leading to enormous uncertainties between intent and outcome.
- Tilley (2006) concedes that the knowledge to be conveyed for Problem-Oriented Policing to succeed is much more complicated than first assumed. He describes the requirement within that approach for supplying relatively complex guidance to 'reflexive practitioners'.

The complexity conundrum

So what is this demon, Complexity, that makes such difficulty for the SCP/POP enterprise, and for the wider field of crime prevention? We must first distinguish between the merely complicated, and the truly complex (Burns et al., 2006).

- An object, process or system is *complicated* if it has many components richly interconnected with one another and the outside world. This is essentially a

quantitative property, like the repeated branching of a tree. Complicatedness is straightforward and increases additively or combinatorially.

- Scientific interest in *complexity* however centres on more *qualitative* processes that generate complex phenomena in the natural and human world. This relates at one level to *interaction and emergence* of causal properties and at another to *complex adaptive systems*. The complexity appears on diverse scales and is usually non-linear: it doesn't increase in smooth lines or curves but in jumps. Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1999; Pease, 2006) describes how complex systems can generate unforeseen and undesired effects. Many of the components of such systems are adaptive agents with their own distinct goals and resources, meaning that a deliberate perturbation of the system in one place (say by injecting a crime prevention intervention) may have unforeseen and undesired effects, as the agents (both offenders and preventers) make their own adjustments for their own benefit (see Chapman, 2004; Pawson, 2006).

As 'transformation designers' RED put it,

Traditionally, organisations have been designed for a complicated rather than a complex world. Hierarchical and silo structures are perfectly designed to break problems down into more manageable fragments. They are not, however, so effective handling high levels of complexity. For this reason, many of our most long standing institutions are now struggling to adapt. (Burns et al., 2006: 8)

It's clear the field of crime prevention is both complicated and complex.

Complication

A sample of preventive methods reveals 'sheer exuberant variety' (Ekblom, 1996) – from puppet shows to dip-resistant handbags; from women-only taxi services to alley-gates. Working within POP, and considering only the nature of crime problems, Eck (2003) demonstrates how combining just a few dimensions for classifying *problems-to-be-prevented* generates thousands of cells. Interventions are likewise numerous – the 25 techniques of SCP (at www.popcenter.org) include 75 diverse examples.

Beyond the core crime prevention methods in themselves, the practical *realisation* of those activities adds further complication to knowledge which must be collected, synthesised and applied. For example:

- The distinction between *levels of action* such as programme, project, problem, case;
- The distinction between 'transferable action elements' such as how to mobilise people to implement interventions (ranging from locking their doors to controlling their children);

- Embedding in different *institutional settings* including police, probation, social work, health, planning and design (Ekblom, 1998b; Welsh and Farrington, 2006);
- Delivery at different *geographical scales*.

On the offender-oriented side of prevention, complication additionally resides in the multiple levels of causation and risk factors typically addressed in the field – individual to family to community, for example. And the scope of human motivation, emotion and cognition embraced by offender-oriented analyses and interventions adds another dimension of complication and complexity. Ekblom (2007b) argues that even SCP should adopt a richer model of the offender, the better to tailor its interventions.

Moving beyond narrow, criminal event-oriented crime prevention into criminal career intervention or holistic developmental intervention, further dimensions must be taken into account – for example a young person’s well-being may involve educational, interpersonal and health outcomes as well as avoidance of, or desistance from, crime. The same applies to the range of harms to be reduced in tackling organised crime.

At the widest level, the quality-of-life concept of community safety embraces many facets (addressed in Chapter 8).

Failure to address any one of the dimensions illustrated could jeopardise the implementation and impact of preventive action. Somehow, our knowledge, and knowledge management systems, must be capable of handling this richness of information. Ratcliffe (2008) notes that increasing complexity of policing has driven the pursuit of a better level of organisation of knowledge.

Complexity

The simplest kind of complexity is the *interaction*. As said, we just don’t know, in any detailed or systematic way, how the components of our central theories interact. How do propensity to offend and opportunity interact (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990)? Within Rational Choice Theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986, 2003), for example, under what circumstances do perceived effort and perceived risk merely *add* in their influence in discouraging and deterring criminal behaviour, and when do they *interact* to produce unique, emergent patterns? How do the paths and nodes of environmental criminology (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2008) bring together the Routine Activities triad of offender, target and absent/incapable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979)? The simple rules of combination mean once again that there are enormously many cells to be investigated for possible interactions and filled with appropriate knowledge.

Interactions render impacts dependent on their *context*. The fundamental significance of this is to make *replication* a particular challenge (Tilley, 1993a; Ekblom, 2002a). Every attempt to recreate a success story in a new context requires

deliberation (is the new context too different, in practically significant ways, for this intervention method to work here?); it also requires improvisation, extending into full-blown innovation (Ekblom, 2002a, 2005c).

Emergence is less of an issue with SCP because, as said, it has deliberately chosen to focus on the immediate micro-causation of criminal events. However, to the extent that it aspires to cover area-level phenomena and higher levels of causation it must address this wider picture. Paul and Jeff Brantingham (1991) have attempted this with *niches*, Eck (1995) and Sutton et al., (2001) with *markets*, myself with *arms races* (Ekblom, 1997, 1999, 2005c), Clarke and Newman (2006) with *opportunity structure* and Felson (2006) with *ecology* as a whole. These are notable developments but they are patchy.

Emergent levels are more routinely relevant to offender-oriented prevention – at least, to those practitioners concerned to go beyond individual casework/treatment (like cognitive skills enhancement) to consider the life circumstances of the offender, group of offenders or community. Family life, school, employment, peer group and neighbourhood factors are all of interest both as causes of crime and domains for intervention. But in all fields of prevention, and however simple the intervention, consideration of *context* means we can't avoid attending to these levels.

Now for *complex adaptive systems*. This perspective appears in various accounts of 'evolution' or 'arms-races' in crime (Ekblom, 1997, 1999, 2002a, 2005a,b), in ecological approaches (Felson, 2006), innovation among offenders (Lacoste and Tremblay, 2003) and complexity theory itself (Eck 2003). Cohen et al. (1995, as adapted by Ekblom, 2003, 2005b) state the challenging nature of the crime problem from an angle consistent with the 'complex adaptive systems' approach. Here, crime is:

- Dispersed and invisible – forming loose networks;
- Invasive and progressive;
- Resistant to countermeasures;
- Evasive (moving operations around to avoid detection and countermeasures in any one location), self-protective and subversive – seeking to disable and corrupt crime control systems;
- Cryptic (hard to detect that a crime is being committed) and deceptive;
- Persistent;
- Adaptive to different targets, places and methods (capable of being altered to circumvent countermeasures and exploit new opportunities);
- Innovative and surprising;
- Entrepreneurial and sometimes well-resourced;
- Mobile in location and transmissible to other offenders.

Ratcliffe (2008) gives a similar account of the hydra-like nature of organised crime.

At one end of the scale of complex adaptive systems are the *dynamics* of the criminal event and its immediate antecedents. Ekblom and Sidebottom (2007) mention the ‘interchangeable currency’ of risk, effort and reward. If we increase the risk, say, the offender’s decision to commit the crime may not directly reflect the level of *risk*, but the unconscionable amount of *effort* needed to reduce that risk to acceptable levels.

A related line of research is Cornish’s (1994) perspective of the criminal event as the unfolding of a cognitive *script* of the offender (e.g. ‘seek target, see target, take target, escape, sell target’). I develop this dynamic further in Chapter 9.

Short-term *displacement* is considered a limited problem in SCP (Hesseling, 1994). In a design context (Ekblom, 2005a) I discuss the relationship between displacement and longer-term cycles of *adaptation and counter-adaptation*. These occur, say, when offenders develop ways round procedures for preventing credit card fraud. I also make the point (Ekblom, 1997, 1999, 2002b, 2005a,b) that social and technological change combined with adaptive criminals renders what-works knowledge a ‘wasting asset’, much as new cars lose value from the day they’re bought. What works now will eventually cease to work; or become irrelevant, like ways of combating horse theft in cities. The offender-oriented equivalent to displacement is *offender replacement* (Ekblom and Pease, 1995; Ekblom, 2003). For example, if a drug dealer is arrested or reformed, and the lucrative ‘niche’ for offending isn’t removed (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991), someone else will swiftly reoccupy it.

But adaptability isn’t the sole prerogative of *criminals*. As Pawson (2006) describes it, social interventions always involve the injection of new complexity into existing complex systems. The *implementation context* of crime prevention also demonstrates features of complex adaptive systems, which pose enormous problems for *delivery*. Virtually all the features of adaptive offenders listed above have their equivalent in the ‘awkward squad’ among the honest citizenry – probably most of us. The citizen who lowers vigilance against theft knowing insurance will supply replacements (perhaps even newer models) illustrates this, demonstrating too the wider principle of ‘System Failure’ (Chapman, 2004). So, too, do youth centre teams who (for the best of operational reasons) use informal face-to-face conversations to bypass formal constraints on information exchange with police colleagues.

This approaches what Kahane (2004) identifies as ‘tough’ problems, which are

complex in three ways. They are dynamically complex, which means that cause and effect are far apart in space and time [e.g. impact of early childhood experiences on later criminality], and so are hard to grasp from firsthand experience. They are generatively complex, which means that they

are unfolding in unfamiliar and unpredictable ways [co-evolution of prevention and offenders' techniques]. And they are *socially* complex, which means that the people involved see things very differently, and so the problems become polarized and stuck [e.g. welfare versus enforcement]. (2004: 1-2; examples in brackets inserted).

Summary

In this chapter, I've focused on the 'simplification tendency' within academic and practical crime prevention. Having documented the manifestations of simplification of terms, concepts, education and guidance materials, I've argued that they can be understood as adaptations to particular institutional and professional circumstances. But simplification is ultimately maladaptive if pursued to extremes. Situational prevention has some inherent simplicity in its theory (though this shouldn't be exaggerated). With offender-oriented prevention, where the interventions at the heart of the action may themselves rely on manipulating rather complex psychological processes, aspirations to simplicity are even less helpful – but so is unconditional surrender to complexity by a retreat into inarticulacy.

We've seen how the opposite of simplicity divides into complication and true complexity. Both of these challenge knowledge, theory and practice, demanding solution if the profession of crime prevention is to significantly improve its performance and its scope. Serious consequences follow from failure to address them in theory and practice, giving extra force to the deficiencies of knowledge and articulacy described in Chapter 3 and contributing to implementation failure documented in Chapter 2. However, driven by the reality of their research findings, even the arch-simplifiers of Situational Crime Prevention are now coming to acknowledge complication and complexity as an issue; and agencies such as the Youth Justice Board seem increasingly ready to take it seriously.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 5 Appropriate complexity

From diagnosis to remedy

This is where we begin to move from description and diagnosis of the shortcomings in the performance of crime prevention, towards a remedy for at least one constraint on that performance: knowledge and how it's managed. In this chapter, I make some strategic suggestions for how crime prevention and its knowledge framework should co-evolve. This prepares for more detailed specification, in the next chapter, of what a knowledge framework should do, and how.

So, crime prevention is complex after all – not like quantum mechanics, but maybe not as far removed from rocket science as some believe. (Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, 'complexity' includes 'complication' – for simplicity's sake!) Therefore, the fundamental requirement for academics and delivery managers wishing to improve performance of prevention is to *accept* this complexity rather than pretending it doesn't exist. Most practitioners, I suspect, know complexity already because they handle it every working day.

This realisation poses several challenges. Large gaps in quantity and quality of knowledge require a cadre of action researchers/evaluators to fill them. The scale of knowledge to assemble requires knowledge managers to find practical ways of organising it. But combinatorial complication means knowledge requirements can never be filled by cumulative research effort. As Chapter 3 noted, this is a Malthusian problem: geometric versus arithmetical increase creates an inevitable knowledge deficit.

Practitioners improvise and innovate to fill this deficit, so we must find ways of helping them do this well. Innovation is all the more important because even that which we *already* know needs constant replenishment as crime and prevention evolve. Once practitioners' work in implementing action is done, helping them document and even perhaps evaluate their practice to a moderately high standard may diminish the Malthusian knowledge gap, because there are many more of them than professional evaluators.

How should practice-oriented academics and knowledge managers otherwise respond to the complexity challenge? A straightforward strategy would be to establish a proper *balance* between simplicity and complexity in all aspects of prevention. Like Yin and Yang they can be used together *positively*, to generate creative tension. But they aren't entirely oppositional: paradoxically, as will emerge, a little complexity can actually simplify things. And we should remember that science itself doesn't only seek simplicity but wields Occam's razor in pursuit of *parsimony*: this, to paraphrase Einstein,¹² is about being *as simple as possible but no*

simpler. In other words, where nature demands more complexity, it should be incorporated; but this should be done from the simplest starting position where every additional complication must fight empirically and logically to justify its inclusion.

Situational prevention, focused on proximal causes, does this already, albeit with deliberate neglect of most offender factors (although the offender-model within SCP is becoming more elaborate (Ekblom (2007b))). Offender-oriented prevention tackles causes (and risk-factor correlates) at diverse levels but these aren't always clearly identified; and interventions often lack the focus from connection to immediate causes acting in the here-and-now of the crime (Ekblom, 1994, 2000). Holistic approaches centring on individuals, families or communities are welcome: evidence indicates the benefits of synergy (e.g. Ekblom et al., 1996). But *blurred* holism, failing to articulate the components of intervention and their interaction, will perform poorly.

We can articulate the complexity-simplicity issue at an even more abstract level. Ashby (1957), a cybernetician, proposed a universal *Law of Requisite Variety* which is quite widely used in government and business. Paraphrasing quite arcane language, the essence of this law is this. In designing some *control* system to effectively influence the state of some larger *real-world* system, the former needs sufficient complexity of its own to handle the latter. In other words, *it takes some complexity to control a lot of complexity*.

The system we wish to control is crime; the control system, prevention. Our concepts of crime and prevention must therefore be of *appropriate complexity* (Ekblom, 2007a) to handle the real complexity out there, and our communication of knowledge to practitioners must be of appropriate complexity to get it across. So, to repeat, it's futile dumbing down crime prevention knowledge into slogans and rapid-read case studies to aid communication to practitioners, and supply one-dimensional guidance for the choices of policymakers and delivery managers, if these can't inspire actions sophisticated enough to do good and avoid harm (Ekblom, 2006, 2007a). And on the receiving end of those communications, it's equally futile if practitioners lack the expertise to understand, critique, assimilate and intelligently apply that knowledge.

Adapting crime prevention to appropriate complexity: application of design

How do we determine appropriate levels of complexity? And how do we help practitioners, and practice-oriented organisations, to boost their own mental and institutional knowledge systems to increase the complexity that they can routinely handle in the real world? How to augment their capacity to innovate, to better tackle old problems in old contexts, to customise old solutions more closely to new contexts, and to tackle entirely new problems?

In what follows I suggest some strategic adaptive responses to complexity, which also address the challenge of tacit knowledge identified in Chapter 3. The

fundamental idea is to apply Ashby's Law and use a *small* injection of organised complexity into our frameworks to tame the *greater* and more chaotic complexity out there. This is realised by helping theory engage with complexity; making process models a little more complex; turning both theory and process models into 'learning engines'; articulating complexity through specially-designed language; and educating practitioners to cope with complexity. Many of these strategies help overcome the 'Malthusian knowledge deficit': via generalisation and recombination they confer on practitioners the capacity to produce many new and plausible ideas and variations on themes, that at some level are evidence- or theory-based. In effect, this means bestowing more action-research-like skills upon everyday practitioners.

Given all the good reasons for simplicity stated above, we can't, though, just hit the 'Jackson Pollock' complexity button and hope for the best. Simplicity is at least partly adaptive, as fully conceded in the previous chapter, and our concepts must operate, and win market share among users, in the real world. How, then, do we constructively and creatively reconcile the opposing but equally-valid principles of simplicity and complexity to arrive at *appropriate* complexity? How do we get more sophisticated understanding and sharper capabilities into practitioners' heads without scaring them off or consuming too much of their time? How do we additionally address all the specific shortcomings of knowledge identified in Chapter 3? This is the realm of *design*. In fact, design in problem-solving terms thrives best when its 'requirements capture' process can identify and sharply articulate *contradictions* of the kind just expressed. Design applies creativity and ingenuity to maximise on *all* conflicting requirements rather than generating a half-hearted compromise. (The centrality of contradiction in design is most clearly stated in TRIZ, the theory of inventive principles (Altshuller, 1999; Shulyak, 1998; Eklblom and Sidebottom, 2007).)

Helping theory engage with complexity

Some practitioners and policymakers scorn 'academic' theory for being remote from practice. But as pioneering action-researcher Kurt Lewin said (Marrow, 1969), there is nothing so practical as a good theory. Conversely, Pawson (2006: 26) refers to intervention as 'theory incarnate'. Theory can support innovation because it's *generative* – knowledge distilled from many *past* contexts, applicable in an infinite number of *new* contexts. In this sense theory is also a *complexity-reducer*, because it compresses and summarises many diverse observations and patterns into one concise statement. Finally, the process of evolving theory through research, action and evaluation makes theory a fundamental component of the 'learning engine' of our knowledge base, as will be seen. Indeed, Pawson (2006: 96) Popperian-style, writes of 'adaptive theory', seeing it as the key to synthesis and application of evaluation findings to inform evidence-based policy and action.

Limitations of theory

But current theory, in some ways flourishing, has serious limitations. As said, overemphasis on simplicity constrains the ability to describe and act on the many *interactions* which occur between the theorised elements, and the *emergent properties* that result – this is largely unknown territory for research. Individual theories in isolation don't actually take us far, because they each explain a narrow slice of reality, hence the above scorn. Interventions based on a single isolated theory are unlikely to get very far either. With their simple, universal answer they're also more likely to stifle creativity than to foster it.

But attempts to understand interaction and emergence, and build a truly cumulative body of theory (Pawson, 2006), are inhibited by the *diversity and mutability of terms and concepts* documented in Chapter 3. This makes individual theories and contextual conditions hard to combine within the same mental frame (Ekblom, 1994). If we're ever to 'stand on the shoulders of giants' in building an academic and professional discipline of crime prevention (Ekblom, 1996), those conceptual and terminological shoulders should be square and strong, not sloping and sloppy.

On the situational prevention side the continued failure to integrate key theories such as Rational Choice, Routine Activities and Environmental Criminology was described in Chapter 3. Simplicity is claimed for these theories. Individually speaking that's undoubtedly true but the challenge for practitioners and theorists alike is in having to assemble them into a workable whole *each and every time they are referred to or applied*. Virtually every textbook or practical guide just lists the theories in succession as a pot-pourri. This abrogation abandons unfortunate users to find their own path and create their own esoteric conceptual structures. To proclaim this as simplicity is, in my view, cheating! Imagine opening several Lego kits, tipping them into a single box without instructions and saying to the perplexed child 'I don't see what the problem is – the pieces are all simple.' This state of affairs would surely leave other sciences blushing.

On the offender-oriented side the evaluators of the Communities That Care programme in England (Crow et al., 2004) note its appeal of simplicity; but because it has undergone little critical reflection they caution that greater debate is needed about its limitations and problems, especially on causality and theory.

Making the most of theory

To make the most of the power of theory in generating plausible preventive actions, we must establish several fundamental building blocks:

- An approach for theorising and researching about common *interactions* between causal factors; and about *configurations* of causal factors, whether in the built environment (Ekblom, 2004c) or in holistic approaches to offending at individual and community levels (IYJS, 2009).

- A broader *integrating and cumulating framework* that brings theories together in one schema and one language so that overlaps, gaps and true contests for explanation can be identified and resolved.
- An interest in and an approach to *emergence*, building upwards from individual proximal causes of criminal events to cover ever more complex theories and phenomena, whilst hopefully, like two drilling teams digging a tunnel from opposite ends, meeting like-minded sociologists moving systematically in the other direction. Much as physics and biology often meet up at the level of chemistry, the realm of theories at ‘middle levels of abstraction’ (Pawson, 2006) becomes a significant place for cross-talk between academic and/or professional disciplines.

As we’ve seen, all these requirements are interlinked; so, too, are the solutions now suggested.

Mechanisms

Central to building an understanding of crime and crime prevention is the Scientific Realist concept of causal *mechanism* (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Eck, 2005; Pawson, 2006; Wikström, 2006). In fact, mechanisms can be seen as irreducible causal interactions between the various components of the proximal circumstances of criminal events (Ekblom, 1994), such as *predispositions and resources of the offender x properties of the target and environment*. Such interactions generate *crime patterns*, so are part of know-about knowledge. When additional *preventive intervention* mechanisms are injected into the fray these further interactions generate *outcome patterns* of results. These of course are central to know-what knowledge.

A vital understanding from the Scientific Realist approach is this: a preventive action won’t work unless key preconditions are met which enable intervention mechanisms to be ‘triggered’. For example, in order for bag-securing clips to cut bag thefts in bars, drinkers must spot the clips affixed to their tables, and use them; the clips must then stop the offender taking the bag undetected, say by physically blocking movement. And in order for young people recruited into youth centres to change their predisposition to committing crime and misbehaviour, they must normally freely volunteer to participate. From a Scientific Realist approach, therefore, *how does it work?* and *what are the necessary triggering conditions?* become vital aspects of know-what works (Tilley, 2006).

The notation used in Scientific Realist accounts of interventions is the ‘Context-Mechanism-Outcome’ configuration (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). To illustrate with prevention of shoplifting, a *mechanism* like *deterrence* interacts with properties of the *context* (a bulky target of crime, like high-value razor-blades, enclosed in a large package; a ‘shopping bags sealed’ policy by the store; and security checks at the exit) to cause particular kinds of *outcome* (reduced risk of theft). The same intervention (the bulky package) in the absence of the other

conditions is unlikely to have the same preventive effect, much as a match will fail to light a fire if the wood is damp and the wind strong.

This context dependence explains why too-literal, high-fidelity copying doesn't work. *Intelligent* replication (Tilley, 1993a; Ekblom, 2002a) relies on understanding of theory and of specific 'Context, Mechanism, Outcome configurations', and possession of a map of the wider causal context. So *know-what works, how* must be further modified to *know-what works, how, in what context*.

The classic illustration of context-dependence of preventive action was Tilley's (1993a) study of several attempted replications of the Kirkholt domestic burglary prevention project. Project managers in the UK Safer Cities Programme, pressed for quick spends and quick wins, rushed to replicate this renowned success story. Unfortunately, few of the outcomes remotely succeeded like the original. Tilley's post-mortem account centres on the practitioners' cookbook replications which they neglected to adapt to new contexts, and the failure to follow the process of researching the problem and devising customised solutions. Ekblom (2002a) further explores the replication issue in cultural evolution terms: practitioners copied the end product, but should have copied the process.

Realistic Evaluation's distinction between intervention mechanism and context is, to me, not fundamental – more a matter of 'figure and ground'. Intervention mechanisms influence those mechanisms that are already present and either *facilitating* crime (a weak door lock) or having the unrealised potential to *prevent* it (a householder who currently can't be bothered to fix a better lock). Context essentially supplies the causal backdrop, the partners in causal interaction, for the intended influence of the focal activity – our intervention. The intervention is intended to block, weaken or divert the factors that cause the criminal event, and/or to permit, strengthen and direct those that prevent it. The context of preventive action is centred in the proximal circumstances of the crime (that is, the offender in the crime situation – Ekblom, 1994). But it spreads out in time and space to involve a widening range of environmental factors on different scales, and people and institutions with their goals, choices and the enablers and constraints they impose.

Evaluators must articulate mechanisms and contexts when they collect and synthesise what-works knowledge for practitioners to use. As argued elsewhere (Ekblom, 2002a, 2005c, 2006), when distilled across contexts those mechanisms amount to 'generic principles' of intervention. However, being analytic, in real-world contexts they can only ever be realised in combination as practical methods. The same applies to individual theories, as discussed above; what is a theory and what is a principle overlap. (Both are generic and generative but the former tends to be more formally-expressed and connected with other concepts and research findings.) Eck (2002a: 105) makes a similar point when he notes that the theories (of situational prevention)

do not dictate specific actions, but provide a framework for the creation of context relevant interventions. In this example, the answer to the question,

‘what works?’ to prevent crime at places is ‘routine activity theory and situational crime prevention.’

The principle : method duality connects with the discussion in Chapter 3 of the *structure* of preventive action. In fact it adds a level to that structure because, as Tilley (1993b) points out, a given preventive method may act via several alternative mechanisms. For example, putting CCTV into a car park may increase the perceived risk to the offender; increase the objective possibility of interruption and arrest; alert users to risk and make them take action to secure their car; and attract security-conscious drivers to use that car park. Likewise, fishing trips for deprived youngsters might prevent crime by reducing impulsivity and increasing calmness; teaching respect for the environment; providing legitimate money-making opportunities (fly-tying); providing esteem through trophies; and supplying acceptable entertainment (except perhaps to fish). The reason for this multiplicity of pathways is simply the richness of the interacting components in the crime situation and what precedes it.

Several high-level functional requirements for theoretical knowledge emerge from this discussion:

- A distinction between generic intervention *principles* relating to underlying mechanisms and thence to *theories*, and the practical *methods* that realise them. For example, *increasing the effort and risk to offenders* to modify their decision to steal a car radio (*theory/principle*) by *disguising the target of crime (lesser principle)* by *fitting a cover (method)*; or *applying social learning theory* by *building trusting relationships with pro-social role models (principle)* by *taking young people on fishing trips with carefully-selected leaders (method)*. A *many-to-many* relationship exists between methods and mechanisms or principles. This is because one method may act through several mechanisms (thereby engaging several generic principles); and one principle can be realised by many methods.
- A focus on *proximal* causes (those operating within or very shortly before the criminal events) rather than *distal* ones (Ekblom, 1994, 2000). This is because the former are fewer in number and can be described with greater clarity both individually and in relation to each other. Nonetheless, the proximal causes should in principle be linkable to the distal ones, and distal theories should be articulable in terms of how they ultimately act through the proximal ones. No sociological theory depicting community- or society-level processes can influence criminal events without eventually acting through the here-and-now of offenders in crime situations. This isn't reductionist because higher-level emergent properties are preserved in the *pattern* of the interacting proximal causes, and the processes bringing them together, like people's travel routes or acquaintanceship networks.
- A map of the commonly-occurring *causal components* that interact, through causal mechanisms, to generate criminal events. The map should integrate situational and offender-based causes.

- A similar integrated map of *intervention principles*, centred on influencing the same causal components. The existing causal components of crime, into which the intervention is injected, comprise the immediate *context* of the intervention.
- An ability to identify and systematically describe both the *immediate context* in which the core intervention is embedded, and the *wider context* of human choice, institutional decision-making, resources and environment.
- A sensitivity to *ecological levels* of causal mechanism – individual, family, group, institution, community etc (WHO, 2004). To achieve this, the interactions between the proximal causes, and their links to more distal causes (such as in offenders’ early childhood) and/or emergent causes (such as the operation of market processes for stolen goods), should in principle be describable.
- A more specific sensitivity to *configurations* of causes. This is particularly important in the field of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) (Cozens et al., 2005). Combinations of particular spatial layouts of buildings and streets, sightlines, barriers etc, plus patterns of presence, ownership and movement of people, will continually recur. Some will tend to facilitate particular crimes, others to inhibit them. In understanding and anticipating crime risks and in designing interventions, knowledge of such configurations will trump knowledge of individual components in isolation (Ekblom, 2004c). The same may apply to configurations of causes and risk factors when holistically intervening with offenders (IYJS, 2009).

These requirements are carried forward to the Specification in the next chapter.

So far we’ve focused on the theory of the causation of criminal *events* and their prevention. But context and mechanism can equally apply to wider outcomes including the quality-of-life considerations of community safety and the improvement-of-life-chances focus of much offender-oriented action. For example, how exactly does reassurance work? What contextual conditions are required to trigger it, or to destroy it? How can taking on a ‘responsible’ role in a youth centre lead to improved employability and/or better relations with a wider circle of people? These are important outcomes, but far more nebulous ones than merely securing the non-occurrence of criminal events. To the extent that mechanisms can be articulated and linked to plausible realisations of theory, the prospects of the outcomes’ successful delivery increase.

Context and mechanism at large

The concepts of context, mechanism and outcome don’t just apply to the core crime prevention intervention, but equally well to *every kind of action that crime preventers undertake*. Such actions can include the practicalities of *implementation* and the *mobilisation* of other individuals and organisations. Each will have its own

mechanisms interacting with its own particular context. They may seem a ‘sideshow’ from the perspective of academics interested in crime prevention theory; but like the chemist interested in galvanisation processes in Chapter 3 they will have substantive theoretical domains of their own. Most of these will connect to processes of human perception and choice. Outcomes will include, not direct crime reduction, but events like acceptance, mobilisation and commitment (Dolan et al., 2010). We thus reach the kind of complexity that the knowledge managers of social interventions should be getting to grips with (Pawson, 2006; Hough, 2006; Raynor, 2004). A full understanding of the *process* of crime prevention should deploy these different theories at different stages of the action.

This is complexity incarnate, but as will be seen, it can be tamed. It’s important to get such taming right, because mechanism discourse shouldn’t be seen as the exclusive preserve of elite crime prevention academics. Practitioners themselves routinely need to be able to generate, test and develop *working hypotheses* about the causes of their crime problem and the preventive mechanisms implicated in their interventions (Laycock, 2001). Sensitivity to mechanisms alerts them to the kinds of feedback they need to customise their action to its context; and indeed to decide as early as possible whether the intervention is working.

The value of mechanisms is manifest, not only in leading from theory to practice, but also in the other direction. Rothman (2004) argues that both theorists and interveners should treat theories as dynamic entities whose form and value rests upon their being rigorously applied, tested and refined in both laboratory and field. Mechanism discourse is arguably the only language we can use to test our theories and their interactions bidirectionally, by drawing detailed implications for theory from the outcomes of action research applying generic principles combined in real-world methods. So-called ‘evolutionary epistemology’ (Campbell, 1974; Plotkin, 1993; Eklom, 2002a) is learning about the world by doing (generating a variety of responses); succeeding or failing; and incorporating successful responses into evolving knowledge structures whether these are genes, personal knowledge or collective cultural assets. It links with the constructivist approach of Piaget (1954, 2001) discussed below. Wikström (2007) makes a similar point, as does Eck:

If we look for general principles of prevention, rather than general tactics, we may have greater success for longer periods. Such knowledge will come quicker, if theory development and testing are coupled more closely to solution development and evaluation. (Eck, 2002b: 285)

Of course, if we only ever get as far as implementation failure the only theories we can test are those relating to implementation itself.

Improving process models

I’ve already mentioned the importance of know-how, or process knowledge. Now this receives full attention. We can start by setting out some *functional*

requirements for the sort of guidance the *users* of good practice knowledge bases need. These contribute to the requirements for designing *process models* used to structure such guidance. The guidance should help them:

- *Search for, and select* likely preventive methods on the basis of any evidence of what works, and what is implementable, for *their* context; then if prior knowledge exists and methods seem appropriate for context,
- *Replicate* the methods; or where no prior knowledge of appropriate methods exists,
- *Innovate*, whether at the level of *detail* (customising an existing method to a new context) or something more *radical* (creating a wholly new method from recombination of first principles).

These tasks are considered in turn. They closely resemble those identified in the POP Center tool guide for implementing responses (search, choose, implement – Brown and Scott, 2007); but as will be seen the challenges of replication and innovation require quite particular treatment which receives little coverage in that publication (see ‘The Learning Process’ – p5).

Selection

Selection requires more detailed information than the simple ‘what works’ outcome commonly supplied in either impact or process evaluations; more, even, than the more sophisticated ‘what works, in what context’.

As suggested previously, information collected by *impact* evaluations is often too one-dimensional in the information collected, giving practitioners insufficient guidance when selecting what works for their problem and context (Ekblom, 2007a). Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness should of course remain the key items but beyond these we can identify additional selection criteria:

- Responsiveness – efficient and appropriate targeting and prioritisation;
- Coverage on the ground – what proportion of crime problem tackled?
- Scope – narrow or broad range of crime types tackled?
- Durability;
- Taking action over appropriate timescales;
- Pursuing actions that are sustainable;
- Avoiding undesirable side-effects of action and balancing tradeoffs with other values;
- Maximising legitimacy/acceptability of actions;
- Ensuring actions are reliably deliverable in mainstream programmes.

These criteria reappear in Chapter 15.

Replication

Chapter 2 previously identified replication as a major focus of implementation failure: projects successful in ‘hothouse’ conditions often transfer poorly to routine roll-out in mainstream programmes. Brown (2006) identifies pragmatic factors behind this failure. He talks of (pilot) projects coming in a kind of ‘wrapper’ (p.42) separating them from mainstream pressures of staffing, budgets and ways of working. The decision to mainstream a project may moreover be made before a robust evaluation has taken place (a case of premature implementation).

But obstacles to replication don’t stop there: they connect quite fundamentally with the issue of causal mechanisms as discussed in the previous section. Replication requires both simplicity and detail: simplicity in the generic principles which are to be customised to the new context (Tilley, 1993a, Pawson and Tilley, 1997); and detail to match the complexity of the action being emulated. To aid intelligent replication, we must enable practitioners to *redesign* the stages of action in line with their own problem and context, rather than simply to *regurgitate* them. Capturing knowledge of *process* should therefore extract and articulate what occurred during the preventive action much more systematically than now. We should document the critical ingredients of interventions; the theories and principles and the contextual conditions vital for triggering the mechanisms. This must be done, not just for the core ‘analysis of causation and generation of intervention’, but for knowledge of every task in the action sequence, especially motivating, activating and collaborating with other agents whose contribution makes the preventive action succeed.

Every subsidiary task in the preventive process will pose alternative choices. Should a project team opt for universal or selective targeting of offenders or victims? Should they motivate preventers by rewards or penalties? There will also be design dilemmas or ‘troublesome tradeoffs’ (Ekblom, 2005a): how to ensure the intervention method itself doesn’t unduly clash with aesthetics, privacy, fire safety, convenience, sustainability and ethics? The *principles* of preventive intervention may be the same in projects implemented in several different contexts; but the right *practical resolution* of the pros and cons and the troublesome tradeoffs will probably differ from place to place (Ekblom, 2004c).

Therefore, *the most useful practical information to capture for successor projects is not necessarily the final choice made in the present project, which may be very context-specific; but the issues encountered in making the tactical decisions in every task of the preventive process.* This matches Pawson’s (2006) belief in the primacy of understanding the decisionmakers and their choices at all levels and stages of action in the implementation of social programmes. It also fits my (2002a)

view of replication as an exercise in *reconstruction*, recapitulating the choices made as a project plan unfolds; and Brown's (2006) view of project management.

Innovation

Innovation isn't 'icing on the cake' but a necessity, because replication always requires it to some degree (Ekblom, 2002a). To support innovative capacity, our process model needs in turn:

- To handle *generative theory*, and *interactions* between theories, whilst simultaneously connecting with *practical action*.
- To split practice into *interchangeable elements* of action which can be reassembled in new combinations (a badly-designed project to prevent car theft could nevertheless create a brilliantly-effective way to mobilise the community; this could be salvaged from the wreckage and re-used, say, in a burglary project) – but only if the individual elements were adequately documented and evaluated.
- To support rigour, discipline and evidentiary quality, whilst simultaneously fostering flexibility and creativity. In other words, *the whole process model itself must be generative*. If practitioners program the same process with different crime and context parameters, and different priorities, it should produce different types of action and perhaps different sequences, although the logic in each individual circumstance should be equally capable of being traced back to the same origin.

The first requires the parallel discourses of analytic, theoretical *principles*, brought together in detailed interactive *mechanisms*), realised in practical *methods*. For example, 1) achieving *access control by creating an enclosure* behind a row of houses; 2) enclosure works by physically blocking offender, increasing perceived risk and effort to offender, reducing effort to preventer who only has to lock gate rather than guard the house; and 3) realise mechanism by installing and operating alleygate.

The second requires a *detailed structure of labels* to identify functionally equivalent and interchangeable elements of action (such as how to mobilise residents), to know where to systematically record this knowledge on a knowledge base, and later to help retrieve them. It also ideally requires a whole industry of benchmarking and performance-criterion-development for the diverse activities concerned. This, truly evaluative, side of process evaluation has always been neglected; we return to it later.

The third requires developing a knowledge framework far more like a *language* and less like a rigid sequence of action. Innovation also requires the development of an *iterative process* (Thorpe et al., 2009; Ekblom, 2005a) of trial, feedback and improvement (see also Brown and Scott, 2007). This is because it's very unlikely a new idea will emerge perfectly-formed, like Botticelli's Venus from

the sea. According to the canon of ‘replication as innovation’, even where practitioners attempt to apply a well-developed method to broadly similar circumstances they will probably need to make adjustments. This makes the ability to obtain evaluative feedback from tentative initial action and use it to guide modification, into a core practitioner requirement.

Efficient knowledge management

Simply extending the number and range of individual preventive actions properly documented, and meeting the above requirements for selection, replication and innovation, will generate much information. Considerations of *efficiency* alone mean it increasingly needs explicit attempts to organise and manage it. The sheer quantity and diversity of knowledge of Situational Crime Prevention and Problem-Oriented Policing at both practice and delivery levels that is revealed, cited or implied, in the contributions to Knutsson and Clarke (2006) alone, cry out for organisation to make it better available to practitioners. (The same applies to peer-to-peer knowledge bases (Bullock and Ekblom, 2011). Capture, assessment, synthesis, storage and retrieval, dissemination and application require investment in deliberate techniques of *knowledge management*. But sharp-suited KM consultants lacking domain knowledge aren’t enough. They must be complemented by a parallel academic exercise in compression through creation of theories with wide explanatory power, and through theory-integration.

As a rather small cadre of researchers, those working within the SCP/POP field really should be able to get together and reach agreement on elementary terms and frameworks for, say, describing key dimensions of the context of preventive action (e.g. institutional settings) in standard ways. This kind of ‘bread-and-butter’ activity is already under way for example in Eck’s (2003) attempt to classify crime problems, Bowers and Johnson’s (2006) lessons learnt from implementation failure, and Brown and Scott’s (2007) POP guide on implementing responses. But there is still far to go. On the offender-oriented side, the range of models and levels of intervention is wider so the task will be harder. The Youth Justice Board has, however, established a framework called the Scaled Approach,¹³ which promotes a coherent relationship between National Standards, Key Elements of Effective Practice and case management guidance. Although much of this covers justice rather than prevention, some of the latter is incorporated; the general approach is commendable.

Ensuring knowledge and theory frameworks are ‘learning engines’

Knowledge doesn’t stand still. For one thing, as said, crime problems change and offenders adapt. For another, practitioners, researchers and evaluators hopefully continue to innovate, generate new knowledge and evolve new theoretical perspectives. To the capacity to efficiently organise what we already know must be

appended the capacity to add new knowledge or amend existing knowledge. Our knowledge framework therefore must be a 'learning engine', that can adapt to the new and weed out what's old and irrelevant or proven wrong, whilst keeping up with any increasing complexity and maintaining an adequate level of organisation. As an example of an organised learning engine in action over two decades, the techniques of Situational Crime Prevention¹⁴ have cumulatively progressed from 12 to 16 to 25 within the same consistent framework.

The developmental psychologist Piaget (2001) identified two countervailing processes of *adaptive learning* which can be used to articulate how our knowledge structures should evolve. *Assimilation* is about imposing an existing mental framework on the world; *accommodation* about adjusting the framework to fit new things encountered in the world. Development is driven by a continuing process of 'equilibration' between these principles. The term Piaget used for framework was *schema* – defined as the mental representation of an associated set of perceptions, ideas, and/or actions.

Moving smoothly from individual child development to collective learning among academics (maybe not such a great leap), assimilation in our knowledge base is a 'normal' activity of placing new knowledge elements on an existing framework where they can later be retrieved. Using the 25 Techniques as illustration, we can simply file a new exemplar – for example 'laminare the pictures on identity cards so they can't be altered' – under 'Hardening the target'. But where to place 'fit swiveling bar on lock to prevent thief sawing through it'? It still helps the target resist crime, by deflecting force, but this is *target-softening*. Do we simply cram the example into the existing category, amounting to forcible assimilation? Or choose accommodation, the more 'exceptional' activity of modifying branches of the framework itself to better map onto reality? Accommodation might involve expanding the category heading, like 'target hardening or softening'; or adding an additional category of 'target softening' under the column 'increasing the effort'.

This exercise should involve far more than merely dropping additional facts into a folder in a filing cabinet. If new findings are not totally consistent with existing knowledge at the same 'address', some synthesis, including theoretical development, may be required. Ensuring the new and old knowledge reliably come into contact with one another and demand theoretical synthesis (see Pawson, 2006) is therefore an important function of organised knowledge bases.

Using assimilation and accommodation in both knowledge management and theoretical evolution is a way of tracking progressively greater complexity from simple beginnings. In this it resembles Piaget's child-psychological original.

Articulating complexity

If greater complexity in our theories and process models is necessary to address the reality of crime prevention, then we must ensure this doesn't itself create

barriers which practitioners are unwilling or unable to surmount. We must use all available techniques to minimise the obstacles to obtaining, sharing and using knowledge of appropriate complexity. In this section I describe two such approaches: extracting tacit knowledge, and ensuring our process models use a flexible and fluent language.

Extracting tacit knowledge by improving our terminology

The example with which I began this book (and see Chapters 10-15) surprised and delighted both the researchers and the practitioners with the richness of intervention methods and wider practices. But for the systematic interrogation they received, this knowledge would have remained tacit, and thus unavailable for dissemination, assessment, reflection and improvement. It's unlikely that as much detail would have emerged in an unassisted peer-to-peer exchange of knowledge; and that the knowledge would have been cast in generative form (e.g. distinguishing between principle and method).

There will always be tacit knowledge, particularly at the frontier of evolving new skills. And there will always be benefit from apprenticeship-type transfer methods as advocated by Tilley (2006). But to accept a large corpus of tacit knowledge at the heart of preventive practice is unwise. We should ask *why* practitioners are confined to the tacit. Cultural factors (like a certain anti-intellectualism among practitioners) may contribute. But practitioners may be trapped unnecessarily in the tacit because of oversimple, imprecise and piecemeal development of the concepts and language of crime prevention (Ekblom 1996, 2000, 2001, 2002a), as described in Chapter 3. If they lack adequate language tools to articulate practice considerations, what else can practitioners do but remain incoherent?

As already suggested, a little complexity can buy considerable simplicity. Pidgin English is a makeshift language that evolved in colonial times. Pidgin has a limited vocabulary, so enormous circumlocutions are needed to describe simple concepts. For example 'accordion' was rendered 'allsame box you shove him he cry, you pull him he cry'. Building up a hierarchy of concepts and terms to communicate them may add to the practitioner's and researcher's initial burden of learning, but once learned, those concepts become tools for planning and communication which make us smarter throughout our careers. (Dennett (1995) names tools which make us smarter 'Gregorian' after the psychologist Richard Gregory (1981). See also Ekblom (2002a).) They may also become the basis of the practitioner's mental *schema*, as will be seen. (An equivalent view based on elaborating people's individual and collective 'personal constructs' (Kelly, 1950) is possible, as pointed out by Pease (personal communication May 2010).)

So a task for researchers should be to develop, and supply, the language of articulacy in practice. This means *developing a more systematic framework and terminology*.

Flexible, generative language rather than rigid sequence of preventive actions

Crime prevention projects involve diverse actions, from applying the intervention proper (such as teaching an offender anger-management skills); to creating the practical context of implementation (such as arranging for insurance for motorcycling projects); to getting particular people to undertake particular tasks (like recruiting volunteer assistants); and to establishing partnerships to provide a suitable mix of skills and powers (e.g. involving police and probation services). Experience shows that trying to describe this action in linear fashion with a rigid structure of headings simply can't handle the complexity, and indeed makes descriptions hard to write and to read as a coherent story, let alone to search, select and replicate from.

Process models like SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) (Clarke and Eck, 2003) have seen the preventive process as a mainly linear sequence. Brown (2006) presents a model of project management, the 'dynamic project cycle', which is more subtle and complex – and better resembles reality. Actions are continually reviewed, and if necessary revised, at tactical to strategic levels. Brown and Scott (2007) explicitly incorporate this into SARA by describe important, but basic 'adjustment loops': 'replanning' (e.g. modifying schedules) and the deeper but less frequent 'redesigning' (back to the drawing board).

These are useful but don't go far enough. Capturing practice knowledge of complex projects needs the whole process framework to be less *sequence*-like and more *language*-like. For example, sometimes a research phase is needed, not just to identify and understand crime problems, but to help identify suitable partners. And likewise, it's sometimes necessary to establish partnerships before information about problems and offenders can be exchanged and/or jointly analysed. Linguists (like Hauser et al., 2002) describe embedding an action or object within another instance of itself as *recursion*. Related to this, Pawson (2006) refers to complex 'implementation chains' where a series of actions to realise a social programme involve an arbitrary number of transfers of responsibility and nested goals (such as local authorities getting social housing organisations to install security locks on their houses, and getting tenants to use them).

What might be called 'sequential flexibility' predominates in this way of describing action. But we've already seen a *structural hierarchy* of action where one preventive project involves several interventions, each intervention principle is realised by a practical method with its own requirements for mobilisation and partnership, and each method acts by several putative causal mechanisms.

There may also be 'crossover functions' in which, for example, involvement and intervention are realised by the same action. In one housing estate in Ireland, for

example, a problem of arson and stoning of firefighters when they attended the blaze was dealt with by inviting the ringleaders onto firefighters' training courses. This not only created the right *climate* for involvement of firefighters in the neighbourhood, it also served as the intervention itself: in resolving a local conflict at area level; supplying exciting but legitimate things for the young people to do; and supplying role models for acceptable behaviour and attitudes.

Describing a preventive project as an intelligible *story*, coping with recursion, lengthy implementation chains, structural hierarchies of multiple activities and crossover functions is, then, a challenge too demanding for a rigid linear description. The conclusion is that we must adapt our process-model frameworks so they more closely resemble a *language* than an ordered list. Good descriptions of preventive action are thus recognised by the quality of their *grammar* (properly-applied and connected parts of speech) and the expressiveness and precision of their *vocabulary* rather than by their parroted¹⁵ adherence to a specific sequence.

But we needn't confine ourselves to thinking about the grammar of description – we can also contemplate the grammar of *action*. Our capacity for language can apparently effortlessly generate an infinite number of comprehensible grammatical sentences. (This is because of, rather than in spite of, the structured nature of language.) Perhaps researchers and practitioners alike can use an appropriately-designed conceptual framework to generate complex preventive actions which are 'correct grammatical utterances' – plausible in method and structure on the basis of theory and know-what works. This gets to the fundamentals of innovative replication, and innovation proper.

Another way to articulate complexity, not covered here, involves paying attention to *discourse* (for example whether and when to use language that variously talks of purpose, subjective experience, mechanism or technical realisation). Explored further in the final chapter are using *ICT*, and more radically, considering how to raise the level of complexity that practitioners can cope with, by foundation-education using a more sophisticated schema.

Summary

This chapter has begun the move from diagnosis of how shortcomings in our knowledge about crime and prevention contribute to implementation failure, to remedy.

The first suggested step was simply to face up to complexity – neither denying its existence and significance, nor acknowledging it but avoiding tackling it.

The second step was to bestow upon practitioners a greater capacity to innovate and evaluate, as a means of tackling the 'Malthusian knowledge gap'. This concerns the inescapable fact that for a number of reasons, the capacity of professional researchers to document and evaluate good practice is perpetually

outstripped by the variety of preventive actions, the range of contexts, the changing nature of crime and criminals' ever-evolving capacity to adapt and innovate.

The third step was to understand how simplicity and complexity should be maintained in a state, not just of optimal balance, but of creative tension. The optimal balance relates, at a high level of abstraction, to Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety, which states that it takes complexity (in models and frameworks) to control complexity (in the real world). The strategy is to inject a little more complexity into our concepts, terminology and frameworks, to allow practitioners and researchers alike to handle much more complexity out there. Creative tension can best be exploited and addressed through the process of design, which is about resolving conflicting requirements.

To serve this strategy, we considered ways to help theory engage with complexity, principally via the concept of causal mechanisms and the wider Scientific Realist agenda. We considered how to improve process models, and the need for both theory and process to be efficient 'learning engines'. We covered language and education as tools for developing the capacity of practitioners to handle complexity and applied concepts originated by Piaget to understand adaptive learning, both at the level of the knowledge base, and of the individual practitioners acquiring their own mental schema for assimilating and accommodating to new knowledge.

We're now in a position to set out the detailed Specification for a knowledge framework for crime prevention that fits these strategic requirements and the more pragmatic, but equally important, ones identified in Chapter 3.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 6 Specification for a knowledge framework

Now we can develop a detailed Specification for a knowledge framework for crime prevention, combining suggestions from previous chapters. As indicated, I shall use a design-like approach to identify and resolve contradictions and tradeoffs between simplicity and complexity, and between brevity and familiarity of terminology versus articulacy, clarity and precision. The *content* of the knowledge framework will also encourage practitioners to draw on design in their own work. I will be using the language of design, encouraging 'design freedom' in avoiding unnecessary restrictions of choice and execution of preventive action, and recommending design processes including requirements capture, and iterative development and testing. But freedom to innovate will be tempered by attention to clarity and rigour. You might wish the architects of your new office to be bold and creative, but unless you're particularly adventurous you'd equally want them to be disciplined and professional!

In general I aim to connect with other realms of crime prevention (for example Intelligence-Led Policing) and draw on existing terminology, but simultaneously to avoid diluting the principles set out in this Specification, which are there for good reasons.

After restating the purpose of the framework in performance terms, I declare my views on its scope. I then specify requirements from a technical knowledge management perspective. Unsurprisingly, this is followed by how the framework should handle complexity; then come core sections on theory and the model of the preventive process, emphasising replication and innovation. Building on these is a section on performance assessment and evaluation. This is followed by communication and collaboration; education, training and guidance; and organisations and organisation development. Because all these comprise different perspectives on a common set of issues, there's some overlap. But often, fortunately, the same technical feature (such as clarity of terminology) serves multiple requirements (such as analysis, retrieval and communication).

Purpose of framework

The purpose of the knowledge framework specified here is simply *to improve the quality and extend the scope of the performance of crime prevention, community safety and security action*. Good practice needs evidence and theory bases, both of which must grow and adapt to changing circumstances. Secondary purposes of the framework are thus *to systematically obtain and feed 'raw material' into research and theory, and to channel that evidence and theory back to guide practice*.

Performance is defined in terms of the multiple outcome dimensions identified in Chapter 5: cost-benefit, avoidance of undesired side-effects, responsiveness, coverage on the ground, scope of crime problems tackled, timeliness, legitimacy and acceptability, and ethics. *Scope* and *quality* are characterised below.

Scope of framework

Showing the richness of the field we address, the scope of the framework reveals surprisingly many dimensions. Most are subsequently revisited in greater depth. The default position is one of *inclusivity*.

Kinds of knowledge

The knowledge framework should cover all aspects of knowledge identified in Chapter 3: know crime; know-about crime problems; know-what works in what context and how, with what triggering conditions, what *doesn't* work and why, and what does harm; know-who to involve in doing prevention; know-when to act; know-where to distribute resources; know-why (symbolism, values, politics, ethics); and know-how to put into practice – process knowledge. These are reflected in the headings that follow.

Operational level of action

The framework should centre on the *operational practice* level (individual preventive actions linked by a common specific set of operational objectives, like 'reduce domestic burglary in Mapperley'). Direct application to the practice of *individual casework* (for example if the burglary problem stems exclusively from Wayne X, a local prolific offender) is less appropriate, because that requires a specialist process of its own (such as through treatment in prison). However, the targeting and delivery of *streams* of such specialist interventions may be incorporated within a wider *problem- or service-oriented process* that is within scope.

The framework should also contribute to the level of *delivery and/or capacity building*. Here it would aim to supply information on the particular human, financial, technical and informational infrastructure needed to make the project a success, and the general *deliverability* of particular interventions (how straightforward, or demanding and risky, is this kind of project to replicate locally? Does it rely, say, on finding charismatic project leaders? Is the mechanism of prevention tricky to trigger, and context-dependent? Does it rely on forming unlikely partnerships?). The framework should also be suited to handling *programme-type* performance besides that of the individual projects making up the programme. Beyond this level it should contribute to the assembly of information and development of theory applicable at

policy level. But to restate, all these higher levels are served via knowledge emanating from the primary concern with operational practice.

Scales of analysis and action

The framework should handle causes and interventions at all *geographical* scales – micro (e.g. installation of locks, interventions on individual offenders), meso (e.g. creation of enclosures protecting groups of houses, interventions in neighbourhoods and communities) and macro (e.g. city, national, regional or global market). Similarly with *governance*, it should cover interventions implemented locally, nationally or internationally.

Institutional settings

The framework should apply to a range of institutional settings, given the aim of supplying an integrated view of prevention whether delivered via enforcement, justice, civil institutions like schools or industry, or the general public. It should be suited to corporate/organisational practices and memory besides individual practitioners.

The political and emotional dimension

The framework should be sensitive to political and emotional aspects of crime but not driven by these. Perhaps optimistically, I assume rational planning and scientific, evidence-based preventive intervention can occur even in highly emotional and political circumstances driven by principles of justice and perhaps feelings of fear or revenge. This requires that the interface is carefully and explicitly handled rather than deliberately blurred. Here, the ‘know-why’ dimension (Ekblom, 2002a; Freiberg, 2001) is important to capture and reflect in the preventive process. However, even this attempt to bring divergent perspectives together may sometimes break down, as Pawson’s (2006) review of attempts to control sex offenders within the community reveals.

Crime types

The framework should handle everything from conventional crime, disorder and antisocial behaviour to organised crime and terrorism. The actions, motives and contexts in these domains are diverse. But there’s enough in common for a single process framework, perhaps a single causal framework – with variations – to integrate the field (an example is Roach et al., 2005). The system- and/or cyber-dimensions should also be included, although again they may need variations of terms and concepts applying to crime in ‘meatspace’ – the physical world.

Preventive methods and approaches

All kinds of preventive methods should be describable by the framework, giving practitioners, delivery managers and policymakers the widest choice of intervention. The basic orientation should range from situational (including Design Against Crime and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) to offender-oriented. The approaches should include conventional crime prevention and reduction, community safety, reassurance and security. The central focus should be on the criminal event, but the framework should be extendable to cover interventions aimed at influencing prolonged problems such as hotspot aggregations; holistic solutions to crime problems centring on products, areas or buildings; holistic solutions to offender problems, offender development and criminal careers. Scope of methods shouldn't be constrained by current institutional settings.

Theoretical orientations, causal levels and approaches to risk

The framework should handle the widest range of scientific theories of causation of crime, at all ecological levels from individual to global via families, peers, communities, institutions and so forth. It should encompass interventions based on both causes and empirical correlates of offending captured as risk and protective factors. Incorporation of other risk models (e.g. risk management) should be considered.

Harms and benefits

The framework should support an approach which includes, but goes well beyond, the narrow concern with reducing the frequency of criminal events. It should cover wider harm reduction issues, whether these are the harms of crime to be prevented or any harmful side-effects of prevention itself. It should articulate community safety benefits expressed in terms of quality-of-life, social cohesion and inclusion, health, education, environmental quality (e.g. illegal waste dumping) and sustainability.

Action-oriented and descriptive

The framework should be capable of *guiding* preventive action as well as merely *documenting* it. Only by testing the utility of its captured knowledge through replication and innovation can the performance and value-added contribution of the framework itself be assessed and improved.

Evaluative

Finally, the framework should be evaluative as well as descriptive. Evaluation is covered in depth below.

Knowledge management requirements

Having established the scope of the framework, we now set out the proposed knowledge management requirements. We start with some basics, then come more sophisticated requirements applying to social/scientific knowledge on crime and its prevention.

The basics

The complexity of crime and its prevention necessitate explicit incorporation of knowledge management principles and practice. Basic technical aspects of knowledge management include:

- Standardised, well-defined terminology and concepts – but allowing flexibility and ‘wriggle room’ to facilitate adaptation and innovation.
- Concerned with quality of content.
- Where relevant, operationalisable and measurable.
- Efficient at capturing and consolidating the knowledge, and retrieving and disseminating it. This requires organisation: any knowledge base should go far beyond a heap of individual case studies to be mindlessly data-mined. Organisation in turn requires well-developed typologies.
- Capable of using diverse knowledge transfer methods in diverse organisational circumstances.
- Supporting a culture of continuous improvement.
- Communicable and learnable.
- Supporting communication and collaboration, as below.

Beyond the basics

More sophisticated requirements apply to managing social and scientific knowledge and the research-led practice and practice-led research that accompanies it, and in particular to the *practical reality of crime and its prevention*.

- Acting as a *cumulative learning engine*, capable of both assimilation of new knowledge and accommodation to challenging new content. This means building new knowledge progressively onto what’s already known. But this isn’t just about piling new floors on top of the House of Knowledge. It may not always require the addition of new material, but sometimes just the capacity to dismantle and rebuild. The vision is therefore that of *reconfigurable* scaffolding and partitions rather than permanent walls and floors.

- Fundamental connection to *theory and mechanism*, and evolution and synthesis of said theory; encouragement of two-way flow between theory and practice. Theory is covered in depth below.
- More generally an *analytic* approach rather than one which organises knowledge solely on surface features, such as which institution does what, or which preventive methods defend the same kind of target.
- Proper respect for *evaluation methods and quality standards*, and a *filtering or rating capacity* based on these standards (further discussed below).
- Serving *diverse users*: both the scientific leading edge and, adjusted as appropriate, practitioners, public and politicians. The same underlying concepts should be expressible at a range of levels from simple to complex, according to user needs and abilities, and encouraging user progression.
- *Future-proofed*: adaptable to changing circumstances. These changes may originate within crime itself (offenders adapting to currently-successful crime prevention interventions, or particular actions becoming criminalised or decriminalised). They may alternatively come from outside. New tools for crime may appear (like pocketable cutting torches). The institutions dealing with crime may undergo change (such as the rise of Intelligence-Led Policing (Ratcliffe, 2008) or the assumption of crime prevention functions by the urban planning system). New technologies for crime prevention may arrive (like graffiti-resistant building materials, intelligent CCTV, scope to embed security within an intelligent, internet-linked home). Changes in the wider environment for crime prevention could include shifts in priorities in energy conservation (profligate use of security lighting is no longer acceptable); or in resilience to terrorism or climate change. Changes in values may also occur, like the balance between privacy and security. Technically speaking, generic *processes, principles* and *analytic frameworks* contribute more to longevity than individual items of content or structure.
- A *weeding* functionality, to remove time-expired knowledge, which is a particular problem with crime prevention. Given, though, that subsidiary elements of some now-defunct action may still be of use elsewhere, it's important to be cautious in what is jettisoned. Quite a lot of 'nutrition' can usually be extracted before the empty shell is discarded. Besides, some record should be kept of what has worked in the past but no longer does, supplying raw data for the study of processes of change and evolution. And old preventive ideas may still work in some places (for example where there is still use of horse transport). Moreover, old crime problems and old perpetrator techniques can re-emerge in new guises, as the UK Foresight Programme's review of cybercrime (Collins and Mansell, 2004) noted.
- Support for innovation (covered in depth below).

Theory

The framework should be oriented towards theory in general. This is because of the importance, for practice, of connecting with the tested, generative knowledge of causation and intervention that theory can (in theory) provide (Eck, 2005). It also follows from theory's role at the heart of the cumulative scientific and practical 'learning engine'. Unless otherwise stated, reference to 'theory' in this book implies this generic sense rather than any particular theory.

When it does come to particular scientific theories, the framework should aim to encompass as wide a range as possible, and shouldn't favour one or other individual theory or theoretical orientation. This is for three reasons:

- Simply to support the widest choice of crime prevention interventions and diminish the fragmentation of the field (especially between situational and offender-oriented approaches, enforcement and civil intervention settings, and sociological versus psychological perspectives). A fully problem-oriented approach makes no presupposition about the kinds of causes of crime it will be tackling or kinds of intervention to be applied.
- To be able to handle interactions, and identify gaps, overlaps and true rivalries for explanation, a range of theories must be capable of being mapped out and 'joined up' within the framework, using a common language.
- To acknowledge the fact that at any given time nobody can foresee which currently competing theory will ultimately be proved right or wrong, or shown to be limited; or whether entirely new ones will be constructed. The framework must therefore future-proof itself by avoiding too great a dependence on a single, potentially obsolete theory.

Likewise, the *generative nature* of theoretical understanding should be encouraged and exploited, as should the more specific Scientific Realist emphasis on causal mechanisms, and context/mechanism/outcome configurations. The investigation and exploitation of mechanisms fits well with a *hypothesis-based* approach to prevention (Laycock, 2001).

Making the 'how does it work' question salient (Tilley, 2006; Pawson, 2006) in this way provides a two-way conduit between theory and practice. It's also central to the ability of practitioners to design an intervention in principle, plan its realisation through a particular method, implement, monitor and adjust, and then evaluate – all in a well-articulated and communicable way which supplies an intelligible rationale for action and a guide to replication and innovation.

In more specific terms, the theory within the framework should centre on the *proximal or immediate causes of criminal events*, to convey a sharp focus, be of manageable size and complexity and automatically combine offender and situational perspectives. Here, it should aim to cover the key interactions between situation and offender which generate the complex dynamics of criminal events. From this

platform it's possible to dive down into neuroscience, biochemical and genetic causation and intervention, and to climb up through emergent *ecological levels* such as inter-group, network or community processes. Theory (especially its detailed expression in terms of interactive causal mechanisms) should support the development of practitioners' and scholars' understanding of the interplay with *context* at each of these levels and at each stage of the preventive process. Likewise an appreciation of holistic *configurations* of causes (Chapter 5).

Accompanying theory of the *causation* of criminal events should of course be theory of *intervention* in preventing those events. It's again vital for the theory in question to be *integrated* rather than fragmentary, to express the range of causes and interventions in a *common language* and to be centred on a *common perspective* (the criminal event and its occurrence and non-occurrence). As argued in Chapter 5, we need an *integrated map of the causes of criminal events* and a related *map of the principles of intervention* in those causes.

The range of theory within scope of the framework shouldn't just be confined to the central, twin domain of the causation of crime and intervention. Each task of the preventive process, and each layer of detail, has its own theoretical basis. Theory of participation, theory of partnership, theory of complex adaptive systems... even theory of galvanisation of alley-gates may be relevant in some way. Likewise, we must develop theory underlying the quality-of-life side of community safety (including for example, approaches to happiness (Layard, 2005), and of the causation and wider impact of *harmful consequences* of crime and criminal events. The latter connects with the field of security and that of risk management, where hazards may be economic or natural rather than confined to human threat. In general, following Pawson (2006), building theory at 'middle-range' is most appropriate for this wider crime prevention knowledge: neither too specific leading to microscopic, isolated and context-bound understandings, nor too generic and abstract to be practically applicable.

Handling the complexity of crime prevention

The framework should be capable of organising and managing both *complicated* and *complex* knowledge of crime and crime prevention.

However, complexity shouldn't be pursued for its own Baroque sake. The tendency to develop detail and sophistication should be kept in dynamic tension with the tendency to simplify. The balance should be determined by the complexity of reality out there; available, reliable and useful detail of knowledge on the relevant topic; the capacity of the users to handle the complexity in question; and judgement (preferably, evidence) of the added value in performance terms of the additional complexity under consideration. The underlying principle is *to inject a modicum of organised complexity into the framework, in order to simplify practitioners' task of coping with the far greater and more confusing complexity in the field.*

The ‘injection of organised complexity’ requires several solutions:

- Making room for complexity where it counts, by *simplifying fundamentals* – removing *unnecessary* complication, as with duplicate or vague terminology and disjointed theory.
- Enabling the efficient *articulation of complexity* by attention to terminology (below); developing integrated theoretical models.
- Drawing on all the tricks of IT to handle the necessary complexity, as efficiently and painlessly as possible. Graphic and interactive design are vital – diagrams, icons, drop-down menus, way-markers, pop-up or ‘hovering’ definitions, guidance of users through complex choice sequences by simple steps with only relevant information on view at any one time, and so on.
- Attending to *interactions, holistic configurations and emergent properties* at different *ecological levels* from individuals to society.
- Emphasising the *richness of humans*: perception, experience, motivation and emotion, and instrumental choice and the pursuit and execution of goals, whether this concerns people acting as offenders or playing other roles such as crime preventers; considering both individuals, organisations and complex adaptive social and technological systems.

Communication and collaboration

Given that knowledge management’s immediate purpose is to capture and redistribute knowledge from practitioners and scholars, it makes significant demands on communication. This applies whether the communication is of the informal practitioner-to-practitioner kind, or via some formal knowledge-sharing or teaching system that articulates otherwise tacit knowledge and practice; and whether national or international. Communication doesn’t just deliver information, but facilitates *collaboration*, whether informal or via some partnership arrangement. To quote Hastings (2009: 9),

Partnerships are necessary, and the capacity to collaborate is the fundamental building block of success in this area. This in turn will depend on our ability to establish a common language, to come to agreement on goals and strategies, and to devise a common approach to evaluation and accountability.

Communication and collaboration are facilitated by the conceptual and terminological precision tools already beneficial for analysing problems, causes and consequences, and for contemplating and planning action. As implied in Chapter 3, cross-disciplinary and international knowledge transfer and collaboration stand to benefit from such clarity. The more explicit and unambiguous the terminology, the easier it is to translate. Articulacy also supports *reflective practice*, whether undertaken individually or collectively. Clarity is important in all kinds and contexts

of preventive action, but especially helps communication and collaboration on *holistic* interventions.

Communication isn't only about content-knowledge: *navigation and placement* are vital. It's important for practitioners, delivery managers and others collaborating, or just exchanging information, to know and communicate what *level of action* they are talking about – operational practice, delivery in the form of capacity building and capacity development, policy, public understanding and debate, politics or governance.

In designing the framework there are some key tradeoffs. The framework must be communicable at several levels: to the novice/trainee practitioner; the expert practitioner; their (possibly generalist) managers; lay people involved in projects or simply as interested members of the public; press and politicians. At the other extreme, it should allow leading-edge theorists and action-researchers to communicate efficiently. Jargon is good for economy of communication provided terms are clearly-defined; but bad for transparency, and for exclusion of lay collaborators. There is no right answer here, but the experience in medicine shows it's possible, without sacrificing high-level practitioner or scientific capability, to convey knowledge between people with radically different levels of understanding. Accompanying the clear terminology itself there must be a positive *working culture* of clarity, to avoid continual dilution by everyday confusions and ambiguities, which the politicisation of crime policy continually injects.

On the technical side of requirements, much has already been specified under the basics, such as standardised terminology. Other necessary features include:

- Reduction of spurious complication by minimising unnecessary synonyms (or worse, half-synonyms).
- Explicit communication of meaning, *denotatively*, rather than *connotatively* through nuance and flavour.
- The terms and concepts must be clearly stated in a consistent, interlocking suite of *definitions-in-depth*, where not only the individual terms, but the *relationships* between the terms via the underlying concepts they refer to, are designed (see Ekblom and Sidebottom's (2007) attempt at this for product security in a suite of 31 interlinked terms).
- Terminology should be cumulative and only change for substantive reasons (for example a new theory or method emerges which needs accommodation rather than assimilation within existing terms), not for spurious ones (a new policy director or politician decides to give the impression of change). It should be distanced from institution-based definitions, and transcend institutional boundaries.
- The framework should be articulated in a flexible and adaptable way that more closely resembles a *language* with vocabulary and grammar than a fixed and

rigidly-structured list. It should be:

- Generative;
- Capable of describing action as a coherent story rather than as a disjointed ‘butcher’s shop poster’, whilst nevertheless clearly identifying distinguishable functional elements of action;
- Supportive of the explicit use of alternative discourses (e.g. functional versus technical, or causal versus goal-directed);
- Capable of handling recursion, complex implementation chains and crossover functions (e.g. where intelligence is obtained to plan and negotiate partnership, or partnership is set up to share intelligence on a crime problem).
- Capable of connecting with meta-data like XML or other markup language to facilitate searching. The more that terms are well-defined and clearly-related to one another in a ‘controlled vocabulary’,¹⁶ the easier to computerise the knowledge base.

Model of preventive process

The framework should be constructed around a model of the *preventive process*, since know-how combines all other kinds of knowledge and is ready-made for capturing and replicating action.

Process itself should be considered at two organisational levels: the *operational* level of doing projects and thereby directly preventing crime, and the *capacity-building* level of generating projects, establishing partnerships, mobilising citizens and organisations and more generally building constructive relations with stakeholders.

If practitioners are to be innovative, then we must distinguish between the building of *operational* capacity (supplying practitioners with ready-made solutions to regular problems such as designs of secure bicycle stands (Thorpe et al., 2009), and the building of *innovative* capacity (supplying them with techniques to creatively generate, critique and test new ideas), as elaborated below.

The process model should capture the *structured nature* of preventive action, from programmes to projects or casework, to mechanisms. This requires definition and consistent use of labels like *programme, project, method, mechanism*.

The process model should fit with *sophisticated project management frameworks* like the ‘dynamic project cycle’ described for example by Brown (2006).

Selection, replication and innovation requirements of process model

The framework should support the key process tasks of *identification and clarification* of the crime, safety or security problem, *searching and selection* of action from existing knowledge base; intelligent, context-sensitive *replication*; and where prior experience or evidence is lacking, *innovation*.

Identification and clarification are important because it's not always clear whether the 'presenting problem', perhaps defined by complainants, or referred by some agency, constitutes a valid or balanced picture.

Searching should simply be efficient and based on multiple features, both analytic and superficial. Selection should be as open-ended and unrestricted as possible in line with the wide scope of the framework, the inclusive approach to theory and the more particular principle of 'design freedom'. It shouldn't be constrained by institutional settings because crime and its causes and consequences cut right across divisions of labour in society (Ekblom, 2004b). Nor should it be constrained by organisational or administrative habits (Got a robbery problem? Call the robbery squad) of the kind rejected in the pursuit of Problem-Oriented Policing (Goldstein, 1990).

The main criteria for selection should be appropriateness (does the action fit the problem and context?) and (cost-) effectiveness, where possible based on specific evaluative evidence (such as 'vehicle immobilisers have been shown cost-effective in many contexts'). Evaluation requirements are further specified below. As Chapter 3 noted, though, evaluative evidence on specific preventive methods is commonly lacking. In this case the framework should guide practitioners to generate plausible actions using generic, evidence-based first principles.

The framework should acknowledge the close relationship between replication and innovation. Replication, specifically, should be viewed more like redesign rather than cookbook copying, and will inevitably require some innovation itself, if only in tweaking an action to fit a slightly different context. Here, attention to the structure of action, as mentioned above, can be of help. To support replication in different contexts, the framework should collect knowledge of necessary conditions for the action to work, and to be implementable: practical issues, trade-offs and constraints, motivational issues (including rights and responsibilities, acceptance and commitment); also know-why considerations such as ethical, legal, justice-based, political and governmental questions faced at each task or stage of preventive action. Each replication must resolve these matters afresh. Alerting practitioners to the *key dimensions of choice* may be as far as a knowledge base can get in some circumstances, but this is no small contribution to their performance. Knowledge of such tradeoffs and issues should help delivery and policy people as well as practitioners.

Design-type approaches (see for example Thorpe et al., 2009, and the UK Design Council's 'Double Diamond' process¹⁷) should be incorporated within the process model. Iteration will normally progress from generalised ideas of intervention principles and methods tested out in the designer's head, to more fully-

worked out paper proposals, to pilot trials, to full operations, with feedback and adjustment or even radical redesign (Brown and Scott, 2007) undertaken as necessary.

To support innovation, the framework should use all means of fostering a generative approach, as described above (theory, mechanism, the analytic principle-practical method distinction, and language). Both to capture practice in sufficient detail, and provide for innovative *recombination* of elements, the description of preventive action should be progressively broken down into distinct *tasks* undertaken at successive stages of the preventive process, which can be organised under generic headings (e.g. 'mobilisation of preventers'). Innovation can also benefit from careful importation of cross-disciplinary expertise and concepts from, say, architecture, health and hard science.

Performance assessment and evaluation

The framework needs an evaluative side as well as a descriptive side. But the two should be kept distinct: the framework should be capable of describing *any* kind of proposed or actual preventive action, even ineffective ones, without restriction. The alternative assumes accurate and universal foreknowledge of what works, in which case why waste time and money on evaluation!

Types and dimensions of evaluation

We should also distinguish between performance assessment and evaluation proper, although these are clearly related and often use similar data. *Performance assessment* is a regularly-repeated activity which monitors outcome indicators of preventive operations. Its focus is normally the institutional or programme level (how well is this Youth Offending Team or police force doing? Is the Crime Reduction Programme meeting its objectives?) Some sort of target criteria or comparator benchmarks (such as crime rates in reference cities) are employed, perhaps in a formal package relating to outcome targets. Causal and statistical inference are limited though there may be retrospective interpretation of unexpected changes.

Evaluation proper is usually a one-off exercise covering projects, services or programmes. Causal inference and quantification are done through formal comparisons using research designs involving statistical testing (Ekblom and Pease, 1995). Realistic Evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Pawson, 2006) focuses on causal mechanisms and the construction and testing of theory explaining how an intervention works (Eck, 2005), as does the Theories of Change approach (Connell et al., 1995). Estimation of effectiveness may be augmented by assessment of cost-effectiveness.

Systematic reviews of evidence of what works have an obvious place in knowledge management. Chapters 3 and 4 rehearsed the Realistic critique of the methods these normally use. Pawson (2006) suggests constructive, though challenging, ways of building a Realistic equivalent of systematic reviews based, of course, on theory building. Another initiative is the pragmatic Dutch attempt to develop a two-staged review process where a narrow, Campbell-type review of effectiveness is followed by scrutiny and synthesis of causal mechanisms Scientific-Realist style (van der Knaap et al., 2008). Unsurprisingly, the authors noted the difficulty of locating and/or interpolating information on mechanisms from traditionally-written up evaluations. But when this *was* possible, it gave greater credibility to the policy-level users of the findings, and led to their greater application. Evaluations documented using a knowledge framework like that specified here could make their task easier and more reliable.

Process evaluation obviously covers the quality and immediate successes and failures of the activity of doing prevention. However, it's rarely systematic or consistent across studies. Each tends to reinvent the array of questions posed, and these are never the same twice, leaving significant gaps in coverage and failure to cumulate and organise knowledge. Process evaluation has variable methodological standards and is weak on theory-building. It may or may not capture sufficient detail to support replication and innovation.

Specification of framework in terms of evaluation

How should the present Specification align itself with these various alternatives?

Performance assessment is a necessary management tool; but if the criteria and the model it imposes are simplistic then preventive action is inappropriately constrained, creativity and adaptive innovation stifled and achievement limited (Hough, 2006). On the other hand, if the performance assessment regime allows for more complexity and choice then it can fit with the kind of knowledge framework set out here. (Indeed, it can draw on the knowledge framework itself for clearly-defined and generic dimensions of performance to assess.) But evaluation proper fits even better.

Both performance assessment and evaluations proper require *multidimensional outcome criteria* of the kind listed in Chapter 3. Process evaluation plays an obvious role in developing the process model that underlies the present Specification, but this should be *cumulative* (covering progressively greater detail and wider fields of action in a single coherent framework), *theory-oriented* and *systematic*. Only under these circumstances does it become worthwhile attempting to develop a detailed system of *performance and/or quality benchmarks* as per the Beccaria Programme (Marks et al., 2005; Coester et al., 2008).

With its greater capacity for handling complexity and cumulative understanding, and its emphasis on generative theory, the *Realistic approach* as described by Pawson (2006) is the preferred model for systematic review. (This is not to reject methodological rigour, efforts to quantify benefit or the pursuit of negative findings.) And to the extent that ‘typical’ systematic reviews progressively enter the realm of complexity and detail through moderators and mediators, become aligned with theory and report on issues relating to deliverability (definable as replicability plus scope for innovative customising to context), then some major differences between these and Realistic approaches begin to diminish. The combined meta-analysis plus Realistic approach developed by the Dutch is promising, but shouldn’t divert us from Pawson-style syntheses of middle-range theory.

The tricky issue of methodological standards for *impact evaluation* is discussed in Chapter 15.

Evaluation and practice

There’s a pernicious tradeoff between quality and quantity of evaluation findings. In Chapter 5 the case was made for developing practitioners’ capacity for supplying mass evaluation findings as a means of coping with the Malthusian gap between demand and supply of up-to-date practice knowledge of what works in a huge array of contexts. The problem is one of boosting the quality of such evaluations and motivating and assisting the practitioners and their managers to contribute their ‘tithe’ (Ekblom and Pease, 1995) of evaluation knowledge to the common pool. To the extent that practitioners are empowered to play a more ‘consultant-like’ role, developing their evaluative capabilities to a ‘good enough’ degree is a demanding requirement, but perhaps not so unrealistic. It becomes more realistic if practitioners are simultaneously empowered to undertake quality assurance, iterative adjustments, implementation monitoring and reflective improvements to their interventions and to preventive processes in general: these activities also require evaluation-like skills. This strategy must be matched by organisational acceptance of the necessary investment in training, time and expense; and readily-available disaggregated computerised crime statistics/audits to contribute to low-cost and low-effort outcome measures.

It should also be accompanied by a national or international filtering/*rating system* to maintain, or progressively improve, standards for practice evaluations admitted to knowledge bases, such as Beccaria and the sadly quiescent UK IPAK scheme (Improving Performance through Acquisition of Knowledge).¹⁸ Standards can also be enacted through crime prevention awards like the Tilley or Goldstein award, or the European Crime Prevention Award.¹⁹ Rating allows a wider capture of knowledge and lets users or synthesisers make their own decisions. Filtering (which could be iterative, with feedback to contributors on what was needed to meet the standard) guarantees a minimum quality. Some combination seems appropriate.

Criteria for rating should include quality and clarity of evaluation, quality of practice and quality of project description in supporting selection, replication and innovation (aligning with Beccaria principles²⁰); ideally also the degree of theory testing and theory building should count.

Within evaluation, there's a steep tradeoff between desired quality and affordable quantity in terms of effort and opportunity cost. Hence, we must also establish principles for *selective use* of knowledge-capturing and -transferring resources.

Evaluation itself requires *standard terminology*: input, output, intermediate and ultimate outcome – there is currently much variation and confusion in this domain.

Evaluation and research

Evaluation offers a royal road to *test* theory by (quasi-)experimental manipulation of causes, and scrutiny and attribution of effects. Moreover practitioners, acquiring a knowledge schema of the kind advocated here, begin themselves to think more like researchers as well as evaluators. The evaluation-like skills they require to be effective operators move closer to research-like skills if the Scientific Realist approach is adopted, where intervention, monitoring and evaluation require conjecturing and testing hypotheses about what's going on within the treatment.

The raw material which scholars can use to *generate* new theory becomes richer and more plentiful to the extent that descriptions of the preventive process in action routinely capture systematic detail under reliably-used headings. But this of course doesn't absolve us from due diligence on accuracy, bias, reliability and validity.

Education, training and guidance

Education and training are taken to include both early-career foundations and continuing professional development. Education inclines towards conceptual learning and 'underpinning knowledge', training towards practical competence (Ekblom, 2008b; Sasse et al., 2007). Guidance refers to specific knowledge on moderately-to-very specific topics which the practitioner obtains whilst 'on the job' and which can fairly easily slot into existing knowledge frameworks. The balance of effort between dedicated foundation learning versus taking in fundamental knowledge through on-the-job guidance, should ideally favour the former, for the latter may lead to overload and discouragement.

Whatever form education, training and guidance take, the obvious top-level requirement is to convey to practitioners – in a form they are willing and able to acquire and then use – concepts, frameworks and competencies of the kind specified

elsewhere in this chapter. The framework must of course be communicable *itself*. As foundation-level professional education, it must moreover supply a mental *schema* on which all else can build, covering both theory and process. It must endeavour to integrate the field rather than perpetuate fragmentation. As far as possible it must help practitioners articulate the tacit, and support reflective practice and sharing of knowledge. It must provide them with the competence to handle complex crime and crime prevention concepts and practices in a way that respects evidence and rigour, draws on and feeds back to theory, and copes generatively with gaps in knowledge and new crime problems and contexts. Therefore it must *shape the practitioner's mind so it's sufficiently complex and organised to handle the greater complexity and complication of prevention out there; and so it can cope plausibly and well when the limits of detailed knowledge have been reached.*

With on-the-job guidance, the framework should support the conveyance of sophisticated information to practitioners who have received the relevant foundation training and subsequent experience; but it must also be flexible enough to support formats which supply 'quick-start' or 'catch-up' information to those freshly entering the job with limited training. The more a practitioner has acquired and embedded an appropriate mental schema in the past, the *less* is the information needed to describe to them any given preventive method in the present. An abbreviated version will get sufficient information across because it combines with information already in their head to regenerate the full detail. This is equivalent to being told 'the *durian* is a fruit': recipients needn't be told what a fruit is, because that's already in their head; only the extra distinguishing detail about the new exemplar need be conveyed (with the durian, plus a warning!).

To support education, training and guidance the framework must be coherent, consistent, well-connected to underlying theory, and inclusive. It must also be progressive, starting students off with simple introductory concepts and leading them gradually into complexity without confronting them with alarming cliff faces.

Organisations and organisation development

While frameworks must fit with individual practitioners, and practitioner culture/s, they must also suit the organisations in which the practitioners work. They must mesh with existing organisational practices relating for example to performance management, project management, and business models like the UK's National Intelligence Model. They must fit with *partnership* working. They must switch between the detail needed for ground-level practice, to the reduced detail required by immediate line managers of practitioners (who need to know enough to contribute ideas, to guide and to quality-control use of professional knowledge), to the increasingly strategic abstractions of middle and senior management who need only know the outlines of the framework and its content.

But ideally the accommodation by the framework to the organisation should not be at the price of yielding on fundamental principles of knowledge management and quality of practice and evidence. In fact, one could argue that far wider performance benefits would accrue to organisations accommodating to a knowledge management framework of the kind specified here.

The framework must in particular contribute to ‘organisational DNA’ (Kransdorff, 1998): the capacity of an organisation to articulate, communicate, reflect on and share and remember its key working knowledge despite individual experienced staff cycling through posts, dying with their boots on or otherwise leaving the organisation entirely. Frameworks must therefore be supportive of both organisational sustainability and organisational development. Frameworks must be durable too: able to maintain their integrity and utility even when the organisation undergoes significant change.

Knowledge management roles

A final issue is to define the kinds of *roles* people can play in knowledge management: the framework must be designed to meet their needs and suit their abilities. The *primary users* are of course the practitioners, consulting a knowledge base in search of solutions to their problems. *Secondary users* will include delivery managers and researchers. *Contributors* are practitioners whose actions are entered (by themselves or others) on the knowledge base. *Knowledge harvesters* (BSI 2001; Bullock and Ekblom, in press) are expert, variously, in finding, articulating, assessing and documenting knowledge acquired from practitioners. *Consolidators* synthesise the material from individual entries into orderly, concise structures and perhaps extract and articulate underlying principles and theory. *Knowledge transferors* variously create guides and toolkits, or develop and deliver education and training. The roles may overlap, in that, say, an expert, articulate practitioner can play all of them.

Conclusion

This chapter has set out a surprisingly full Specification for a framework to manage crime prevention knowledge. Hopefully it meets the recommendations of the United Nations (2006) cited in Chapter 1. Likewise, scholars or delivery managers can debate, and hopefully contribute to, the exact content of the Specification (via <http://5isframework.wordpress.com>). If they are content with the Specification but disagree with my proposed realisation of it, they can still use the Specification, and the diagnosis on which it drew, as a basis for their *own* attempt to design a framework.

The Specification can supply criteria by which to assess the added-value of any framework attempting to realise it – such as the 5Is. This is discussed further in Chapter 16.

Finally, it's worth restating the sobering observation that no knowledge framework, however well-specified, realised and populated, can improve the performance and scope of crime prevention practice without equal attention to the infrastructure and wider delivery system. This includes the education, support and quality-assurance of practitioners, and the development, performance and monitoring of their organisations. But such activities can adequately be done only in detailed awareness of the tasks to be undertaken in crime prevention practice.

Chapter 7 Introducing the 5Is Framework

This chapter gives a first view of the 5Is framework. After an account of the historical background to its development over some two decades involving experience from the UK, the wider European scene and North America, 5Is is introduced. Then some major foundations are set out. The central purpose of 5Is is described in relation to three main groups of users – practitioners, delivery managers and policymakers. Moving from function to structure, the essential features and descriptive conventions of 5Is are stated in ways consistent with the Specification in Chapter 6. (Given this is an introductory chapter, some features of 5Is will be presented as assertions, whose rationale will be explained subsequently.) Where appropriate, these features are contrasted with those of alternative frameworks. Foundation work continues in the next two chapters which flesh out the central 5Is process model with conceptual and institutional definitions, and with a specific, inclusive and integrated approach to the causes of crime and mechanisms of intervention. Detailed exposition of each of the Is is introduced in Chapter 10 and the Is themselves presented in Chapters 11-15.

Historical background: stop-start

The 5Is label was first introduced at the Aalborg conference of the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) in 2002 (see Ekblom 2002c), for standardising information on good practice descriptions of crime prevention projects across member states. But the central ideas have a long history. In an early guide to crime pattern analysis (Ekblom, 1988), I introduced the term *preventive process* as a generic label for the rational, ‘action research’ model of crime prevention applied and developed in the UK Home Office and North America from the mid-70s, which also engendered the ‘SARA’ process of Problem-Oriented Policing (Eck and Spelman, 1987; Clarke and Eck, 2003). As practical experience of crime prevention developed, and as UK government policy increasingly supported local, civil crime prevention (culminating in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998), a growth in explicit training for crime prevention occurred. Various national working groups and projects arose with an interest in the ‘core competencies’ of doing crime prevention.

In parallel, an attempt to classify the preventive schemes implemented within the UK Safer Cities Programme led to a framework – *Proximal Circumstances* (Ekblom, 1994, 1996) – which sought to draw together current situational and offender-oriented theories of crime and its prevention. As the training interest grew, this was revised and relabelled as the *Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity* (as described in Chapter 9). CCO expanded piecemeal from its initial focus on causes and interventions to take in process elements (Ekblom, 2001). A range of professional groupings in UK crime prevention (including NACRO and Crime Concern) came together to design standardised ways of describing preventive action

for a case studies-type knowledge base, around a CCO format. However, this was interrupted when a Home Office minister decided he urgently wanted a suite of toolkits. Efforts to implement a standardised framework and language for these were defeated by time and organisational politicking, so a minimalist position was reached where an introduction to the CCO was put on the then new Home Office-sponsored Crime Reduction website (mummified from May 2010) where it sits to this day alongside other frameworks in the 'Learning Zone'.

Meanwhile, a multi-national Council of Europe project to introduce crime prevention into Ukraine (Alexandersson et al., 1999) had identified the importance of transferring good practice via specifying generic crime prevention *tasks* combined in a process model, rather than suggesting organisational *structures* (which, in post-communist Ukraine, were in flux). I then explored in depth the transfer of good practice knowledge in the context of crime prevention programmes in a paper *From the Source to the Mainstream is Uphill* (Ekblom, 2002a). This was based on the growing experience of implementation failure in the UK Crime Reduction Programme and its predecessors (as described). This laid much conceptual groundwork for knowledge management in crime prevention. Aware of this work, and of wider input to the nascent European Crime Prevention Network (Ekblom, 2002d), the Danish Crime Prevention Council invited me to develop a framework for capturing and sharing that good practice when they organised the first good practice conference of the network (in Aalborg). I decided to hive off the process elements that had accreted around the CCO and refashion them into a separate process-related knowledge capture framework. 5Is was the result, while CCO continued to evolve as a more narrowly-defined companion framework centring on causes and interventions, as described in Chapter 9.

Detailed subheadings of 5Is and initial guidance materials²¹ were worked up in relation to the first UK example project description using 5Is – the Stirchley Burglary prevention project (Ekblom, 2002c; Home Office, 2004); and further refined in two more for the same conference (on a youth inclusion project and national initiatives against mobile phone robbery). Although 5Is was developed to capture good practice *descriptions* it was realised it could become the backbone of an *action-process* to help guide practitioners undertaking the tasks of crime prevention. Furthermore, both modes could contain an evaluative, prescriptive aspect reflecting quality standards and benchmarks.

Subsequent progress was limited as little official time was available to further develop 5Is within the UK Home Office (where I then worked), which also appeared averse to imposing a single, unifying knowledge management framework upon either the UK practice world or of supporting one within EUCPN. This was seriously mooted, however, at a Paris seminar of 2004 (Ekblom, 2004a). (As Oscar Wilde might have said, 'There's only one thing worse than a knowledge management framework: *several* knowledge management frameworks.') This book now resumes the development of 5Is, so frustratingly halted.

5Is introduced

The 5Is framework comprises five top-level *task streams* of the preventive process, and associated *products* of those tasks which are passed from one task to the next or out into the real world. They are normally presented, with variations, in the following sequence, but note from the outset that they are really five interlinked *themes*, with flexible possibilities for ordering as will be discussed below. Given this, and the mutual reference between the tasks, it helps to peruse the following list more than once.


- *Intelligence* – the tasks of gathering and analysing information and knowledge on crime, its nature, causes and harmful consequences. Its purpose is to inform the specification of crime prevention and community safety aims and priorities to be Implemented; the planning and design of the preventive Intervention/s and the other tasks that follow. Each of the other three Is has its own subsidiary intelligence requirements.
- *Intervention* – the task of Intervention responds to the requirements for action revealed by Intelligence, by designing and planning practical *methods* to realise particular intervention *principles*. These all aim to block, divert or weaken the causes, and attend to risk and protective factors, of *future* criminal events and careers or of wider community safety problems – so the probability of their occurrence, and the harm they cause, is reduced. Beyond this primary preventive focus, Intervention can also include stopping *ongoing* harmful events and processes and mitigating harm *already done*. Here, it combines *local* evidence from Intelligence, and *generic* evidence from what-works knowledge and theory. The Intervention task is the defining focus for describing crime preventive, security and community safety action.
- *Implementation* – the wider set of practical and managerial tasks required to *realise the plans and designs* for methods of Intervention, and of the other main tasks of the preventive process. Implementation operates at levels ranging from the specific intervention *methods* themselves, to *projects and services* applying sets of methods, to *processes* like recruitment, training or management of the ‘final delivery unit’ such as a youth centre or an ad hoc project team. 5Is focuses on the first but attends to the rest.
- *Involvement* – tasks specifically focusing on getting *other people and/or agencies* to understand, accept, and undertake, share or support the tasks, roles and responsibilities of implementing preventive interventions; or to otherwise support them by alleviating constraints, boosting enablers and establishing a receptive climate. Involvement and Implementation should be viewed as two intertwined streams – the one *people*-focused, the other *task*-focused. *Outbound* Involvement operates through partnership, mobilisation, consultation and climate-setting, among other processes. *Inbound*

Involvement operates via the response of crime prevention practitioners to demand; their recruitment to serve wider aims such as inclusion or economic regeneration; or the task of giving account to other organisations.

- *Impact* – gathering and presenting evidence of effectiveness and related evaluative information on the intermediate and ultimate outcomes of the preventive action. This is variously for use as feedback in improving performance of the current preventive action; guiding decisions on continuance, expansion and replication of that action; accountability; or ‘export’ to the collective evidence base. *Process* evaluation isn’t a separate task stream but can be undertaken throughout the other ‘I’ tasks: wherever there is a process, it can be evaluated, learned from and improved. However, a culminating overview of Implementation and Involvement achievements is required as part of reporting on Impact evaluation.

These top-level tasks are more fully described in subsequent chapters, in each case split into subsidiary tasks. The resemblance to, and compatibility with, the SARA process of Problem-Oriented Policing is clear, as Figure 7.1 shows:

[Figure 7.1 Relationship of 5Is and SARA] [*hi-res artwork on separate file*]



Like 5Is, SARA supports iterative feedback and adjustment loops (Brown and Scott, 2007) not shown in Figure 7.1. The obvious distinctions between the frameworks at this stage are first, the pooling of SARA’s Scanning and Analysis tasks under Intelligence; and second, the division of the amorphous Response stage of SARA into three distinct tasks within 5Is. The first appears to gloss over a valuable practical distinction but in fact the Scanning-Analysis divide is preserved under the subsidiary tasks of Intelligence (Chapter 11). The second is a deeper difference, reflecting the requirement to handle the rich complexity of preventive action (an oversimplification acknowledged, within the Problem-Oriented Policing world, by Scott (2006)). Involvement appears implicitly within more recent formulations of SARA’s companion model of causes and interventions, the Crime Triangle. Each of the intervention points (target, offender, location) has a counterpart ‘crime preventer’ role (guardian, handler, place manager). However, these are

limited in scope, depth and flexibility. One might say overall that whereas SARA brought to the practice world the systematic analysis of the crime problem, the importance of a problem-appropriate response, and evaluation, 5Is in building upon SARA, brings systematic and detailed analysis and design of Intervention, Implementation and Involvement options too.

The two frameworks are readily linked: ‘Scanning and Analysis for Intelligence’; ‘Response through Intervention, Implementation and Involvement’; and ‘Assessment for Impact evaluation’. As articulated here SARA appears more action-oriented and 5Is more knowledge-oriented, but this is a matter of language – either framework can switch discourse from *task* to *product* of task. All this supports transfer of learning of both process and content; in fact, there’s little detailed structure to *unlearn* from SARA when transferring to 5Is. It also supports ‘interoperability’: any description of practice written in SARA terms can readily be understood in 5Is terms and vice-versa.

But further differences between the frameworks emerge below. This partly stems from structural *features* of 5Is that aim to make it fitter for purpose. But it partly also follows from functional *scope*: 5Is aims to meet the knowledge requirements of a range of approaches beyond purely problem-oriented ones and/or situational crime prevention.

A functional equivalent to SARA is CAPRA (Deukmedjian and de Lint, 2007), introduced by the RCMP: *Clients Acquiring and analysing information, Partnership, Response, and Assessment*. In distinguishing between *Partnership* and *Response*, this begins to differentiate action but as will be seen, the Involvement task of 5Is, where partnership knowledge is located, is more generic and inclusive. The *Clients* aspect of CAPRA is an important element not explicitly seen in SARA, which reflects the *initiation* of preventive action by various stakeholders; it’s somewhat equivalent to ‘Demand’ in the Metropolitan Police problem-solving model. 5Is acknowledges the importance of this task and covers it explicitly.

5Is has been deliberately *designed* to fit the understanding of crime prevention and community safety, and the diverse and sometimes conflicting requirements for managing knowledge of crime and what to do about it, that were summarised in Chapter 6. But this is only a beginning. Under appropriate pressure and feedback 5Is can evolve towards an ever-better fit, and greater internal consistency; and the knowledge management requirements which it aspires to meet can themselves evolve, albeit more slowly, in an exercise of deliberate reflective practice.

What and who is 5Is for? A functional definition

5Is is an action-oriented *knowledge management and application framework* intended to improve and extend the performance of crime prevention, security and community safety action. Its primary focus is on the work of ground-level

practitioners of diverse backgrounds. But it also aims to help programme delivery managers and policymakers in this domain meet their equivalent aims and objectives through their own activities of direction, support, guidance and quality assurance for practice. 5Is further aims for sensitivity to issues of public understanding and debate, and governance. As will be seen in Chapter 16, besides its primarily practical purpose it's also a research tool. 5Is aims for universal applicability across all approaches to crime prevention.

5Is for practitioners

The 5Is *tasks* aim to combine *evidence and experience* – covering the crime problem, the context, what works and how to realise it. In functional terms, and at the *operational* level, 5Is aims to help practitioners to:

- *Identify and clarify* the crime and community safety problem/s, causes or risk factors they seek to tackle. Problem is used here inclusively, covering not just the conventional POP definition centring on criminal events, but also for example the problem posed to a locality by a particular set of offenders with particular criminal careers and predispositions – that is, the *potential* to generate criminal events.
- *Search and select*, from the body of existing knowledge and experience, good practice appropriate to the problem, context, causes or risk factors, and their own resources and circumstances.
- *Replicate* the preventive action customised to their own problem, causes or risk factors and context.
- *Innovate* intelligently, given the many problems and contexts where no well-documented and well-evaluated good practice examples yet exist.

5Is for programme delivery managers

Programme delivery managers, charged with converting policy into practice, aim to assure and improve the performance of the practitioners and practice organisations within their purview. They may also seek to extend that practice to cover more of the same crime problems in new contexts, and broaden its scope to tackle new kinds of problem. To these ends they may supply funds, guidance and other resources, set targets and standards, and monitor processes, outputs and outcomes. They will especially focus on building the *operational and innovative capacities* of their practitioners, whether as individuals, teams or organisational units like youth centres or local community safety departments.

Expressed in these functional delivery-level terms, the 5Is framework is primarily intended for *capturing, assessing, consolidating and transferring knowledge of good practice among practitioners*. However, each 5Is description of a

project can lead seamlessly from an account of ‘what the action was’, and ‘whether well or badly performed’, to a structured and systematic account of ‘the organisational and infrastructural reasons why the particular action was taken and why it was well or badly performed’. These latter factors are the responsibility of delivery managers to exploit and promulgate, or to remedy, as appropriate, whether by local action or by referral upwards to top-level programme managers. Process models and material expressly for the purpose of guidance of *delivery* (such as the UK Home Office’s *Guidance for Effective Partnerships* (Home Office, 2007)) can incorporate the delivery-level knowledge captured by 5Is.

5Is for policymakers

Ministers or administrators obviously wish delivery managers and practitioners alike to successfully implement their policies. There should thus be an unbroken thread of logic, theory and evidence connecting the three levels of activity. Policymakers in particular will want to know broadly what works, what problems and contexts the action can cover, and what other policy areas it will support, synergise with or antagonise (and what undesired side-effects it may generate). They will also want to know what policies and strategies are *deliverable*. Existing approaches have failed to support this upward flow of information. For example, a major Australian government review of good practice (AGD, 2004) sought to address what it saw as a serious inability to inform policy with practice-originated knowledge.

Expressed in these terms, the 5Is framework is intended to help *assemble and organise the body of knowledge connecting policy to practice via delivery, and to help policymakers select and design policies capable of being delivered at acceptable cost, timescale and risk.*

Having highlighted the distinction between practice, delivery and policy, it’s worth mentioning that these activity domains can exist within a range of public and private institutions and at a range of geographical levels. So, for example, even the smallest local community safety team may make policy decisions or undertake delivery activities besides basic practical operations; and an initiative to improve the security of cars or electronic products could take the form of a national- or even international-level project.

The politics and governance levels

Politics covers both *decision-making* as it affects values, ethics, interests and interest groups, and wider *public understanding and debate*. Although Adam Sutton (1996) calls these the ‘interesting bits’, 5Is has a purely pragmatic interest in politics. It’s concerned with how the practice and processes of handling the political issues that arise within crime prevention are accomplished (such as how to handle ‘deservingness’ when young offenders are sent on educational visits which could be

construed as ‘treats’), and how the knowledge can then be transferred. As Sutton et al. (2008) note, effective crime prevention performance requires sensitivity and skill in politics and advocacy as well as in specific practical contexts. Mike Sutton’s (1996) process study of the UK Safer Cities Programme illustrates the political practice issues encountered by the local prevention teams. From a mainly US policing perspective, Scott and Goldstein (2005) review the practice of handling the litigious and constitutional issues raised when diverse business interests and political views are awakened and engaged (perhaps, too, enraged) when police seek to intervene in the civil world.

Sutton et al. (2008) and Homel (2008) see *governance* as the key to a successful crime prevention strategy. To a large extent this is beyond the issue of practice knowledge where 5Is is centred. But the performance of governance can itself be supported by relevant practice knowledge, especially since governance is not purely a central government issue but reaches down into communities where preventive action is often inaugurated and implemented. Governance-level issues may thus be included within 5Is knowledge capture if the processes and systems for regulation, consultation and decision-making are an important part of the context needed to make certain interventions work, or to make them acceptable to those who deliver or receive them. Indeed, the co-production of safety and security described under Involvement fundamentally connects to governance at micro to macro levels. Institutional arrangements concerning governance and delivery issues resurface in the next chapter.

International application

From its origins within the EUCPN, 5Is was intended to provide a means of sharing good practice internationally. The drive for clear, in-depth definitions may occasionally seem a hindrance to ‘getting on with the job’ or ‘telling it simply’, but clarity and a fuller spelling-out is especially important where users of languages other than the original English are concerned. In 5Is, this clarity is aided by supporting the definitions of the five top tasks with more detailed subheads. These serve to illustrate what, for example, the concept of Involvement means in practice, and do so far better than a single, neat definitional phrase.

Other users/uses for 5Is are discussed in Chapter 16.

What are the distinctive features of the 5Is framework?

The distinctive features of 5Is are intended to meet the Specification, and more generally to create a workable system. They are exemplified in practice in subsequent chapters.

Process with purpose

5Is is, at heart, a *process* model of crime prevention and community safety. This implies a structured sequence of *tasks*; the term ‘task’ itself incorporates *purpose*. Process models avoid the too-literal ‘cookbook copying’ shown to jeopardise replication of success stories indifferently to context. They support the kind of future-proofing sought in the Specification because they remain valid despite changes, over time, in content of the crime problems, interventions and contexts. Although process models like SARA are familiar already, the distinctive nature of 5Is in strictly process terms relates to its flexibility and richness.

Although Implementation is a distinct stream of 5Is activity, every task requires a *management/planning* dimension; likewise a *performance* dimension ranging from supervision and monitoring to evaluation. Knowledge on these aspects of process may be important to collect and share.

Flexibility in the order of tasks

The order in which the Is are normally presented, from Intelligence to Impact, reflects the research-led practice model also employed in SARA. But as already acknowledged this is a default sequence. Even the briefest familiarity with real-life prevention reveals the inherent *messiness* of action.

- There are convoluted *implementation chains* to describe (for example, a local government community safety department may wish the education department to influence head teachers to get their staff to deliver certain lessons on ‘civil behaviour’ to their students, this last being the actual Intervention).
- *Parallel actions* are often undertaken under the different I’s. For example, *initiation* tasks of identifying and responding to public demand to tackle particular crime problems, and setting aims, are part of the Implementation stream, pursued largely in parallel with Intelligence tasks like researching causes of crime.
- *Recursion* means that 5Is must describe procedures such as developing a partnership (Involvement) in order to pool Intelligence, or undertaking Intelligence activities in searching for appropriate institutions to mobilise (Involvement).
- The interest in fitting together *reproducible and recombining elements* of action and a more general concern with *progressive detail* makes for a process resembling modular, nested subroutines in computer programming.
- *Feedback* in designing and trialling methods of Intervention and Involvement, and more basic monitoring and adjustment procedures, supports iterative, looping sequences.
- *Initiation* of action may occur at different points of the cycle. *Problem-oriented* approaches begin with Intelligence about the crime problem or perhaps with some initial *demand* from interest groups claiming the existence of a problem.

But *cause*-oriented approaches (Wikström, 2007) start further back, as do those based on *risk and protective factors* (Youth Justice Board, 2005; IYJS, 2009). Some *design*-based approaches start with specifying an ideal solution in functional terms (e.g. ‘this building must be secure whilst convenient, sustainable and aesthetically-pleasing.’). *Case*-based approaches may start with a procedural handover of a young offender requiring some kind of individual treatment. This could trigger parallel action, say, at a community level to address why so many offenders originate from a particular housing estate.

Although we can describe a ‘default’ order of the tasks that comprise 5Is, for the reasons just stated they constitute more of an interlocking *procedural system* than a straightforward linear sequence (hence my deliberate avoidance of the term ‘stages’). Here, the different streams of action and decision repeatedly feed into, and from, one another. 5Is descriptions require flexibility to cope with the diverse starting points, loops, recursions and chains. And as Cherney (2006) notes, there’s a need for the understanding of the problem itself to be flexible, and for the target of problem-solving to adapt, as new information and interpretation emerges. Typically this may occur at the transition from initial scanning of a problem and receipt of demands to ‘do something about X’, to the deeper understanding when more systematic and rigorous analysis has taken place revealing the ‘real’ problem to be Y.

Language-like description

The flexibility just noted can’t easily be handled by descriptions of practice that rely heavily on lists and tables in strict sequence. Early experience compiling 5Is descriptions soon made this apparent. So 5Is has adopted a *language*-like approach to description which allows diverse formats. Here, keywords can appear at any point of a description, whether in prose text, lists or tables; and can be searched for, wherever they occur in the account of preventive action. And analytically-dissected descriptions of individual elements of action – tasks – can be accompanied by an intelligible and logical *story* of the development and operation of a given preventive activity. Note, here, that language comprises not just vocabulary but *grammar* – so 5Is offers a kind of syntax for describing action in pluralistic but equally grammatical ways.

The recursive nature of action means we must double-up terms like ‘intelligence for Involvement’ or ‘objectives for Intelligence’. For this, 5Is conventionally uses capital ‘I’ for the ‘mainline’ tasks on the default sequence of Intelligence to Impact, and lower case ‘i’ for what could be called ‘sideline’ tasks. It also allows use of different discourses to give alternative accounts of the same action from, say, Implementation and Involvement perspectives. The one would centre on how the various tasks followed in logical relationship; the other how the people and organisations involved in undertaking the tasks became motivated and how their participation was supported.

Clear terms and concepts

5Is strives for clarity of individual terms, and consistency and comprehensiveness of the entire lexicon. This is especially important given the weight placed on language rather than position in sequence. Rather than offering a collection of snappy one-liners, definitions are set out in depth and interrelated with one another, as will be apparent in the following chapters.

Explicit not tacit

5Is aims to render explicit rather than tacit as much as possible of the knowledge needed to successfully replicate or innovate; and to develop the vocabulary of terms to support this. However, certain kinds of knowledge (such as people-handling skills) will always retain significant tacit aspects, requiring educational approaches like apprenticeship to transfer them.

Relating to evidence throughout

The 5Is framework relates to evidence in several ways. Under Intelligence the 5Is process itself describes information and knowledge-gathering activity in support of all the other stages. This would include *local* evidence on the specific crime problem addressed and the context of action; *generic* what-works evidence used to select/design Interventions; and evidence otherwise used in targeting whom to Involve, monitoring Implementation and evaluating Impact.

At another level, 5Is descriptions can report on the *processes* of measurement, collection, and analysis of data. Here the purposes are to indicate the *quality* of this process, and of the products of Intelligence; to capture knowledge of *how to do it*; and to facilitate *improvement* of the process.

Progressive detail

5Is of course is designed to handle the complexity of crime and its prevention. This requires 5Is itself to be more complex than alternative frameworks. But as said (Chapters 5 and 6), this modicum of added complexity in the framework is intended to *reduce* the difficulty of the task of managing crime prevention knowledge for contributors, knowledge harvesters, consolidators and users. Moreover the complexity of 5Is itself is mainly *complication*: simple branches that each split into further simple branches.

5Is has been designed to cope with the tradeoff between simplicity and complexity by ‘zooming’ in and out of detail rather than having a fixed and limited set of levels and tasks. This is illustrated, for Involvement, in Figure 14.1. At the very least, as said, it divides the amorphous and all-encompassing ‘Response’ stage

of SARA into the three interlinked tasks of Intervention, Implementation and Involvement. This detailed and extended coverage is intended to facilitate the systematic capture and transfer of knowledge on the wide range of activities that are necessary for successful replication. In particular it should help articulate the tacit. In a biological analogy, 5Is doesn't aim to capture just the DNA of the interventions at the heart of preventive action, but the whole 'body preventive' – the metabolism, physiology and anatomy of the action which are needed to replicate and realise the intervention against fresh problems and in fresh contexts. It aims to realise what Brown and Scott recommend:

It is... important to capture the learning from the response stage for future implementation. The process of implementing interventions usually brings with it a great deal of knowledge and experience, which will be transferable to ... implementing the same responses in other contexts. All too often, this knowledge and experience resides with the response team's individual members and is not shared with the wider organization. This means that organizational memory about particular interventions can be short, and there can be danger that mistakes made in implementation are repeated time again because the response knowledge is not disseminated. (2007: 45)

Context-sensitive

Knowledge of contexts is vital for the activities of selection, replication and innovation. 5Is aims to capture contextual information at many levels. While the 'core' contextual knowledge concerns the interacting causes of criminal events into which preventive interventions are injected (covered in Chapter 9), in fact each of the Is has its own field of contexts which require articulation and documentation. Key aspects of this are covered next.

Capturing tradeoffs, issues and interactions, not just decisions

Each attempted replication in a new context, or with a somewhat new crime problem, may alter the balance and interactions between priorities, and among practical or theoretical considerations. As the Specification noted there is much benefit from identifying interactions and setting out the tradeoffs and issues that faced the originators when planning each task. In this way, replicators can make their own choices appropriate to their own contexts.

Interactions are, as previously argued, a key aspect of the complexity in understanding and intervening in crime. (I use 'interaction' in the causal sense of 'the effect of A on B depends on the level of C'.) Interactions may occur between intervention and context, between different combinations of contextual circumstances, or between interventions. practitioners must be alert to these interactions when planning innovative action or replicating existing responses customised to fresh contexts; and in reflective mode, when seeking and applying

feedback to improve their current performance or to communicate practice knowledge to others. 5Is documentation thus aims to facilitate the capture of knowledge on interactions – what will work in what context and how to adjust actions to fit. Unless a systematic and rigorous programme of comparison is undertaken though, much of the context-knowledge is likely to remain patchy and conjectural; but used with care, it can at least sensitise successor practitioners to things to look out for in planning and designing their own actions. The COPS guides to tackling particular crime problems²² address the contextual interaction issue in their summary tables of responses with the heading ‘Works best if’.

Tradeoffs may be in any domain, from practical to political. For practical examples, consider the trade-off between strength versus weight of a bicycle lock; or limiting the numbers of young people attending a youth centre to those who can be successfully handled at one time, versus proportion of coverage of the neighbourhood’s ‘difficult’ youth population. For political examples, consider who gets the priority for intervention in a community in terms of targeting by *need*, versus handling people or groups with differing ability to press their *demands*; or trading-off the requirement to acknowledge *punitiveness* whilst maximising rational, evidence- and theory-based *effectiveness* by what may be non-punitive interventions. The process of handling political tradeoffs (and under Involvement specifically, allocations of responsibility for undertaking crime prevention tasks or roles) generally requires *negotiation* – here, too, there may be good and bad practice to document.

Analytic and theory-oriented yet practice-oriented

To describe action so as to support intelligent, theory-led replication, 5Is adopts the twin discourses, identified in Chapter 6, of *generic principles* and *practical methods*. Causal mechanisms of crime, and mechanisms/principles of Intervention, are primarily covered through the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity framework (Chapter 9), which focuses on *proximal causes*. However, 5Is aims also to encompass higher-level causes; and to allow for correlational approaches such as risk and protective factors. The wider Community Safety side, so far under-developed, will have its own theories and mechanisms covering for example potential victims’ *perception of risk* and how *reassurance* interventions work.

The above primarily applies to principles and methods of Intervention in the causes of criminal events and of insecurity. But the intention is to extend it to actions in support of *all* tasks – for example, principles and methods of Involvement. This is important since the same action often serves several crime prevention tasks/functions under different Is. For example, an attempt via publicity to Involve the public in prevention by getting them to Implement the method of locking their doors, may also act *directly* as an Intervention which deters burglars. The kinds of outreach activity designed to encourage young people on the streets to join a youth centre are a kind of *self*-Involvement in Implementing a range of Interventions on their own criminality,

in the form of the socialising activities undertaken, and relationships established, once they pass through the centre's doors. But in parallel the outreach activity may act more directly as an Intervention in itself, by supplying a positive role model which gives the young person mental resources for avoiding offending. The upshot is that there's no fixed 1:1 correspondence between an element of action and the location of that action at a single place within the 5Is framework.

Reflecting natural structures and units of action

Describing tasks in terms of *practical methods : generic principles : specific mechanisms* is only part of the necessary language of action. Methods in turn may be organised around managerial *projects*. The daily work of projects may centre on identifying and tackling a stream of crime and community safety *problems* (in the Problem-Oriented sense of particular, distinctive and localised crime or safety issues) or *cases*, as with the individual young people handled by a youth offending team. Brown (2006) documents disadvantages of purely project-based approaches like SARA. Although originating in the domain of problems and projects, 5Is seeks a wider scope, as discussed in Chapter 8.

Even when confined to the managerial sense of the word, *project* has diverse meanings; but it's taken here to mean an organised set of actions sharing common and relatively specific and localised aims. Examples are reducing a domestic burglary problem in a particular housing estate; or establishing a centre to reduce youth crime and improve the members' educational and social prospects. A project will often tackle a given crime problem by applying several methods in parallel. Benefits from so doing may include 'belt and braces' redundancy, coverage of gaps, strength in numbers of interventions or contributors involved, and synergy. Disadvantages may include inefficient 'over-engineering' of solutions, managerial and resource burdens, and (important from a knowledge perspective), uncertainty over what lay behind the success.

Breaking down descriptions of preventive tasks into detailed, structured *elements* supports recombination of those elements in new ways to suit new contexts or problems. This in turn supports a generative approach to innovation. It also facilitates efficient capture, consolidation and retrieval of practice knowledge relevant to each level of action (e.g. distinctively *method*-level knowledge such as how to get planning permission for alleygates; or distinctively *project*-level knowledge, such as how to plan a diversity of methods running in parallel so they synergise rather than mutually interfere). This could be extended so issues with significance for *delivery* (e.g. programme, service) and *policy* dimensions are also flagged up. Obviously that would require some knowledge-harvester with appropriate briefing and sensitivities to do the flagging.

In practical terms for both capture and use of 5Is descriptions (to help people be aware of what they are looking for/ looking at), it should be possible to 'tag' every

piece of knowledge to indicate whether it concerns principle, method (of any of the Is), case, project, package, organisational, or programme level. This could be achieved in a number of ways, including by headings, language or hypertext markup.

Covering wide range of aspects of knowledge

The 5Is framework as a whole is principally about Know-how but together, the individual Is connect to all seven aspects of crime and crime prevention knowledge previously identified (Chapter 3). However, the mapping is not always a straightforward 1:1 process, as the Flexibility section above illustrates. For example, there will be *Know-how* for undertaking collection and analysis of Intelligence in the form of *Know-about* knowledge. Likewise, *Know-why* issues may surface that are important for good performance of any of the 5Is tasks. And as said, although the theory of Intervention is paramount within 5Is, the knowledge for undertaking each task can and should be built around its own domain of accumulating theory, for example the theories of partnership and motivation that underlie aspects of Involvement.

Concerned with harm and its reduction

5Is has an interest in both narrow crime prevention, security and wider, quality-of-life issues of community safety. This is covered in Chapter 8. Here it should be noted that 5Is is designed to collect knowledge of *harm* (under Intelligence) and its reduction through prevention and mitigation (under Intervention). There's also an interest in avoidance of harmful *side-effects* of action under any of the 5Is tasks.

Inclusive

5Is seeks to include all kinds and perspectives of crime prevention, security and community safety. It's intended ultimately to cover all kinds of intervention, and indeed those which don't start off with an analysis of temporally, geographically and behaviourally distinct problems, but begin instead with analyses of causes (Wikström, 2007) or risk factors (Youth Justice Board, 2005). However, the initial position has been to centre on Problem-Oriented approaches and work outwards.

Quality-oriented

5Is aims to promote quality in both the *content* of the preventive action described and replicated, and in the *description and evaluation* of that action. Quality is interpreted in several ways: being evidence-based and seeking to generate additional systematic, reliable and valid evidence in its turn; focusing on theoretical principles and detailed mechanisms; establishing and using clear definitions; and

seeking to emphasise the rationale underlying the action. Through its interest in quality 5Is relates to the *7 Steps to a Successful Crime Prevention Project* produced by the Beccaria programme.²³ The 7 Steps are:

- Establishing and describing the topic;
- Identifying the causes;
- Specifying the goals;
- Developing possible solutions;
- Devising and implementing the project plan;
- Reviewing the impact;
- Documentation and conclusions.

However, while 5Is centres more on the *specific content of the crime prevention action* being described, and the *logic or rationale* of ‘problem and causes to intervention to implementation and evaluation’, 7 Steps focuses more on generic *project planning and project management* processes covering ‘central questions, central worksteps and methods of work’. Though there’s some overlap, the two frameworks are complementary and the link between them could be developed further.

Learning engine

5Is is intended to be a learning engine, as described in the Specification. In its detailed and explicit structure it seeks to support the ready assimilation, storage and retrievability of large quantities of fresh knowledge of practice and theory – hanging the new gifts in just the right places on the Christmas tree, where they can later be found for the appropriate recipient. Here, specific *learning points* – both positive ones to emulate and negative/cautionary ones to avoid – can be explicitly flagged up in 5Is documentation. But 5Is itself is designed to be capable of accommodation, too. We should expect that new headings will continually be added, and occasionally a revised structure, as fresh exemplars of preventive action challenge the existing version. The self-mobilisation of offenders described above is an instance of this. On a more routine basis, stray exemplars of action initially classed under ‘other’ might, as a knowledge-base becomes populated, become organised into retrievable categories of their own.

Alert to adaptive offenders, changing crime and changing contexts

Crime, and the context in which it occurs, doesn’t stand still – knowledge shouldn’t get left behind. 5Is descriptions are intended to capture information on crime displacement and offender replacement, offender adaptations and countermoves, and ways of anticipating and responding to these. (The ‘flower-bed’

in Chapter 12 is a good illustration.) To the extent that project descriptions document influential contributions to the causes of crime and to the success or failure of action from the context, then anticipation of any impending *changes* in that context can guide subsequent adjustment on site or selection, replication and innovation for new sites.

Schema for practitioners

It's too much to claim, at this stage of development at least, that 5Is could be the one single schema exclusively supporting and organising practitioners' knowledge, understanding and learning about crime prevention. But as a comprehensive, inclusive, detailed and adaptive process model, it should be a good candidate for a role as the predominant framework for education and training.

Supporting a range of knowledge formats and superstructures

Depending on purpose, audience and knowledge-base structure, a description of preventive action may take different formats. It may attempt to holistically recapitulate 'the unfolding story and logic of demand and discovery' undertaken by the practitioners originating the preventive action. Or it may offer something more analytic, standardised and perhaps searchable and statistically analysable in terms of exhaustive pre-coded checklist categories such as 'city centre, inner urban, suburban, rural'. (As previously said, to act as a learning engine any such category systems must be able to grow and differentiate as the knowledge-base becomes populated and progressively finer distinctions can usefully and meaningfully be made.) It may be intended to be complete in itself. Alternatively, it may serve as a 'quick grab' depository of information which knowledge harvesters can then review and decide whether there is sufficient that is newsworthy in the action to merit an in-depth follow-up, in terms of more formal evaluation. 5Is has been designed in sufficiently generic terms to support a wide range of alternative formats. The design of practical formats, and indeed of the wider system of knowledge management to which those formats are to contribute, is an exercise intended as a follow-up to this book.

Consolidation of individual items of knowledge is a vital part of knowledge management. With its standardised terminology and generic process model 5Is is suitable to feed into, and help to organise, a range of knowledge superstructures beyond simple case studies and elements of practice.

'*Toolkits*' for professional practitioners are intended to provide crosscutting, integrating problem- or process-based materials for learning/training off-the-job, and guidance on-the-job. They can economically cover material common to many replications in diverse contexts (e.g. some fairly standard ways of running publicity campaigns or setting up insurance policies for youth activity schemes) and that which is context-sensitive ('if replicating Neighbourhood Watch in low-cohesiveness localities, do this but not that' (Laycock and Tilley, 1995)). They can also extract

and consolidate wider principles, middle-range theories and expositions of tradeoffs which can be used to support exploratory replication in new, untried contexts, and full-blown innovation. In terms of content the toolkits can be focused on specific crime problems, different types of intervention (such as situational or offender-oriented), or different aspects of process – for example one toolkit on methods and issues in Intelligence, another on Involvement. If these kits share the same terminology and basic concepts, and connect to case studies structured in related ways, then the benefits for communication and transfer of knowledge are obvious (although as said, toolkits should ideally complement foundation learning). Within the Problem-Oriented approach the COPS guides aspire to supply this, as do those on the UK Crime Reduction website but the structure and content of knowledge bases like the Home Office Effective Practice Database (Bullock and Ekblom, 2011) have significant limitations.

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the 5Is framework as the centrepiece of an attempt to deliberately *design* a system for capturing, consolidating and transferring knowledge of crime prevention, security and community safety. The design aspires to meet the Specification in Chapter 6. In particular, it seeks to empower practitioners using it, to handle and share the rich complexity of practical and theoretical knowledge that effective crime prevention requires.

The fit is less than perfect; indeed, attempts to realise the Specification pose challenges in operationalising some of the concepts it contains. But 5Is is intended to be a significant advance on process models such as SARA – a logical next step – whilst being entirely ‘backwards compatible’ with existing knowledge captured using that framework. Moreover, it’s designed to be capable of evolution towards ever-closer compliance with the Specification; and the Specification itself, at a slower pace, can be continually revised in the light of experience. The key to making both these processes happen is feedback from users at practice and delivery levels based on deliberate and sustained pursuit of an agreed strategic goal and overall approach.

If 5Is is the centrepiece, what is the rest of the knowledge management system? As my historical account described, 5Is emerged from a wider suite of rather loosely-arranged guidance and classificatory materials. The next two chapters cover these systematically, as necessary companions to 5Is. After that come chapters describing and illustrating the individual Is, realising in detail the broad principles set out here.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 8 Conceptual companions to 5Is: Defining crime prevention activities, institutional contexts and values

Algorithms can't operate on thin air. The 5Is process model is necessary, but not sufficient as a complete framework for characterising knowledge of good practice in crime prevention. 5Is must be fleshed-out by four things:

- Clear and consistent *definitions-in-depth* of the central concepts of practice such as crime, crime prevention, community safety and security. The definitions must support *operationalisation* and *measurement*. Measuring something highly-valued yet potentially nebulous like community safety is vital to every 5Is task from obtaining Intelligence on crime/safety problems to setting objectives and monitoring Implementation, to evaluating Impact.
- A way of describing the *diversity of institutional contexts* in which prevention operates, capable of handling the ever-mutating variety of arrangements within a given country, and of supporting transfer of knowledge to very different contexts internationally.
- A brief attempt to orient 5Is in relation to issues of *vision and values*.
- A *causal model of crime and preventive interventions* suited to 5Is.

The first three are addressed here; the fourth in the next chapter.

Given the attention to the deliberate design of 5Is itself, it would be strange if these conceptual companions weren't themselves subject to scrutiny and design to ensure fitness for purpose and a comfortable match with 5Is. Existing definitions and terms can't just be lifted off the shelf and grafted on (and as will be seen, few are in any state to graft onto anything). They must equally fit with one another in an integrated suite that meets the wider Specification in Chapter 6.

The present chapter proceeds as follows. After brief resumption of the muddled historical background come efforts to resolve various aspects of the muddle covering crime, crime prevention and the wider family of activities including community safety and security. In each case both conceptual and institutional issues are addressed; the treatment begins discursively, continues with a statement of the '5Is orientation or requirement' and ends with the definitions and frameworks actually adopted, which have been designed to meet that requirement. The whole exercise allows both conceptual clarification and further refinement of the scope of 5Is, together with an analysis of the confusing tangle of institutional and procedural acronyms in the British context.

Historical background: muddling through

Many of the definitions and institutional concepts proposed here initially emerged within a national group convened in the mid-90s to develop guidance on education and training in crime prevention. The work continued, specifically dedicated to providing guidance for the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 (Ekblom, 1998a). The process drew on the experience of Home Office policymakers and researchers, Police and Probation trainers, Local Government Association, Local Government practitioners and the independent crime prevention organisations Crime Concern and NACRO. Early published versions variously appeared in Ekblom (2000, 2001).

But these developments were not fully rational or indicative of ‘progress’, although there was a sense of being in a progressive ‘movement’ (Sutton et al., 2008) away from ‘cops, courts and corrections’ (Waller, 2008). Much of the evolution was provoked (and constrained) by the succession of new terms (not always dignifiable with the accompanying ‘and concepts’) that seemed to pass through the Home Office with every new minister or senior official, let alone every change of government. Over some two decades from the early Eighties, crime prevention became crime reduction, tackling the roots of criminality, community safety and round again. The nadir of this process of ‘muddling through’ was perhaps the occasion when the minister scribbled in green ink, upon the attempt to incorporate clear terminology within the guidance section on education and training being drafted for the Crime & Disorder Act 1998, that he ‘didn’t want definitions’. Imagine that happening in medicine! (In time-honoured civil service style, definitions *were* supplied, but no longer given that label.)

Accompanying the shifting terminology was an equally-shifting domain of governance, as central government received and eventually digested the import of various messages from research and experience: the inadequacy of traditional approaches to crime control (for example, Clarke and Hough, 1984); the need to adopt localised solutions to local problems; the requirement to deliver multi-agency responses to the multiple causes of crime and then to embark upon partnership solutions in both public and private sectors; and beyond governance, to consider not just crime but wider quality-of-life issues. Institutional boundaries and responsibilities were being shaken and stirred, and both Conservative and New Labour administrations sought to establish programmes giving national-level coverage of local crime prevention. (Similar changes were afoot in other European countries and the wider English-speaking world.)

Yet even here, the institutional outcomes from this process hardly reflected rational design. For example, the original plan for the Crime & Disorder Act was to give local government the lead over this domain, but police lobbying led to jointly-responsible statutory partnerships. Even the minister’s avoidance of definitions was said to be a ruse to prevent local government from claiming ‘added burden’, which would enable it to claim extra funding. So alongside half-baked terminology we had

half-frozen patterns of institutional change. Probably – though circumstantially – this state of affairs in the UK, and equivalents elsewhere, contributed to the implementation failure documented in Chapter 2.

Unfortunately there's little sign of the confusion diminishing. The definition of community safety so carefully and collectively crafted by the widest range of stakeholders, disappeared overnight and was replaced in the National Community Safety Plan for England and Wales 2006-9 (Home Office, 2006b) by a bland collection of themes like 'making communities stronger and more effective', and a more expansive definition on the Crime Reduction website which will be (severely) dealt with below. In fairness most of the elements of the definition developed here appear in fragmented form and sometimes tacitly within the suite of Public Service Agreement targets that the latest national version contains. But the process as a whole has revealed no sense of vision or deliberate continuity. Each successive version adopted by the Government merely reflects the immediate concerns and local political/administrative fashions of the day rather than being made in reference to a continually but carefully evolving and internationally-relevant concept – as exists, say, in public health. How far this consequential shortcoming reflects a diminution in the *vision* for crime prevention (Sutton et al., 2008), and a loss of *leadership* in policy and practice at national and international levels, is a moot point.

But the different terms for crime prevention so casually and impressionistically used, then discarded, by passing administrators and politicians did, however vaguely and inconsistently, expose different facets of crime prevention to view, and did attempt to put them into practice. And however erratic the course of institutional change, it explored new ways of delivery and indicated still wider possibilities. My own personal mission was to capture practically useful and durable understandings of perspectives and concepts from the fleeting terminological and institutional changes. (This was not, strictly, what the Home Office was employing me for, but it was what I strongly believed its delivery and practitioner cadres needed!) That mission remains today.

My 'own' definitions subsequently evolved ad-hoc in various fora including preparations for the UK Foresight Panel on Crime Prevention (Department of Trade and Industry, 2000); EU Crime Prevention Network (Ekblom, 2002c, 2006b); and Council of Europe Expert Committee on Partnership (Ekblom, 2004b). The definition of community safety was updated to incorporate emerging interest in reassurance and social capital, and is comparable to other value-centred, cross-cutting policy concepts like sustainability, accessibility and inclusion. As will emerge, more recent changes in the definition of crime prevention are being explored, linking to harm reduction and accommodating a goal-directed model of offenders alongside a purely causal discourse. With growing interest in countering terrorism and cybercrime, conceptual links are being explored with domains of security and Intelligence-Led Policing. On the last, Ratcliffe (2008) has recently

undertaken a parallel exercise in scrutinising and tightening concepts and constructing a practically- and intellectually-sound framework.

Resolving the muddle

The Specification requires that a knowledge management framework rest on standardised, consistent, well-defined, denotative terminology and concepts for analysing problems, causes and consequences of crime, and for contemplating and planning preventive action. The more so in settings where collaboration and communication must occur across professions, disciplines and perhaps countries (Ekblom, 2004a). When we seek to create an intellectual context within which 5Is can comfortably operate, the muddle described in Chapter 3 and the historical account above strengthen these requirements. But as the Specification also requires, standardisation shouldn't be rigid and ossifying, but should allow flexibility to facilitate innovation in both preventive interventions and the institutional arrangements to deliver them. This is a classic design conflict.

5Is can't be the utopian vehicle for redesigning society's institutions. It must take them largely as they are, although one hopes clarity of knowledge can itself create conditions, and pressures, for institutional improvement. But what 5Is can do is provide ways of describing institutional arrangements in a relatively *distanced* and *timeless* way which steps outside the everyday discourses and working assumptions of these domains (see also Wiles and Pease, 2000). This would allow the contexts for action they provide to be explicitly described in accounts of practice and delivery; enable contemplation of alternative arrangements; and build continuity despite the steady stream of terminological and institutional changes that beset the field. The interest in transferring knowledge of practice between different countries, with their different institutional arrangements, further necessitates such distancing from the parochial present.

We can't, though, escape the contemporary institutional context entirely – it must be considered when selecting and replicating good practice. Our detachment can't be too radical or it would no longer make sense to the practitioners and delivery managers whose actions we're seeking to improve. It's thus appropriate to define the institutional settings within which crime prevention is pursued, in terms that are broad and generic enough to apply to different times, different countries and different ways of assigning institutional responsibility within a broad framework; but which are nonetheless sufficiently familiar and tangible. Likewise, whilst adhering to a baseline of 'civilised values', the inclusive approach of 5Is means that anything more detailed and specific shouldn't define what kinds of practice knowledge should be incorporated.

So in developing crime and crime prevention concepts and ways of describing institutions for 5Is we face some interlinked design conflicts: 'precise and standardised but not completely rigid'; 'distanced and analytic, but not too-distanced

from current institutional arrangements and practice concepts'; 'sensitive to values, but within broad limits not predefining what practice should be excluded on a value basis'; 'conferring continuity, but itself able to grow and evolve'.

The rest of this chapter addresses these design conflicts in defining key concepts and describing institutional arrangements. First, a working definition of *crime* suitable for 5Is is proposed, followed by discussion of *crime prevention* and related activities including security and community safety. This leads to statements of the position of 5Is on conceptual, institutional and value issues; then sections setting out the actual, designed, definitions and institutional framework adopted as fit for use with 5Is. I've deliberately adopted a discursive approach, as much persuasion is needed to detach people from customary positions; and I recognise that while my own attempted resolutions may not be the last word, my arguments may still advance the debate.

Crime: conceptual and institutional issues

We can't build a science of crime and its prevention, or an appropriate knowledge management framework for this domain, without defining crime itself. Much has been written on defining crime, which doubtless will continue, but 5Is uses a simple, practical conception.

Every social problem faced by society receives a collective response based on a blend of generic solutions: *care, control, conflict resolution and collaboration* (Ekblom, 1986, 2004b). Crime is no exception. Crime is taken as conflict between individuals, groups and/or corporate bodies over *ownership of property, integrity of person and acceptability of behaviour*, that violates the law, placing offenders in additional conflict with the state and its institutions. With so-called 'victimless crimes', individual conflict may be absent. In all cases, control is the primary social response but the others may be activated to some degree. A wider range of misbehaviours, from antisocial behaviour to terrorism, share some of crime's features.

Straightforward or not, any definition of crime poses wider issues which 5Is can't ignore unless it aims to be an unquestioning administrative tool with no sense of institutional or societal context. Defining some problem behaviour as a crime not only places it firmly in the realm of formal institutional control, but immediately makes suppositions on how it should be controlled, and by whom. This can happen as much at practice level as at policy level. An incident reported to the police may get an enforcement response; the same incident reported to the local social work department, a welfare response. In the past, this has sometimes closed minds to the wider range of solutions now envisaged under the heading of crime prevention and community safety (and equally to *non-crime* solutions). Minimalist arrangements for *referral* of such cases or problems from one agency to another are an important means of transferring responsibility. *Partnership* approaches *share* responsibility.

Widespread in crime prevention (for example Gilling, 2005), these can be seen as attempts to overcome the disadvantages of rigid division of labour in responding to crosscutting problems, whilst preserving the advantages (Ekblom 2004b).

These definitional issues and alternative possibilities will normally be in the background to the daily work of crime prevention practitioners. However, they surface as practice issues whenever partnerships seek to span the division of labour; whenever choices regarding diversion of offenders from the Criminal Justice System must be made; and whenever solutions to associated practice problems must be developed (e.g. how youth centre staff should regulate the sharing of information on individual offenders with the police). But the same practice issues can also nourish debates and decisions at the levels of policy, politics and governance. 5Is descriptions must therefore support the collection and consolidation of such information for application at all levels of action.

Besides establishing a position on crime in general, 5Is must relate to crimes in particular, whether crime-specific or broad in scope (theft of luggage at Heathrow Airport, or ‘juvenile crime’).

Criminality

In some languages the equivalent of ‘criminality’ is used interchangeably with ‘crime’. There are tendencies towards this in English, including treating ‘criminality prevention’ and ‘crime prevention’ as near equivalents. To avoid ambiguity, 5Is uses criminality only in its restricted sense of an *individual’s predisposition to offend*. Criminality prevention is thus a subset of offender-oriented prevention.

5Is orientation to crime

In sum, the 5Is process model has the following orientations to crime:

- A background interest in what comprises *crime*, and the boundaries and institutional implications of those boundaries.
- A foreground interest in the nature of specific *types and subtypes of crimes*.
- A scope including *all kinds of societal response to crime* – care, control, conflict resolution and collaboration.

Crime Prevention: conceptual, institutional and value issues

The issue of the institutional boundaries of practice returns with a vengeance when we move from crime to its prevention. After a general discussion, more specific conceptual themes covered below include enforcement and criminal justice, harm-reduction, vision and values, orientation to offender, community or situation;

and going beyond crime. The definitions actually chosen for 5Is each address several of these themes, so are individually discussed in the next section.

For the institutional issue in particular, a knowledge framework centred on crime prevention *tasks* and their products, rather than who does them, offers a functional discourse that can provide some of the necessary semi-detachment from institutions, and give conceptual focus too. Tasks naturally fit within a process model. Tasks, unlike steps, imply no mandatory order, allowing instead for some flexibility and recursion. The number of tasks and sub-tasks identified necessitates a *detailed* process model. To further support this task orientation, following Ratcliffe (2008), 5Is descriptions must be clear about when they are referring to an *activity* (such as policing) or the *institution* that normally undertakes that activity and is associated with it (the police). The practical implication is that such relationships needn't be so rigid: policing tasks may be undertaken by other organisations or individuals; and what the police do may go way beyond policing.

Whilst diverse tasks must be accomplished for crime prevention to work, the focal task indisputably should be the crime prevention and community safety *interventions* themselves rather than the means or institutions of their implementation, or how they are targeted.

Both conceptual clarity and institutional detachment are further served by adopting an *analytic* framework for describing interventions within 5Is, rather than a loose assemblage of intervention methods, which inevitably bring their own institutional baggage. They also benefit from definitions which, like the tasks above, aren't shackled to parochial or ephemeral institutional arrangements. This adoption of analytic/theoretical principles and mechanisms as per Specification confers a combination of precision with generative flexibility, meeting the 'precise-but-not-too-rigid' criterion above. But lest this become 'too detached' from practical reality the Specification also suggests a dual approach of *analytic principle : practical method*, and this has been adopted for 5Is. The intervention principles are mainly supplied or organised by the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (Chapter 9).

So, in sum, the 5Is process model is accompanied by the following orientations to crime prevention:

- A focus on *tasks* and their products rather than institutions undertaking those tasks, and tasks in preference to steps which imply a fixed sequence.
- Ability to identify tasks in *progressive detail*, and a *structure* to manage and communicate that detail.
- A focus on *Intervention* tasks as the focal, defining preventive activity, whilst enabling the other tasks to be on view as necessary.
- A dual approach to describing Interventions – analytic *principles* and real-world *methods*.

Relationship to enforcement and criminal justice

The traditional response to crime is inescapably linked with institutions, understandings and customs centring on law enforcement, justice and punishment (sometimes collectively termed 'repression'). 'Rational', evidence-based approaches to crime prevention have long tried to distance themselves from this but success has only ever been partial. The definition proposed by van Dijk and de Waard is typical in this respect. They define crime prevention as '*The total of all private initiatives and state policies, other than the enforcement of criminal law, aimed at the reduction of damage caused by acts defined as criminal by the state.*' (1991: 483).

Focusing on enforcement, I don't think we can simply get away with defining criminal justice/enforcement issues out of scope. The result is a makeshift approach which fails to cover the full extent of practice knowledge and the institutional requirements for its delivery.

At the very least, defining one's core preventive activity in terms of what it is *not*, rather than what it *is*, makes for obscurity (Ekblom, 1994). And logic suggests that creating an enclosure to lock offenders *out* of someone's house and away from their property is functionally (and topologically) equivalent to creating an enclosure to lock them *in* to prison. Both are equally preventive (we're discussing principles and possibilities for action, not cost-effectiveness) and there is no *logical* basis for talking of prevention *versus* repression. (Unless, that is, the police and Criminal Justice System are misused for political ends.)

The Criminal Justice System (CJS) and the law enforcement/investigatory part of the police that serves it, have various declared functions, most of which have preventive aspects. The CJS is intended in its own terms to deter people in general from offending (general deterrence), reduce recidivism among those who have offended already by (specific) deterrence and rehabilitation, protect the community by incapacitation of offenders, deliver appropriate compensation to victims, and exact just and appropriate levels of punishment.

But it's rarely appreciated in crime prevention circles that the very *existence* of the CJS in dispensing fair and satisfying justice sets the conditions for all other forms of prevention to be possible. In this sense, the CJS is inherently preventive because it helps to channel blame and revenge into a formal, controlled and relatively impersonal public arena, and to avoid the slide into extremes of vigilantism, feuding and 'terrorist justice'. For constitutional reasons this judicial crime prevention and law enforcement are tightly circumscribed.

Much everyday preventive work on the ground simply can't be done without addressing the *interface* with criminal justice and enforcement.

- Many preventive interventions rely, directly or indirectly, on *legal force* for the ultimate influence on offenders (with situational prevention, the perceived risk of arrest, conviction and punishment).

- From a wider perspective it's possible that non-law-enforcement approaches (other than individualised fortification, armament and intimidation of the kind seen in conditions of severe social breakdown and failure of governance) can only work in a context of adequately-functioning formal control. (This is not to deny that, once an adequate minimum of formal control has been established, reductions in crime may be more cost-effectively and humanely achieved *at the margin* through *non-enforcement* interventions, as evidence suggests.)
- So-called *preventive intelligence* – information on offenders' modus operandi for example, which can guide the design of appropriate preventive interventions – can often only be obtained whilst the offenders are in custody.
- Many essentially non-punitive, but often intrusive *treatment schemes* for offenders rely on legal force, or at least legally-embedded referral systems, to get them through the doors and keep them there – for example, mandatory attendance at alcoholism classes for drunken drivers.
- *Conflict containment and resolution* extends beyond criminal law to include *civil* law, informal *mediation*, *restitution/ restorative justice* and even the formal *urban planning* process. All can potentially reduce violence and criminal damage, for example between landlords and tenants, or neighbours.
- Interventions targeting the *opportunity structure* for crime (Clarke and Newman, 2006) may rely partially or wholly on legal instruments including *specific criminal and civil legal powers*. For example, laws prohibit the unauthorised possession of weapons or certain tools – such as software for reprogramming the security chips on mobile phones. Businesspeople convicted of fraud may be constrained from exploiting fresh opportunities via court orders banning them from being company directors. Violent men are kept away from partners by injunctions. In the UK, civil Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) enter the criminal domain if perpetrators breach their terms.
- Literal application of the Problem-Oriented approach – seeking the most appropriate solutions whatever they are, rather than being restricted by institutional precedents and boundaries – dictates that under some circumstances, conventional law enforcement may be the best response. The 'Once-Bitten' approach to repeat victimisation (Farrell and Pease, 1993) specifically developed a strategy of moving from *universal* situational prevention for all potential burglary victims, to *selective* additional situational prevention for those already victimised once, to catching offenders with surveillance and alarms for the few multiply-victimised homes.
- As Sutton et al. (2008) note, following Freiberg (2001), failure of practitioners to address the 'affective', 'know-why' dimension of crime prevention activities in terms of justice, fairness and deservingness may jeopardise public and political acceptability.

- Finally, in the other direction, some non-repressive preventive action actually *protects* the police or criminal justice system, ranging from restricting knowledge of police officers' home addresses, to designing corruption-resistant procedures. Other such action supports the *collection of evidence*, such as surfaces designed to capture fingerprints.

Practice knowledge must cover all the above, and more. The position adopted for 5Is (previously stated in Ekblom (1994, 2000)) is to acknowledge the institutional differences within crime prevention centring on criminal justice and enforcement; and to adopt an inclusive and *positive* definition that seeks to build conceptual bridges between the different institutional responses to crime, without losing what is distinctive about 'rational' crime prevention.

Harm reduction – safety and security

In referring, in their above definition of crime prevention, to '*reduction of damage*' caused by crime, van Dijk and de Waard (1991) made an early move towards harm reduction, as advocated in the Specification. Harm reduction approaches can be linked to the perspective of community safety as discussed below, and as will be seen, are explicitly incorporated within the definition of crime prevention used with 5Is. Harm reduction has much in common with *security*, and I will attempt to develop links to this sphere too.

Public, private and personal spheres

Discussions of institutional responses to crime centre on public institutions such as police and Criminal Justice System unless there is a specialist interest in the private sphere. However, private security takes an increasing role in provision, and long ago moved beyond the elementary 'manguarding' approach. In the Netherlands an explicit public-private partnership runs the national crime prevention organisation CCV,²⁴ and in many other countries local partnerships operate, for example in running town centre security schemes. But much everyday, informal crime prevention activity is conducted personally – whether self-protection (Clarke, 1997) by purchase of burglar alarms or avoiding risky shortcuts at night, informal social control, or socialising children.

Knowledge must be captured on how prevention operates within these spheres, and equally significantly, how collaboration, competition and conflict between them are successfully or unsuccessfully handled. Hence knowledge of the practicalities of the public, private and personal spheres and their interfaces falls within scope of 5Is descriptions. From the perspective of professional crime prevention practice, the interest in 'natural' preventive activity covers how to foster and channel it in positive directions, working with it and not stifling it.

Vision, values and orientation within crime prevention

Sutton et al. argue that the modern crime prevention movement, from its inception in the 1980s, was as much based on a *vision* and *values* of a ‘good society’ as on considerations of pragmatic social control: ‘...once that vision faded, and governments... began to treat crime prevention as a purely administrative challenge, even the most generously-funded programs lost impetus and direction.’ (2008: 7).

The constructive values underlying crime prevention, and the importance of maintaining a vision which translates down through politics to policy, delivery and practice, are readily acknowledged here. But the holders of the values and vision referred to by Sutton et al. probably never agreed with one another except in rejecting the traditional enforcement/justice response to crime. Indeed, one of the authors of their review of prevention previously identified distinctly *divergent* value systems existing in parallel over the period: conservative (including, as he classes it, much of situational prevention), liberal (including many social/offender-oriented approaches) and radical (such as calling for changes in distribution of wealth as a means of reducing crime) (White, 1996).

These latter distinctions are not just value-driven. As previously noted (Ekblom, 1994, 2000, 2002a) situational versus offender-oriented approaches, and individualistic versus community-oriented approaches, also differ in terms of their theory, practice, language and working culture. Bridging these divides allows practitioners and policymakers an unrestricted and fully problem-oriented choice of interventions from an all-inclusive menu. But this isn’t to argue for a purely pragmatic approach that ignores all value preferences; rather, for more openly-managed relations between values and evidence-based effectiveness.

The view adopted for 5Is is that a knowledge framework must handle the range of broad approaches to prevention, whatever their underlying values, orientation and practices; but that where values play a critical role in guiding practice and defining good performance, and where these values are not obvious, project descriptions should endeavour to identify and declare them. The aim is for 5Is to be a universal knowledge management tool with the potential to envisage and articulate *any* kind of preventive action without presupposition of what works or what is acceptable. But there is, of course, a commitment to collecting knowledge that is useful, reliable and valid; and a similar concern to meet ethical and humanitarian standards. To the extent that 5Is is used in an international context, these standards may vary locally but United Nations declarations on human rights etc should be taken as the norm. A particular *sensitivity to cultural context* should be observed, especially in countries with indigenous peoples or recent immigrant communities, who may have different cultural concepts of crime and preferences for prevention.

A similarly inclusive approach is taken towards different political orientations. Attempting a 5Is description of a radical, wealth-redistributing or socially-empowering initiative would pose interesting challenges – but shouldn’t be ducked for that reason.

Position of 5Is on definitional, institutional and value issues

To summarise the position on crime prevention, 5Is has a narrow focus on *preventing criminal events*, a different, but equally narrowly-focused concern with *preventing criminality and/or curtailing criminal careers*; and a wider focus on *community safety* which, besides harm reduction, can include quality-of-life and conflict avoidance and resolution. Of these, the criminal event perspective is currently the most thoroughly covered. A similar scope for crime prevention is set out by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC, 2008). Finally, as noted in the previous chapter, whether the focus is on criminal events or quality of life, much crime prevention may be undertaken in the context of services, policies, or programmes such as health or education whose primary objectives aren't about tackling crime.

5Is is intended to be set within a clear and well-fitting suite of conceptual and institutional definitions which resolve a number of design conflicts. The intention is to acknowledge and/or incorporate:

- An interest in harm reduction, safety and security that links with wider policy and practice areas without seeking to dilute the crime-focused knowledge at its heart.
- An inclusive approach to prevention covering situational and offender-oriented interventions and community-based approaches, besides those where crime prevention is part of a wider programme.
- A positive definition of prevention and related concepts (rather than defining what it is not) which as far as possible can be operationalised and measured.
- Logical, political and practical links to formal law enforcement and criminal justice, and an acknowledgement of their role in crime prevention, but a vision and values emphasising a far wider range of constructive and evidence-based ways of addressing crime.
- Interest in declaring vision and values within 5Is descriptions as much for their implications for capture and transfer of practice knowledge, as for inherent political transparency.
- The requirement that potentially universal knowledge management tools should be inclusive of different political orientations, but overridingly sensitive to cultural context and the need to avoid misuse to support unethical or inhumane practices or policies.

Crime prevention and family: 'activity' definitions for 5Is

Now for the definitions of spheres of activity designed to accompany 5Is and fit the above requirements. We start with crime prevention proper. For those who prefer total clarity and consistency, it would be nice to keep the deliberation brief;

but benefits flow from supplying alternative definitions. Compared with, say, medicine, crime prevention is still a young and fast-evolving discipline; crime itself, and the arrangements that deliver prevention, are both still significantly evolving too. There are active points of evolution in several domains (e.g. conventional crime prevention, intelligence-led policing and security) which at this stage it would be premature to force together conceptually (although the aim here is to make a start). Even should these domains merge, crime and its prevention will continue to have diverse facets best handled through different discourses. Whilst clarifying the essence of prevention it's therefore important to leave in some bounded diversity and creative tension, and to give prevention room to adapt. The difference in the 5Is approach is the explicit use of diverse discourses, as perspectives and languages to be deliberately, consciously and consistently selected rather than blundered into and mixed together willy-nilly.

1. Crime prevention proper

Crime prevention can be defined in functional terms as

ethically-acceptable and evidence-based advance action intended to reduce the risk of criminal events.

Risk is oriented towards an uncertain *future*. Its reduction can be achieved through 1) *eliminating the possibility of the criminal events*, often by design; 2) *reducing the probability by intervening in the causes* or alternatively stated by *frustrating criminal goals by disrupting activities and organisations* directed towards them; or 3) *reducing the harm* by advance preparation to eliminate, reduce or mitigate it.

Definition-in-depth addresses the subsidiary concepts in their turn:

- *Action* includes all tasks whose fulfilment serves the goal of reducing the risk.
- *Ethically-acceptable* places limits on what can be done in the name of prevention.
- *Evidence-based* refers not just to empirically-supported evidence of what works but also to tested scientific theory, which is the stronger source (Eck, 2002a,b; 2005). Should we want to include informal prevention as well as professional, 'evidence-based' can be relaxed.
- *Interventions* are the focus of prevention; specifically those actions intended to block, weaken or divert the causes of criminal events. (The ICPC definition (ICPC, 2008: 19) is similar and refers to 'influenc[ing] their multiple causes'.) There is no presumption about *which* interventions are effective or acceptable at this point: the aim is to encompass the universe of *possibilities*. Interventions are taken to have policy, delivery and practice dimensions, following the ICPC definition which refers to 'strategies and measures'. 5Is will strongly emphasise practice, though ideally policy or delivery issues are extracted for upward

referral. There is no specification of *who* undertakes the intervention – public, private or commercial. (Incidentally, ‘measure’ is confusing because it denotes both measurement and action – so its latter sense is banned from 5Is.)

- *Causes* (and *advance*) convey what’s distinctive about prevention – intervention *before* the crime happens (or, with more complex crimes in particular, before the sequence of actions is successfully completed). This therefore emphasises an *anticipatory* aspect, whether simple inductive prediction that recently-observed crime patterns will continue, hence are worth targeting; theory-based prediction; or more ambitious and longer-ranging horizon-scanning exercises where the vision of the future markedly differs from the present.
- The causes in question aren’t specified – the definition is deliberately *inclusive*. It covers all causes, and hence all theories of causation and approaches to prevention of crime, irrespective of whether situational or offender-oriented, and which institutions address them. Nor is there any distinction between interventions acting on immediate or remote causes of crime; but, *understanding* those interventions is helped by focusing on how they all ultimately act through the proximal causes of criminal events. Many developmental interventions are targeted on *risk and protective factors* (RPFs – Youth Justice Board, 2005), leading correlates of later offending. Although they may not be strictly causally related to the propensity to offend, the intervention is undertaken on the assumption that they are, and that influencing these factors will only work if they manipulate the causes proper. Therefore the use of ‘causes’ alone in this definition seems appropriate: RPF-based approaches are logically not excluded, and moreover are alluded to by reference to ‘risk’ in the definition.
- The focus is on criminal *events*, because this is sharp, immediate and measurable; and common to all crime problems. Much offender-oriented prevention focuses on criminal *behaviour* or *acts*, which whilst equally immediate, measurable and pervasive understate the ecological nature of the causation of crime (behaviour of offender in situation), and its significance in designing interventions.
- *Related occurrences* includes similar kinds of undesired events which (due to luck, nuances of social judgement, fine legal distinctions, and historical and cultural differences) are not-quite criminal but which have similar causes and/or consequences – like anti-social behaviour.
- *Risk* covers *possibility* (the nature of the events we don’t want to happen), *probability* and *harm*. Reducing risk can work through each of these. Elimination of possibility is rare but includes, say, tackling forgery of car tax disks by abolishing them and collecting revenue via increased fuel tax. (*Crime abolition*, such as decriminalisation of homosexuality, is *excluded*.) Earlier versions of the definition (Eckblom, 2000, 2002a) used ‘risk’ to mean ‘probability’ alone, referring separately to ‘seriousness of consequences’. The current version draws more on harm reduction/safety perspectives (below and see also Eckblom and

Sidebottom, 2007). Who or what suffers the harm is unspecified but includes individuals, communities, society, and objects, places and systems.

- *Advance preparations to eliminate, reduce and mitigate harm* explicitly incorporate wider security and community safety perspectives. These are planned, professional actions rather than, say, spontaneous assistance from bystanders.
- Reference to *frustrating criminal goals* and *disruption* reflects discourses (Ekblom, 2007b) to describe human behaviour not just as *caused* (socialised, motivated, prompted, provoked etc) but also as *causing* (active, goal-directed, planning and decision-making agents). Although causation ultimately underlies both perspectives sometimes it's more fruitful to use the latter (as with deliberate, planned, organised crime and terrorism). The *goals* in question may be the ultimate ones of making the criminal event succeed, but also preparatory ones (such as establishing corrupting relationships or stealing getaway cars), 'consummatory' ones of enjoying the proceeds, and 'protective' ones of laundering money, destroying evidence or intimidating witnesses. The discourse of goal-directed offenders is closer to that used in the formal Criminal Justice System: free will, evil intent and criminal responsibility; but the purpose of rational risk-reduction prevails over justice.

Although it uses somewhat different language, the above definition-in-depth covers the same ground as the UK government's counter-terrorism strategy 'Contest'²⁵ (Pursue – stopping terrorist attacks; Prevent – stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; Protect – strengthening protection against terror attack; Prepare – where an attack cannot be stopped, mitigating impact).

2. *Crime reduction*

Crime reduction is a broader and simpler concept than prevention, currently favoured in the United Kingdom. Although its originators never gave it a clear definition it is worth attempting one:

Crime reduction is any intervention made before, during or after criminal events to reduce their frequency or harm.

In practice, most reduction is delivered through *future-oriented* prevention, focusing on prior causes. (But even prevention predicts future risks on the basis of past experience of some kind.) However, reduction additionally has *present-oriented* aspects including detecting ongoing criminal events, and responding as they unfold ('Constable Lomax, the back door!'). It also has *past-oriented* aspects such as investigating crimes, punishing and reforming criminals for prior offences and offering victim support. Hence the substitution of 'frequency' for probability. Note, though, that both present and past aspects of reduction will reduce the likelihood of

future events too. Offenders contemplating a robbery may be deterred because they *anticipate* intervention by public or police, and on conviction and punishment they (or others observing their fate) may be deterred or incapacitated from committing the *next* crime. Victims may be encouraged to take preventive action against *repeats*.

3. Crime control

Total elimination of crime is impossible on both resource and effectiveness grounds (not to mention libertarian considerations – see Sutton et al. (2008) on Singaporean crime prevention). Crime control can have two meanings:

The ‘everyday’ aim of *crime control* involves *holding the frequency of criminal events, or their harm, below a tolerable level*. The ‘exceptional’ aim is *halting rapid growth in frequency or harm*.

- Crime control is essentially crime reduction with targets. *Tolerable level* means those targets are set in a context of harm reduction, of finite resources, and wider priorities and choices to determine (Ekblom, 2000).
- *Growth* reflects the understanding (Ekblom, 1997, 1999, 2002a) that crime is continually changing. Growth may happen with a specific crime problem (like a spate of car thefts following arrival of a new perpetrator technique), or on a wider front. It may be a qualitative deterioration as well as quantitative, and may feed back on itself – with increasing seriousness and organisation of offending, intimidation, corruption of agents of regulation, law enforcement and criminal justice and ultimately collapse of the state’s power and legitimacy.

4. Security / Risk management

Where crime prevention, reduction and control cease and security begins is unclear, due to the semi-independent growth of institutions and industries each with proprietary terms. We should bring prevention and security closer together, conceptually and linguistically, to avoid confusion and to facilitate exchange of knowledge. This is especially pressing given the increased stakes in prevention of terrorism, mostly the province of organisations covering Security with a capital ‘S’.

Security is deliberate action to reduce the risk of criminal events, taken before, during or after the event. The latter, temporal, dimension draws on the *Haddon matrix* described (in a counter-terrorism context), by Clarke and Newman (2006), and can be further refined (Ekblom and Sidebottom, 2007) as follows:

- *Primary security* – action eliminates *possibility* of harmful event; if event nevertheless remains possible, it reduces its *probability*.
- *Secondary security* – if event does happen, action *limits harm as it unfolds*.

- *Tertiary security* – action *limits propagation of harm* that may occur post-event, e.g. by preventing further offences such as identity theft following theft of credit cards.
- *Mitigation* attempts to repair harm already done, but may be prepared for in advance.
- Together, the capacity to deliver secondary and tertiary security and mitigation are aspects of *resilience*. Edwards (2009) defines this wider concept as the capacity of an individual, community or system to *adapt* in order to sustain an acceptable level of function, structure, and identity.
- Note there's no direct connection with 'primary, secondary and tertiary prevention' (Brantingham and Faust, 1976) which as said are risk-based targeting strategies and in 5Is more meaningfully named 'universal, selective and indicated' (Mrazek and Haggerty, 1994; Wilson and Lipsey, 2007).
- Security adopts a *risk management* approach similar to crime control in seeking to keep risks below tolerable levels, to anticipate or keep abreast of changes in risks, and to be prepared should the undesired events happen.
- Security as defined here merges key elements of crime prevention, reduction and control in a framework emphasising harm reduction. It is wider than the 'Contest' strategy mentioned above because it is both preventive and reactive (depending on how 'pursue' is interpreted). It's also echoed in the definition of community safety that follows.

5. *Community safety*

Community safety focuses less on individual criminal and disorderly events and more on consequences of crime and disorder as a whole; hence the goal is *harm reduction and mitigation* (as in *security*, above) and the delivery of various social and economic *benefits* rather than merely lowering the frequency or probability of criminal events or reducing their rate of growth. (Growth in the probability of crime may, however, be harmful in itself, scaring people and arousing punitiveness irrespective of the objective consequences of those crimes.) Wiles and Pease (2000) made the connection with harm early on but inclined towards safety in its widest sense – that is, including physical and accidental hazard as well as deliberate criminal threat. The distinctive emotional significance of crime perhaps makes the latter inclusivity unrealistic although there may be much to gain from institutional and methodological links in managing diverse risks.

The definition adopted here is necessarily long.

Community safety is an aspect of the quality of life, a state of existence in which people, individually, collectively and in organisations, and in public and private space, enjoy the following crime-related conditions:

- *Freedom from and/or reassurance about a range of real and perceived risks* centring on crime, antisocial behaviour, disorder and drug dealing and abuse – including freedom from fear of crime.
- *Ability to cope with the harmful consequences* of those incidents they nevertheless experience, at reasonable cost (e.g. without curtailment of going out).
- *Help to cope if unable to do so alone*, whether informally from the community, or more formally by, say, victim support or insurance.
- *Confidence* that the police, CJS and other agencies will if needed provide a responsive, fair and effective service that delivers justice and remedies to the problems and conflicts they experience or risks they perceive.
- *Trust* – within and across cultural boundaries – in neighbours, colleagues and passers-by to support them both morally and materially in terms of sympathy; existence of collectively-upheld moral order, social control and support; trust in police and other enforcement-empowered services, to behave fairly and decently towards those they must confront.
- *Avoidance and resolution of civil conflicts* with the potential to turn criminal.

When all these conditions are sufficiently met, they enable individuals, families and, communities to enjoy these wider benefits:

- Pursuing the necessities of cultural, social and economic life;
- Receiving adequate services;
- Exercising skills;
- Experiencing well-being;
- Engaging in community life;
- Creating wealth in the widest sense.

(Note that the concept of community is itself problematic, as discussed below.)

Particularly where *social cohesion* and *collective efficacy* and an obligation to reciprocate develop, the above conditions contribute to the community's own capacity to address crime and disorder in collaboration with official institutions *without* making informal social control oppressive, invasive or exclusionary, or taking the law into their own hands; and to the development of sustainable communities.

The above definition is a positive one, more akin to health as a state of wellbeing rather than merely the absence of sickness. (Indeed, it comes close to a public health-oriented conception of safety adopted within Québec (Maurice et al., 2008.)) As stated at the beginning of the chapter, it achieved some currency within the Home Office and various national and local agencies but – in the wearily familiar

administrative way of failing to cumulate on existing thinking and introducing change for no apparent reason – the National Community Safety Plan for England and Wales circa 2006 opted for a half-satisfactory muddle (Home Office, 2006). It's worth describing and deconstructing this definition in full because it epitomises a major and ongoing flaw in the way definitions are handled by government in the UK and probably in many other countries, to the detriment of knowledge management and ultimately of performance:

How does the NCSP define 'community safety'?

Community safety has always been a difficult concept to define rigidly. Usually, the priorities of local communities drive the scope of community safety activities at a local level. Our definition of community safety must therefore reflect the breadth of understanding in the wider community. Community safety means more than the more commonly used crime reduction or crime prevention. In using community safety, we recognise that we should focus attention not only on efforts to reduce or prevent crime and disorder, but also on introducing social and economic change as a way of preventing crime and disorder from taking place. Community safety activities will aim to reduce offending behaviour and also the harms experienced by individuals and communities because of crime and disorder and will seek to improve their quality of life through efforts to change the wider physical and social environment.

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/communitysafety02.htm>

On the good side, this text acknowledges that community safety is wider and more challenging to define than crime reduction/prevention, it mentions harm reduction and quality-of-life for individuals and communities, and it relates to local priorities. But a local-priority-sensitive approach could equally be applied to narrow crime prevention. And on the bad side, the definition appears to link improvements in quality-of-life simplistically and narrowly to changes in the physical and social environment. In the middle of the attempted definition, what began as an account of a *state*, then confusingly introduces methods of *intervention*. These methods, moreover, are at different levels and give a spurious contrast between 'efforts to reduce or prevent crime and disorder in general' and 'introducing social and economic change as a way of preventing crime and disorder from taking place'. So 'reducing/preventing crime and disorder' is *contrasted* with one *specific* set of approaches to preventing crime and disorder. Fruit versus apples! Nor does the definition link to key concepts such as reassurance or cohesion, which one would imagine were important to the Home Office. One wonders how seriously the task of coming up with this definition was taken, and how carefully this major plank of guidance was appraised for fitness for purpose! This fumbling paragraph fails to offer a definition which is clear, consistent and unambiguous enough for organising knowledge of practice, and for measuring the state of community safety itself, in

support of all the tasks of practice, and the specification of objectives and performance measurement in delivery.

6. Maintenance of civil society

A final concept – rarely considered when everyday community safety in most Western countries is being discussed, but unfortunately relevant elsewhere – is needed to cover the extreme case of the *maintenance of civil society*. This embraces the control of a range of progressively more apocalyptic problems: corruption, particularly in the enforcement and judicial system; feuding and conflict and other forms of extreme and persistent disorder; the collapse of faith in the state as provider of fair and satisfying justice, and its substitution by vigilantism, violent self-defence, and even quasi-government by paramilitaries. As stated above, the existence of fair and effective justice probably makes a huge contribution to keeping these problems at bay. To the extent that we wish to make significant contributions to development and governance in the world's less fortunate places, we must capture practical knowledge in these domains too.

The above suite of definitions within the wider crime prevention family covers the field in complementary ways. Crime prevention and community safety in particular are well-paired: the former narrow and tightly-focused on criminal events and their causes; the latter broad and incorporating subjective as well as objective components relating to harm reduction and quality-of-life. Security, with its 'harder' focus on crime, but its clear interest in harm reduction and enabling life to carry on, lies somewhere in between. The definitions attempted here don't yet fit perfectly together as a whole – there is overlap – but probably no gaps. However, I believe enough of a definitional core has been established to furnish the needs of 5Is whilst allowing for further evolution; hopefully even stimulating it.

Although these definitional distinctions are important, for brevity's sake wherever 'crime prevention' is henceforward mentioned, unless otherwise stated this refers to the entire family of activities.

Crime prevention and family – descriptions of institutional settings designed for 5Is

5Is has an institutional dimension. Intelligence, say, can draw on particular institutions to supply it, Intervention may act on particular institutions (e.g. influencing a criminogenic industry like mobile phone providers), Implementation may employ the resources of a particular institution, Involvement may require partnership with or mobilisation of a particular institution, and Impact evaluation could include assessing the performance of those institutions. But institutions are much more than organisations alone – they are associated with particular *targets* of preventive action including

potential, suspected and convicted offenders, and virtually every other object, place, system or agent in society (indeed institutions may be corporate offenders themselves). They have occupational and institutional *subcultures*; and particular *discourses, methods and principles* of intervention (including legal, penal, medical, psychological and situational). Altogether, a better term is *institutional settings* (Welsh and Farrington, 2006). Crime prevention practice must refine and apply knowledge of such settings, and the interfaces between them, as a significant part of the operating environment within which interventions are planned and implemented.

This section first draws on earlier work (Ekblom, 2000, 2004b) to define various broad institutional settings within which preventive action is delivered. It then considers more specifically how institutional settings relate to the targeting and organisation of preventive action. Finally attention turns to the parochial issue of institutional arrangements within England and Wales, where the delivery of crime prevention has become a conceptual and practical tangle in which Problem-Oriented Policing and Intelligence-Led Policing are delivered through the National Intelligence Model, which the Home Office has sought to extend from policy to cover the work of local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (now Community Safety Partnerships.). The shifting and parochial complication of these arrangements (and their equivalent in other countries) illustrates the importance of being able to describe principles and generic issues with some detachment and stability of language and concepts.

Judicial, civil and parajudicial settings

We've already concluded that law enforcement and criminal justice have an important role in prevention and are very much in-scope of 5Is. Here, we switch focus from the specific *activities* of these domains to a broader view of the *institutions* that produce them. (Again, 'crime prevention' is here taken to include all the activities 1-6 listed above.) *The preventive aspects of law enforcement and punishment can be called* (with some elasticity) *judicial crime prevention*. This acts – while simultaneously delivering justice – through the familiar formal processes of arrest through to punishment of individual offenders. 'Producer' institutions include police, prosecution services, courts, prisons and probation, but also others with relevant powers like border control, wildlife protection or fiscal agencies. A similar concept is 'criminal justice prevention' (Tonry and Farrington, 1995).

The rest of crime prevention, acting *outside* the formal process of law enforcement and the CJS, could be termed 'extrajudicial'. It's implemented by diverse agencies, partnerships, private companies, communities and individuals; and may operate before or after any court case occurs; or more often in the *absence* of any such proceedings, perhaps without targeting individual offenders at all. It also (with poetic licence) includes the *Civil Justice System* as a means of resolving conflicts between individuals and/or organisations without recourse to intimidation, violence or criminalisation. This 'rest-of' category retains the negative or 'residual' aspect of the

van Dijk and de Waard (1991) definition criticised above; but not for long, because it actually comprises two *positive* institutional settings: civil and ‘parajudicial’ prevention.


Civil crime prevention covers interventions in the everyday, routine social and economic behaviour of individuals, groups, subcultures, and public and private institutions and companies, and the design of products and places. Each of these causes or prevents crime by variously creating and influencing opportunities and opportunity structures, provocations, prompts, motives and predispositions. The interventions may be implemented by institutions including local community safety departments, trading standards or planning departments; national agencies like environmental watchdogs or fraud prevention organisations; and private companies or industry umbrella groups such as national insurance industry organisations. (For example, the Association of British Insurers has a centre for attack-testing vehicles to determine their level of security and hence their insurance premium.). Private individuals and households implement informal civil prevention when they fit and operate locks on their doors, or when parents socialise their toddlers or ground their teenagers for misbehaviour. Private individuals, groups, gangs or companies sometimes administer their own ‘rough justice’, but ethically that’s outside the scope of 5Is except as offences to be prevented.

Civil crime prevention is perhaps the most important institutional setting, with potentially the greatest influence on crime and community safety. However, it remains perpetually underdeveloped and underfunded due to the lasting political and public obsession with ‘cops, courts and corrections’. But blame for this can’t be laid solely at the door of tradition and/or our evolutionary psychology. An inability to articulate the rationale and practice of certain domains with precision and force is an inherent weakness holding civil prevention back in the ‘battle of the discourses’.

But there’s an intermediate area, logically also part of extrajudicial crime prevention, which is important to distinguish. This can be called *parajudicial crime prevention*. The various institutions centrally involved in delivering formal enforcement, justice and punishment – prison, police, probation – also implement diverse activities to prevent impending criminal events, to deflect groups at risk of committing crime or to rehabilitate existing offenders. These operate, for example, by altering the predisposition or motivation to offend, or supplying skills and the social and economic opportunities to avoid offending and go straight. Cognitive and social skills enhancement, for example, may be done in *prison*. Supervision in the community, through the *probation* service, may include efforts to resolve problems (like unemployment) in offenders’ current life circumstances motivating them to commit crime. And the *police*, of course, patrol the streets, frustrate offenders’ preparations for crime, intervene in ongoing crimes and advise on prevention. Some of these activities, particularly those which could be classed as ‘repressive’ due to their significant impact on individual liberty and privacy, are subject to stringent procedural controls and are often formally linked to the penal process. Parajudicial prevention can be defined as *crime prevention acting through the institutions of law enforcement and the*

administration of justice, which may sometimes be formally linked to the criminal and penal process and draw powers from criminal statutes, but which is not strictly part of that process.

[Figure 8.1 Institutional settings for 5Is] [hi-res artwork on separate file]



Of course, the boundaries between these settings are permeable. Diversionary processes deflect offenders from the CJS into parajudicial or even civil prevention. (For example, a youth caught shooting swans was sent by an imaginative police officer to work in a swan refuge, with apparently transformational results.) Civil prevention draws significantly on the law enforcement and criminal justice ‘back-up’, as described above. On the offender-oriented side, many youth organisations with crime prevention among their aims may have highly-structured links to police and probation services; and may apply quasi-judicial means of control and conflict resolution within their own walls.

It’s important for 5Is to document these *interfaces*, how they are managed and the wider institutional implications for delivery: these are some of the trickiest aspects of practice to get right. Mistakes have significant impact on the viability of preventive organisations and their activities.

Institutional settings and the organisation of preventive action

Institutional settings strongly influence how preventive action is organised, principally through the way it's *targeted* and the people or things it's targeted *on*, a topic revisited in Chapter 13 on Implementation. Many offender-oriented interventions are delivered in judicial settings. These relate to the investigation of crime series, the targeting of prolific or serious offenders and supervision by the Probation Service. The kind of targeting of offenders adopted here may be *indicated*; or in the case of intervening to disrupt serious crimes, *selective* (Mrazek and Haggerty, 1994; Wilson and Lipsey, 2007).

Parajudicial interventions, often involving youth justice services delivering criminality prevention or intervening in current life circumstances, may be selective (open only to those at risk of offending) or indicated (e.g. referral of convicted youths post-sentence). *Random* police patrolling is *universal*.

Many civil interventions are universal. Examples are youth centres open to all, and situational crime prevention advice available, on request, to all homes or businesses. Civil prevention may also be selective (e.g. youth workers targeting neighbourhoods at risk or property-marketing schemes directed towards high-burglary areas) or indicated (e.g. educational interventions targeting young released prisoners; repeat victimisation services).

Practice knowledge must respect, and reflect, these aspects of institutional contexts. There may be a complicated relationship between handling a pattern of crime as a one-off *problem* through an equally one-off *project*, or as *cases* through a more routine *service*. Part of the response to a persistent *problem* like antisocial behaviour in housing estates may be to establish a *service* like a youth centre to which troublesome individuals may be referred. Prolonged contact with the attendees may reveal Intelligence of specific causes of antisocial behaviour which again becomes a specific *problem* that the centre staff may then address, or refer to another agency.

Similar entanglements may occur with situational prevention – an initial focus on a manifest pattern of crime *problems* may lead, say, to targeting of homes in the area at risk with a *service* of security advice and installation. Further variations centre on hierarchical targeting with units in receipt of action identified in different ways. For example, although a neighbourhood may be targeted as *indicated* due to high rates of youthful antisocial behaviour, the individual young people within it may be given *universal* access to entertainment facilities; and CCTV watches everyone.

Describing such arrangements, routines and evolving processes in a clear way to aid the capture of transferrable knowledge therefore requires close attention to:

- The *types* of intervention activity (e.g. crime prevention, community safety);
- The institutional *settings of intervention* (judicial, civil etc, and the specific institutions in more detail, such as probation or police);
- the *targeting of action* (universal, selective, indicated) upon recipient individuals, families, groups, neighbourhoods or any other identifiable ecological *units*; and

- the *organisation of action*, which may be structured around
 - one-off problems or routine services;
 - individual crimes as cases;
 - risk factors or causes;
 - offenders/clients as cases.

As a final point on generic institutional arrangements, *partnerships* between institutions commonly share responsibility and pool resources for preventing crime (Ekblom, 2004b). Their arrangements and procedures add another layer of practice knowledge to capture. Partnerships are handled in 5Is under Involvement (Chapter 14).

We should now bring together the implications for the institutional *scope* of 5Is. 5Is can cover any of the types of *targeting*. It should cover *projects* with distinct and localised crime prevention/safety objectives (e.g. ‘reduce the risk of antisocial behaviour on this housing estate’) and *services* (e.g. ‘help divert young offenders from the CJS’), with the proviso that it focuses on the *strategic intervention* rather than the individual *cases* this envelops. The core field should be *civil* and *parajudicial* crime prevention, security and community safety.

Pure judicial interventions, with individualistic responses of detection and arrest through to conviction and punishment, would probably not be handled in ways helpful to preventive practice, and seeking to accommodate to this could risk distorting and diverting 5Is from its main purpose. However, as argued above, enforcement and judicial actions of various kinds give force to civil prevention either in the background or as hybrid approaches. Repressive targeting of offenders as a *set* rather than as individuals, is one crime prevention *strategy* which would fall within scope – especially if implemented alongside, say, various situational interventions. (An example is an anti-robbery initiative where environmental changes to aid surveillance are combined with enhanced police patrols and stakeouts.) Here, 5Is could describe action up to the stage where the conventional judicial process takes over. Unless there are particular parajudicial interventions to report which match the crime or criminality problem in question (e.g. specific treatments for aggressive youths), the description of this aspect of the intervention package could simply end with ‘referral to police/CJS for prosecution’ or ‘gateway to mental health treatment’.

But the term *core* deliberately avoids rigid boundaries. In fact there may be an expanding ‘frontier territory’ for 5Is to explore and accommodate until it hits clear limits to its competence. The institutional boundaries of prevention are themselves changing. For example, Phase Two of the Kirkholt Project (Forrester et al., 1990) addressed offender-oriented causes of residential burglary through area-level actions to tackle debt and alcohol problems that were motivating offending. Here, actions of the Probation Service were extended from individualised supervision of clients to parajudicial area-based initiatives.

5Is and policing

The institutional setting that is *policing* is a special case covering many of the alternative arrangements discussed. To the extent that policing seeks to prevent, reduce, disrupt or control crime, disorder and terrorism, and contribute to community safety through reassuring presence and responsiveness to a wide range of problems and plights, the activities of the police are parajudicial and civil – thus well in scope of 5Is. As stated above, the pure ‘judicial’ channel of *investigation, interrogation and referral to prosecution*, unless part of a wider, mixed crime prevention strategy, is not. *Cautioning* of offenders is however in scope because it’s primarily intended to be preventive (in reducing immediate crimes and avoiding boosting criminal identity and career). It may be combined with a range of civil or parajudicial interventions including attendance at youth centres, driving schools or anger-management classes.

Problem-oriented approaches to crime prevention are now explicitly incorporated in *Intelligence-Led Policing* (ILP) although Tilley (2003) and Ratcliffe (2008) make clear distinctions between them. Both identify a common information-gathering and analytic approach, but see Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) as focusing on, well, problems, ILP on judicial/enforcement-oriented pursuit of offenders and wider disruption of criminal organisations and networks. To the extent that ILP involves interventions against (individual or organised) offenders which play a *strategic* role in tackling crime problems at local, regional, national or international levels, by diverse kinds of intervention, it falls within the field of coverage of 5Is and benefit should flow from interleaving concepts and frameworks. To the extent that ILP focuses single-mindedly on catching prolific and/or serious offenders by intelligent application of investigation, detection and targeting, it’s better, as said, that the frameworks keep their distance.

A very British conundrum: POP, ILP, NIM, PBM, SARA and 5Is

But the ‘separate development’ scenario is unlikely at present in the UK, where the Home Office has sought to merge ILP with the wider partnership-based approaches to crime prevention, even to the point of attempting to develop a common business model.

The UK is among the world leaders in the development of partnership-based crime prevention, Problem-Oriented Policing and Intelligence-Led Policing. Recent efforts of the Home Office to merge aspects of all three are ambitious but raise doubts. To give a brief genealogy, the Problem-Oriented Policing approach was transliterated into Problem-Oriented Partnerships, as evidenced by the Tilley Award which now takes submissions from both police and partnerships. The UK version of ILP – the National Intelligence Model (NIM) – expanded in scope from the enforcement/judicial side of policing into a generic business model for policing (see

e.g. Tilley, 2003; Ratcliffe, 2008). NIM then appeared to take in various aspects of POP. Are you following?

POP fits fairly well with features of NIM including ‘intelligence products’ such as ‘problem profiles’, and ‘analytical products’ such as ‘target profile analysis’, ‘network analysis’, ‘risk analysis’ and ‘crime pattern analysis’. The ‘Tasking and Coordinating’ process of NIM relates to objective setting, resourcing, implementation and accountability for performance which in fact promises to give POP-type action a proper organisational home in the police rather than being a ‘pick up and put down’ hobby of a few isolated enthusiasts. ‘Results analysis’ of NIM relates to process and impact evaluation. Intelligence on the harmful consequences of crimes could inform strategic assessments used to determine priorities for a ‘control strategy’. NIM has a knowledge management dimension, both in the key processes it captures, articulates and prescribes (which seek to embody how to undertake the business of policing), and in the content of the various ‘products’ they generate and use. NIM has adopted SARA to cover the problem-oriented elements within it. But it’s not clear whether SARA is meant solely to cover the extension of ILP into wider prevention, or additionally the ‘sharp end’ of pure enforcement.

Tilley wrestles with the convoluted relationship between POP, NIM and ILP. He maintains that whilst

POP allows space for the intelligence-led enforcement focused on in ILP, the reverse does not hold. ILP provides no space for the wider conception of police problems and responsibilities contained in POP. (2003: 3).

He further holds that it’s unclear, and untested, whether NIM comprises the optimum model for delivering POP. But on the positive side,

NIM may be a useful business model for delivering POP and the ILP that it may sometimes require. If designed to deliver POP, and ILP when this is appropriate to dealing with a specific problem, it might need to be reconfigured. It may be sufficiently flexible, however, already to allow this for a police service or local partnership committed to NIM but also wanting to embrace POP. (2003: 3-4).

To resume the historical account, around 2003-4 the Home Office first promulgated the ‘Partnership Business Model’ (PBM).²⁶ This was followed in 2007 by National Standards for partnership working²⁷ based on six principles or ‘hallmarks’ combining statutory obligation and good practice guidance. These are: empowered and effective leadership; intelligence-led business processes; effective and responsive delivery structures; community engagement; visible and constructive accountability; and appropriate skills and knowledge.

The PBM and the Guidance both claim transferability of the police National Intelligence Model to become *the* business model for partnership working. This cross-breeding is debatable – we don’t yet know whether it will engender ‘hybrid vigour’ or the sterility of a mule – but there are doubts from first principles. There’s much in common between what the *police* are required to achieve on crime

prevention (in its inclusive sense embracing community safety etc) and how they do it, and what local crime prevention *partnerships* do (which will usually include the police as members). But there are significant differences in remit, organisational structure and practice, including the balance between judicial, parajudicial and civil intervention, and the balance between addressing crime problems (or even educational or welfare problems) versus pursuing offenders.

The tendency to merge everything into the one framework continues with the attempt to apply SARA as a common and major process element in NIM and PBM. Is this wider use of SARA appropriate?

SARA was designed to cover problem-oriented approaches and despite its originators' situational preferences, it can also handle offender-oriented interventions. But by default, SARA seems the only model proposed for all kinds of civil and parajudicial preventive arrangements *beyond* the purely problem-oriented (those targeting causes or risk factors in current life circumstances or developmental pathways; and those targeting offenders referred for treatment or other life-changing experiences). How far SARA can handle this drastic extension has yet to be demonstrated.

So where does 5Is fit in? Given its common origins, alongside SARA, within the action-research tradition it is unsurprising that 5Is fits well with the practice of Problem-Oriented Policing. Indeed, many of the original case studies captured using 5Is (Chapters 11-15) were implemented in an explicitly problem-oriented context.

Likewise, 5Is could fit many of the processes and products of NIM. Indeed, the Home Office published a simplified 5Is questionnaire²⁸ as a list of interview themes for process evaluation of burglary projects, which originated as a police attempt to apply 5Is to a 'results analysis' exercise under NIM. 5Is subheads could give NIM further support, for example Intelligence on the harmful consequences of crimes could inform strategic assessments used to determine priorities for a control strategy.

More generally, all the technical advantages claimed for 5Is over SARA in the previous chapter are equally relevant in an NIM and PBM context. The much wider scope of 5Is in going beyond purely problem-oriented arrangements for preventive action and in encompassing a broader range of alternative preventive approaches (crime control, security, community safety etc) means we can make firmer connections with hard-end policing and soft-end education and welfare across the full remit of partnerships. The backward compatibility of 5Is with SARA means there are no serious practical obstacles to exploring what 5Is tasks and products could contribute to NIM/PBM, and vice-versa.

Well, that's sorted then! Whatever the arrangements for England and Wales specifically, from a less parochial perspective the same arguments can support 5Is as a contributor to the more strategic side of Intelligence-Led Policing (i.e. where crime prevention goes beyond pure judicial law enforcement) and to the wider range of

interventions and arrangements for interventions under crime prevention partnerships. However, to the extent that the police require a bespoke, judicially-oriented, framework then it makes sense for them to assimilate elements of 5Is into their own Intelligence-Led models. And the ultimate proof of any claimed superiority of one framework over another is whether it can be made to work on the ground and be accepted by practitioners, whether that working is more intelligently done and – most importantly – whether that working delivers significantly improved performance as an outcome.

Looking briefly to the wider issue of the governance of crime prevention, the attempts at fusion of police and partnership approaches in England and Wales clash with views expressed for example by Weatherburn (2004) and Homel (2008). Drawing on extensive Australian and international experience, they cogently argue that, while crime prevention is generally viewed as a criminal justice activity, in fact much of what prevents crime is rooted in a much broader social development and governance agenda relating more closely, although not exclusively, to the human services sector. Knowledge and practice frameworks must track these relations, and indeed 5Is has been designed to do so. It can fit either a police-dominated context or a civil, human services one. However, the issue of which practical institutional settings are most suited to the 5Is approach in terms of professional and organisational culture, practitioner career structures etc might suggest the latter.

Community in crime prevention

One last issue. Community safety tends towards a holistic view of crime problems, and of solutions. Paradoxically, this requires an even *greater* clarity and rigour, to understand what *exactly* the interventions are aiming to achieve and by what causal mechanisms they will do so. Without this, practical interventions often degenerate into well-meant but superficial and ineffectual efforts with drifting objectives. It's particularly important for 5Is to address the concept and institution of *community*, a term used with some abandon within the crime prevention field (community policing, community safety, community crime prevention, even punishment in the community) and beyond. The wide range of meanings of the term 'community' itself make this task harder. To act and to document effectively, those engaged in community safety must be able to navigate this particular semantic sea (see also Jamieson, 2008). Wiles and Pease (2000) also warn against the 'fluffy' connotation of 'community' which may privilege 'social' or offender-oriented action over other kinds.

Communities can cover particular *territories* (such as neighbourhoods), or comprise diffuse sets of *people with a common interest or sense of identity* (such as ethnic minority groupings). The concept relates to community safety in several ways:

- A community itself (or its physical components like high streets or community centres) can be a collective *target of crime* in receipt of crime prevention or safety initiatives.
- A community can be a *source of crime* meriting preventive action – simply by being composed of many criminally predisposed members, or by the emergent contribution of a criminal subculture. The crime can afflict members of the same community, other neighbourhoods or (say) the town centre.
- A community can be a *setting* where crime preventive interventions are planned and implemented, with a key ingredient being the participation and ownership of community members and organisations in identifying problems and planning and implementing solutions.
- Community safety can exploit specific *community crime prevention mechanisms*, including informal social control or support processes, in the intervention itself. It can also tackle *the social conditions which act at a community level to generate crime*. Offenders, victims and other crime preventers may be linked by pre-existing community *relationships* (such as pupil-teacher, landlord-tenant, employer-employee, neighbours) which may be the source of *conflict* and/or offer the prospect of resolving it. Interventions may enhance the *general* capacity of a community to protect or control by developing social structures such as residents' associations, and/or by improving trust among members. Interventions may also empower through provision of *specific* resources, such as property marking tool-libraries or transport for young people to legitimate entertainment facilities.

So, wherever 'community' appears in portraying some instance or aspect of good practice, a 5Is description should aim to declare which of these facets of community applies.

Conclusion

This chapter has put some conceptual and institutional flesh on the skeletal process model at the centre of the 5Is framework. This rather mammoth effort was necessary for it to engage with the real world of practice and delivery, whilst simultaneously maintaining both continuity and distance from the muddled, superficial and shifting sloganeering of everyday terminology and parochial institutional structures as documented here and also by Homel (2008).

To resolve these and other design conflicts, a carefully-crafted suite of definitions was adopted after some discussion of issues and alternatives. Although attempting standardisation (Ekblom, 2004a), this was done so as to allow for alternative perspectives and further development of terms and concepts. The direction that evolution takes henceforward can't be predicted, but I hope those who undertake it use the same design-based approach, rigorous but sensitive and inclusive, adopted here. The benefit is that terms, concepts and descriptions of

institutional domains grow fitter for purpose in capturing the content and context of good practice and delivery.

Clarifying the institutional contexts of crime prevention enabled a further, tentative mapping of the scope of 5Is. It also illustrated how rich the term 'context' is, an understanding taken further in the next chapter.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 9 A companion framework for causes of crime and preventive interventions: the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity

The last chapter stated how conceptual clarity was vital for the framework for knowledge management of good practice; and in particular, how crime prevention *interventions* – what’s done to block, weaken or divert *causes* of criminal events – should be central to descriptions of preventive action. 5Is therefore needs a versatile and rigorous language for describing causes and interventions so the latter can be readily selected, replicated and innovatively modified, or created afresh from first principles.

An existing, and much-used, framework for causes and interventions within crime prevention is the Crime Triangle (Clarke and Eck, 2003), which centres on the immediate causes carried by target or victim, offender and place. However, it has significant limitations for organising practice knowledge as already noted (Chapter 7). This chapter describes a more advanced framework, functionally equivalent to the Crime Triangle but with greater scope, integration and detail – the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (CCO). CCO supplies a map of 11 proximal causal pathways which come together to make criminal events happen, and 11 counterpart principles of intervention which seek to tackle those causes.

CCO, it will be argued, is an ideal companion framework for 5Is. Given the degree of detail it organises, and its importance to both Intelligence and Intervention tasks (and, with Realistic Evaluation in mind, Impact evaluation too), CCO deserves its own chapter. How CCO is used in the 5Is tasks is illustrated in Chapters 11-15. But people more comfortable with the familiar Crime Triangle could still use this with 5Is, despite its limitations.

This chapter aims to describe CCO sufficiently thoroughly to highlight its importance for the management and application of knowledge of good practice in crime prevention. Here, prevention is used in its narrow sense of intervention in the causes of criminal events to reduce the risk of their occurrence. We begin, as before, with an account of the historical and intellectual origins of CCO. The section continues with a discussion of the nature of CCO and its general suitability for the 5Is framework. The following two sections are straightforward descriptions of the basic content of the CCO framework in terms of the 11 generic *causal components* and the counterpart ‘how does it work?’ *preventive principles* that make it up. The last main section covers various considerations and adjunct concepts necessary for the proper understanding and use of CCO.

Introduction: background, intellectual origins and nature of CCO

Historical background: sado-masochism

In the early 1990s I undertook a rather masochistic exercise to classify several thousand local crime prevention projects implemented under the UK Government's Safer Cities Programme (the sadism came when colleagues had to read the report). One purpose was to try to put 'like with like' when evaluating project impact. The range of those projects was challenging: they covered diverse institutional settings and preventive activities, and no available framework could handle the complexity or encompass the breadth. Likewise, attempting to determine exactly what the individual projects were endeavouring to do, even from detailed entries in a management information system, proved difficult: there was no universal, rigorous and consistent language by which the implementers could articulate the preventive interventions. This not only inhibited intelligent replication of success stories and extraction of principles, it also constrained the realisation and monitoring of the original project as it unfolded. Heightening the confusion was the fragmentation of the field of crime prevention, as already described, into situational and offender-oriented territories, each with its own languages and theories (and poorly-integrated in their turn); and fragmentation, too, into institutional settings. Two decades on, these shortcomings, and their consequences for performance of prevention, sadly remain.

I decided therefore to develop a new framework purpose-designed for the job: one that was inclusive of types and theories of crime, and types and contexts of prevention; and based on a suite of clear and consistent definitions. The focus was to be on the immediate, or 'proximal' causes of criminal *events*. This was reflected in the label initially given to the framework – *Proximal Circumstances* (Ekblom, 1994, 1996), which was intended to convey those causes acting via the *offender in the crime situation*. 'Distal' or remote causes (such as children's early upbringing, aspects of social structure like inequality, or market forces like those which make copper cables worth stealing), were important. But they were too varied, complex and often hard to measure and define, to form the basis of a theoretical and conceptual framework. In any case, no matter how remote from criminal events they all ultimately had to act via the final common paths of the proximal causes. This wasn't intended as reductionist: CCO acknowledged the importance of *configurations* and *chains* of such causes, and interactions between them.

In an attempt to classify the widest range of preventive interventions, CCO/Proximal Circumstances was assembled from familiar theories and models of crime causation including Rational Choice Theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986), Crime Pattern Theory (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2008) and Routine Activities Theory (RAT) (Cohen and Felson, 1979). The last was in effect the starting point: a crime occurs when a likely offender encounters a suitable target in the absence of capable guardians. I began to ask '*how* is the target suitable?' and '*why* is the offender likely?' Since these situational theories intentionally contained only minimal reference to offenders, and many of the Safer Cities Programme's projects were offender-oriented, I boosted the offender side with reference to psychological and interpersonal aspects of criminals. These were taken mainly from the theoretical

writings of David Farrington (1994). (Contemporary arguments for extending the offender side of the map even just for the benefit of situational prevention are in Ekblom (2007b).) Charting an exhaustive ‘map’ of causes led to the identification and filling of gaps: for example, the concepts of ‘crime promoters’ and ‘resources for committing crime’ as described below.

At about this time, Nick Tilley began introducing ‘Scientific Realist’ perspectives to the crime prevention domain and to Safer Cities in particular (Tilley 1993a). The SR paradigm – the desired preventive outcome only being achieved if *causal mechanisms* were triggered in necessary contextual conditions – provided the right discourse, and shaped the orientation, of the emerging framework. The framework evolved iteratively as it was applied to a succession of Safer Cities projects (acting as a ‘learning engine’ as described in Chapter 5). Through assimilation and accommodation as new kinds of cause or intervention were encountered, it steadily increased its compass and refined its tracking of reality. Eventually it ended up with a stable configuration (which has remained ever since) of 11 components of causation, and 11 counterpart principles of prevention. The result was more complex than alternative frameworks, but this was considered worthwhile given its greater rigour, scope and consistency, and its ability to simplify the handling of the complexity of the real world.

Crime prevention continued to grow in the UK, particularly with the preparation for what became the Crime & Disorder Act 1998, which established statutory local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (now Community Safety Partnerships). Work on guidance, education and training for practitioners was discussed in national fora and working groups (as described in Chapter 8). (In fact, I recall Nick Tilley bursting into my Home Office room to tell me he was in the middle of a meeting with one such working group, had just informed them they needed a conceptual framework, and knew the right person to supply one... and could I join the meeting straightaway.)

It was then I rebranded Proximal Circumstances as the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity to reflect its extension from purely academic to practitioner-friendly orientation (actually, when walking towards Oslo Harbour in discussion with Ron Clarke in July 1997). The ‘ray and shield’ graphics (below) were created with herculean effort on a home PC. In 2001 the Home Office commissioned the development of toolkits for crime prevention practitioners²⁹ and these were accompanied by the website material introducing CCO³⁰ (Ekblom, 2001). The intention had been to use CCO as a common language for describing interventions across toolkits, and a multi-stakeholder working party was set up to develop this, but organisational pressures and politicking within and outside the Home Office frustrated that ambition.

The evolution of CCO within a practice and delivery context up to 2003 led to an accretion of process elements which were eventually hived off to 5Is itself, as already described.

Since around 2000, CCO has pushed its frontier into organised crime (Ekblom, 2003), drugs (Dorn et al., 2003), terrorism (Roach et al., 2005), crime and policing futures (Ekblom, 2002b, 2005b), cyber crime (Collins and Mansell, 2004) and most recently Design Against Crime (ODPM, 2004; Ekblom 2004c, 2005a, 2008d), where it's currently undergoing some rapid extension to accommodate to highly dynamic interactions between users and abusers of designed products and places (Ekblom, 2009).

Nature of CCO and suitability for 5Is framework

Moving from evolutionary origins to contemporary nature, CCO, like RAT or Gottfredson and Hirschi's General Theory of Crime (1990), is an *ecological* model of the immediate causes of criminal events. That is, it centres on human agents acting out particular roles or pursuing particular goals in a particular setting. On the agent side it focuses on individual and interpersonal psychology. Described in terms equivalent to RAT, the *causal* side of CCO is summarised thus:

A criminal event happens when a predisposed, motivated and equipped offender encounters, seeks or engineers a situation conducive to crime, perceives opportunity and decides, or is provoked, to act. The situation comprises a human, material or informational target that is vulnerable, attractive or provocative, perhaps within an insecure enclosure, and in any case located in a wider environment that motivates and/or gives tactical advantage to the offender, who may also be aided deliberately, recklessly or innocently by people acting as crime promoters, and insufficiently hindered by people acting as crime preventers.

Arguably, neither CCO nor RAT can strictly be called *theories*. They are more like *truisms*, or statements of the defining ecological components of crimes, the presence, properties, states and interactive mechanisms of which, specific theories are intended to explain. The closest to an all-encompassing theory covering the explanatory territory of CCO is Wikström's (2006) Situational Action Theory, although Tremblay (e.g. 2010) provides an integration of genetic, environmental and behavioural factors from a developmental perspective. CCO, however, is intended to step back from specific theories, however broad, to provide a framework and language within which the widest possible range of those theories can be encompassed, expressed and integrated (Ekblom, 1994, 1996). A framework moreover which is fairly conservative and 'future-proofed', offering continuity during the evolution, and perhaps extinction, of more specific theories.

CCO offers a universal 'mechanism map' of the proximal causal preconditions that must come together for a criminal event to occur. The same map applies when considering preventive interventions in those causes. The *preventive* side of CCO is simply a matter of blocking, weakening or diverting one or more of these 11 causal factors so the necessary conditions are no longer complete. This

reduces the probability of criminal events happening (total elimination is unlikely), and any consequent harm. Essentially, the causes of criminal events are recast (in terms of discourse) as *generic, mechanism-based intervention principles*.

The mechanism perspective enables CCO to centre on analytic causal and contextual factors rather than simply being a superficial listing of causes and a ‘natural history’ of preventive methods. As Chapter 5 argued, and following Tilley (1993a,b), Eck (2005), Pawson (2006) and Wikström (2007), understanding and reproducing mechanisms is vital for intelligent replication of ‘success story’ projects; it is also central to innovation.

CCO causal components: agents and entities

The 11 causal components of CCO comprise a mix of living *agents* and non-living *entities*. Together, these cover the offenders and their crime situation, though as will be seen the situation is not an absolute set of causes but *relative* to the agent whose perceptions and actions we are considering (crime preventers have their situations too, and the offender is part of these). CCO uses ‘causal components’ rather than plain ‘causes’ because it is *properties* and *states* of entities like the target of crime, or of agents like the offender, that carry the causal mechanisms, in *interaction* with the other components of the conjunction.

Agents

The *Offender* – often the *potential* offender – is covered below. The other agents, as part of the situation *for the offender*, play two kinds of role in the causation of crime.

Crime Preventers are people who make criminal events less likely, by their mere presence or by action including surveillance of strangers, using window locks, or supervising children. Preventer roles can be undertaken in various institutional settings, by police patrols, vigilant employees, neighbours chastising next-door’s children or ‘good citizens’ reporting hazards. Preventers can act *before* the criminal event (securing their car), *during* it (repelling assailants) or *after*. Regarding the last, the prevention strictly speaking won’t affect the current crime but may involve fixing a vulnerability before the next; arrest of the current offender; and perhaps deterring other offenders. However, offenders’ *anticipation* of such responses to their crimes may serve to prevent the current instance too. The term preventer incorporates those roles envisaged in the Crime Triangle (Clarke and Eck, 2003): guardians of targets, managers of places and handlers of offenders. But it’s more generic and flexible, covering additional roles such as passers-by exercising casual surveillance.

Crime Promoters are people who, by contrast, play roles which *increase* the risk of criminal events, with varying degrees of intentionality and responsibility. They include someone accidentally provoking the (potential) offender; a ‘friend’

encouraging the offender to avenge an insult; or simply someone forgetting to lock their house. The aim of much prevention is to switch the careless promoter into the role of careful preventer. The usual focus is on preventers and promoters exercising influence over the probability of criminal events from within the proximal circumstances. But the roles can include more distal activities such as parents socialising their children well or badly; designers creating/constructing secure or vulnerable environments; or antiques dealers buying stolen goods or reporting suspicious offers to the police. Note that using *roles* gives a more general flexibility. A user of a car park could, over several minutes, lock their car door (preventer), leave their laptop in view (promoter) and yield to temptation to keep a found wallet (offender). It's also helpful from an Involvement perspective to consider the overlap of other *civil world* roles with crime prevention roles, such as the bike user who is a preventer, or the sales assistant who is a promoter or even an offender.

Victims don't directly feature here, although unsuccessful preventers may become victims. Victims, considered as active *roles* (rather than as a status) comprise people seeking to limit, mitigate and recover from the harms of the criminal event experienced (and to participate in investigatory and judiciary processes). They may also be the *target* of violent crime whether or not they may have promoted it, for example by insulting someone or flashing money about (we're talking causation, not blame here).

The baseline model assumes the various agents are individuals, but CCO can cover co-offending and corporate offending, and preventer or promoter equivalents. With cyber-crime and cyber-prevention, intelligent systems monitor credit card patterns or movements in buildings, make decisions and initiate action (CCO is discussed in this respect in Collins and Mansell, 2004: 64). Such causes and preventive actions may increasingly require good practice descriptions, hence cyber-discourse will be relevant to 5Is. But for now it's easier to describe CCO within 'meatspace'.

Entities

Entities are the 'things' in crime situations. The *Target* of crime may be a person or object that is inherently criminogenic: vulnerable, valuable or provocative. (The person as target is considered in passive terms; active human prevention is covered under the Preventer role.)

The target may be located in *Target Enclosures* like safes, buildings or gated compounds. Enclosures are characterised by structural features including periphery, boundary fence, access doors/gates and interior. Each may have criminogenic properties (or criminocclusive ones (Felson, 1986): reducing the probability of crime). A wider development of the concepts and language of target and target enclosure security is in Ekblom and Sidebottom (2007).

Enclosures are situated in turn in a *Wider Environment*. This could be, say, a mall, park, transport interchange or housing estate. Environments (whether ‘wider’ ones, or the interior environment of an enclosure) can be characterised by two distinct sets of properties. The *instrumental* environment relates to the goals of offender and preventer. It refers to the degree to which the physical layout (like sightlines and barriers), lighting etc affect the balance of tactical advantage between the conflicting parties, for example in stealth versus surveillance. The *motivating* environment covers, say, how many attractive targets the environment contains. Using Wortley’s situational ‘precipitators’ (2008), the environment may also supply physical conditions which directly prompt, pressure or provoke aggressive actions (like ‘collision points’ at busy commuter stations); or routinely contain crime promoters who may prompt, pressure or permit the action (such as an audience for youths racing stolen cars). The environmental criminology distinction between *crime generators* and *crime attractors* (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2008) covers high crime sites, respectively due to heavy use for incidental routine activities or through being deliberately visited by offenders for instrumental or motivational reasons.

So far, I’ve emphasised the physical side of environment or enclosure, but obviously environments contain (and comprise) people or the potential for people to enter or pass through. The perceptions, decisions and responses of these people, and the offender’s perception or anticipation of same, will merge into one causal web which defies detailed tracking.

The offender

Compared with situational approaches, CCO adds psychological depth to the offender (see also Ekblom, 2007b). But it does so in as generic a way as possible rather than by adhering to specific psychological theories like frustration-aggression, or discourses such as psychopathology.

The offender side of crime causation starts with *Predisposition to offend* – aggressive tendencies, antisocial attitudes etc which comprise a permanent potential for criminal behaviour that is present, but not necessarily expressed, in all situations the offender encounters.

The next component is *Resources to avoid offending* which include both inhibitory capacity such as self-control or executive function (Wikström, 2006; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990), and skills for honest living (hence scope for making legitimate choices when tempted by criminal opportunities).

The remaining offender components move gradually away from omnipresent potential towards factors activated in particular situations. *Readiness to offend* comprises emotional or motivational states induced by current life circumstances (like unemployment, poor housing or longstanding conflict) or recent experiences (like stressful commuter travel, intoxication or need for drugs). Once activated, these

states influence perception, planning and foraging behaviour, situational decisions and emotional responses.

Resources for offending (Ekblom and Tilley, 2000) empower offenders to tackle the risks and exploit the possibilities for instrumental crime and to realise expressive crimes such as revenge attacks. They include facilitators like tools or weapons; skills; predispositions like courage and strength; perpetrator techniques; knowledge of opportunities; assistance from trusted co-offenders or services from fences. The ability to neutralise guilt or ‘psych up’ for an attack may also aid offenders.

Perception and anticipation of offence captures offenders’ immediate address of the ‘Rational Choice’ agenda of risk, effort and reward; and their reaction to situational prompts and provocations. (Wortley’s (2008) two-stage model sees the latter often priming the former.) The immediate decision (with familiar qualifications on rationality) will be influenced by both the offender’s predisposition, resources to avoid and commit offences, and readiness. Habits and more strategic career choices (to be a burglar, to be a criminal and so forth) may also come into play, influenced in turn by learning-outcomes of past attempts. *Perceived* risks, effort etc operate parallel causal mechanisms to their objective counterparts: the robust *appearance* of a bus shelter may discourage vandalism, or its robust *construction* physically resist attack.

Finally, *Presence of offender in situation* is of course necessary. That presence could however be ‘telepresence’, as in obscene phone calls or hacking.


Note that although the above causal components seem conceptually independent they are not always strictly separable: for example, the capacity of an environmental stressor (such as noisy music) to pressure an offender into attacking its source cannot be separately understood from the capacity of the offender to be stressed (perhaps having a low tolerance threshold for disturbance).

Twin perspectives

CCO incorporates two perspectives on the offender. From one angle, they are seen as *agents*, with goals, decisions, and actions intended to realise them. From the other they are as much *caused* as *causing*: early experiences, current experiences, and operation of cognitive processes including perception, motivation and emotion. Recent formulations of CCO (Ekblom, 2009) therefore consider offenders as *caused agents*; likewise with preventers and promoters.

The 11 sets of CCO causes are illustrated in Figure 9.1.

[Figure 9.1 The Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity] [*hi-res artwork on separate file*]



CCO interventions

Given the primary definition of crime prevention as intervention in the causes of criminal events, it's straightforward to convert each of the 11 causal components of CCO into its preventive equivalent. For example, 'resources for offending' is simply flipped to '*restricting* resources for offending'. Each generic mechanism of *causation* of criminal events is accompanied by a counterpart principle, of purposefully *resisting, interrupting, weakening or diverting* that original mechanism. Following the 'caused agent' concept above, and the secondary definition of crime prevention in Chapter 8, this is equally about *frustrating criminal goals* by *disrupting activities and organisations* directed towards them.

Figure 9.2 shows a 'universal story of a crime prevention intervention', albeit a bland one. An intervention, at some point upstream, disrupts the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity, reduces the risk of criminal events (prevention) and if all goes well, ultimately cuts the numbers of such events that actually occur (reduction). Benefits for community safety and economic well-being may follow. The intervention illustrated could be that of trimming the bushes in a hospital car park, which modifies the environment of the crime situation, which removes the scope for ambush helpful to muggers. Benefits, apart from reducing the number of muggings and consequent trauma

and loss, may extend to greater use of the car park hence more revenue, more visits to patients and hence perhaps more rapidly-vacated hospital beds...

Figure 9.2 A crime prevention intervention [*hi-res artwork on separate file*]




Figure 9.2
A crime
prevention
intervention

The language used to describe the interventions, below, is a compromise. Thus ‘improving security of...’ is a functional definition; ‘design of...’ is a procedural definition; ‘hardening...’ is a technical definition; ‘early intervention’ refers to targeting in time rather than actions done to make children grow up well-behaved. Ideally these descriptions should use a uniform discourse of generic intervention mechanisms, but this would mean little to most practitioners. On the situational side particularly, they would also fail to connect with the 25 techniques of situational prevention (discussed further below) which would be a tactical blunder in knowledge management terms even if the ultimate strategy is to head in a different direction. So the present terms remain a melange.

Situational interventions

- *Hardening the target* of crime (e.g. making banknotes difficult to forge, supplying security guards with protective armour, or encrypting data), *reducing its value* (e.g. through property identification or changes to product marketing strategy), *concealment and disguise*, or *removal of the target* altogether (e.g. removable car satnavs, cashless public telephones).

- *Improving perimeter, access or interior security of the target enclosure* – respectively fencing-in storage yards, locking windows and installing posts before shop fronts to stop ram-raiders; strengthening doors and improving their locks, installing firewalls against computer hackers, screening computer disks for viruses, screening people for weapons on entry to airports or for stolen goods on exit from shops; detecting intruders inside a factory, in-house fraud or the operation of computer viruses missed on screening.
- *Design of wider environment* – making residential neighbourhoods or city centres less attractive *logistically* as a place for criminals to operate, by enhancing possibilities for surveillance, or blocking escape routes. Reducing *conflict* by tackling *motivating* aspects like colliding flows of pedestrian traffic, or uncertain territorial boundaries; or by *rule-setting* (as in libraries, football stadia).
- Facilitating the presence of *crime preventers* and variously alerting, informing, motivating, empowering and directing them in their exercise:
 - Of *self-defence* (including combat techniques, avoidance of personal danger, how to spot a con-trick, or how to alert fellow shopkeepers to the presence of a shoplifting gang);
 - Of *perimeter, access or interior control* of enclosures;
 - in the wider environment of formal or informal *surveillance* (e.g. police patrols, security guards or Neighbourhood Watch) or *social control* (e.g. informal censure of young people’s misbehaviour; or getting peer members, family or other ‘handlers’ to dissuade/divert the offender from crime).
 - *Resources for preventers* include spyholes in doors for access control, CCTV and street lighting for wider environments, or tamper-evident seals on food jars. Preventers’ effectiveness and motivation may also be boosted by clearly marked territorial boundaries, as with Defensible Space, or by warnings like ‘beware – forged banknotes circulating’. Formal preventers, especially police officers, may have special *legal powers to intervene*. *Human factors* – for example issues of vigilance and trust – are an important, and growing, topic within security (Sasse et al., 2007), and can help understand and influence the performance of preventers.
- *Discouraging, deterring or alerting deliberate, reckless or inadvertent crime promoters* (e.g. *disruption of markets* for stolen goods, *police crackdowns* on fences, *publicity campaigns* of the practical ‘lock it or lose it’ type or the moral ‘don’t ask someone to drink and drive’, *training in social skills* for ticket inspectors on trains to reduce assaults).

Offender-oriented interventions

- *Early or remedial intervention* (alternatively 'criminality prevention', or tackling the 'roots of criminality'). This includes influencing people's potential to offend by intervening in their *early lives* (through families, schools and peers) in order to bring about changes in their trajectories of development, socialisation and enculturation – often called 'developmental prevention' (Tonry and Farrington, 1995) or more recently, 'risk-focussed prevention'. It also covers *remedial* interventions post-conviction including control of sexuality or anger management. Many of these interventions act by establishing 'inhibitory' processes in the offender, whether 'conscience', or a more general curbing of impulsivity.
- *Supplying offenders with resources to avoid offending*, principally through *cognitive or social skills enhancement*, is a more positive set of approaches aimed at helping offenders obtain desired ends by legitimate means (such as through improved literacy enabling them to obtain a job), and teaching them how to avoid or manage conflict.
- *Changing current life circumstances* of individuals (including debt, poor entertainment facilities, membership of offending peer groups, or reputation for aggression) which may be influencing their current state of motivation, emotion or decisions to offend, or which may bring them into conflicting relationships or contact with promoters.
- *Restricting resources for crime* that offenders can employ against the crime target or use to handle crime preventers and logistically difficult environments. (This includes control of firearms, clearing bottles and bricks from downtown streets before the weekend, limiting use of colour photocopiers, crackdowns on fences, denial of decryption software, regulating the purchase of night vision goggles and keeping 'inside knowledge' secure.)
- *Deterrence and discouragement* – influencing offenders' *decision* to commit crime by increasing the *perceived risk* of arrest and punishment or informal censure; increasing *perceived effort* to commit crime (e.g. marking property to render stolen goods unsaleable), and reducing *perceived reward* from crime (e.g. confiscating profits from drug dealing). There is also the possibility of *disarming excuses* offenders may offer to others and to their own conscience ('shoplifting is theft' notices).
- *Excluding or deflecting offenders from crime situation* – including stopping more than two children visiting a shop simultaneously; incapacitating convicted criminals through imprisonment, curfew or electronic tagging; supplying legitimate attractions elsewhere which divert offenders from tempting targets and constructively occupy their time.

The full map of preventive intervention families is illustrated in Figure 9.3 and additional material is at <http://5isframework.wordpress.com> and Ekblom (2000, 2001).

[Figure 9.3 Crime prevention and the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity]
 [hi-res artwork on separate file]




Figure 9.3
 Crime prevention and
 the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity

CCO – wider considerations

As with defining the main concepts and perspectives of preventive action and the principal institutional settings of prevention, some of the concepts of CCO need developing in greater depth. This section therefore sets out a range of interpretations and adjunct concepts necessary for the proper understanding and use of CCO in the 5Is context and beyond. It also compares CCO with equivalent frameworks and indicates some directions of future development. Covered are the relationship of CCO with Involvement, the relationship between Intervention and context, the institutional settings handled by CCO, the 25 techniques of situational prevention, the Crime Triangle, Situational Action Theory, the issue of causally remote interventions in a proximally-centred framework, the importance of dynamics, and the question of emergence.

Where CCO and 5Is overlap: preventers and promoters, Intervention and Involvement

Although the intention has been to separate out the 5Is *process* model from the *cause/intervention* model of CCO, this distinction breaks down with preventers. These agents usually undertake preventive action, itself describable in process terms.

(The exception is where the mere presence of someone, say, passing unawares could deter offenders.) As Chapter 14 will show, mobilising preventers' action can be described under Involvement. Alerting someone to a particular crime risk is an Involvement mechanism; because that person may act as a crime preventer, it's simultaneously an Intervention mechanism.

This overlap of the frameworks must be handled through convention. CCO refers to preventers and promoters in terms of the causation of crime through their actions, potential actions, and potential actions perceived by offenders. It covers only those 'native' preventers or promoters immediately implicated in that causation: those at the 'business end' of any implementation chain. Involvement covers a wider set of agents and addresses the practical processes of influencing them to actively prevent crime, or at least to stop facilitating it. As will be seen, this concept of mobilisation in its turn can enrich CCO's understanding of the capacities of preventers and promoters; even of offenders.

Interventions and contexts

Context has many aspects: for example, *legal frameworks*, other *policy values* like sustainability with which crime prevention must co-exist; and *interactions of the rational with the political process*. These are vital elements of practice knowledge to capture and organise, so they will be highlighted throughout the following chapters. But the concept of context at the heart of Scientific Realism (SR) has a distinctive, causal, meaning. As described (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) SR talks of contexts and mechanisms as separately contributing to outcomes. However, the whole *configuration* is better understood as a web of mechanisms causing criminal events, into which we insert one or more mechanisms of prevention.

CCO serves as a generic mechanism map, which at a fairly high level of abstraction describes the totality of interacting factors. The immediate contextual conditions necessary for a given Intervention mechanism to work can therefore be described in terms of the *remaining 10 causes of CCO*. For example, for surveillance to work *preventers* must be *present, motivated* and *capable* of responding; *offenders* must *perceive* this possibility and be *concerned* about it because the *environment* conceals people's approach or hinders their own escape, and so on. As said, which cause is intervention and which are context is a 'figure-ground' issue.

CCO and institutional settings

A particular kind of context is the institutional setting where action takes place. CCO is intended to apply to interventions across all institutional settings, from personal to private to formal, and from civil to parajudicial and judicial. Of course, settings may actually contribute to interventions, activating causal mechanisms in the above sense. The spectacle of the criminal court is intended to convey the majesty of the law to offenders and others, in order to amplify deterrence.

CCO and the 25 techniques of situational prevention

CCO is *analytic*: comparison with the 25 techniques of situational prevention³¹ illustrates the point. Essentially, each of the 25 techniques is a collection of related preventive *methods* expressed in practical terms – such as ‘2. Control access to facilities’ – with example methods like ‘entryphones, electronic card access and baggage screening’. Each technique is listed under a column describing which of the ‘Rational Choice Theory-Plus’ mechanisms it comes under – *increasing the effort, increasing the risk, reducing the rewards, reducing provocations and removing excuses*. (The ‘-plus’ refers to the last two, add-ons prompted by Wortley (1996, 2001). More generally, the cumulation and differentiation in number of techniques over the years exemplifies the ‘learning engine’ approach advocated here.) There are several limitations to this approach, apart from the self-imposed one of covering only situational interventions.

- ‘Control access to facilities’ is a generic principle which does amount to an analytic causal mechanism. But taking the equivalent headings of the 25 Techniques as a whole (‘Harden targets’ etc), the principles heading each cell are not tightly-related to one another, but rather ad-hoc. The only framework which serves to relate them is the important, but narrow, focus on the offender’s decision-making and provocability. The organisation of the techniques solely around the *offender’s* perspective also brings limitations. With the ‘control access’ example, any staff acting as *preventers* would find surveillance easier if they only had to attend to a fixed entrance/exit point. CCO supports taking the *other* agents’ perspectives (or indeed, focusing on any of the other entities such as the target and how it appears to offenders or preventers), enabling a more flexible, generative consideration of preventive options. From a designer’s perspective (Ekblom, 2005a; Thorpe et al., 2009) it balances being user-friendly with abuser-unfriendly (Ekblom, 1997), and seeks to maximise ‘design freedom’, vital for innovation.
- Only one analytic causal mechanism is mapped onto each intervention method. ‘Control access to facilities’ comes under ‘increase the effort’. Following Tilley’s (1993b) example of nine possible mechanisms underlying how CCTV might prevent crime, access control might also act in other ways. For example, it could make offenders perceive increased risk of being seen, identified and arrested at the access control point; and reduce reward because they would only be able to smuggle out of the enclosure small items rather than, say, home-cinema TV sets. This one-to-one relationship of the 25 techniques unnecessarily restricts the generative power bestowed by understanding causal mechanisms. CCO is deliberately designed to handle the one-to-many relationship between method and mechanisms, as Figure 9.4 illustrates. Here, creating a target enclosure (method 1) is shown as simultaneously having the potential to physically block access, facilitate the performance of preventers and influence the decision of

offenders. The Figure also shows how *several* methods contribute to the structure of a broader project.

[Figure 9.4 Crime prevention methods and mechanisms] [hi-res artwork on separate file]




Figure 9.4
Crime prevention methods and mechanisms

- Note also that as mentioned, effort, risk, and reward are ‘interchangeable currency’ (Eckblom and Sidebottom, 2007) to adaptable offenders:
 - To reduce risk I can take less reward or put in more effort;
 - To increase the reward I can invest more effort, spend more time, deploy more sophisticated resources...;
 - Taking more time to overcome resistance increases risk of harm, and increases opportunity cost;
 - More effort may require more resources, greater time/cost/risk of harm in obtaining them (arrested for ‘going equipped’ with tools for theft), perhaps more risk of physical injury.

This means we can never be certain which of the risk-effort-reward mechanisms is working on a given occasion. The disruption achieved may not always be the disruption intended (knowledge of the mere act of installing a preventive scheme may suffice to deter offenders, whether or not the intervention

worked as planned). A more analytic framework for organising the knowledge of interventions, like CCO, encourages those designing interventions to actively consider these possibilities. The internal *dynamics* of the CCO are further covered below.

Despite these points, in the spirit of good knowledge management and cumulative science, wherever possible CCO seeks to use the same terms and categories as the 25 techniques.

CCO and the Crime Triangle

The widely-used Crime Triangle (Clarke and Eck, 2003) offers a broader analytic framework than the 25 Techniques, centring approximately on Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979). But as said, it's more limited than CCO. For example, CCO breaks *offender* down into six aspects, and *place* into enclosure and wider environment, each of which can progressively split to cover further aspects as knowledge accumulates. (CCO also resolves the confusion between *target = contents*, and *target = enclosure* in which those contents reside, such as a burgled house.) On scope, too, the Triangle, covering only target, place and offender, misses out on promoters. The current version³² does add a layer of *preventer* roles covering each of the sides of the triangle – guardian of targets etc – but these are confined to controlling or protecting the three basics. As Chapter 14 will show, there is much more to Involvement than this heuristic.

Remote interventions

Although the focus of CCO is deliberately on the proximal *causes* of criminal events this doesn't mean it's only concerned with covering proximal *interventions*. It acknowledges that interventions happen at any point causally upstream of the potential event or events we are interested in understanding and preventing. The point of intervention may be causally remote or *distal* from specific criminal events (e.g. changing potential offenders' predisposition for crime by community-level action to influence children's upbringing; or changing the production and marketing of computer memory chips, which influence their value as a crime target). Or it may be more *proximal* (e.g. occupying young people's leisure time constructively to prevent vandalism; rehabilitating offenders post-conviction; or installing screens in buses to prevent assaults on drivers). Whether the intervention itself is proximal or distal, the focus is on the *difference those interventions make to the components of the proximal Conjunction*. So, for example, early intervention in a child's problematic emotional responses ends up making a difference to the predisposition to offend that that child, now an adolescent, brings to a given crime situation in the here and now. Of course, there could be many more downstream effects on 'pathways to crime' (Homel, 2005) and criminal careers, which together mean the might-have-been offender never goes near the situation of interest or never mixes with a group of

unruly peers. Upstream interventions may thus impact on a far wider set of potential crime events than proximal interventions can... but the tradeoff is, that their influence on individual crime events may be weaker; it's certainly harder to measure.

While the above argument centres on the *practice* of interventions, exactly the same point can be made about criminological *theories*. Even those theories that address issues of developmentally, historically or structurally distal causes of crime, can only ever influence the nature and occurrence of criminal events via the presence or absence of their influences in the proximal circumstances immediately prior to those events. In other words, there's no action at a distance (Ekblom, 1994). But there should be an interest in *how* the offender got to that particular situation in space and time, and *how* that situation came to be.

CCO doesn't support reductionism, because the *pattern* of interacting causes that come together in the final conjunction reflects a rich and *dynamic* combination of prior causes. It may also reflect *emergence*. These are both considered below; but in concluding this section, I concede there's more work to do in bridging the gap with remoter causes and interventions. This will involve constructing a developmental, 'pathway-to-crime' dimension to the CCO framework, in evolving a robust framework for connecting to, and handling, 'community-level' causes and interventions, and in incorporating *opportunity structures* (Clarke and Newman, 2006).

CCO and dynamics

CCO, particularly as shown as the 'ray' diagram, gives the impression of a static 'anatomical dissection' of causation. This perspective probably predominated given CCO's origins in an exercise of classification of preventive action, and also its emphasis on the analytic. But attention to the 'physiology' of the dynamic interplay of causes is vital for understanding those causes and intelligently and subtly replicating preventive mechanisms in new contexts.

A dynamic side to CCO has always been present, if understated. The final causal path to criminal events often involves *social interactions* between the agents. Conflict, say, irreducibly involves a *relationship* between two individuals or groups: offenders, preventers and perhaps promoters ('Are you going to let him get away with insulting you?'). The connection of *offender decision-making* to the causal component of 'perception and anticipation' is another, pivotal, dynamic which can range from the simple 'rational choice' approach of Clarke and colleagues (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) to the more complex interplay of the internal processes of self-control and moral choice envisaged by Wikström (2006). But decision-making has always sat uneasily alongside the more static components of CCO, and besides, focuses on the decisions of just one of several agents. Thanks to my own involvement with the Design Against Crime world, CCO is currently undergoing a shift to a more dynamic stance, both within the Conjunction itself, and externally.

Recalling the dual discourse of people as ‘caused agents’, the decision-making, goal-directed side of the offender and the other agents belongs within this broader dynamic perspective. The causal side, covering in this instance perception and anticipation, belongs within the static, analytic perspective.

One aspect of *internal* dynamics recently taken further is the notion of cognitive *scripts*. Following Cornish (1994; see also, Rengert and Wasilchick, 1985; Wright and Decker, 1994) we can analyse the commission (and prevention) of crime using scripts which offenders employ, with improvisation, to take them through the criminal event. In the case of bicycle theft, for example, this might involve ‘seek bike park, see bike park, enter bike park, select bike to steal, check surveillance, release bike, leave, sell bike’ (Ekblom, 2009). It’s also helpful to analyse scripts of users and would-be preventers: for example, ‘seek bike park, see bike park, enter bike park, select free parking stand, lock bike, leave bike... return, release bike, pedal off’. At the heart of designing situational interventions in particular is the study of ‘script clashes’ between the different agents – such as ‘lock v release’, ‘surveill v conceal’, ‘pursue v escape’. The aim is to bias the environment to ‘favour the good guy’ in such clashes. Cornish (1994) also refers to *scenes* for handling the procedures offenders undertake in more complex crimes – ‘acquire forged passport, arrange getaway car, execute bank raid, escape, hide up, cover tracks, launder money’, etc. Ekblom (2003) used this in applying CCO to organised crime. Here, each separate scene had a culminating event which served as an intermediate goal to the ultimate end of obtaining and enjoying the loot. CCO could be used to give a ‘synoptic view’ over the whole script, analyse the necessary causal preconditions for *each* of the intermediate criminal goals/preparatory events to succeed, and to suggest appropriate kinds of intervention against each event and overall.

External dynamics cover the processes whereby the components of the Conjunction come together: for example, lifestyle routines of the players, market processes, people-flows on foot or in public transport (the ‘nodes and paths’ of pattern theory – Brantingham and Brantingham, 2008), all of which may count as crime generators. Of course, some offenders deliberately seek favourable places (defined as crime attractors); they may even actively plan to bring the components of the Conjunction together as in a ‘professional’ robbery or fraud.

The final point to note is that dynamics can operate over a range of *timescales* (Ekblom, 2005a): the immediate interactions between offenders and other agents and entities within CCO; adaptive moves and countermoves including displacement and longer-term adjustments (such as acquisition of new tools or skills, and even coevolution and arms races (Ekblom, 1997, 1999)); or shifts in criminal careers.

In describing interventions for knowledge management purposes we should be clear about what dynamics are important over what timescales. For example, is geographical displacement likely to be a problem with a particular preventive method in the short term? Following intervention will offenders adapt in the medium term?

What tactical countermoves might be expected, and should therefore be guarded against when designing a replication?

CCO, emergence and complexity

Dynamics covers processes of change over time, usually involving causal interactions. Emergence is closely-related, referring to new causal properties appearing in systems that are irreducible to the system's constituent parts (Laughlin, 2005). The Specification (Chapter 6) includes the requirement to handle true complexity: essentially emergence, progressing to complex adaptive systems.

CCO determinedly starts from the bottom up in terms of components of proximal causation. (Not the very bottom: it doesn't explicitly delve into neuropsychological or biochemical explanations of behaviour, though connections could readily be made.) Some emergent properties reside in the interactions within offenders' heads, such as (failure of) self-control or 'executive function'. CCO itself – the term 'conjunction' – is inherently interactive because all behaviour requires offenders to interact with their situation. 'Opportunity' is equally interactive: although most often associated with 'situation' or 'environment', opportunity is in fact an *ecological* concept (Ekblom and Tilley, 2000). An open window three floors up is only an opportunity to an offender equipped with courage, agility and a ladder.

Other emergent causes, mentioned at various points above, bring the components of CCO together and make them interact. They include:

- Planning and action by the offender – *creating* the crime opportunity;
- *Social relations* between the CCO roles, including conflict, gang turf;
- *Market* processes – demand for goods or illegal services;
- *Niches* and other *opportunity structures* for offending careers and criminal service providers such as fences;
- *Developmental* processes including pathways and careers.

Ultimately, explanations of patterns of crimes in time and space may require entertaining a range of higher level emergent causes. The line taken with CCO is, as said, to begin with proximal and molecular causes; and to require proof of the existence and practical significance of emergent causes at a higher level. Some apparently higher level causes will turn out to be merely compositional, where the whole is exactly the sum of its parts rather than something extra, and unforeseeable from those parts taken in isolation.

Whether emergent causes or compositional factors, in practical terms those undertaking and describing crime prevention interventions (and any other supporting actions) must pay close attention to what can be called *ecological levels* (World Health Organisation, 2004)³³ of causation and intervention. These include

- Individual agents or entities (places, products etc)
- Interpersonal interactions (e.g. fights) and coalitions
- Family
- Peer group
- Institutions
- Neighbourhoods/communities
- Markets/networks
- Society

Causes can operate at one or other level; interventions may be directed to the same or different levels, whether for efficiency (in the case of compositional factors) or effectiveness (with emergent causes). For example, family stress could cause an individual to offend, but the intervention might either be at the family, institution (e.g. school) or individual (e.g. counselling) level. Confusion over these levels can hinder appropriate selection and replication of preventive action.

Finally, the dynamics of the Conjunction can be lively. Offenders may actively search and attend to certain information, be provoked, choose, react and act, apply skills and capacities to exploit the opportunity and overcome the risks of crime. Preventers and promoters make equivalent contributions. And, over various timescales, all three kinds of agents will mutually anticipate and adapt to one another's perceived actions. While preventers may struggle to keep the components of CCO apart, offenders may be actively working to bring them together.

CCO as described surely amounts to a complex adaptive system. No wonder Tilley (1993b) identified at least nine mechanisms whereby CCTV could reduce car park crime.

Conclusion

CCO is a suitable companion to 5Is, mapping both causes (within Intelligence) and Interventions for the purpose of knowledge management and application. This assertion is based on the range of issues covered above: the inclusive and integrating nature of the framework across all kinds of crime, immediate causes of crime, crime prevention interventions and institutional approaches; a standardised and integrated suite of terms and concepts; a capacity to progressively handle complicated detail and emergent complexity, a history and future potential as a learning engine, and a generative potential derived from an orientation towards interactive mechanism and analytic theory without being too closely tied to specific theories, however currently fashionable. The mechanism approach also enables it to articulate the key components of intervention in ways

which support intelligent, context-sensitive replication. CCO can offer a coherent schema for organising knowledge of causation and intervention for the purpose of storage and retrieval of practice knowledge; and for educating practitioners.

Other relevant applications of CCO within 5Is include, under Intelligence, an approach to analysing perpetrator techniques and a schedule for interviewing offenders about these and the range of causes of their behaviour.³⁴ Under Impact, an understanding of causal mechanisms is vital for getting a clear picture of what's going on during impact evaluations; and for gaining the most information from such studies both to feed back into adjustment to practice and to facilitate the evolution of theory. Looking further afield, CCO offers a basis for 'futures' work including systematic and rigorous crime risk assessment and crime impact assessment (for example Ekblom, 2002b, 2009), and for coping with adaptive offenders.

As was shown, CCO doesn't directly incorporate higher-level sociological or cultural causes of crime. It adopts the perspective that each of these higher and/or remoter causes must act through one or more of the components of the CCO before it can 'help make a criminal event happen'. But although CCO is oriented towards immediate microcausation of events there's an interest in studying processes that emerge from the elemental ones CCO covers. CCO does, though, need further links to frameworks for organising understanding of community-level causes and interventions, and developmental-pathway and criminal career counterparts.

CCO doesn't inherently restrict itself to evidence-based knowledge. It's a way of envisaging and articulating possibilities in 'intervention space'. Evidence has to come from evaluation – but as just said, CCO can contribute to the sharpening of such evaluations. To the extent that each of the 11 *generic intervention principles* behind CCO is supported by evaluation we can adapt Eck's response to the 'what works?' question:

The answer to the question, 'what works?' to prevent crime at places is 'routine activity theory and situational crime prevention.' The answer is not, CCTV, lighting, locks, management screening of prospective tenants, nuisance abatement, street redesign or any other particular measure. These are tools that might work in some circumstances but probably do not work in every circumstance (Clarke, 1997). (2002a:105)

Design of interventions requires an iterative process of generation and appraisal (Thorpe et al., 2009). CCO can contribute to this by a 'plausibility test' helping practitioners to articulate the mechanisms by which they claim their proposed intervention will work.

CCO is undoubtedly more complicated *at first sight* than individual equivalents such as the Crime Triangle, although it offers *compensatory simplification* because it integrates all major theories of crime and its prevention in a single 11-component framework. Considering that it summarises and organises the core knowledge of an entire field, I would argue that it is fit for purpose. The

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practical issue for the future is how to present it in sufficiently user-friendly form for practitioners to wish to use it and to move beyond the 'comfort zone' of more familiar frameworks.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 10 Presenting the Is in detail

Introduction

Chapter 7 presented basic design features of 5Is descriptions and the following two chapters developed supporting terms and concepts. Chapters 11-15 define, illustrate and list the detailed features and headings of each individual I. This chapter addresses some common practical issues. It first covers structures and formats for 5Is descriptions. Then it describes the kinds of ‘content’ information to record under the individual headings. Besides the main information on each task or subtask of the preventive process, it suggests recurrent themes including quality and improvement, and the kind of evidence appropriate to support description, prescription and evaluation. After this, it sets out a common structure for each of the ‘I’ chapters, broadly but not identically followed in each case. Last, it describes the sources of the 5Is illustrations used throughout the ‘I’ chapters. The ‘master-list’ of 5Is headings at their current stage of development is presented at the end of each chapter.

Alternative formats and structures

There are deliberately many possible ways of presenting 5Is descriptions of action. In fact, 5Is could assume different formats for describing preventive action, monitoring and managing it, evaluating it, researching it, prescribing and guiding experienced practitioners, and training novices. Research users, for example, would require more detail on methodology; experienced practitioners the newsworthy and the challenging; trainees a more complete description of what to their seniors is obvious and familiar. One extreme format is the relentlessly systematic ‘checkbox’ list that feeds a pre-coded database. This is appropriate to serve a monitoring and management information function. Although 5Is could support such an impoverished format it’s not what the framework was intended for.

At the opposite end of the scale is the semi-structured interview schedule which briefs an experienced knowledge harvester to pursue particular lines and raise particular issues as they emerge in discussion with practitioners. The purpose of the latter is to produce either a holistic case report or some knowledge synthesis product covering specific tasks (like the *55 steps* guide to crime analysis – Clarke and Eck, 2003). It could even be designed to develop and test practically significant middle-range theories.

Intermediate formats may help practitioners at the selection stage searching directly for a project to emulate. They can additionally provide a ‘feeder’ stage which knowledge harvesters can use to select action worth following up with the

kind of depth interview just described, on grounds of its interest, quality of process and reliability of evidence.

Hierarchy

5Is is designed to handle the rich complexity of preventive action. It has four levels of detail into which contributors and users may zoom as appropriate:

- *Message* (the 5Is themselves, for example ***Intelligence***). An easily-remembered and simple slogan communicating the basic task concept in everyday language to diverse users.
- *Map* (principal subheadings under each I, such as ***Intelligence: causes and risk factors***). From the perspective of *capturing action*, this is a list of *tasks* (e.g. gathering information on causes). From a *knowledge* perspective it's the *product* of that action (e.g. the list of causes identified). The headings of the Map level give clearer meaning to the rather abstract Is. They set out a broad agenda for the kinds of information to be recorded. They thereby complement the 'theoretical' discussion of each 'I' at the start of the relevant chapter, helping to operationally define and interpret what's meant by Intelligence, etc. (Unfortunately this principle was abandoned in current practice in the EU Crime Prevention Network website. The original 5Is definitions were used for several years but eventually replaced (in a misplaced backslide into simplicity) by snappy but uninformative questions such as 'what? (Intervention) and 'who? (Involvement)'. Map-level headings can also be used as a self-explanatory, 'lite' version of 5Is which doesn't demand too much of users. The Map level is also perhaps sufficient for generalist managers of practitioners to be familiar with.
- *Methodology* (e.g. ***Intelligence: causes and risk factors: immediate causes: Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity***). This is typically a conceptual framework that supplies, and/or organises, the detailed guidance and knowledge that appears under a given Map heading. Not all headings yet have such frameworks but this is where middle-range theory is likely to be drawn on and further developed as the body of captured knowledge accumulates and is accommodated within 5Is. Where specific knowledge is unavailable the structure of the frameworks can guide innovation by application of first principles (for example – 'target-hardening' can apply to an entirely new kind of target).
- *Meat* – this is any specific *content* of knowledge organised under a Methodology-level (or Map-level) framework. For example, under *immediate causes: CCO* one of the causal components is *offender's readiness to commit crime*. Here, the Meat comprises factors under this heading such as *intoxication or boredom from a lack of entertainment facilities in the neighbourhood*. At this final most detailed level, explanations of crime, or

rationale for action, can be covered with reference to specific theories and/or conjectured causal mechanisms where these are available.

These levels are approximate and for knowledge-management purposes; they have no academic significance.

The headings

5Is has a flexible approach to formatting, to allow for the complexity and variety of crime prevention stories and arrangements. It relies on use of uniform language within descriptions rather than a rigid set and sequence of headings. In this respect, and at risk of mixing metaphors, 5Is more closely resembles an artist's palette from which diverse kinds of description can be painted, than a child's 'painting by numbers' book. In any case, the list of headings within 5Is isn't a final, 'once-and-for-all' version but is intended to develop, differentiate and grow as knowledge-bases are populated. Nonetheless, to describe the detailed grammar and vocabulary of 5Is exhaustively and systematically, in the following chapters I've adopted a default format and order of Map- and Methodology-level headings.

Regarding the overall *order* of headings, descriptions of actions must, as stated, cope with *recursions* like 'intelligence for planning Involvement', or 'involvement to support sharing of Intelligence'. As a rule, each of the primary, Message-level tasks (Intelligence, Intervention etc) gets its own chapter while its secondary, supporting functions are covered under the primary task they serve, meaning some blurring of chapter boundaries. One exception is the inclusion of Initiation and Objectives under the overall heading of Intelligence. Although these are essentially Implementation tasks, they deal mainly with Intelligence material.

I pondered about the *style* of the headings as presented here. A *question-based* style ('What are the causes of the crime problem?') would better fit *retrospective* knowledge capture. *Imperative* (e.g. 'Identify causes of crime problem') might better fit the transfer of already-captured knowledge to practitioners for *prospective* use in guiding new action. This could be further supplemented by *choice-structuring* terms to aid selection, replication and innovation (e.g. 'Is your context X or Y? If X, this action is advised; if Y, that action.') A neutral *statement* list ('Causes of crime problem') however seemed preferable for the present generic purpose.

Kinds of information to record under the headings – the Meat

The headings and subheadings of 5Is themselves embody important, fundamental knowledge about crime prevention practice. But the content beneath those headings – the meat – is richer, more varied and hopefully more novel. The kinds of information to record will be illustrated by excerpts or précis from 5Is descriptions (further explained below).

Main content

The *main content* under each Methodology-level heading will variously comprise information on particular *tasks* (e.g. Intelligence – scanning of nature of crime problem); *processes* (e.g. how survey was designed); *inputs* of knowledge and resources needed to make the task happen; and *products* or outputs of one or more tasks (e.g. a picture of the crime problem combined from several sources). Ideally where tasks are described their purpose in the wider scheme of action should be clear from the heading and/or the content.

Recurrent themes

The following generic kinds of information will be relevant at many points of a description of preventive action, although selectivity is vital to minimise contributor effort. Often the information will be obvious and not worth stating explicitly except for purposes of teaching or cross-national transfer.

- The *ecological level* of the task or its product – describing whether it relates to individual, family, peer group, community, institution, network etc. The *targeting* of action (universal, selective, indicated) upon recipient individuals, families, groups, neighbourhoods or any other identifiable *units* at the appropriate ecological level. For example, the *indicated* targeting of *convicted offenders* at the *individual* level.
- *Techniques and resources of intelligence, implementation and involvement* for that specific task – describing how and in what circumstances to do the task; what human, financial, infrastructural, informational and material resources are needed; tradeoffs and conflicts with other values and with undesired side-effects; and learning points.
- *Quality and improvement* – giving an account of how well the task is done (e.g. the sample size of a survey, the ethical standards of an offender interview) or how good the product is; identifying threats to quality and how to overcome them; identifying failures, their causes and possible remedies; applying, suggesting or developing *benchmarking* criteria. *Process* evaluation is intended to assess the quality of actions throughout all 5Is, but for presentational reasons it's discussed in the Impact chapter. *Learning points* of good, bad or contextually-(in)appropriate actions, and risks to avoid, can be highlighted under any heading.
- *Context* – describing relevant aspects of the context which may help or hinder the task, including the social, geographical, technological and institutional (which may include legal/statutory aspects such as investigatory powers and injunctions, civil law, data protection and planning); also, ways of customising to particular contexts.

- *Vision, values and ethics* – accounts of values may cover those purely within crime prevention (such as the relative priority of protecting person or property); or those potentially in conflict between crime prevention and other domains (such as security versus privacy). Such issues can be covered in two ways: both as substantive policy questions (‘these are the potential policy conflicts to look out for’), and for knowledge of how practitioners can handle them (‘this is a good way of increasing security without losing privacy’). Another important aspect of practice knowledge to capture is how the rational approach connects with the emotional/symbolic and with political processes, and the ways practitioners can handle these issues without getting into hot water.
- *Delivery issues* (such as infrastructural enablers and constraints) may be flagged up anywhere.

Evidence

Both knowledge and evidence are about representing some aspect of the real world. But evidence is based on a formal, rigorous and transparent process of data collection, analysis and inference.

In an ideal world, each piece of information reported in 5Is descriptions would be supported by reference to some kind of evidentiary foundation on which users of a knowledge base could judge reliability. However, in many circumstances the effort of obtaining, recording and reading all this methodological detail would be hugely burdensome in relation to the value of doing so. Those designing a working knowledge-base would have to develop and apply appropriate standards which resolved the conflicting requirements for a) systematic evidentiary support and quality assurance, b) significance and newsworthiness and c) economy of effort for contributors, consolidators and users. On the situational prevention side, the problem-solving guide for crime analysts by Clarke and Eck (2003), and the standards set for entries for the Tilley Award (Home Office, 2010) have got the balance about right for Intelligence and Impact (the tasks where quality of evidence is most important) but there is probably no comprehensive equivalent on the offender-oriented or community-based side.

Structure of the ‘I’ chapters

Each of the individual ‘I’ chapters uses the same two-part structure.

An *introduction* variously includes:

- A definition in depth of the main Message-level task (e.g. Implementation), and discussion of how it relates to the other Is. Considerable attention falls on definition because above all 5Is is a way of thinking and articulating in a structured way, and it’s vital that contributors and users understand the concept they are working with. A one-sentence definition can’t convey this.

- A section on language and subsidiary concepts (e.g. suggesting a standard terminology for Impact evaluation).
- Some reference to important *contextual considerations* concerning the task.
- An account of the *process* of undertaking the task, in terms of what *inputs* it works on, what *products* constitute its output, and what it *does* in between (e.g. design or management processes).
- Reference to methods and mechanisms (not just confined to Intervention).
- The *purposes* of reporting the relevant ‘I’ task in action descriptions.
- Some general comments on *structure and content* of the action description.

A *contents* section then covers the details in two complementary ways:

- First, it presents appropriate illustrations from the 5Is exemplars, where available. The purpose is to demonstrate the *kinds* of rich information that can be systematically captured and organised for retrieval under 5Is, and to help define the *scope* of particular headings. Alternative *formats* relating variously to projects, services and knowledge syntheses are sometimes used to illustrate possibilities in that domain;
- Second, it sets out the ‘*master-list*’ of definitive headings.

Sources of 5Is illustrations

The content of a 5Is description is illustrated principally by *Operation Moonshine*, with which Chapter 1 began. This was a locally-generated project in the problem-oriented mode instigated by the Hampshire Constabulary from 2002. The project came to the attention of the Home Office, and I and a colleague (Andrew Kent) conducted an intensive 3-hour interview with the originating practitioners using 5Is headings as an informal schedule.³⁵

Additional material supplementing the above comes from:

- 5Is project descriptions undertaken in 2002 for the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN), especially the Stirchley Domestic Burglary Prevention Project, based on a re-working of information from process and impact evaluations undertaken for the UK Crime Reduction Programme (Ekblom, 2002c; Home Office, 2004).
- 5Is descriptions of individual CCTV case studies evaluated under the UK Crime Reduction Programme (Gill et al., 2005a,b,c).
- ‘Trident’: a case-study in Bradford of intensive supervision of offenders in the community for the national evaluation of New Deal for the Communities (Adamson, 2004).
- Ad-hoc project descriptions 2003-4 prepared for further EUCPN good practice conference entries and based on practitioner interviews and site visits

supplemented with supply of outcome data. (Sadly, with regime change at EUCPN earlier entries disappeared from its website but the UK ones are available via <http://5isframework.wordpress.com>)

- Additional project descriptions from the Residential Burglary initiative of the UK Crime Reduction Programme prepared during 2003-4.³⁶
- Visits, courtesy of the Irish Youth Justice Service, to several youth centres in Limerick and Dublin in 2008 as preparation for a conference presentation (Ekblom, 2008a). In each centre, an hour-long workshop was held with local staff and partners such as Garda (police) and probation, with 5Is again used as an informal schedule. The practice and delivery knowledge gathered here is in a form more representative of a comparative, analytic, knowledge synthesis process rather than the preparation of a case study.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 11 Intelligence

Introduction

We begin the detailed description of the 5Is task streams with Intelligence.

The primary function of Intelligence in the course of preventive action is to gain a detailed understanding of the crime/community safety problem in order to guide Intervention. The information that Intervention needs to draw on comprises the causes and context of the crime problem to target, and the what-works principles and methods of intervention to select. However, intelligence is all-pervasive. It also feeds Implementation (supporting initiation of action, setting of aims and objectives, targeting on some risk-related basis, management information); Involvement (whom to mobilise and what might motivate them); and Impact (the same crime data that feeds into analysis of problems can be repeat-measured as part of an outcome evaluation; more generally, it can inform the design of an appropriate evaluation). Likewise, each subsidiary task under Intelligence will have its own implementation aspects (for example the practical side of how to run a survey) some of whose details may be worth recording.

The Problem-Oriented approach assumes that action *begins* with Intelligence. But, as described below, preventive action may be initiated before that, through processes of *demand* from various stakeholders (such as retailers wanting action against shoplifters) or referral from another agency. The action may seek to build on a failed, or partially successful *prior* Intervention. 5Is therefore cannot be set out as a simple linear process with all Intelligence steps invariably coming early in the preventive process; nor neatly confined to this one chapter.

Chapter 7 introduced the concept of Intelligence within 5Is. This chapter begins with its more detailed definition as both *task* (with a process emphasis) and *product* (with a content emphasis). The rest of this introduction considers the relationship between Intelligence and evidence, discusses the purposes of reporting Intelligence in action descriptions, and comments on the generic process of undertaking the Intelligence task. The rest of the chapter illustrates the content of Intelligence, then systematically presents the ‘master list’ of subheadings at their current state of development.

Defining Intelligence

Ratcliffe, writing on Intelligence-Led Policing (2008), gives a good, ‘borrowable’, definition of Intelligence. He distinguishes between *data* – basically observations and measurements; *information* – data with greater relevance and

purpose; knowledge – weaving in context, meaning and interpretation; and, finally, *intelligence* – knowledge designed to generate and guide *action*. (Note the progression from technical concepts to mechanistic ones to, ultimately, a functional definition.) Intelligence-Led Policing emphasises justice and the judicial side of crime prevention, but as Chapter 8 described there are strategic and practical links between the two fields and Ratcliffe’s definition can equally serve a more general crime prevention purpose. Here, the action in question is preventive (in its widest sense, including community safety etc); and as said, Intelligence primarily guides the design of appropriate Interventions, but is otherwise all-pervasive in the preventive process.

Like Ratcliffe, we’re interested in Intelligence both as *product* and expert *process* designed and performed to deliver that product to a certain quality standard. From a knowledge-management perspective we are, though, additionally interested in the methods of *reporting* of intelligence products and processes. We are also interested in Intelligence as fitting in with, or challenging, some kind of wider, pre-existing *schema* of knowledge, understanding and action-planning. Both reporting and schema also link to Ratcliffe’s concerns because in his view, a key task of intelligence analysts is to influence the decision-makers and action-takers to take account of their products. Therefore, how the content of new intelligence relates to existing intelligence and decision-makers’ wider assumptions is important.

The only doubt about the use of the term ‘intelligence’ is a possible connotation of ‘hard security’ and ‘repression’. Such action is in-scope of 5Is, but not predominant.

Intelligence and evidence

Ratcliffe doesn’t explicitly link data, information, knowledge and intelligence to *evidence*, whether in a legal sense or – of greater interest here – that of research, and research-like practice. The continued importance of the evidence-based movement within policy and practice requires that 5Is make that link.

Evidence is information, such as facts, coupled with principles of *inference*, that make information relevant to the support or disproof of a hypothesis. Reference to principles implies a formal *quality* dimension. Reference to inference, hypotheses and conclusions suggests evidence is more appropriate to knowledge and intelligence (in Ratcliffe’s terms) than to data and information; and to the products of *analysis* rather than of *scanning* (in SARA terms); though there is no clearcut boundary.

Reference to hypothesis-testing should not, however, imply that evidentiary processes are only for scientists – this activity is equally important in practical, research-like crime prevention (Laycock, 2005; Townsley et al., 2003). However, not all Intelligence has to amount to formally quality-assured evidence (for example, knowing who supplies satisfactory insurance for youth activities), though accuracy remains necessary.

'Evidence-based' in a practical crime prevention context is commonly equated with what works (Know-what). However it's equally important that the action bears a relationship to the evidence of the *particular crime problem and context* that one is attempting to target (Know-about/ know-where). Only by combining these can Intelligence lead satisfactorily to properly customised interventions. This is reflected in a concern with the pursuit of evidentiary quality in the entire preventive process that 5Is shares with (among others) the protagonists of Problem-Oriented Policing (Clarke and Eck, 2003; Read and Tilley, 2000), the Beccaria Programme (Marks et al., 2005) and Communities That Care (Crow et al., 2004). Beyond evidence, Intelligence must also draw on legal and vernacular definitions of offences (Know-crime), and symbolic meaning (Know-why).

The purposes of reporting Intelligence in action descriptions

Whether in a one-off project write-up or as an entry in a knowledge base, and whether undertaken as primary or secondary tasks, the *reporting* of Intelligence serves several functions.

- Accounts of the *products* of Intelligence in a description of action obviously aid selection and replication. Are the crime problem, causes or context of interest to users seeking action to emulate for their particular circumstances? To knowledge harvesters, does the content suggest the action is worth investigating further for the purpose of extending the existing body of knowledge?
- Describing the *capture and analysis process* enables an evidential/methodological *quality-check* on the information and knowledge on which the reported action is based. The check can cover, say, quality and appropriateness of sources and reliability/validity of sampling and analysis. It may be undertaken and reported:
 - To supply *internal guidance* to the practitioners undertaking the original action (having self-consciously to record/describe what they are doing whilst at the planning and execution stages, naturally encourages an interest in maintaining and improving quality);
 - For *process-monitoring* by external delivery managers for quality-assurance purposes;
 - To *enable practitioner-users* to decide whether the action in a knowledge-base, however newsworthy and appropriate the content, is based on evidence of sufficient quality to be worth following up; and if the knowledge-base is a moderated one, for *helping knowledge-harvesters* to decide whether the action is of good enough quality to include at all.
- The *specific techniques* and *generic processes* of collecting, analysing and presenting intelligence may themselves be transferrable practice knowledge.

Alternatively, they may be worth *avoiding* in the light of reported experience (some promising techniques may prove too intrusive or may reveal biases), or restricting their application (for example if a survey technique is difficult for older respondents).

Undertaking the Intelligence task

Initiation of preventive action, although strictly a task within the Implementation stream, often begins with Intelligence. The Intelligence may be transferred (as with referring an offender's case from one agency to another); imposed (through *demand* from stakeholders); gleaned from routine crime audits, risk assessments, analyses of crime patterns or documentation of risk factors and causes of crime; or obtained as a special undertaking in response to a problem that emerges in other ways. In the list of map-level Intelligence tasks below, some will be of universal relevance but others will suit specific forms of initiation.

Where practitioners are confined within a specific institutional/programmatic context, they will usually follow just one or two such initiation processes. To the extent that they are 'free-ranging', they will additionally need to know *when* to opt for a given process; and this, in itself can become knowledge worth capturing and consolidating. As an example Clarke and Eck (2003) set out the 'CHEERS' criteria (Community; Harm; Expectation; Events; Recurring; and Similarity) for helping practitioners decide whether or not they are facing a *problem* in the Problem-Oriented sense.

Once initiated, the process of undertaking the Intelligence task is highly iterative, as is well-known (Ekblom, 1988; Clarke and Eck, 2003). Quick scans lead to deeper, more focused and rigorous causal analyses and more targeted collection of data as the problem clarifies, the assumptions of demand are challenged and underlying issues emerge. The same applies, in a service context, to casework. Repeated assessments and diagnoses may be made of attendees at a youth centre, perhaps on a daily or weekly basis, to assign them to the most appropriate activity (arriving in a bad mood may not be conducive to group activity that day) and to adjust intervention strategies in the light of progress.

What starts out as a narrow 'presenting problem' may kindle an interest in wider-ranging causes, leading to more holistic interventions. These may even serve some broader purpose than crime prevention. For example, initial referral of young offenders to a youth centre on the basis of one or more crimes committed may be swiftly followed by an interest in their personality, health and life circumstances. Planning a customised intervention may lead in turn to a wider, more strategic investigation of causes at a range of ecological levels such as family, drug markets or local subcultures. One Irish youth centre identified, and sought to address, a local *envy-culture*, which offered resistance to individuals bettering themselves.

Of course this shift in focus isn't confined to offender-oriented action. For example, what at first sight appears to be a local crime problem with predominantly local causes may, with further investigation, be shown to stem from wider *opportunity structures* operating at national level or beyond – such as a vulnerability in the design of credit card chips and security procedures. The ability to shift perspective in this way, and the enablers and constraints of infrastructure which influence how far such problems can be cross-referred and responded to, are useful practice and delivery knowledge in themselves.

The Intelligence task is not a purely intellectual exercise. In many circumstances it will involve negotiation of *understandings* and of *priorities* between partners and/or stakeholders; and of course, presentation of findings with careful anticipation of media reactions. Here, sensitivity to 'Know-why' issues like fairness and blame becomes important. The ways of doing the negotiation and consultation are of course a field of practice knowledge in themselves. Handling Data Protection issues may involve a combination of negotiation (e.g. between partner organisations) and observation of regulations.

The content of Intelligence

We begin the account of the content of Intelligence descriptions and tasks with illustrations from existing 5Is examples; then finish the chapter by presenting the definitive 'master-list' of map- and methodology-level headings.

Illustrative examples

The crime context

The following example of a context description is from Operation Moonshine, as introduced in Chapter 10.

What was the geographical and social context of the crime problem?

Location/built environment

Valley Park is a housing estate on the borders of Eastleigh and Test Valley Borough Councils, in Hampshire, near the city of Southampton. The problem occurred in one small location within Valley Park.

Social-demographic

The Census 2001 shows that the population of the Borough of Eastleigh was 116,169 (47,001 households), of which just under 3% are non-white; this compares with just under 10% nationally. Unemployment within Eastleigh is 3.4% of the working age population, lower than the national average (5.1%).

Valley Park is a new ward, part of Field ward before May 2003. In indices of multiple deprivation in 2000, Field ward was within the 5% of wards *least*

deprived. The population of Valley Park was 7,484 according to the 2001 Census of which just over 3 per cent were of Asian ethnic backgrounds, with a further 1 per cent from Chinese (and “Other”) ethnic backgrounds. Just over 1 per cent of the working age population was unemployed.

More could be presented here if judged helpful to understanding the action story, or if relevant to selection, replication or analysis. As said, though, contextual information shouldn’t be deposited as one all-purpose mass of material but as specific, considered items throughout the description.

A particular aspect of context not emphasised in the Moonshine example is *prior and existing action*. This may be specifically crime preventive (e.g. a history of high-intensity police patrols, a multi-agency community safety project); or, as is common in high-crime areas, numerous social/economic interventions addressing many social problems. This information is important in several ways, for:

- Reviewing options for action which may already have failed, or alternatively succeeded but merited being built on (as with South City CCTV project: Gill et al., 2005b);
- Mapping the existing set of causal influences on crime into which the new intervention must be inserted;
- Leading into stakeholder mapping prior to Involvement actions; and
- Identifying the causal background for Impact evaluation: here, evaluators would want to determine whether prior action had had no effect, had hindered the current action, boosted impact or was a *necessary* precondition of success.

In terms of format, a ‘database’ variant could include a structured series of checkboxes on various common contextual features (such as ‘urban, suburban, rural or other’, but the technical design would need to allow the categories to be expanded and refined, learning-engine fashion, as the number of exemplars increased and understanding of the features that are significant grew (Bullock and Ekblom, 2011). General-purpose lists of context features could readily be developed (at the Methodology level) but not all items will be relevant to all kinds of action.

Initiation and demand

A crime problem doesn’t always materialise on someone’s desk in a clearcut form which it maintains throughout the subsequent action to address it. The call for action must come from somewhere, and early understandings of the nature and extent of the problem may be corrected (even renegotiated) following more thorough investigation. *Initiation* covers the process, and *demand* the source and content of the calls for action.

Initiation takes many forms, including:

- Routine scanning of crime statistics by those professionally involved such as the police or local government officials;
- Formal consultations and surveys;
- Emergence of ‘new’ problems to diverse agencies, like the realisation by surgeons that they have been handling many facial injuries from ‘glassing’ (Shepherd, 2001);
- Surges of interest in the media;
- Lobbying from stakeholders (such as retailers) who may themselves organise around crime issues.
- On the offender side, obviously most individuals present *themselves* by their criminal actions, but many will then be referred to, or recruited by, preventive organisations like youth centres for action at case and/or group level.

Demand is where stakeholders wish to mobilise professional preventers and related agencies. (Mobilisation in the other direction is covered under Involvement.) The CAPRA framework³⁷ explicitly acknowledges the fact that demand, in terms of what the public or other stakeholders initially consider to be a problem, may differ from the problem-as-formally-identified. An early study I undertook of a police truancy patrol, for example (Ekblom, 1978), revealed that shopkeepers’ concerns about truants offending during school hours were misplaced.

Needless to say, there’s practice knowledge to be captured on both initiation and demand. Initiation knowledge might cover, for example, how to do crime and safety surveys and audits; how to handle crime problems that arise unexpectedly; how to request and use appropriate ‘intake’ case information on referred offenders or children at risk. Demand knowledge might cover how to handle vociferous stakeholders and ensure more balanced consultation; how to deal sensitively but rationally with ‘moral panics’; how to cope with differences emerging between the ‘demand’ and ‘research’ views of the problem, through managing stakeholders’ understandings and expectations.

The crime problem, evidence of the problem and know-how in collection and analysis

Although these are listed as separate items in the Map- and Methodology master-list, in practice it’s often helpful to combine their presentation. It may also make sense, as here, to weave in accounts of initiation and demand.

What was the crime, security or community safety problem that the action aimed to address?

The crime problem tackled

The *crime problem* in overview was a complex of criminal and antisocial behaviour centring on drinking (often underage drinking) and disorder.

Initiation of action against the problem seemed to have come from police scrutiny of local crime statistics. *Demand* had been limited – local people had seemed reluctant to report ASB related crime, partly in the belief that the police were doing nothing to tackle it; the parish councillor had been ‘inundated with calls’ for action against ASB but apparently had no channel of recourse. The extent of concern was later revealed however in a public meeting organised through the project.

In terms of *evidence of the crime problem*, initial *crime pattern analysis* was undertaken for a sub-territory within Valley Park, called here The Close, between March-August 2002. *Data collection* was through a computerised crime/incident reporting system but analysis began with physical pin-mapping.

The project team studied *recorded crime* (mainly criminal damage, shoplifting, commercial burglary and drugs offences) and what the police force termed Crime and Disorder Act (CADA) *incidents* (mainly juvenile nuisance, minor public disorder and noise nuisance). Incidents were acts of drunken behaviour, not necessarily drunk and disorderly, involving loudness and substantial congregation of youths. A *definition* of acts of disorder adopted by the project team defined for local practical purposes was “anything that you can think of that would impact on your quality of life without being a criminal offence”. [Possible learning point worth considering at both practice and policy levels.] When baseline data was collected there were on average 30 anti-social behaviour complaints per month, 6 recorded (ASB related) crimes per month and 36 other crime and disorder act incidents.

More detailed accounts of *offending behaviour* within incidents covered places and objects *targeted by offenders*; elementary *Modus Operandi* and situational accompaniments. This indicated ASB within Valley Park was often associated with alcohol. Groups of youths up to 50 strong were drinking around the local shopping parade, which made them noisy and disorderly, leading in some cases to violence particularly where local groups of youths interacted with others from outside the area. Street items that obstructed were damaged, mainly in the Leisure Centre area: damage to windows, doors, the fabric of the basketball court (fire damage, gates broken off, hoops broken, nets pulled down). Missiles had been thrown at the roof of the building. The surrounding litter bins and dog waste bins had been set alight. Forty-seven trees in the area had been broken. The sight screens of the cricket pitch had been damaged and turned on their side. Motor vehicles had been driven over the playing pitches making them unusable for several months. A particular convenience shop door was targeted by youths, as it was behind a broken roller shutter, which was repeatedly kicked in to allow theft of alcohol and food.

Offenders

Offenders were mainly local boys and girls aged between about 12 and 18. There was also a less affluent migrant ASB offender population coming to the shopping area from further afield (some from Southampton). The 'migrant' population was formally identified through arrest data.

Much more could be included under the description of the crime problem and of offenders, as appropriate for aiding user selection and setting the scene for the account of Intervention. Such items include timing, qualitative and quantitative trends or repeat victimisation. Again, a benchmark on the situational and 'problem' side is the 55 Steps guide, covering both content of information to collect and methods of collection and analysis. The Beccaria standard for problem description³⁸ offers a more generalised prescription.

On the offender-oriented side, ways of *risk-factor targeting* are worth documenting. One Irish youth centre used participation of an elder sibling in crime to indicate whom to proactively invite for membership before they got into trouble. This risk factor has long been familiar, but the *practicalities* of making it work in a real context with real consequences for individuals and their families constitutes a whole micro-field of practice knowledge in itself.

Likewise, *switching investigation between ecological levels* is an important analysis skill. Unemployment may be an individualised cause of young people's offending but if investigation reveals that area reputation lies behind their difficulty in getting a job, then a different level of intervention is needed. Important knowledge for projects and programmes can be gleaned from studying good and bad ways of doing this, and from the enablers and constraints thereon.

On problem definition, the *institutional context* in which the problem is cast can preordain both analysis and the kinds of solutions in scope. Redefining that context is an important item in the preventer's armoury so care should be taken that the system of documentation does not force a particular perspective. For example, many crimes and acts of antisocial behaviour can be helpfully viewed as 'civil conflicts gone wrong' and efforts can then be devoted to finding ways of resolving those conflicts (like organised off-road motorcycle activity replacing careering round the streets) rather than persisting with seeking direct solutions to the unwanted by-product of crime.

Community safety and security: significant harmful consequences of the crime problem/s

This item is intended to extend the perspective from criminal events to consider the immediate *harms* from those events, wider harms to victims and offenders (including curtailment of life chances), and quality of life issues to the community as a whole.

What were the harmful consequences of the crime problem?

Regarding *consequences for the community*, public perceptions of safety had been severely diminished by the growing numbers of disorderly intoxicated youths in the shopping area of Valley Park. The public felt intimidated by them.

Customers were deflected from the row of shops in Valley Park at certain times of the day, as they perceived youths gathering on the flowerbed as a threat. This concern was raised at the committee meetings involving the local residents (see involvement). Damage to and deflection of customers from businesses also had economic effects.

Offending and anti-social behaviour also resulted in a substantial proportion of police time attending to disperse some youths and deal with calls to apprehend others. At the onset of the project, the time spent patrolling the area was around 30 hours a month, with police overtime running into 25 hours a month.

Significant *consequences for further offending* were in this case limited, although in a sense illegal acquisition and consumption of alcohol was part of a wider self-amplifying crime and disorder problem. There was no evidence that ASB offending specifically led individuals to a criminal career, or to the development of a 'community crime career' for example through an offending subculture. The presence of youths themselves in large numbers occasionally attracted the attention of drug dealers.

The kinds of consequences that can be covered are many and varied. One of the CCTV case studies (Gill et al., 2005c) refers to voids in public housing, for example. In general our knowledge of the wider consequences of crime is limited and research is needed to develop a schema for this knowledge, which would be of value to both practitioners and policymakers. To the extent that 5Is descriptions devote space to consequences, the raw material for schema development can accumulate.

*Causes and risk factors*³⁹ *of the crime problem*

Project Moonshine is problem-oriented. Causes are therefore described mainly using the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (Chapter 9), which emphasises immediate causes acting through individual people and places. Where possible the relevant causes should be supported by evidence; where such evidence is missing, plausible conjectures could be made and declared.

What were the causes of the crime problem and/or the risk and protective factors associated with it?

Immediate causes

Wider Environment

- A raised flowerbed in the shopping area seemed to encourage youths to assemble on the flattened earth to drink, often bringing blankets with them. The area had been ruined by people walking over it – so that the flowers ceased to grow. The rough patch of land also encouraged littering.
- A specific store adjoining the flowerbed was identified as a focal point for ASB as it provided light and shelter (the shop had a canopy).

Resources for committing crime

- Loose bricks within the flowerbed presented a tool for use in vandalism.
- Some of the migrant offenders – from the Southampton and surrounding areas – were arriving in Valley Park with golf clubs and wrenches to use in criminal damage and conflicts.
- Mobile phones were sometimes used to draw gang members together.
- Given that Valley Park was a very affluent area, it was suggested that the local offenders had an average disposable income of £10 at least a night and some were given £600 a month by their parents. This was used for both alcohol and to a lesser extent recreational drugs.

Readiness to Offend

- Underage drinking acted as a disinhibitor – encouraging criminal damage and minor public order offences. It was also thought that alcohol played a symbolic role as an expression of their independence.
- Alcohol was made available through some youths stealing from a ‘soft target’ shop, and through the action or inaction of various crime promoters (see below).
- Boredom through inadequate local leisure facilities was cited as a common problem behind ASB. At the time of project implementation, there was a leisure centre, but this was not an exclusive resource for youths. There were plenty of play areas for younger children, but there were no recreational facilities for older youths. The absence of legitimate entertainment opportunities for youths to spend sizeable disposable incomes on may have encouraged spend on alcohol.
- Difficulty of access to leisure facilities was a related problem. The surrounding towns offered some suitable recreational facilities, but these involved financial cost and travelling time. The transport system was also not felt to be adequate.

Crime Promoters

- Local retailers sold alcohol to youths under 18 contrary to licensing rules.
- Drink orders were placed with a 17 year old youth from outside the Valley Park area, distributed from the back of a car. Legislation prevents the arrest of 17 year olds selling to under 18s.
- Older friends and siblings purchased alcohol legally and supplied it to younger peers/siblings.
- Offending youths harassed the general public to act as ‘forced promoters’ to purchase alcohol on their behalf.
- Another possible contributory cause was younger, lower-wage workers being poorly supervised and supported, and not receiving appropriate training in handling underage customers attempting to purchase alcohol.
- Peer pressure also served to initiate those who would not normally engage in ASB to perpetrate criminal and socially disruptive acts.
- Parents acted as negligent promoters as often both worked/commuted for very long days and for respite sent their children out with money to amuse themselves. This enabled them to purchase drink.
- Low staffing levels and poor quality CCTV in a particular store in effect promoted the theft of alcohol from this particular store.

Offender presence in situation

- Some youths involved in the ASB in Valley Park came from the local area – estates that were densely populated within the district. But also compounding the problem was the influx of migrant ASB offenders from the surrounding areas – specifically from Southampton. Offenders were attracted by wealthier peers (and the subsequent increase in availability of alcohol) and by specific females within the area.
- Conflicts ensued between local and migrant male youths over the females in the area, fuelling ASB.
- Offenders from outside Valley Park in some cases had links to Valley Park through attending a local school. Certain migrant offenders also saw the wealthier peer group in Valley Park as potential customers for drug sales.

Crime Preventers

- The level of staffing in some local shops appeared insufficient to control shop theft efficiently.

Target Enclosure

- One shop was highlighted as having poor external security – a broken roller shutter coupled with a breakable door and limited internal CCTV – which led to the youths breaking into the shop to steal alcohol and food.

Target ‘Property’

- As said, conflicts between local and migrant males often centred on local females seen as ‘worth fighting for’. This was supported by a youth culture of wagers to ‘pull’ as many females as possible. In this respect, the mere presence of the girls was acting both as an attractor and generator to male crime.

Higher-level causes

Drug Market

- The possible influx of drug dealers from outside the area was possibly the result of accessible well-off youths.

An example of *risk factor* analysis in a 5Is account is in the Bradford Trident case study (Adamson, 2004); this also identifies *needs* of young offenders, albeit in an Implementation context where individual offenders are being dealt with.

Risk and Protective Factors tend to be presented as lists. However, recent critics (IYJS, 2009) have argued that more complex *configurations* of causes/risk factors must be understood in developing and explaining interventions. Some combination of basic checklists plus free-text description would therefore be a more suitable format.

Initial aims and aim-setting

Aims and objectives are obviously important information to capture both to make sense of and to evaluate past projects, and to manage ongoing action. Following Brown (2006), *aims* are interpreted as desired ultimate outcomes in the real world; *objectives* as outputs (such as number and quality of mentoring relationships established). (Further distinctions appear in Chapter 13.) Although aims are part of the Implementation task stream, they clearly relate to the crime, community safety and security problems revealed in the scanning and analysis processes of Intelligence. They may relate to quantified crime reduction targets. They will also relate to causes and risk factors and perhaps to wider, non-crime consequences (such as improving educational chances for young people). And they will also relate to indicators of intermediate and ultimate outcome, under Impact.

The process of aim-setting will also cover early Involvement activities such as stakeholder consultation on both content of aims, and priorities. Descriptions will

also need to document how aim-setting relates to both statutory consultations (as with Crime Audits in the UK) and political processes.

To aid aim-setting, the *scope* of a preventive activity can be defined, using CCO, in terms of any of the proximal causes of the criminal event – for example ‘reducing (say robbery) against particular targets, in particular environments, committed by specific types of offenders, using particular MOs’.

Aims of the project

The primary aim of the project was to reduce complaints and instances of anti-social behaviour (both criminal and sub-criminal activity). A secondary one was to reduce demand for service (and consequently police overtime).

Consultation in the Moonshine project was not originally described as one item; rather, as specific actions that fed into specific intervention and involvement activities as the project unfolded – for example, the residents were consulted when a youth shelter was proposed as one intervention method. However, other projects or services may have a more salient consultation process worth describing more fully.

The *ecological levels* considered in Moonshine are predominantly individual places and people though groups and drug markets make a brief appearance. *Risk and protective factors*, or causes relating to developmental/criminal careers or social structure, don’t directly feature in this example.

Intelligence: master list of headings

1. Intelligence

1.1. General social/geographical context to the problem: broad background information on town/city where action is implemented, helping to complete the picture and to guide selection, including:

1.1.1. *Location/built environment* including design and layout issues, and physical state (e.g. dilapidated).

1.1.2. *Demographic* including significant recent trends.

1.1.3. *Historical and existing action* covering crime prevention and wider social/economic services, projects and programmes.

1.2. Initiation and demand e.g. audits, emergent problems, referral and intake processes; external initiatives to mobilise the preventive agency and how to handle them.

1.3. The crime problem (or set of crime problems) that the project aimed to prevent (for presentational purposes this may be combined with 1.2, 1.4 and 1.5 covering initiation and demand, evidence and know-how of data collection and analysis).

1.3.1. *Definitional issues and action frameworks* e.g. whether a crime, safety or other problem, an offender problem/case, an area problem.

1.3.2. *Aspects of the crime problem, pattern of crime risk and its context.* Selective reporting of:

- Types of *offenders* involved.
- *Modus Operandi*, tools, weapons, skills, ‘script’ and other *resources* used by the offenders.
- *Target goods* typically stolen or damaged.
- *Target homes or business premises* that were burgled.
- *Owners or managers* of the homes or goods.
- *Target persons* who were assaulted.
- *Immediate physical and social context* of the criminal events (type of street, shop, station etc).
- *Wider physical and social context* of the criminal events (town centre, residential area etc; demographic features e.g. social deprivation).
- *Wider crime and disorder context* in which the specific problem is addressed (draw for example on *Crime & Disorder Audit*).
- *Timing* of criminal events during the day, week or year.
- Whether crime problem *recent or of long-standing*.
- Whether *repeat victimisation* significant, and if so, any specific pattern or victims.

Note that *victims* can appear under several entries. Note also that some crimes are more complex and involve *multiple scenes* (e.g. steal getaway car, forge security pass, execute robbery, launder money). Where relevant, the ‘*flow chart*’ of scenes should be described, and the features of each individual scene should be described, as above.

1.4. Evidence of crime problem – sources of information and analysis

1.4.1. Describe the types of *information* that were collected to identify the crime problem, its consequences and causes, and the type of *analysis and causal diagnosis* done. For example:

- *Crime pattern analysis* (including measurement of repeat victimisation) based on *victim surveys* or *recorded crime statistics*, to identify existing *patterns of crime risk*.
- *Forecasting* from known patterns of risk in similar circumstances: for example, for proposed new housing estate.
- Analysis of *risk and protective factors for offending* a) in potential offenders' life circumstances and/or b) in geographical areas.
- *Interviews with actual/potential offenders*.

1.4.2. Describe *briefly* any relevant *technical issues* of reliability, validity, bias etc which may have significantly affected the crime picture obtained.

1.5. **Know-how in data collection and analysis**

1.5.1. Describe any special *difficulties and tradeoffs* encountered in collection or analysis, and any *innovative* approaches adopted.

1.6. **Community safety and security: significant harmful consequences of crime problem/s** to individual victims and offenders, families, communities or society, covering:

- Immediate effects including trauma, injury or financial cost
- Wider effects including fear, restriction of leisure, economic or domestic activity.
- Specific consequences for further offending, whether by offenders originally involved (e.g. drawing them into a criminal career) or crime propagation (e.g. stolen handbags enabling identity theft).

1.6.1. Describe whether these consequences:

- Fell on particular *communities or sets of people*.
- Whether these were specially *vulnerable*, or needed *help* to cope.

1.6.2. Existing *mitigation* actions.

1.7. **Immediate causes, remote causes and risk factors for offending**

Describe any identifiable causes of the criminal events; or any risk factors present and protective factors absent. It's *not* necessary to describe every cause – only those significantly relating to the intervention or determining the context for it to work. The causes below (and the Interventions in the next chapter) are based on the CCO framework (Chapter 9), though others can be used. An equivalent generic framework is needed for organising knowledge of developmental/career causes and interventions.

1.7.1. *Immediate causes on the (potential) offender side:*

- a. *Criminality.*
- b. *Lack of resources to avoid crime.*
- c. *Readiness to offend.*
- d. *Resources for committing crime.*
- e. *Immediate decision to offend.*
- f. *Presence of offender in crime situation.*

1.7.2. *Immediate causes on the situational side:*

- g. *Target person, property, service, system or information.*
- h. *Target enclosure.*
- i. *Wider environment.*
- j. *Absence of crime preventers.*
- k. *Presence of crime promoters.*

Dynamic configurations – interacting causes can include anything that *brings individual immediate causes together* such as victims' or offenders' *lifestyles and routine activities and scripts*

1.7.3. *Remoter, area or higher-level causes can include:*

- *Criminal careers of offenders*
- *Criminal networks and organisations*
- *Criminal subcultures*
- *Criminal markets* e.g. for drugs, stolen property
- *Exclusionary processes*
- *Lack of social capital/ collective efficacy of a community to tackle problem*

1.7.4. If the crime problem is complex, involving *multiple scenes* (e.g. obtain forged passport, open bank account...), it may be necessary to describe the causal preconditions for the offender/s to successfully complete each scene.

1.7.5. *Risk and protective factors for offending* are conditions in offenders' earlier life, which are known (positive or negative) correlates of later offending, then used in predictive targeting of later cohorts of potential offenders. They cover various ecological levels:

- Individual
- Friends/peers
- Family
- School
- Community

1.7.6. *Needs* of individual offenders/those at risk of offending may be important to record if the action is welfare-oriented.

1.7.7. *Evidence* of causes (e.g. offender interviews covering crime situations/opportunities, provocations, motivation and perhaps developmental history; surveys/analyses of risk and protective factors; site visits) should be stated.

1.8. Aims and aim-setting – at planning stage

1.8.1. Nature and priority of *aims*, expressed in the same terms as descriptions of the crime problem, and/or ultimate outcome measures under Impact. Statement of any quantified crime reduction targets. *Scope of action* can be defined using CCO components for example 'reducing (say robbery) against particular targets, in particular environments, committed by specific types of offenders, using particular MOs'.

1.8.2. Nature of any consultation to set aims, and consultation methods worth reporting for audit and/or for knowledge management purposes.

1.8.3. Nature of any climate-setting activities relating to establishing acceptance and understanding of the objectives, managing expectations, reconciling aims with initial demand etc.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 12 Intervention

Introduction

Under Intelligence, differences have already emerged between 5Is and other process models of prevention like SARA. But 5Is really begins to demonstrate its distinctive features from here on. The Response stage of SARA is split into the three interlinked task streams of Intervention, Implementation and Involvement.

This introduction defines the overall task stream of Intervention; introduces the language to use for describing it; considers the relationship between Intervention and evidence; discusses the purposes of reporting Intervention in action descriptions; and comments on the generic process of undertaking the Intervention task, specifically relating this to *design*. It then suggests ways of structuring descriptions of the Intervention task as a whole, of individual interventions and packages thereof.

The second part of the chapter illustrates the concept of Intervention with examples, then presents the ‘master-list’ of subsidiary headings. The important thing for contributors of 5Is descriptions, though, is not to rely on slavish following of checklists, but to work from a deep appreciation of what Intervention is about and how it relates to the other task streams of the preventive process. This level of understanding should make them both better knowledge contributors *and* practitioners.

Defining Intervention

The purpose of crime prevention, security and community safety activity is to reduce the probability of, and harm from, criminal events and wider states of perceived insecurity. As argued in Chapter 8, Intervention should be the focus for describing that action. Intervention in general terms is about *how* the probability and/or harm are reduced, causally speaking; and *what* is done in practice to make this happen. The purpose of the Intervention *task stream* as used within 5Is is still more specific. It’s to *generate plans and designs for intervention methods, based on knowledge of crime prevention principles, customised to the local problem and context*.

Manipulating causes is central to intervention, but seeking to influence *risk (and protective) factors* also comes under the Intervention task stream because these are assumed to have some causal connection to the criminal events. In any case, action to modify risk factors may itself be directed at *their* causes (such as alleviating the *causes* of the risk factor of poor parenting).

Beyond the *primary* preventive focus of reducing the risk of criminal events and insecurity, Intervention can serve the purposes of *secondary* security (stopping ongoing harmful events and processes); *tertiary* security (mitigating harm already done); and *preparedness* for these (such as having a victim support service in place before the crime happens). These are all incident-focused actions. But some fear, trust and quality of life issues may be so detached from specific crime incidents that interventions in their causes, and efforts to mitigate them (as through reassurance), are in a class of their own. However, they are still in-scope of 5Is.

The language of Intervention: principles, methods and mechanisms

Academics and practitioners are so accustomed to talking about ‘interventions’ that few realise how imprecise the terminology is. So now we must tighten the language.

- First, we should flag up the distinction between Intervention a) as an entire *task stream*, and b) the individual *plans and designs* for intervention principles and methods targeted on specific crime problems, offenders etc, that are the *products* of this task stream. It is these products which are to be passed to Implementation and Involvement for their final realisation.
- *Principles* are, as Chapter 7 stated, generic causal mechanisms abstracted from their specific, context-bound, interactions; and, ideally, tested, refined and recast as theory. They are the *how* of intervention, and cover resisting, interrupting, diverting or weakening the identified causes of criminal events or wider community safety problems. In alternative ‘active agent’ language, they cover influencing the decisions, disrupting the plans and frustrating the goals of offenders. Examples of principles are lowering the value of stolen goods, or increasing impulsive offenders’ self-control.
- *Methods* are the *what* of intervention: practical plans and designs for action intended, through Implementation and Involvement, to realise the principles in particular contexts. Corresponding examples to those above are (lowering the value of stolen goods by) property-marking, or (increasing an offender’s self-control by) rehearsing the refusal to steal in common temptation situations. Method and context jointly activate (successful) preventive *mechanisms* and inactivate criminogenic ones.
- *Packages* of methods, perhaps drawing on complementary principles, may serve a common aim and may be planned and designed together.
- Describing interventions in terms of principles or methods supports *replication and innovation* in different ways. Principles are analytic and can be generalised, customised or ‘programmed’ to suit many new contexts; methods can be broken down into subsidiary task-elements and assembled in new combinations.

The CCO describes preventive principles in terms of how they influence the *proximal* causes of criminal events, but in practice many interventions act some way *upstream*. A developmental intervention may ultimately influence an offender's predisposition to crime, which is present and potentially active in a particular immediate crime situation. But the intervention method may have been implemented in another place and years before, during that person's childhood. The term 'principles' can equally cover the theories engaged and the generic mechanisms activated at this earlier time (for example in terms of the socialisation process and the development of the executive function), and those present and active in the immediate crime situation (years later, the potential offender can better resist temptation).

Customisation to context

Customisation covers the *when and where* of action. It is an intimate process – an intervention acts irreducibly in interaction with its causal context. We can't describe the underlying detailed causal mechanisms without reference to both. For example, the *principle* of modifying the environment to boost surveillance can only work if the chosen *method* (say CCTV) in an industrial estate *context* enjoys clear sightlines, good lighting, and employees motivated and empowered to act as effective crime preventers. Only in this way can the method trigger and enable specific *mechanisms* to operate such as employees perceiving, recognising and responding to suspicious behaviour.

The role of context in more detail

Certain components of the causal context are *necessary preconditions* for the intervention to succeed. They may also *boost* the degree of impact; or they may do both. For example, a minimum lighting level is necessary for CCTV to work in an industrial estate, but beyond that, the more the better. More dynamically speaking, following Pawson's (2006) broad view of social action, and Barr and Pease's (1990) more specific notion of crime placement, an intervention can be seen as *an injection of causal influence into an existing system of already operating mechanisms*. Knock-on effects may perturb the entire system.

Usually, given the involvement of *people* playing a range of roles both honest and dishonest, this is a *complex adaptive system* (as described in Chapter 9). The forces at work within that system are in tension and may be continually shifting. They may derive from previous layers of preventive action, such as installation of fences around the industrial estate to create a protected enclosure; and from an equivalent history of offensive action, such as tactical countermoves like loosening the fence posts in secluded areas. The industrial estate system may also contain inadvertent crime promoters, for example in the form of employees depositing rubbish skips where they block the view for surveillance. Secondary interventions

may be necessary as part of the package, to remove these constraints on the main intervention. Besides this situational example, offender-oriented action will also inject what are often complex interventions into already complex social systems and relationships which have previously been driving or inhibiting conflict and offending. Here, too, the intervention package must be designed to take account of (and continually adjust to) these constraining and enabling influences.

With all kinds of prevention, the focus of interventions in the ‘crime system’ as just described shade gradually from the agents operating in the immediate circumstances of criminal events (described by the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity as preventers, promoters and offenders), to a far wider set of stakeholders currently acting to prevent or promote crime. These could be parents, teachers, manufacturers of secure or insecure products or designers of computer operating systems. In many cases the kinds of preventive influence applied to these agents is best described under Involvement, although there’s no clear-cut divide.

Intervention and evidence

To generate good quality action or action descriptions, an intervention should clearly relate to various kinds of evidence; and declare these links.

Evidence of problem, context and causes is delivered by the Intelligence task stream. It’s important for the Intelligence task to capture a sufficiently comprehensive system picture as described above, to maximise the scope for interventions to work with existing preventive influences and to minimise the risk of unforeseen consequences, as described in Chapman’s (2004) ‘system failure’ analysis and Pawson’s (2006) approach to evidence-based policy,

This local evidence must be combined with the prior, more generic knowledge pool of what interventions work, against what crime problem in what context. Where available, this comprises:

- *Informal knowledge* from the practitioners’ own experience and that of colleagues; much will be tacit and/or lacking rigorous assessment.
- *Formal evidence* of What Works from outside the project or case in question. Sources include individual impact evaluations; systematic reviews perhaps incorporating meta-analyses; and theoretical principles often themselves tested through ‘evolutionary epistemology’ (Campbell, 1974): that is, by assessing how far preventive action based on those principles actually, attributably and reliably works.

It’s arguable whether there is an overall ‘best’ source of formal What Works evidence. There are tradeoffs between internal and external validity and generalisability of the results, and greater and lesser levels of detail useful for connecting the existing knowledge to the new problem and context.

Available prescriptions therefore range quite widely, including:

- The broad, principle-based ‘situational prevention works’ (Eck, 2002a);
- The more typical product of systematic reviews, for example the slightly more specific method-based ‘CCTV works – but only in car parks (Welsh and Farrington, 2008);
- Fairly loosely configured and filtered ‘toolkits’ of What Works covering, say, domestic burglary;⁴⁰
- Highly specific programmatic procedures recommended for specified kinds of offender;
- Individual instances of success like the Kirkholt burglary project (Forrester et al., 1988, 1990) whose failed replications significantly contributed (via Nick Tilley (1993a)) to the line of thinking in this book.

None of these has fully captured the principle-method-context-mechanism structure of 5Is, though the Scientific Realist formulation of context-mechanism-outcome (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) comes closest and Theory of Change (Connell et al., 1995) isn’t far behind. Nor have they aligned themselves to the suite of generalised preventive principles embodied in the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity. A review of What Works evidence going ‘round the clock’ of the 11 CCO intervention principles would be more specific than Eck’s suggestion and more analytic and generalisable than the systematic review example just illustrated.

The process of undertaking the Intervention task: the importance of design

The Intervention task stream must respect the complexity described above. This could mean creating new interventions to overcome weaknesses of past efforts. It could also mean anticipating offenders’ future countermoves to the main preventive intervention methods. For example, offenders can climb camera poles and destroy the cameras, hence the spiked collar often adorning them; or the progress made by youth centre members may be hindered by scornful peers, who must be countered in turn. More widely, creating a new intervention method could involve resolving the tradeoffs between, say, privacy and surveillance, intrusion and protection; and satisfying legal requirements and welfare protocols required by diverse partner organisations.

All this necessitates a *design* approach to the development of interventions. The essence of design is identifying conflicting and competing requirements, and constraints and enablers – and creatively resolving them so that the designed product or process serves its main purpose/s without jeopardising others. This doesn’t just apply to the Design Against Crime field (e.g. Ekblom, 2005, 2008d) which focuses on the built environment, products and communications. Rather, it’s about importing the *design process* and the *design way of thinking* into the entire field of crime prevention. (This includes importation into offender-oriented and community-level interventions, many of which will involve a substantial amount of ‘service design’.)

This departs from the ‘classic’ Problem-Oriented approach of Goldstein (1990). Although he did envisage subsidiary actions under the ‘Response’ stage of SARA, these comprised ‘search for response alternatives, choosing the appropriate response, and implementation’. Searching and choosing give no hint of replication, innovation and the role of design in terms of the exercise of creativity-within-constraints in pursuit of solutions. More recent writings in Problem-Oriented Policing come closer to a design approach. Brown and Scott (2007: 22-30) describe the process of developing the Response in terms which raise several basic design requirements, derived from research and practice experience: adapt intervention to context, keep mechanisms simple, consider how interventions will interact etc. But they don’t quite capture the handling of conflicts, tradeoffs and iterated improvements central to design. Knowledge of this is vital for replication and innovation.

Both principles and methods must be subject to design. Principles must be designed so they don’t *mutually interfere* (e.g. an enclosure keeps out intruders, but if they do get in, they may be protected from natural surveillance; or where overt security raises fear) and do *synergise*. The design of methods is more demanding because these must fit in with a host of real-world considerations ranging from political acceptability, privacy and inclusiveness to energy-saving.

The design process includes the following tasks (see also Thorpe et al., (2009):

- *Requirements capture*: to take a service design example,
 - What are the aims or purposes of a particular youth centre (improving life chances of young people, and improving local community safety)?
 - Who is the centre activity aimed at (8-13 year-old boys)?
 - What are the causes of their offending that need addressing (e.g. limited self-control)?
 - What are the possible obstacles to intervention (e.g. attendance being seen as ‘uncool’)?
 - What are the possible downsides (e.g. stigmatisation, interference with schooling), and so on.
 - How do these, and more, relate to the context?

Requirements capture must also reflect issues of Implementation (e.g. cost, human resources, quality-assurability) and Involvement (will the community accept the methods? Will the intended parties, such as volunteers, actually join in? Can the security devices be easily installed and reliably operated?). Where the project is intended as a deliberate test of principle or theory, the *evaluability* of the outcome should also feature.

- *Understanding* (from the intelligence on causes, context and intervention mechanisms, and envisaging the roles and scripts of the different agents involved (Ekblom, 2007c)).
- *Generation of proposed intervention methods* (e.g. through visualisation, brainstorming).
- *Iterative trials or pilots* to improve the design, optimise tradeoffs etc in-context (with an eye on the mechanisms, which will resurface in monitoring of Implementation and Impact evaluation). Brown and Scott's (2007: 22-30) section on 'developing the Response' provides useful challenges to emerging designs.
- '*Correlation*', which in design terms is a self-assessment of how the final proposed design meets the requirements specification and so is fit for purpose.

It's fair to say that most practitioners, and practice-oriented action researchers, use design processes of a kind. But these are usually semi-conscious, tacit and half-hearted. Certainly the reporting of the design process or even of the identified requirements is rare. *If intelligent replication and innovation that draws on past experience is to become a reality, then both the application and reporting of design issues and processes must become far more prominent and routine.*

Once developed, the plans and designs are carried forward to Implementation and Involvement. Of course, the design process does not stop there. Actions as diverse as fitting secure alley-gates to a row of houses, or making a mentoring service work on the ground, require continued attention to detail, adjustment, problem-solving and maybe even complete revision in the light of practical experience.

The purposes of reporting Intervention in action descriptions

The reporting of Intervention serves several functions. Some apply to retrospective descriptions, others when 5Is is undertaken in forward planning mode:

- Accounts of the *content* of interventions obviously aid selection and replication. Are the principles and methods used in this project or service of interest to users seeking action to emulate? Are they newsworthy to knowledge harvesters? Can they be employed in training of practitioners? In some cases the *context* will be of interest too because users may have a similar context to which they need to customise their own action. Here, the whole package of principles and methods may be transferred as a 'going concern'. In other cases all that may be transferred is the abstracted principle; or methods equally detached and modularised.
- Describing enough of the *intervention design process* and the *rationale* for the intervention enables a *quality-check* on the way Intelligence and What Works evidence have been incorporated into proposed interventions. (Absence of specific What Works evidence covering their crime problem doesn't absolve contributors from the professional obligation to make what links they can to

tested theory, in developing the rationale behind their choice and the design of intervention principles and methods.) The quality-check can support *internal guidance*, *external monitoring* by delivery managers, and *indicating utility and quality* to users seeking projects or services to emulate and knowledge-harvesters aiming to extract principles and methods.

- Quality-assurance is additionally served by describing the specific techniques and generic processes of *doing the intervention design*, from choosing and combining the principles to iteratively developing the methods. This also supports transfer of know-how, in a field where reconstruction and innovation are significant features of what may initially have seemed to be a routine exercise of replication.
- A description that reflects thinking on *countermoves* by offenders and reactions of other agents can alert users to *risks* attendant on messing with complex adaptive systems.

The structure and content of descriptions of I/intervention

A convention, already used unannounced, is necessary to avoid confusion. The Intervention task stream considered as a whole begins with a capital 'I'; specific, individual interventions in the causes of crime are lower case. (The overall task of intervention in support of other tasks, such as Involvement, is also lower case but context should make clear which is being referred to.) The description of both the overall Intervention *task*, and the specific intervention plans and designs which are its *product*, should together supply the backbone of the *rationale* for the preventive action selected, designed and implemented.

Describing the Intervention task

The description of the Intervention task must follow logically from the products of the Intelligence task in terms of problem, causes, context and consequences, and from evidence of What Works against what problem in what context. Ideally it must recount key aspects of the design process. In turn it must pass clear actionable 'instructions' onto both Implementation (the practical tasks to be done to make the method happen) and Involvement (getting people to share, undertake or support and accept those tasks).

Describing individual interventions

Individual interventions may be described in different discourses.

Example 1:

Purpose – to prevent robberies in hospital car parks

Generic principles – by environmental design

Detailed mechanisms – by improving sightlines for surveillance

Method – by trimming shrubs

Example 2:

Purpose – to reduce generalised youth offending

Generic principles – by supplying crime preventers acting as positive role models and providing resources to avoid offending

Detailed mechanisms – by identification and social learning

Method – by a mentoring scheme

Description of interventions must reflect the structured nature of action. Each intervention method will have its own aim contributing to the wider plan; it may act through a number of mechanisms, and so realise several principles.

- Descriptions of aims are normally simple, although there may be multiple aims served, both in the crime domain and beyond.
- Descriptions of principles are relatively straightforward (‘restricting offenders’ resources for committing crime’; ‘meeting entertainment needs legitimately’) although interactions may be more challenging (‘making offending more difficult for people who are impulsive’).
- Descriptions of detailed mechanisms constitute a Scientific Realist thread that should run through the entire rationale from problem to causes to intervention to implementation to impact evaluation. The descriptions must be tentative (mechanisms aren’t directly visible but conjectured), but it may be important for contributors to report on evidence of the mechanisms’ presence, operation and interaction with context. (Practical tradeoffs between the brevity of ‘common sense’ assumptions about what mechanisms are operating (such as deterrence) and a more searching, but long-winded stance, must be made as in all scientific/technical writing.)
- Descriptions of *methods* can get messy, for here is the action in practical detail. To the extent that existing classifications are relevant and helpful (e.g. the 25 techniques of situational prevention) these should be used. Descriptions in existing literature range from the reporting of the tangible ‘what was done’ to the prescriptive ‘how to do it’ to the setting out of the understanding of alternative options, tradeoffs, consequences and risks that preceded the final proposal, and which could lead to very different outputs in customising to different contexts. As argued above, these design considerations in both method and principle should feature prominently in richer 5Is descriptions. It’s useful to highlight the *institutional context* in which the method is implemented, for example civil or judicial. Transferring an intervention between these may require major redesign of practical details.

A project to tackle a crime problem, or a treatment regime for offenders, may incorporate several distinct intervention methods. Project descriptions must find ways of representing and explaining this structure (and the rationale in terms of holism, synergy, redundancy etc) in ways which can help subsequent users and knowledge harvesters. Tilley et al. (1999) distinguish three kinds of relations between interventions: interactive, contradictory and combined (merely additive). But a more functional depiction (also applicable to prior action and other contextual factors), is whether they reinforce, complement, synergise or interfere with one another.

Often it will be necessary to repeat the description structure for each distinct intervention, and if appropriate to provide an overview of how they fit together. Alternatively, a single intervention method may be described in turn around each of the principles by which it might act. An example of this is the account of a mentoring project whose single method acted in diverse ways (Home Office, 2002a). Beyond this, it may even make descriptive sense to organise the entire description around Involvement rather than Intervention. This could happen, for example, if the main action centres on building a partnership-based *capacity* to generate a succession of evidence-based and well-targeted interventions of a wide range of kinds (as with the Communities That Care programme (Crow et al., 2004). Central to the account would be the principles and methods of Involvement. Each individual intervention would then have its own subsidiary description.

The content of Intervention

The main illustration for Intervention is again Project Moonshine, whose aim was to tackle drink-related antisocial behaviour in a local shopping and leisure centre. Other examples are drawn on as appropriate, especially to demonstrate alternative ways of structuring descriptions of intervention.

Prior action

Prior action, information on which is gathered as an early Intelligence task, may be described as a separate item, as here. The actions described may or may not be confined to crime-preventive ones: these might, for example, be part of wider educational or housing programmes.

What existing interventions were in place at the time the project started?

There appeared to be no pre-existing interventions in place at the time of the local disturbances, apart from limited police patrolling. The aims of the project included reducing excessive use of these resources.

Overall intervention strategy

If several intervention methods are implemented as a package it makes sense to set out, as below, how they interrelate, before describing each one individually. How the intervention related to prior action (building on it, replacing it etc) can also be included here, as an alternative to the above separate heading.

What was the overall intervention strategy?

The main interventions centred on identifying key Antisocial Behaviour (ASB) offenders and removing opportunities for offending, the time to cause nuisance and the alcohol generating the nuisance activity. The remit of the project was to reduce excessive use of patrolling, and where possible find alternative interventions.

This is a brief example; there would be scope here for stating in more detail the key rationale relating problem and causes to intervention strategy in support of overall aims. An example of a fuller overview is found in a description of national action to reduce mobile phone theft (Home Office 2002b). An example of explicitly building on a prior local CCTV-based security system is in Home Office (2002c).

Individual interventions

The Moonshine example comprised some 13 distinct interventions, uncovered and clarified during an extended interview with the practitioners. Several are omitted for brevity but are available at the website listed in Chapter 10.

Intervention 1

Aim: *Reducing underage purchase and consumption of alcohol*

Method: *Modification of plain carrier bags to branded bags, store CCTV review, and enforcement, using civil and parajudicial actions and judicial powers on offenders, shopkeepers and parents*

Principles: *Reducing readiness to offend (removing supply of alcohol); Demobilising (detering and incapacitating) crime promoters (shopkeepers) and converting them to preventers; Mobilising preventers (parents); Empowering preventers (police).*

Retailers selling alcohol to underage youths were identified through the seizure of alcohol from youths, in bags that revealed the origin of purchase. Police officers then went to the relevant stores and seized CCTV footage of the sale. This footage was then used both to reiterate the licensing legislation on the sale of alcohol to minors and convert the retailer from promoter to preventer. Based on CCTV footage a shop assistant was fired. (This was not promoted by the project team, but it did help *encourager les autres.*) CCTV footage (where of sufficient quality) was also used to inform and convince

parents of the offender(s). The carrier bags of certain retailers were also modified from plain white to 'branded' bags. In the case of two shops with the same bag this served to narrow down the search. As the officers quickly detected and apprehended youths carrying alcohol in the vicinity of the shops, it took on average 10 minutes to review CCTV footage to identify offenders who had purchased alcohol underage.

Risks: *Countermove by offenders*

Following the modifications to carrier bags, youths subsequently brought their own bags from Tesco. The police when confiscating these bags, checked at the local Tesco store for CCTV footage and confirmed that this was not the location of purchase – the police then re-established with the offender the true location of the alcohol purchase.

Intervention 2: Targeted high visibility police patrols

Aim: *Reducing misbehaviour in specific locations; Reassurance*

Method: *Covert and overt surveillance by police patrols and neighbourhood wardens, aided by mobile CCTV, and dispersal of offenders; parajudicial approach*

Principles: *Deterrence and discouragement; Removing offenders from crime situation; Reducing readiness to offend; Reassurance from visible presence of police*

High visibility police patrols and neighbourhood wardens were used to disperse offenders and potential offenders from loitering in problem areas (dispersal reducing interpersonally-stimulated motivation to offend). Surveillance of offenders on the streets was boosted by the use of a mobile CCTV vehicle, which allowed gathering of intelligence (with a capacity to take still images of identified offenders). This also had the effect of reassuring the public that there were people available to support them in case of being threatened.

Risks: *Surveillance countermoves by offenders*

Youths made use of Hoodies (hooded garments obscuring face) and baseball caps to hinder identification. However the police gathered intelligence on specific clothes worn by ASB offenders and so were able to identify individuals on this basis.

Intervention 3: Anti-Social Behaviour Contracts (ABCs) considered for persistent offenders

Aim: *Reduce ASB by specific offenders*

Method: *Threat of ABCs for identified persistent ASB offenders; judicial approach*

Principles: *General and specific deterrence and discouragement; Removing offender from crime situation; Cracking down on promoters (parents) and converting them to preventers*

Nine persistent ASB offenders (previously noted and/or cautioned) were identified by the police as potential candidates for ABCs. In the presence of their parents, the police and council informed them they were under scrutiny for the application of an ABC. The threat of this appeared to prevent further offending by this group. No ABCs had been applied to the nine offenders at the time of this description.

Risks: *ABCs – administrative boundaries*

There were complications over applying ABCs due to borough boundaries, as it was unclear which of two adjacent borough councils should be involved. After liaison and careful mediation, one council was handed ownership to carry forward the ABCs. However by the time this had been achieved, the project team had used alternative methods to tackle ASB (through cautioning, arresting and engagement with the youth services – see below).

Intervention 4: Target hardening of a store to prevent alcohol theft

Aim: *Reduction of alcohol consumption by reduction of supply through theft from retail premises*

Method: *Set of structural and environmental modifications to increase the effort and risk required to steal alcohol; civil/parajudicial approach*

Principles: *Perimeter/access security; Target hardening; Environmental design; Conversion of crime promoters to crime preventers*

A particular store identified as a soft target for alcohol theft received ‘Secured By Design’ advice from the project team. External electric fences were installed to prevent offenders entering through the back-entrance, internal electric fences were placed around the exposed storage areas, the CCTV system was upgraded (and placed inside as well as outside), vehicle parking was improved, and overhanging branches cut down. A new roller screen was installed to replace the broken one and the layout of the store was altered (lowering the height of displays) to promote better natural and CCTV surveillance.

Intervention 5: Removing flowerbed from the front of row of shops

Aim: *Reducing misbehaviour and misuse; Reassurance; Improving area image*

Method: *Removing the flowerbed from the row of shops; civil approach*

Principles: *Environmental design; Restricting resources for crime; Deflecting offenders from a crime situation*

A flowerbed was removed outside a row of shops. This was a focal point for youths gathering, and provided somewhere to sit. The flowerbed had been misbehaved with by youths and adults alike, and was spoiling the image of the area. Removing the flowerbed prevented youths from misusing loose bricks to cause damage elsewhere. The area ceased to attract youths. This helped reduce intimidation felt by legitimate users of the local stores as they ran the gauntlet of the loitering youths.

Risks: *new crime/misbehaviour opportunities*

Local retailers were concerned that removal of the flowerbed would leave them unprotected from ram-raiders. It was decided to place bollards on the paved area. Anticipating further misbehaviour the bollards were designed to be uncomfortable to sit on.

Intervention 6: Community clean up

Aim: *Reassurance; Mitigation of negative area image;*

Method: *Community clean up of Valley Park; civil approach*

Principles: *Deterrence; Reduction of environmental precipitators; Motivating preventers; boosting Community cohesion*

Community wardens and some members of the public cleared up litter and generally tidied up the area by Valley Park shops. This apparently boosted reassurance (although it is difficult to measure and attribute impact) through the visible presence of community wardens and an apparently cleaner and safer place. It may also have engendered feelings of ownership and augmented collective efficacy. Removing the 'signs of crime' and establishing standards may also be seen as applying 'Broken windows' principles to reduce prompting and provocation of misbehaviour and set rules. The clean-up also served the Involvement function of mobilising residents and engaging them as partners.

Intervention 7: Youth shelter

Aim: *Reduce misbehaviour and illegal alcohol consumption by youths; reduce harmful consequences of (mis)behaviour*

Method: *Youth shelter for local juveniles; civil approach*

Principles: *Removing offenders from crime situation; Reducing readiness to offend by meeting needs legitimately and removing from alcohol*

The project team installed a youth shelter to provide personal space for local youths and divert them from the shops (and alcohol). Youths were consulted by Youth Services about the shelter (an instance of gathering intelligence for a specific intervention) and had indicated a need for one.

Risks: *Additional crime – shelter becomes target; offensive graffiti*

The police emphasised the shelter was ultimately the property of the youths, and they should take responsibility for it. If the shelter was spoiled it would be removed. The shelter did attract graffiti but this was seen in principle as acceptable by the police. But when unacceptable language was sprayed on this was erased by spray paint by the police. (The beat constable carried a can in his bicycle saddlebag for instant mitigation, and reduction of reward and further prompting to offenders.)

Intervention 9: Arresting/cautioning of ASB offenders

Aim: *Reducing area crime/ASB overall; reducing offending by individuals and ultimately influencing their criminal careers and life chances*

Method: *Arresting/cautioning of ASB offenders, mainly judicial and parajudicial approaches*

Principles: *Removing offenders from the crime situation; Giving offenders resources to avoid offending (education); Deterrence and discouragement; Mobilising preventers (parents); Gateway to CJS; Gateway to range of youth services*

The police used cautions for first and second time ASB offenders; arrest was threatened if they continued to misbehave, at which point they were sent to the youth courts. (Physical conflicts between local and migrant ASB offenders were also dealt with primarily through the arrest of main participants.) In both cases, the police recommended the youth in question to contact youth services – which offered advice on citizenship, drugs and alcohol, etc. This process was invariably boosted by the police approaching parents and showing them video footage of the child's involvement in ASB.

It was hoped that through confronting parents with the footage confirming ASB activity, they would be engaged to tackle the offending of their children. Once the project was established, the ASB officers assumed this role.

Risks: *Attempting to arrest offenders – countermoves by offenders; negative effects of judicial involvement*

Youths often sought to avoid arrest, using mobile phones to warn of an impending police approach and evading police by ‘starbursting’ (running off in different directions). A local primary school field was also used as an escape route, and the surrounding bushes for hiding places. Alcohol was concealed in hedges. This problem was tackled by the council lowering the height of hedges and bushes, and cleaning out rubbish beneath them.

Intervention 10: Drop in centre for youths

Aim: *Reducing ASB; Improving quality of life/life chances for youths*

Method: *Drop in centre for youths; civil approach*

Principles: *Removing offenders from crime situation; Reducing readiness to offend by reduction of alcohol consumption and alleviation of boredom; supply of positive role models and other preventive relationships*

A drop in centre was made available one night a week to local youths to socialise and hang out. This helped take them off the street, distancing them from sources of alcohol and consequently removing the opportunity as well as the motivation for ASB.

Intervention 13: Disrupting a possible drugs market targeting youths

Aim: *Reduce illegal drug dealing and consumption*

Method: *Enlisting youths to identify drug dealers so that they could be dealt with through the CJS; arrest and incapacitating bail conditions for offenders; supplying advice on drugs misuse; judicial, parajudicial, civil approaches*

Principles: *Mobilising youths to act as preventers; Removing offenders (dealers) from the crime situation; Deterrence and incapacitation (dealers); Resources to avoid offending (drugs education for youths)*

Youths were approached both in the street and at various diversionary events to get them to identify those they believed were attempting to sell drugs. This led to the arrest of identified and known drug dealers. Bail conditions were used for identified drug dealers so that they could not return to the Valley

Park area. Youths also received advice on drug misuse from the youth services (who spent around 2 hours every week raising awareness of drugs and alcohol misuse), wardens (who spent around 10 minutes every evening talking to youths directly on the street and handing out leaflets on the subject) and police officers generally advising youths on drug/alcohol misuse.

These examples demonstrate (besides the energy and focus of the originators):

- The richness of information on interventions that is readily available to share if the right questions are asked of the contributors. Much more could be available to follow up by knowledge harvesters, e.g. details and issues of the design of the youth shelter.
- The fact that individual methods may themselves comprise quite complex combinations of subsidiary tasks all of which are necessary for the method to work (e.g. intervention 1).
- The degree to which the description can be rendered concise, comprehensible and retrievable by a structured approach to describing it, which is capable of handling highly diverse kinds of action involving a range of intervention principles (situational, offender-oriented and community-oriented, mainly described using the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity) and institutional settings (civil, parajudicial and judicial).
- The importance of capturing the rationale of each intervention, particularly as this evolved and the action was (re)designed in the light of risks both anticipated and emergent; the way individual aims can be related to the overall strategy.

The Moonshine intervention descriptions were fairly light-touch ones and did not, however, capture much on the intervention design process (this concept having emerged only recently), although hints of it appear, literally, in the physical design of the bollards (blocking ram-raiding whilst not providing seating whilst appearing aesthetic...). Examples of technical design issues explicitly discussed are in the CCTV descriptions provided by the original evaluators of the project (Gill et al., 2005a-c). Here, headings include:

- Design of the system
- How effectively design met the system aims (equivalent to correlation with requirements)
- Limitations of design (shading into how the system worked in practice, in terms of Implementation and Involvement)

Nor did the Moonshine descriptions explicitly identify significant contextual conditions for success, nor systematically assess the quality and success of the individual intervention methods. On the last, a more formal, rigorous and academic

‘process evaluation’ version might seek to specify intermediate outcome indicators reflecting proposed causal mechanisms (e.g. whether the youth shelter was actually used, and whether it deflected a significant proportion of the youths away from the shopping centre, both of which would be necessary conditions for the ultimate outcome of reduced misbehaviour at the centre). It would also be more explicit about the ecological levels of intervention (whether intervening on individual people and places, families, groups, communities etc).

An alternative presentation arrangement, used in the Stirchley domestic burglary prevention project (Ekblom, 2002c; Home Office, 2004), more strongly emphasises principles and underlying detailed mechanisms of intervention. For example:

Principle 1 sought to *improve and/or create effective target enclosures* around each block of houses. The practical methods used were to design and install *alleygates* (method 1) and *fencing* (method 2). The conjectured mechanisms by which these methods would work included:

- Blocking *access* to *vulnerable* and *unsurveilled* rear of houses
- Reducing *escape* routes
- Thereby making it easier for residents to act as *preventers* and
- *Deterring and discouraging offenders* through perception of increased risk and effort

Yet another approach to description focuses even more explicitly on mechanisms, as in this account of the Trident Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Programme in Bradford (Adamson, 2004: 3):

The TISSP expects that its [aims] will be achieved by a combination of mechanisms.

- Young people will either stop offending because they have engaged with TISSP and benefited from the support offered or they will be back in court. There will be no second chances: At the first sign of failure to comply the police will be informed and they will be arrested and put before the first available court.
- The level of surveillance will be such that it should no longer be possible for offenders to indulge in crime. Use of Curfew Orders and physical tracking will ensure that the whereabouts are known of the small number of young people responsible for most of the crime and anti-social behaviour. The project will carry out un-announced spot checks to back up the surveillance component of TISSP.

A description of a CCTV improvement project on Slough Trading Estate (Home Office, 2002c) was also organised, like Moonshine, around intervention

methods but in some cases the individual principles underlying each method were covered in depth.

A description of a mentoring scheme run by the UK Youth Justice Board's Youth Inclusion Programme (Home Office, 2002a) focused on this single method and then separately covered four alternative mechanisms by which it might be operating (reducing criminality, supplying resources to avoid crime, reducing readiness to offend and excluding offenders from crime situations).

Depending on the content and structure of the action to be described, a better story might be told if each separate intervention were handled as a unit straddling its own specific rationale from Intelligence through to Implementation and Involvement. This approach is adopted in the description of UK national mobile phone initiatives (Home Office, 2002b).

The organisational context and working structure of interventions

Moonshine was clearly a problem-oriented project. In fact, it was set within a (former) problem-oriented support structure ('PRIME') within the Hampshire Constabulary, itself of course a mainly service-oriented and reactive institution. Other forms of intervention delivery exist, with different units of action (e.g. services processing cases) and their description is important. This is true whether we are briefly logging the obvious and familiar or going into considerable detail where the organisational and institutional context of the Intervention task and of individual interventions plays a significant part in establishing and maintaining the causal mechanisms for the interventions to work. Of course, the division between different delivery types isn't watertight, as Chapter 8 made clear.

Many interventions, especially offender-oriented ones, are planned and implemented within a service context and an associated organisational structure, like a Youth Offending Team or a youth centre with wider aims than crime prevention and justice.

Examples from the Irish field trip illustrate some aspects of knowledge of the service context and the wider Intervention task that are important to capture. In many cases they form a necessary background component of the more specific intervention mechanisms. As such these contexts themselves may be deliberately manipulated, and are therefore the subject of transferrable practice knowledge in their own right.

- *Switching between alternative methods* of delivering the same principles – sometimes one-to-one, sometimes group work is judged appropriate in the youth centres depending on the individual young people and their varying state of mind. Knowledge is required both of the alternative methods and of when and how to switch between them.

- *Learning and motivating mechanisms* that are generic and interchangeable underlie a range of practical methods, and may or may not be coupled to specific interventions. Examples are:
 - The use of reward and personal recognition (e.g. young people getting their pictures in local paper for an achievement such as a fishing trophy);
 - Participation in decision-making (one centre deliberately involved each new set of young people in making changes in the building such as redecoration);
 - Giving and taking responsibility and leadership;
 - Giving collective or individual choices (e.g. pros and cons of wearing a hoodie); and
 - Capitalising on new kinds of influential relationship (e.g. if the Garda (police officer) who stops you for bad bike driving is the same individual that you know and respect at the motorcycle club).
- *Balancing different philosophies and values* – such as welfare and enforcement – that may potentially conflict within interventions, in the wider running of the centre, or in maintaining working relations with partner organisations. This relates to the entire process of intake (e.g. deliberate non-reference to the offences for which a member has been referred); day-to-day activity (whether or not to report a minor offence committed outside the centre); and handling crimes within and/or against the centre itself. Skilled practitioners claimed to use the welfare-enforcement balance *positively* besides treating it as a potentially disruptive hazard to defuse. Knowledge of such principles and practice in the centres visited seemed rich, but patchily codified and transferred.
- Often these methods serve *dual functions*: contributing to the specific interventions, facilitating Involvement of the young people and other parties; and in Implementation terms simply enabling the organisation to function with challenging individuals, in a civilised way.

Intervention: master-list of headings

The following headings at Map- and Methodology-level reflect both the example descriptions and the discussion above, not necessarily in the order in which they were previously presented. As with Intelligence, this is a suggested list only, and is intended to develop, differentiate and grow as knowledge-bases are populated and feedback from users and contributors refines it.

2. Intervention

Interventions are *how the action works, what is done and why*: the causal *principles* and practical *methods* that could be applied to block, disrupt or weaken the causes of criminal events or the risk factors, and strengthen the protective factors, in the service of some crime prevention, security or community safety *aim*. An important distinction is between describing the Intervention task stream as a *process*, and describing the individual interventions as plans or designs which are the *product* of that process, to be passed onto Implementation and Involvement. Depending on the structure and scale of the project it will be necessary to adjust the balance between top-down description of the intervention strategy as a whole, versus bottom-up description via the individual interventions that it comprises.

2.1. Interventions in place prior to start of project

Brought forward from Intelligence; including:

- 2.1.1. Those focused on crime prevention.
- 2.1.2. Relevant actions with wider aims (e.g. educational or housing improvement programmes).

2.2. Overall intervention strategy

This is the key rationale relating the problem or case and its causes to the intervention strategy in support of the overall aims, drawing on the account of the design process as appropriate. In design terms, this amounts to a statement of '*correlation*' – how the final design met the requirements and complied with evidence; how conflicts and tradeoffs were resolved, and risks managed and responded to, in the current context.

- 2.2.1. *Aims*: a statement in outcome terms relating to crime prevention, community safety and or security criteria; and/or to wider criteria (such as educational attainment or social/economic regeneration) if applicable. It may be appropriate to justify the aims in relation to Intelligence on problem/s and causes; and to cite the origins of any priorities (e.g. central government policy, local consultation etc.).
- 2.2.2. Summary and explanation of *how individual interventions contribute to the whole*, in terms of methods and principles as appropriate; whether, taken as a package, they reinforce, complement, synergise or interfere with one another (or at least are all necessary ingredients); whether any *prior action* was replaced/abandoned, developed, embedded within wider strategy. Description and justification of any *holistic* approach. Account of how any potential/actual *conflicts* were handled.

2.2.3. Any overview of *institutional context* (judicial, parajudicial, civil, combination) and the part this plays.

2.2.4. *Design process* for overall intervention strategy

In the case of a package of interventions this is where to document how the individual ingredients came to be fitted together to maximise synergy and efficiency and to minimise interference. In some programmes a strategic design process may be explicitly incorporated into the procedures of the delivering organisation. For example, the Communities That Care programme (Crow et al., 2004) provides a menu of evaluated interventions, a procedure for setting up local teams and a procedure for individual teams to select and match the interventions to local circumstances.

Methodology-level headings for describing the design process are mainly listed under the ‘individual interventions’ section below (2.6), but may be applied here too as appropriate.

2.3. Organisational context and working structure of interventions

2.3.1. *Structure* – whether interventions are problem-oriented, a case-based service, a reactive response service (e.g. CCTV) etc. (Strictly an Implementation feature, this may be necessary to complete the picture of the intervention design and describe its context.).

2.3.2. *Significant contributions to intervention mechanisms* from the organisational context – e.g. the ethos on *responsibility* guiding the behaviour of the participants in youth centre, or systems of *reward and punishment*.

2.4. Describing individual interventions – content

Each individual intervention can be described in turn, with common content elements (though not necessarily a common format):

2.4.1. *Aim*: normally expressed in terms of the desired crime prevention, safety or security outcomes.

2.4.2. *Method*: in terms of *practical action*, and the *institutional context* in which it operates (judicial, parajudicial, civil).

2.4.3. *Principles* which the methods are intended to realise: referring to theoretical frameworks such as the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity, and lists or configurations of risk and protective factors.

2.4.4. *Integration*: it may be easier to describe and/or supplement all the above in terms of free text proposing in more detail how both

methods and principles interact with *context* to trigger particular causal *mechanisms* operating at particular *ecological levels* (individual, family, community etc.). Statements such as *the crime prevention outcome [Aim] is to be achieved by [particular principle/s] realised through [particular methods] which are customised to [this context], triggering [specific mechanisms]*.

- 2.5. Describing individual interventions: design process** covering how and why both principles and method were selected, adapted or created to fit the requirement.
- 2.5.1. The *requirements capture* process, especially the role of *evidence* deriving from Intelligence on the crime problem or criminality case, plus contextual information. Implementation and Involvement may impose additional design requirements (for example for efficiency, and for appeal and acceptability to the local community) which may be incorporated here. In evaluations conducted for strategic, theory- or programme-testing purposes, Impact assessment may make its own requirements on the design of interventions, such as a more easily-testable theoretically ‘pure’ intervention rather than one based on a combination of principles.
- 2.5.2. *Idea generation, iterations, pilots and consequent improvements* made; any use of *design techniques*; use of *evidence of What Works* in various forms and sources.
- 2.5.3. Issues of *co-design* with end-users, such as residents: how they participated and what they contributed to the design process.
- 2.5.4. *Risks and tradeoffs* within crime prevention and with other domains of policy or practice: what the choices were and how they needed to be customised to context.
- 2.5.5. *Undesirable ‘system failure’ consequences* including offenders’ adaptive countermeasures such as displacement and offender replacement; and the design responses to those consequences whether these were done in anticipation or as reactive corrections and adjustments.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 13 Implementation

Introduction

The Implementation concept within the initial version of 5Is (e.g. Ekblom, 2002c) comprised a relatively ad-hoc assemblage of headings. To some extent this reflects the inevitable messiness of getting to grips with all the diverse practicalities of the real world. But, as will be seen, it's possible to draw on some more recent 'process' frameworks for implementation to handle the diverse action, and the knowledge of implementation practice, in a more systematic and clearly-defined way. In particular this brings the preventive process and the management process closer together. But in realising this desirable aim, as an Australian review of the management and improvement of preventive practice (AGD, 2004) notes, it is important to ensure the resultant framework remains generic and detached from specific organisational arrangements which may differ markedly from one another (in the Australian case, from State to State). Practically speaking this means any individual programme or organisation adopting 5Is might have to undertake its own process of customising the headings and content. However, the benefits of inter-organisational, inter-programme and inter-jurisdictional exchange of practice knowledge mean this shouldn't go too far.

As further explained below, the scope of 5Is at its current level of development is confined to the implementation of intervention methods, individually or in packages. The running of the organisations that deliver the stream of interventions is here treated as the immediate *implementation context* of those interventions. Obviously there will be much practice knowledge to capture and transfer at that organisational level too (see Cherney's '10Cs', 2008) but, specific examples apart, that's for another book.

Defining Implementation

The product of the main Intervention task stream is the set of finalised *plans and designs of intervention methods*, which realise intervention principles and are intended to activate context-specific preventive mechanisms acting on the causes and risk factors of crime and insecurity. Implementation is about the wider set of practical and managerial tasks through which those intervention plans and designs are converted from a brief (Brown, 2006) into actions and products in the real world.

Implementation has a dual focus: it is both centred on realising specific interventions, and on maintaining the wider organisational capacity to generate and implement those interventions. As just said, the Implementation task of 5Is currently concentrates on the former. Its product is *particular operational preventive actions* in place and working on the ground. It considers the organisational activity, whose

main product is the *succession of operational actions*, as part of the Implementation context.

Implementation must actually address *multiple* contexts. Some are *internal* to the organisation or partnership undertaking the task, as just discussed. Others are *external* in terms of attuning to constraints and requirements imposed by programmes or funding bodies; and exploiting and adapting to the wider practical world.

Implementation and Intervention

Implementation and Intervention actions overlap. In developing the plans and designs for practical intervention methods, the Intervention task of *requirements capture* should already have anticipated and taken account of the context of implementation. For example, a secure bicycle stand should be designed for easy cleaning and not to create a trip hazard; it may have to comply with health and safety standards. And any pilot interventions will already have explored the Implementation domain. All this means it's futile trying to determine exactly when a given activity changes from being an Intervention task to an Implementation task: it may have varying elements of both.

Implementation and Involvement

Consider a campaign to get people to keep an eye on what their teenage children are doing in the town centre. It involves recruiting volunteers to spread the message to the end receivers (parents). Is this Implementation, or Involvement? It's actually both. The same actions can be considered both from the perspective of the concrete tasks that need to be done, and in terms of the business of getting people, other than the professional instigators of the project or service, to undertake those tasks. There may be a *chain* of Implementation and Involvement tasks: one organisation's or individual's task (implementation) may be to mobilise another (involvement).

Knowledge of building and managing such links and chains is an important aspect of crime prevention practice and delivery. Intervention plans and designs may be jointly developed and executed by a partnership: hence Involvement processes like partnership formation may precede, and merge with, Implementation ones. But for describing, replicating and innovating preventive action, it's important to maintain an analytic separation between the Implementation and Involvement functions, and treat them as parallel, interwoven but distinct task streams. (Various users of 5Is have expressed preference for Involvement coming before Implementation in the standard 'linear' 5Is description. But treating these as separate task streams, as I've now proposed, somewhat sidelines the issue. Which comes first will depend on the structure and history of the particular action being described and the requirements of presentation.)

The organisational context for implementing interventions: the concept of capacities

An important aspect of the context of the implementation of individual preventive interventions is that supplied by the organisation undertaking the primary delivery of the action. This could be a police unit, security company or partnership tasked with tackling a particular crime problem; a youth centre providing universal services for local youngsters; or a preventive service targeted on offenders. In each instance a set of common organisational tasks is needed to generate and support the *succession* of preventive actions. The tasks in question range, for example, from recruitment and training to preservation of ethos to literally the housekeeping. (And recall from the last chapter, that even the ethos underlying who gets to do the cleaning in a youth centre may contribute to intervention, so an action description which only focuses on interventions could not ignore these wider aspects of implementation.) We must therefore distinguish between *operations* and *capacities* (Ekblom, 2000; AHRC, 2009), and of course capacity-building and developing activities. One particular aspect of capacity is reflected in the process of undertaking *resource audits* in the course of planning for action.

The language and concepts of Implementation

The implementation field draws on terminology from managerial, organisational and evaluation domains. These can generate confusing inconsistencies so 5Is must establish a convention and define its own basic terms. (The related terminology of evaluation appears in Chapter 15.)

- Aims are purposive; outcomes their factual counterparts. Both refer to the world out there. The *ultimate aim* of preventive action is the desired crime prevention, safety or security *outcome* (e.g. less likelihood of, or harm from, illegal drug dealing). Aims may be expressed as *outcome targets*, whether absolute (reduce dealing by 10 per cent) or relative to trend (by 10 per cent of level projected in absence of intervention). *Intermediate aims* relate to desired changes made in the real world which are causally speaking en route to the ultimate aims. Such changes, or *intermediate outcomes*, could include for example an increase in the proportion of burglary-resistant homes or a drop in childhood risk factors. Of course, the achievement of the intermediate aim doesn't guarantee the ultimate one will be met, especially if it may only be realised some years later via a succession of intervening events and processes.
- The *objectives* of preventive action relate to action rather than to its outcome. They are subsidiary goals intended to realise the aims, whether this realisation is done by the professional crime preventers or by those downstream in the implementation chain. Following the 'smart' concept, objectives can be characterised in terms of quantity, timing, quality and measurability, and they may also be expressed as

targets. For example, the number of homes in which alarms have been installed to a certain standard in a month's operations; or the number of young people leaving a summer camp with measurable changes in attitude to excessive public drinking.

Needless to say, there are complications. The same action, event or state of affairs can be viewed as both aim and objective. For example, the fact that a certain house has been given better locks both meets an output objective (number of houses given locks) and contributes to an intermediate aim (increased proportion of secure houses in locality).

- Processes operate on *inputs* of human, informational, financial and material *resources and assets* to transform them into *outputs*. Objectives, too, come in hierarchies. *Output objectives* will be achieved through the completion of various internal *process objectives* linking means and ends.
- *Feedback loops* have already been implied in describing the iterative nature of the process of intervention design. Such loops are the essence of managerial control and are pervasive in well-conducted and -managed action (see for example Brown, 2006). *Internal* feedback loops in the preventive process cover *monitoring* of inputs, outputs and processes. *External* feedback loops are largely in the domain of Impact evaluation (Chapter 15) but tracking *outcome indicators* (such as yearly crime rates) may help keep a longer-lived project on course to achieve its aims.
- Relating to the outside world, but in a different way – passing to a higher control system for possible action – are what might be called *accountability loops*. Here are included, for example, reporting to higher-level delivery managers or funding bodies on progress and quality at particular intervals or milestones. Again Brown (2006) emphasises the importance of these in management terms and calls for process models like SARA and 5Is to incorporate them. One might extend the concept to include not just retrospective accountability, but (sliding towards Involvement) 'collaborative loops' for *consultation* or *joint decision-making*.
- The feedback loops may serve explicit *quality objectives* linked to *standards* and *benchmarks* for the conduct of internal processes themselves (see Marks et al., 2005; Coester et al., 2008; Youth Justice Board, 2010). An example is whether a survey has met codes of practice on consent. Wider benchmarks cover the definition of *good practice* more generally (see e.g. AGD, 2004). Standards may even cover how well processes and outputs are monitored (e.g. indicators employed are reliable and valid; case paperwork monitored by senior management every 3 months). There may be further knowledge to glean from how a project or service went about *developing* their own good practice definitions and standards. (The AGD study developed and trialled principles for implementation and monitoring of good practice.) Such recursive possibilities are many but a clear and consistent language can help to describe them for users to understand, replicate or modify. There will be occasions when valuable knowledge on, say, quality assurance practices can be transferred. Documenting the difficulty of establishing good quality assurance procedures for a particular kind of intervention method (noting, say, that its outputs

are hard to measure reliably) may mean users will choose alternative methods to replicate. Alternatively, someone might be spurred towards an innovative solution.

- A neglected, but vital concept is that of *continuous improvement*. The AGD study suggested improvement could be undertaken on three levels: interventions, management systems that support intervention, and daily practices of staff who bring the first two levels into action. They advocated an approach where practitioners continually reflect on their practice, in collaboration with consumer groups, management, and funding bodies, to enable a learning-based improvement culture to take root in agencies. This approach, they argue, should *generate* benchmarks rather than merely seek to meet those imposed from outside. But those benchmarks, once generated, can be shared.
- If feedback improves future performance through assessment of past action, *anticipation* offers a complementary kind of guidance. There are two principal management tasks here. *Risk analysis* identifies internal or external possibilities that may jeopardise achievement of aims and objectives (such as key team members resigning, or delay in planning consent for a youth shelter). *Impact analysis* identifies the unexpected and perhaps undesired effects of the organisation's own actions on the rest of the world (such as when bollards installed to prevent ram-raiding of shops, themselves create a trip hazard for elderly pedestrians). Crime prevention is an inherently risky business given it's messing with complex adaptive systems and may need to rely on extended implementation chains. Knowledge of practice in risk and impact analysis is therefore useful. Bowers and Johnson (2006) draw on past instances of implementation failure to develop a framework for practitioners to anticipate and avoid such failures in planning and designing their own action.
- Specialised processes of *budgetary and personnel planning and monitoring* handle specific aspects of anticipation and feedback in obvious and familiar ways. These may interact with the operational cycles, and can interfere with them (e.g. a spending cutoff at the end of the financial year may inappropriately dictate the choice of preventive interventions: see Homel, 2006). Experience of handling these interactions at project- and delivery-level can be captured and conveyed to programme designers for remedy.

The process of undertaking the Implementation task – the significance of management

Like Intervention, Implementation relates to design, ranging from design of guidance booklets on how to do property-marking, to design of quality assurance procedures, to interior design of youth centres. But it also relates to management. The previous section has already drawn on management language, but here the focus is on management *processes*. Management particularly centres on controlling the Implementation task stream, ensuring aims and objectives are adhered to and met, on

time, within budget and to quality standards. But seen from a wider perspective management activities apply to making the entire process from Intelligence to Impact happen. In many cases, but not all, this will be *project* management. As Chapter 2 noted, this domain has been a significant source of implementation failure within crime prevention.

Contributing to the problem have been the usual terminological confusion; poor practitioner training in management skills; and the disconnect between practitioner understandings and those of policy and delivery people (AGD, 2004). But a fundamental and neglected issue, not confined to project work, has been the failure of process models of crime prevention and of management to be fully merged.

In many respects, the preventive process, as described by SARA for example on the problem-oriented side, already has a management dimension in that it seeks to identify and control crime problems to deliver outcomes in the real world. There has, though, been an under-emphasis of the *internal* management process in terms of planning and controlling action in contrast with simply *doing* the expert professional work that is to be managed. (Perhaps this stemmed from the origins of the problem-oriented approach as a reaction to police management practices that were entirely and inappropriately oriented to internal processes like shift allocation and outputs like patrol coverage, rather than to crime problems in the real world (Goldstein, 1990).)

One recent attempt to address this issue has been the publication of a Problem-Oriented Policing guide on *implementing responses to problems* (Brown and Scott, 2007). A more analytic study of the relationship between management and preventive processes, in *project* operations at least, was previously presented by Brown (2006) who introduced the 'dynamic project lifecycle' concept originated within management science by Young (1998). This lifecycle is rich in feedback loops and designed on the realistic assumption that plans must often be changed over the project lifetime. It comprises conception and definition; planning and scheduling; execution; and handover and closure.

5Is already incorporates elements of this process: Intelligence includes the description of project initiation and problem definition; Intervention centres on a planning and design process (there exists an entire sub-discipline of managing the design process, but let's save that for another day). Implementation and Involvement cover execution and management of tasks through people and organisations, and exit strategies. And 5Is as a whole covers the handover of practice knowledge both within and between projects. However, Brown believes both SARA and the initial version of 5Is (Ekblom, 2002c) fail to handle the dynamically-changing nature of project plans, and give insufficient emphasis to planning, monitoring and accountability checks with stakeholders.

These were fair criticisms at the time, and I have sought to redress the balance in this chapter, as Brown and Scott (2007) have subsequently done for SARA. The design challenge for me has been to incorporate generic management concepts and processes within 5Is without losing the distinct crime prevention flavour, and without

specifically imposing a universal ‘project’ model. In the present, updated, version of 5Is, planning, scheduling and monitoring are tasks which can be undertaken in *each* of the main task streams, alongside design. Planning and designing the intervention, for example, focus on the nature of the crime problem, the evidence of what works and what the intervention principles and methods might be. Planning, scheduling and designing the implementation of that intervention will relate to more mundane practical matters such as obtaining property-marking pens, sourcing suitable clothing for outdoor activities for young people and so forth. Doing likewise for Involvement might centre on how to recruit volunteers for youth trips or producing videos containing messages to the parents of misbehaving young people. And of course these internal cycles of planning and execution must mesh with those of outside bodies such as funders and programme delivery managers.

Until recently, problem-oriented approaches to crime prevention have lacked an explicit management framework that embeds them more fully within their host organisation. This reflects the history of the approach as the province of somewhat isolated enthusiasts ingesting the message and applying it as one-off projects; but things are changing. Brown and Scott’s (2007) guide presents practical knowledge of organisational factors necessary to realise such internal support. The UK National Intelligence Model for policing now offers the prospect of a wider managerial and organisational framework for problem-oriented action (see Chapter 8). Youth justice services are increasingly adopting explicit management frameworks, bringing purely local initiatives into national programmes (YJB, 2008; Irish Youth Justice Service, 2009).

Whether the above efforts to merge generic management concepts and processes with the domain-specific crime preventive process are plausible (or even appropriate in principle), readers must make their own judgement and the framework must be tried out in practice. But whatever the outcome, *some* inclusion of management in the knowledge of crime prevention practice is inescapable. This is particularly so where 5Is is to be used as prospective guidance for action; here the lead of Brown and Scott (2007) in the SARA context will be worth following.

Implementation and evidence

It’s fair to say that Implementation activity does not particularly draw on criminological evidence, but there is plenty of scope for using broader evidence on what works to tackle what implementation problem in what context. Such evidence could range from what works best in budgetary control and change management to what works to protect alley-gates from rusting. It may sometimes be appropriate to document the evidentiary basis for adopting a particular implementation method, especially if its application to crime prevention is novel and potentially transferrable.

But Implementation can both generate its *own* evidence on its inputs, processes and outputs, and act on these. Internally this can support design iteration,

managerial monitoring, self-improvement or adaptation to changing circumstances. Externally it can be supplied to delivery managers, policymakers or funders for accountability purposes. As ever, there may be scope for documenting and sharing valid and efficient ways of generating, handling and presenting such evidence.

Implementation methods and mechanisms

Implementation of interventions sometimes requires the application of specific methods of its own, which activate equally specific mechanisms. For example, teaching techniques draw in turn on generic learning mechanisms and people-handling skills; rust-proofing of alley-gates draws on methods and mechanisms of chemistry. One wouldn't expect a treatise on teaching or chemistry in a crime prevention description, unless these mechanisms were especially significant and novel (for example, new psychological or pharmaceutical treatments of impulsivity, or new scratch-resistant coatings for vehicle windows). But flagging up the importance of these practical domains may be appropriate.

The purposes of reporting Implementation in action descriptions

Much of the information that can be recorded about Implementation covers managerial processes: objective-setting and progress-monitoring, due diligence, financial control and human resource management. Here, documentation can serve two purposes. On the one hand, such documentation is an inherent part of the management and accountability processes as noted under the 'evidence' section above, serving both prospective planning functions, ongoing monitoring and retrospective accountability and review. On the other, the same material is potentially a rich source of practice knowledge, whether practice of doing the interventions in a given organisational context, or practice of management itself (such as new ways of quality-assuring installed security products or mentoring activities).

This dimension may need to be brought out explicitly, as for example in the documentation of *improvement* plans, actions and achievements required by the Youth Justice Board (2010). Selection of preventive methods to replicate can't just be based on the intervention and whether it works, but on how effectively the intervention can be managed such that it can *reliably be expected to deliver* whilst avoiding major risks (Bowers and Johnson, 2006 make a similar point). This knowledge is also relevant for higher-level delivery managers and designers of programmes but is rarely found in systematic reviews of What Works.

Information on Implementation also covers key generic parameters like costs and necessary staff competencies, again vital for selection of preventive action to emulate as well as for practical planning of replication. But documentation of Implementation must capture quite action-specific information on what to criminologists may seem boring, bread-and-butter details. Examples include how to obtain insurance for outdoor youth activities (such as off-road motorcycling or fishing

trips), and what practical risks to avoid (e.g. when taking a busload of ‘deprived’ youngsters fishing, *don’t* stop to let them buy lunch from a village store). Addressing such issues can make an immense difference to the success of projects and services, not to mention the reputation of the delivering organisations. They are at the heart of successful replication: even the most brilliantly-designed intervention method can fall flat on its face if, as it were, nobody had thought to tie its shoelaces.

The structure and content of descriptions of Implementation

The description of the implementation of particular interventions must show how the product of the Intervention task – the plans and designs for intervention methods and packages – is transformed into the product of Implementation – operations on the ground. This must equally apply to, say, installation of secure bike stands, inauguration of a conflict-resolution service or establishing an educational/treatment course for drink-drivers. It must also show how the internal and external *implementation contexts* contribute necessary resources, guidance, constraints and so forth, including management and accountability requirements.

Attempting to replicate operational action in an entirely different management context may encounter significant difficulties (AGD, 2004). Action-descriptions meant to transfer knowledge between such organisations and programmes must therefore document or refer to the context; ideally, too, assess its enabling and constraining influence. This is especially important in transfers between institutional settings, or countries.

The main *analytic* division of knowledge is between the *operational implementation* of individual interventions; and the *context* of that activity, both within and beyond the primary delivery organisation, which drives, supports and constrains the succession of interventions. (For brevity, reference to individual interventions henceforth includes integrated packages of multiple methods.) In practice, these aren’t watertight compartments. There will obviously be some overlap between method-centred management and organisation-centred management; and some topics, like risk management, apply to both levels. In writing a description of implementation it’s again a matter of building that description around the structure that exists on the ground, rather than trying to impose a strict format, but using consistent terminology and indicating which level one is describing at any given point.

In practical terms the extent to which the internal, organisational part of the implementation context should be stated in every description of individual interventions will depend on what’s already in the knowledge base. One might envisage a generic account of an organisation or programme combined with successive individual accounts of interventions each briefly mentioning that context; or, if the organisation itself is a new venture generating just a few inaugural interventions, a single account giving equal room to context and interventions.

The content of Implementation

The ideas on Implementation have evolved somewhat during the course of writing this book. This means the availability of existing 5Is illustrations is somewhat limited.

The institutional and organisational contexts

For orientation purposes it's important, probably early in the description of Implementation, to briefly describe the institutional and organisational contexts of the action. Clearly any recent or current *changes* in these contexts would be important to document here.

The broad *institutional settings* used in 5Is are *Civil, Judicial* and *Parajudicial*, as defined in Chapter 8. Descriptions will need to refer to these as well as to the particularities of specific institutions (such as the police, local government or the third sector). They will also need to identify appropriate 'practice models' of the institutions, such as being in the context of problem-oriented policing, restorative justice or diverting young offenders from the Criminal Justice System. In many cases there will be partnerships or referral arrangements across the main institutional divides and much specific practice knowledge will cover the handling of transfers and sharing of problems, offenders and staff between them.

Organisationally, at this point one would want to know whether the final delivery unit (project or service, see below) was a stand-alone entity; a team embedded within a single local organisation such as local government; a problem-or service-dedicated partnership; or part of a national organisation such as one delivering youth justice. It would also help to know whether the delivery unit, or the intervention methods it was delivering, were part of a formal programme. Basic practical information on who has budgetary control etc. would be useful too.

Infrastructure

In the background of any project is a local, regional or national **infrastructure** of resources and support such as training, guidance, funding and operational information systems. The infrastructure may be strong or weak; but it's important to know what level of outside support a project was able to rely on. There is no point, for example, in a country with limited infrastructure trying to replicate a project which only works in well-prepared and fertilised ground, unless they can pay for these basics too.

Mode of delivery: project or service

An important distinction is between preventive action organised in terms of one-off *projects*, tackling some emergent *problem*, and a more routinised *service*, organised

around a succession of *cases*. As said, either mode can evolve into the other – for example, a project which uncovers a repeat-victimisation problem can transform into a service for repeat victims. It could also *incorporate* the other – where dealing with the case of a problem youth, say, reveals more systemic local causes of offending which are then addressed as a one-off project. There may also be knowledge worth recording about the *balance* between the two modes (e.g. how the welfare of individual offenders and victims should be balanced against the wider interest of the community in efficient and effective crime control), and the *transition* process between them.

The ‘cycles within cycles’ of cases within services or perhaps within projects is a feature of preventive action that descriptions of that action will have to accommodate. No fixed-format checklists could handle this important natural complexity; but using standard terminology this could be done in a systematic and retrievable way in free text.

Targeting

Targeting of action (as opposed to target-*setting*) has several aspects worth documenting.

- The *problem, behaviour or condition tackled* is already specified in the *aim* of the action – e.g. street robbery, joyriders, fear. The *scope* of the aim can be wide (all property crime in the industrial estate) or narrow (theft of baggage whilst on airport conveyors) and (as stated in Chapter 11) can be defined using CCO components such as ‘enclosures’.
- The *ecological level* of action, identified under Intervention: individual people or places, families, peer groups, communities etc. who are to receive the action.
- The *targeting strategy*. Following recent health terminology (Mrazek and Haggerty, 1994; Wilson and Lipsey, 2007) terminology, targeting can centre on issues of *risk*; this includes risk and protective factors but is not confined to them, and can also be based on known causes, emergent crime patterns or needs.
 - *Universal targeting*: focusing on the general population as potential offenders, treating all environments as potential scenes of crime, or all people and material goods as potential targets of crime.
 - *Selective targeting*: focusing on people at particular risk of offending, on targets at risk of theft, or on places likely to set the scene for crime.
 - *Indicated targeting*: focusing on people already convicted, manifesting troublesome behaviour or victimised, or on targets and scenes of existing crime. This links to the concepts of *repeat victimisation*, *repeat or persistent offending*, and geographical *hot-spots*.

The basis of any selection or indication should be stated, as here. Note this framework replaces the equivalent terms ‘primary, secondary and tertiary’ prevention as discussed in Chapter 8.

The targeting can apply to entities at any of the ecological levels. A complete statement of the targeting strategy would include all this information so one might have, for example, a) *universal* targeting of b) *individual* c) *young people*, or a) *selective* targeting of b) *communities* c) on basis of *causes* of crime (e.g. an increase in drug use in the neighbourhood).

- The *coverage* – the proportion of an area’s crime problems, human or material targets at risk of being attacked or offenders that the action aspires to tackle (for example, it may be targeted (indicated) on already-burgled homes; these may comprise only five percent of the area’s homes but 40 per cent of the incidents).

Issues in targeting for which cautionary notes should be sounded (and useful ways of coping documented) may include familiar ones of stigmatisation, net-widening or fairness of who receives the intervention.

An example of targeting modified from the Moonshine description follows. This shows how targeting of the implementation can be described as a *profile* of different people and entities in question.

Targeting of the implementation

<i>Offenders</i>	Juveniles, of either sex aged 12 to 18 from the surrounding area (<i>selected, indicated</i>)
<i>Crime preventers</i>	Local police unit and Community wardens (<i>indicated</i>)
<i>Location</i>	Community facilities - including specific shops, a school and community centre (<i>indicated</i>)
<i>Targets</i>	Food and alcohol was stolen (<i>indicated</i>)

An alternative way of documenting targeting was in the Stirchley burglary project:

In Stirchley, targeting was *indicated* and focused on *situations* – aiming at known burglary *hotspots*. In terms of ecological levels, the intervention methods were directed at all *residents* within a *specific geographical area*, to tackle causes of crime acting mainly at *geographical area-level*. (This in fact evolved into implementation and involvement at the *community-level*, given the collective nature of the intervention and the [desired] outcome.)

Tailoring

Related to targeting is tailoring – ways in which generic interventions are tailored, for example to individuals or to communities intervened in. An example of the former is the ‘Scaled Approach’ of the UK Youth Justice Board;⁴¹ of the latter, Communities That Care.⁴² Communities, of course, as well as being the *subject* of intervention, also serve as the *context* to which interventions must be customised.

Lifecycle/s of action

Sometimes a *project* is established to tackle a specific emergent problem, and closes down when that problem is successfully solved. Alternatively, a project may be one of a succession of similar activities. A *service* will have individual cases each with its own lifecycle, and the service itself will have been inaugurated and perhaps brought to a close.

It may be therefore be appropriate to describe more than one cycle; but a common terminology can apply to each:

- Initiation (also discussed under Intelligence)
- Execution (including conception and definition; planning and scheduling in Brown and Scott's (2007) terms)
- Exit (including handover and closure)

Initiation of a project may come for example from stakeholder demand, analysis of crime patterns, or anticipation of some impending problem, as described under Intelligence. Initiation of a *service* may also come from these, or analysis of need, or from transformation of a project into routine. Initiation of a case within a service may come from referral and intake from other agencies (e.g. of offenders or victims), outreach or self-referral (e.g. someone sees a poster for a mentoring service or seeks crime prevention advice). Initiation will include setting of aims, objectives and targets, whether these are ultimate or intermediate, and whether they relate only to the subsidiary cycle of action.

The Trident Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Programme (TISSP) had a highly-structured and well-documented initiation process for referrals:

TISSP uses the YOT [Youth Offending Team] information system, individual assessment pro-forma and police intelligence to identify repeat active offenders. TISSP is pro-active at the remand stage to offer programmes as part of a bail supervision package in order to reduce the incidence of offending on bail and to ensure attendance for Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) appointments and at court. TISSP staff liaise closely with YOT PSR writers, including attendance at PSR appointments for those in the target group. TISSP has a protocol with Wetherby Young Offenders Institution to ensure contact and involvement with TISSP target offenders on Detention and Training Orders (Adamson, 2004:4).

Basic execution processes are described below, but as Brown (2006) makes clear, there may well be significant changes of direction to be documented. This was recorded within Moonshine thus:

Lessons learned during Implementation

Adaptability – coping with limited sustainability of impact. It was estimated based on past experience that the interventions planned would only be

effective for 3-5 years. Those involved therefore had to continually re-assess alternatives to sustain the project. Diminishing effectiveness of interventions stemmed from the cyclic nature of fashionable activities for youths (for example youth clubs were cited as being initially popular, then the popularity tailed off). Thus a certain element of the project was to estimate future youth interests and adapt the project accordingly.

Exit could include closure, continuation, handover to other partners, or mainstream replication (Brown and Scott, 2007). Project Moonshine actually made provision for the action to be *revived* should the drink/disorder problem flare up again, itself a useful nugget of practice knowledge.

Plans for expansion and/or exit

An exit strategy outlining the specific roles and responsibilities of each partnership member was drawn up to allow the actions and capacity to respond to persist when the project team had relinquished direct control over the project. The project team would continue retain the role of monitoring the ASB crime and incidents in Valley Park and would offer advice to the residual steering group should problems re-emerge.

The basic execution process of Implementation

The main sequence of Implementation action can be described simply in terms of *input*, *process* and *output*. It is also useful to document, under this heading, any practical obstacles and facilitators that the intervention may have encountered during execution, and any useful solutions devised.

Inputs into implementation comprise funds and in-kind supplies, effort, human resources and capacity-building specific to particular intervention methods, like the supply of equipment and training. It may also be helpful to document whether the inputs are funded through *running costs* (including salaries and maintenance) or *fixed/capital costs* (equipment). The *sources* of the inputs (funds from a charitable organisation, academic expertise from a university or local volunteers) will usually be useful knowledge for selection and replication considerations. The nature and extent of available *infrastructure* (e.g. in terms of supply of training, equipment and premises, access to information streams) is hugely important for the viability of attempted replication. *Funders* commonly supply infrastructural support, whilst imposing constraints on the scope and nature of operations; *academics* will usually boost the level of theoretical and methodological knowledge applied within the action to a level which may not be sustainable in mainstreamed replication; and reliance on *volunteers*, while expanding capacity, may limit what's possible or make operations precarious.

Inputs into project Moonshine

There were no **running costs** stipulated from the project. Most costs were absorbed into routine costs – such as the residents' association newsletter and

local newspapers' coverage of the project. One of the only running costs mentioned was the purchase of the spray paint to cover abusive graffiti, paid for by the officer concerned.

Capital costs were mainly funding the purchase and installation of the youth shelter. This came from a budget of £48,000 awarded by the Government Office for the South-East.

In terms of **human resources**, community wardens dedicated time to engage with the public and clean up the environment. The public's time was voluntary. High visibility policing monopolised time spent on routine daily patrols and generated overtime dealing with ASB on the streets. Time spent on co-ordination by the civilian crime reduction officer was absorbed into normal daily workload.

Process issues appeared in this description of a mentoring service in Leicester (Home Office, 2002a):

- Having been referred to the project the aim was to set up a '*catalytic cell*' of three, involving a professional mentor, a student/peer mentor and the mentee.
- Meetings between the student/peer mentor and mentee were more frequent than the professional mentor/mentee due to comparative numbers and time resources. This was a way of extending the scarce resources of the professional mentor.
- Mentors were placed on a standard *induction and training programme* to explain amongst other things the role of the mentor, aims of project, youth offending team operation, skills in objective action-planning and target-setting for mentees.
- Mentees could choose mentors with whom they felt most comfortable. It was hoped this would improve completion rate, increase enthusiasm to participate, and aid social development. This was implemented at the start of the programme. Matching was deliberately not done on the basis of ethnicity.

Likewise, the Intensive Supervision project described the process of identifying the *needs* of the referred offenders and how these were addressed.

TISSP draws up a programme to address the identified needs, taking account of what is required by the court, what is proposed by TISSP and what the young person wants to achieve. A formal written contract is drawn up incorporating the programme content and breach arrangements and is signed by the young person and parents or guardian. The programme is then regularly reviewed and evaluated. The programme includes one to one sessions and accessing services

which the young person wants or the programme thinks would benefit him...
(Adamson, 2004: 5)

Output documentation is straightforward. Moonshine illustrates this, although without reference to any quality standards or quantification.

Outputs achieved

The following outputs were achieved:

- Modification of the environment (removal of a flowerbed and insertion of bollards) adjacent to a parade of shops.
- Augmentation and installation of facilities for youths at a local leisure centre.
- Provision of a range of health and educational services by the youth service.
- Installation of a youth shelter.
- Designated area of a wood for use as a gathering spot for youths.
- A mobile recreational unit for supplying diversionary activities for youths.
- Reinforced security measures in a local shop identified as a target for theft of goods.

Practical issues and solutions allows for recording any problems arising during Implementation, as in Moonshine:

Practical issues in implementation

Certain complications with rolling out interventions stemmed from borough boundary lines and subsequent confusion over which council was responsible and which police station a crime or incident should be reported to. This was largely solved by police officers using bikes – face-to-face reporting in the street bypassed the potential confusion over which police station the informer should report to. Bikes were also advantageous as officers could remain mobile, access places not available to vehicles, and it was easier for the members of the public to approach them (it was harder for the public to stop a police car to report an incident). Bikes also served to help engage with those residents who were not involved with committee meetings.

The number and variety of such issues which surface and must be addressed is enormous. The Irish youth centres visited revealed a long list of issues and some locally-developed solutions, all of which comprised knowledge worth capturing and

sharing. Here's a sample, ranging from implementation of individual intervention activities to implementation at organisational level, to wider contextual issues:

- Knowledge of how to monitor/demonstrate compliance with conditions set by insurers for outdoor activities (e.g. on procedure for getting bikes/horses safely across road).
- Mood control: a practice of deliberate, measured let-down after exciting activities.
- Mood assessment of young people before class: have newspapers etc. available in relaxing social conditions so youths can be observed on arrival in the morning and then handled/assigned accordingly.
- Knowledge of how to defuse awkward situations between various parties.
- Continual checking whether tutors buy into the values and philosophy of the centre, and developing ways of giving constructive feedback about this.
- Deliberate delegation and distribution of leadership tasks among the staff, to maintain a corporate memory resilient to individual staff departures.
- Avoiding adverse impact of noise from children leaving the youth centre, by locating new premises at a shopping centre.
- Development of collective reporting process so a local centre doesn't have to fill in large numbers of slightly different accountability forms, at different times of year, for diverse partners and funders.
- Practices and principles for maintaining or resuming contact with members returning from a spell in prison.

Likewise, the Intensive Supervision programme in Bradford had an issue with premises ranging from the purely practical to the quite fundamental, and developed a range of transferrable solutions:

...a problem was identified in the location of a project dealing with offenders on premises where other activities such as those for children are also run and the necessity of balancing protection of the public with benefit to the offenders. This was resolved in a move to other YMCA premises within the Trident area where the TISSP has much more spacious accommodation with a separate push button security controlled entry to the rest of the premises. One result has been a significant increase in clients popping in whereas before visits had to be by arranged appointment and often workers had to go elsewhere to meet clients. Now clients are able to do work at the project without a worker necessarily in attendance. (Adamson, 2004: 6.)

One can almost palpably feel the scope, and the benefit from a growing searchable tree or web of knowledge on these and many more issues of practice and principle, perhaps constructed and collectively developed by some combination of peer-based interest groups (e.g. via a topic-based blog or wiki), and maybe moderated

through knowledge-harvesters. Perhaps, even, the development and application of some middle-range theory variously on mood, conflict or cultural transmission.

In Chapter 16, an approach to *process evaluation* is set out which suggests the identification of successes and failures, and behind these the enablers and constraints, in executing every one of the 5Is tasks. This means that in effect the ‘practical issues and solutions’ heading above can be repeated throughout the preventive process.

Management, planning and organisational issues

Management proceeds via organised, purposeful activities for planning, executing and controlling action. Descriptions of these activities may apply to each individual intervention method and/or to an entire package of methods as appropriate; they will also shade into the management of the delivery organisation as a whole.

- *Setting of aims and objectives* – these were defined in the introduction to this chapter, the former relating to desired changes in the real world, the latter to actions intended to achieve the aims. Both can sometimes be expressed in terms of numerical *targets*.
- *Development, building and maintenance of capacity* will include *recruitment, training and retention of staff, development and maintenance of staff knowledge and ethos, and acquisition and maintenance of non-human assets*.
- *Scheduling, progress monitoring and quality assurance of operations*, undertaken as good management practice, will need to be *documented* for account-giving purposes. In terms of knowledge transfer such documentation should additionally enable knowledge-base users to judge whether a preventive method is worth replicating; and, for improvement purposes, to report on transferrable better practice in doing the monitoring and assessing the quality themselves. Even the quality standards developed in a project may be useful to practitioners and delivery managers elsewhere. The Leicester mentoring project illustrates a description of monitoring:

Monitoring, quality assuring and adjustments made to the implementation

The ongoing process with mentoring was measured through verbal and written feedback from the mentors plus keeping a close watch on drop out rate and any information on re-offending whilst on the project.

- *Risk management* is a necessary process in the complex and people-dependent world of crime prevention, as underlined by the evidence of systematic implementation failure documented in previous chapters. As well as failing to meet crime reduction, safety or security aims any failures will affect reputation and

partnership relations. Risks to the proposed or ongoing intervention may of course come from *within* the project or service (such as key staff departing), or from *outside* (a youth centre evicted from its premises). The two examples concerned risks to human and physical *assets*, but other risks can relate, say, to *processes*: for example, where new regulations cause difficulties in data-sharing between organisations. Risks *from* the intervention can be assessed in some kind of *crime prevention impact analysis* (for example whether concentrating young people around a youth shelter may cause problems to nearby residents or shops).⁴³

No formal risk assessments appeared to have been undertaken in planning the Moonshine interventions, but (as Chapter 12 reported) the team were alert to a range of risks to the effectiveness of the individual intervention methods, devising counter-countermeasures to the offenders' likely reactions. They also anticipated, and prepared themselves to handle, issues of 'nimby' reactions to proposals such as the youth shelter.

Although risk management is listed here under Implementation, it will of course cover the entire preventive process from Intelligence to Impact. Much of the risk to be assessed and managed will come under Involvement (failing to get particular people or agencies to undertake particular tasks, or failing to establish a supportive climate for intervention). Indeed, 5Is itself can be used as a framework at the project- or service-planning stage for assessing risk, as will be described in Chapter 16.

- *Change management and wider issues of adaptive capacity* may or may not have any distinctively crime-related aspects but may be worth documenting for accountability and explanation of (good or bad) performance, and perhaps for any transferrable practice.
- *Structures of internal management* itself are usually worth describing as they may play a key role in determining success or failure of projects or services. They are part of the *context of replication* of individual intervention methods, and part of the *body to be replicated* of entire project-or service-delivery organisations. If outside stakeholders are included in management structures there may be an Involvement element, as in Moonshine:

Strategic and tactical co-ordination and monitoring of performance

A steering group to tackle ASB emerged in response to concerns raised by the public after the problem of ASB grew. The group involved relevant agencies (police, youth service etc) and residents. Its meetings monitored progress on the reduction of ASB (covering both crime and CADA incidents). Decisions on appropriate courses of action were determined, based on intelligence gathered on the nature of the crime problem and possible displacement effects of the interventions.

- *Structures of external management* shade from the local (e.g. the department within which a crime reduction project is run), to the programme level (such as is run by national governments such as the Youth Justice Board, or organisations like Communities That Care). If the project or service is part of a wider programme then it will be important to document significant contextual issues and in particular any beneficial and harmful interactions between these (AGD, 2004; Homel, 2006). As said, *transitions from pilot to mainstream operations* may bring problems, tradeoffs and solutions worth recording (Ekblom, 2002a; Brown, 2006).

To the extent that communities and elected representatives are involved then it becomes important to document the *governance* context and governance issues, for example how ‘community leaders’ were identified and brought into the decision-making process, or how consultation over priorities was undertaken.

Implementation: master-list of headings

The following suggested headings at Map- and Methodology-level reflect both the example descriptions and the discussion above.

3. Implementation

The content is to be structured and flagged to reflect and identify the particular arrangements for action. For example, some entries will cover implementation of individual preventive methods, others the project or service organisation as a whole.

3.1. The institutional and organisational contexts

- 3.1.1. *Institutional settings*: civil, judicial and parajudicial, and any specifics (e.g. ‘diversion of offenders from CJS’) or cross-setting combinations (e.g. ‘court makes referrals of offenders to civil youth centre’).
- 3.1.2. *Organisational arrangements*: whether project or service is stand-alone, embedded in a particular organisation etc; whether action is part of a programme.
- 3.1.3. Important recent or current *transitions* in institutional or organisational context.
- 3.1.4. *Infrastructure*: training, guidance, data systems and so forth.

3.2. Mode of delivery – in particular, whether the action is a *project* (generally focusing on a specific crime or safety problem), *service* (generally dealing with a succession of individual cases) or *capacity-building* only (such as training). Issues of balance or transition between the modes. Free text

descriptions will be needed of processes whereby projects become routine services or services generate projects.

3.3. Targeting (target-*setting* is under 3.7.1)

3.3.1. The *problem, behaviour or condition tackled* is described within the *aim* (stated under Intelligence at 1.8).

3.3.2. The *ecological level* of action e.g. whether it acts on individual people/places, families, communities.

3.3.3. The *targeting strategy*, focusing on

- the *basis of selection* including risk & protective factors, known causes, risk patterns (of people, hot-spots etc), or needs; and
- the *principle of selection* – *Universal, Selective* (e.g. at risk) or *Indicated* (e.g. convicted offenders, repeat victims).

3.3.4. The *coverage*: proportion of the total potential targets, that actually receive the intended intervention.

3.3.5. Targeting issues e.g. net-widening and any efforts to avoid it.

3.4. Tailoring

3.4.1. Ways in which generic interventions are tailored, for example to individuals or to communities.

3.5. Lifecycle/s of action: may cover individual intervention case, or entire life history project or service, as appropriate.

3.5.1. *Describe initiation* (linking to 1.2 under Intelligence), *execution* (including conception and definition; planning and scheduling) and *exit* (including handover and closure).

3.6. The basic execution process: planned and achieved

3.6.1. *Inputs*: running costs, capital costs, human resources, both dedicated and from *infrastructure*. Sources, constraints imposed and support offered as part of context.

3.6.2. *Process*

3.6.3. *Outputs*

3.6.4. *Practical implementation issues and solutions*

3.7. Management, planning and organisational issues: for individual interventions and/or for project/service level as appropriate

- 3.7.1. *Setting of aims and objectives, including numerical targets: content, and how it was done*
- 3.7.2. *Development, building and maintenance of human, material and informational capacity*
- 3.7.3. *Scheduling, progress monitoring and quality assurance of operations*
- 3.7.4. *Risk management*
- 3.7.5. *Structures of internal management*
- 3.7.6. *Structures of external management*
- 3.7.7. *Change management and wider issues of adaptive capacity*

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 14 Involvement

Introduction

Few crime prevention interventions are directly put in place and even fewer operated by the professional preventers that design them – these tasks are often done by other people and agencies. Involvement is therefore a major aspect of the context of crime prevention interventions, Involvement activity a major proportion of the work of practitioners. Involvement *failure* is often behind overall implementation failure. Therefore it's important to distinguish Involvement as a separate concept from Implementation in general. We must also develop a knowledge structure to capture the potentially huge amount of good practice of Involvement to be replicated, developed and adapted to context, and bad practice to be avoided.

Defining Involvement

Criminal Justice is about accurately pinning *moral blame* on *offenders* (then fairly punishing them). Although justice provides for various 'accessory roles' in crime, crime prevention embraces far wider perspectives on the role of other people in *causing* crime. These causes can operate through people's presence or absence, their action or inaction, their capability or lack of it and, up to a point, whether or not they collectively define an act as a crime. This view of causation is not a purely scientific and detached one: it is accompanied by a whole spectrum of *moral responsibility* ranging from civil to criminal. Thus people's causal implication can be *innocent* – a pedestrian crossing the pavement momentarily causes another to halt, allowing a quick-witted pickpocket to strike. It can be *careless*, as with a tourist's backpack left unzipped to reveal their camera; *deliberate*, as with provoking a fight. It can be *immediate*, as in these examples; *remote*, as with early upbringing by parents; *diffuse*, as in the evolution of a financial system which facilitates fraud; *shared* – many individuals and agencies jointly failed to stop the maltreatment of the child.

The prevention of crime and enhancement of security and community safety must venture way beyond the offender and the offence, to influence *civil* world causes: everyday behaviour, routines and responsibilities; family life, schooling and leisure; and public services, industry and commerce. Professional crime preventers like the police, local government officials and youth justice teams cannot, for practical and governance reasons, directly manipulate the causes in these spheres: most crime prevention interventions must be delivered via influencing other people and agencies. The major task for professional crime prevention practitioners is therefore to *get other people and agencies to understand, accept, and undertake, the tasks, roles and responsibilities of implementing preventive interventions, or*

otherwise share or support them. This is Involvement. As said in the previous chapter, it's appropriate to view Involvement and Implementation as two intertwined streams – the one people-focused, the other task-focused.

This perspective on Involvement is clearly within the 'administrative' tradition. But involving other people and influencing the civil world generally means *politics*, with arguments over who's responsible, who's to blame, what are the priorities and what's to be done; and the triggering of broader social challenges in which prevention may have to confront and contest vested interests (Sutton, 1996). Here it's worth recalling (Chapter 7) that 5Is has a purely pragmatic interest in politics: how the political issues that frequently arise within crime prevention are handled, and how the knowledge of the issues and their handling can then be transferred. Each organisation delivering prevention draws a different line between the pragmatic and the political (for example, whether elected representatives are engaged in operational decisions) so the applicable knowledge will differ.

Politics apart, we're dealing with human interaction, so things get complicated. Pawson (2006) describes the challenge of achieving, and understanding, programme delivery via implementation chains. Studies of knowledge transfer in medical practice (Davidoff et al., 2008) note similar issues which must be systematically described in reports of treatment trials in the field, where the social and psychological context of diagnosing, prescribing, taking and responding to a medicine, say, all significantly affect whether treatments successful in the laboratory are deliverable and work in practice.

The aim in this chapter, as always, is to provide some structure to tame this natural complexity without obliterating it. As an anchor-point, we start with the basics of the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity.

We've already seen (Chapter 9) how CCO includes two sets of agents besides the offender – *preventers and promoters* – who are causally implicated in whether or not crimes happen. They are the elemental players in Involvement. In CCO, these two roles are taken by the agents already present in potential crime situations (or significantly missing from them, such as those ever-absent capable guardians); or by people otherwise intimately connected with elements of the conjunction (the parents of the offender, say, or the designer of a 'hot product' like a personal music player).

Switching to 5Is, Involvement supplements this sharply-focused and narrowly-circumscribed *causal* picture with a much broader view of the *practical process of exercising influence* upon, and with, those immediate preventers and promoters in their turn. It relates not just to the parts they play in crime, but to their other roles in society, and how these roles interrelate (a housing landlord, for example, could be preventer, promoter, offender and even victim). Recall, too, the distinction (Chapter 9) between 'native' preventers, operating at the 'business end' of implementation chains, and directly within CCO; and professional 'preventive practitioners' at the initiating end. Forming intermediate links of the chain, other preventers may be professionals in another sphere (such as education or

architecture), communities, or private individuals and groups. (Professional *promoters* do exist to facilitate and encourage crime, such as fences for stolen goods, drug barons or trainers of terrorists.)

As noted in Chapter 9, the Crime Triangle, CCO's more limited counterpart, has been extended by an outer layer of roles causally influencing, and potentially responsible for, the inner elements. Guardians protect targets, handlers control offenders, and managers places. The thinking is further developed by Felson (1995). Consistent with the ethos of Problem-Oriented Policing, this offers an effective guide to help busy police to rapidly start thinking about the roles of causal agents and the processes of Involvement. But as with all such heuristics it remains inflexible and limiting given the complexities of real life. POP guides such as Scott and Goldstein (2005) on 'shifting and sharing responsibilities' have started addressing this issue but largely as seen from within the police, and in an ad-hoc manner without benefit of a more sophisticated conceptual structure to handle the riches of practice knowledge. As will be seen, 5Is offers ways of handling these complexities more generically and subtly.

Processes of Involvement

It's time to develop the promised knowledge structure by differentiating the concept of Involvement further. An important dimension is *direction* of Involvement. *Outgoing* Involvement is influence exerted by crime prevention practitioners on others; *incoming* is the converse. Adding to this is the question of whether the influence is all *one way*, or *bidirectional*. Bidirectionality is not just all-or-nothing: it's important also to consider the degree of *symmetry* in power and influence between the parties doing the involving and being involved. Finally, we can distinguish between *direct* influence beamed straight from preventive practitioners to the targeted native preventers and promoters, and *indirect*, where the influence is achieved via yet other parties in an implementation chain. Taken together these distinctions give the following meaningful permutations:

- *One-way, outgoing* Involvement is here called *mobilisation*. Professional preventers invite, persuade or sometimes order others to take positive preventive action or to desist from activities which promote crime. The 'others' in question may not always respond passively to this influence. Scott and Goldstein (2005) note the ability of powerful companies or agencies to deflect responsibility for crime prevention that the police may seek to impose on them. In practical terms, the best agents are those requiring only a slight nudge of influence, or only a small tweak of current competencies. As Brown and Scott suggest, 'Responses are more likely to be implemented if the people and organizations tasked with implementation feel they are competent to carry out the activity, one that fits their conception of what they or their organization should be doing.' (2007: 7) Forcible mobilisation, through coercive pressure or lavish reward, is unlikely to succeed for long save in exceptional circumstances. Whatever the case, the

bestowing of responsibility for tackling a crime problem is not always a one-sided affair: negotiation may occur between crime prevention practitioners and those they seek to mobilise. This, too, is an important mini-domain of practice knowledge.

- Mobilisation can also apply to potential or actual *offenders*. In the world of youth crime prevention, for example, *outreach* actions to recruit young people to youth centres are intended to mobilise offenders to collaborate with youth centre staff as co-preventers of their own crimes. (By supplying positive role models, deploying outreach worker scan contribute to the *Intervention* as well as being a method of Involvement, illustrating again the subtle and complex nature of preventive action.) Older offenders, too, can be encouraged to join anger- or alcohol-management classes; and similar recruitment may happen with attempts to reduce drug addiction and the crime it generates.
- One form of *two-way or multi-way* Involvement is *partnership*. The partnership may be broadly symmetrical, or in practice dominated by the power, funds and agenda of one member like the police or local government. A definition adopted by a Council of Europe expert committee fits well with 5Is (actually, I did help draft it: Ekblom, 2004b). This sees partnership as a way of enhancing performance in the delivery of a common goal, by the taking of joint responsibility and the pooling of resources by different agents, whether public or private, collective or individual. A partnership may serve crime prevention or another aim.
- An asymmetric form of two-way Involvement is *consultation*. Here, the incoming influence is circumscribed.
- In countries such as USA, the boot may be on the other foot. Referenda may be taken within the local democratic process to mandate some anti-crime action (usually in a judicial context) which the preventive practitioners are then obliged to adopt. This is an extreme example of incoming stakeholder *demand*.
- Another incoming influence is *recruitment*, where crime prevention practitioners are themselves mobilised or taken on as partners, supporting some wider aim like urban renewal.
- A final incoming influence to be heeded is *accountability* to funders, government or elected representatives.
- Returning to outgoing influence, this time indirect, we have already noted the existence of *implementation chains* leading ultimately to preventers and promoters in the CCO.
- While implementation chains focus on a specific set of tasks or roles, a more diffuse indirect influence on potential preventers and promoters and wider interested parties is that of *climate setting*. This activity comprises several tasks:

- *explaining or justifying actions* which may go beyond traditionally-accepted bounds and may be in tension with other norms such as privacy;
 - *shifting underlying assumptions* (for example about who, beyond the immediate culpability of criminals, is responsible for a crime problem);
 - *changing expectations* about who can and should be doing something about the crime problem in question (for example, getting the public, politicians and media to expect better security from vehicle manufacturers and designers);
 - *aligning stakeholders and dutyholders*: getting them to support one another's goals and understand their constraints, and generally marshalling support; and
 - *healing hostile or suspicious relationships* between, say, communities and the police which are blocking specific collaborations to prevent crime.
- A final diffuse and indirect influence is via fostering *social cohesion* and *collective efficacy*. In Involvement terms this is about *building collaborative capacity* within a community, so that community and its members are prepared to be collectively mobilised, to be consulted or to act as partners when specific crime and safety issues arise and need responses.

This elaboration gives us the language and concepts to articulate and organise knowledge of Involvement. Most preventive projects or services include a blend of these tasks, and the individual actions to be undertaken may each serve more than one purpose.

The process of undertaking Involvement

Involvement and Implementation together take as *input* the plans and designs of Intervention, and make them happen. Involvement concentrates on the people side. This could mean influencing native preventers or promoters *directly* (e.g. by 'keep an eye on your child' campaigns). Alternatively, the influence could be indirect, via influencing other agents in turn (such as persuading footballers to deliver anti-racist messages to supporters). The joint *product* of Involvement and Implementation is, again, a series of concrete actions on the ground leading ultimately to the delivery of intervention methods and thereby the activation of intervention mechanisms.

In some circumstances, however, the output is not the *solution of a problem or completion of a case* but *referral* of responsibility to another agency or partnership. The commonest instance of this 'gateway' process is where offenders are passed to the Criminal Justice System for prosecution and punishment and/or judicially-sanctioned treatments. In other cases, more strategic Involvement actions (as with improving social cohesion or police-public relations) don't lead directly to the implementation of

operational crime prevention interventions, but create the climate and conditions wherein those interventions can be implemented, and might even flourish.

Involvement action may have its own distinct *outcomes*. These range from individuals who, as following their experience acting on the original crime prevention remit, are empowered to undertake new tasks or roles in life; and communities that, through collaborative action, have become more trusting and cohesive. But involvement outcomes can be negative too, including areas stigmatised, or people at risk of offending being caught by ‘net-widening’.

Beyond these generalities, each of the tasks identified in the previous section has its own distinctive process, although there may be common elements. Those processes will be interwoven with management, design (from the procedural design of focus groups to the website design of consultation methods), communications, law, education, use and handling of the media and *social marketing*. This last is the application of commercial marketing techniques to public health and social issues (for example the anti-drink driving project by Rothschild et al., (2006)). The Involvement action will of course serve multiple tasks: for example, consultation is an end in itself but also supports successful climate-setting.

The only explicit methodology for Involvement yet to have emerged covers mobilisation. However, 5Is was intended to grow and differentiate so there is ready scope for developing equivalent process models for the other tasks, along the lines of what follows.

The mobilisation process: CLAIMED

Sometimes patterns are only discernible when viewed from a distance. I had this opportunity when, as research manager for a programme studying and developing the field of design against crime, I read through the contractors’ report on the state of the art in areas as diverse as the design of vehicles, housing, railway rolling stock, consumer electronics and the military (Design Council, 2000). In each area the report listed enablers and constraints, and by the time I’d read through to the end a common underlying thread had emerged. This concerned factors which *alert, motivate and empower* designers to undertake design against crime; or more likely, unfortunately, those which lull, deter or disable them from doing so. This descriptive framework then became a process model (e.g. Pease, 2001; Ekblom, 2001) and other refinements have since been added; and pretty soon I realised it could apply not just to design but to all crime prevention.

CLAIMED, then, is a universal algorithm summarising the tasks preventive practitioners must do when mobilising people or organisations to undertake crime prevention action, or to desist from promoting crime. It’s equally a framework for systematically describing how it was done in practice, how it succeeded or what went wrong. Stated here in action terms (the description equivalent is in the master-list of headings at the end of the chapter), the process goes as follows:

1. Clarify the crime prevention action that needs doing. The action could be that of implementing the intervention itself (as done by crime preventers directly within the CCO frame, such as a bartender restricting customer's alcoholic intake). It could also include less direct actions like supplying enablers or alleviating constraints (where the bar management, say, institute a policy on curbing excess drinking, supply bartenders with training in polite refusals and don't expect them to indiscriminately pour drink down the throats of the customers).

Acting as preventers can mean undertaking very specific *tasks* (for example, a street warden sticking theft warnings on bike stands); pursuing a particular *goal* (keeping an offender out of further trouble, say); or taking on a wider *role* with greater scope for initiative (for example, architects 'thinking thief' in all their work). The tasks or roles come with some kind of formal or informal *responsibility*, or *ownership of risk*. They often incorporate the making of particular *decisions* e.g. on the reporting of suspicious actions to the police, or the referral of young people at risk of offending to a particular agency. Note that these examples are positive, but the desired preventive action could equally be negative. In other words, the tasks and roles of interest could equally concern the *desistance of crime promoters* from certain actions (e.g. 'don't encourage your mates to drink-drive'), and the switching of people from *promoter to preventer* roles (e.g. from leaving the back door unlocked, to leaving it secure). For brevity, this aspect is mostly left implicit in the remaining steps of mobilisation.

2. Locate the individuals or organisations best-placed to undertake the tasks and roles. This may require mapping existing resources, motivation and responsibilities among potential 'mobilisees'. Felson (2003) distinguishes four classes of people who (in 5Is terms) could be assigned preventive tasks and roles.

Personal discouragement is exerted by family and friends; assigned discouragement, by those so employed; diffuse discouragement, by those employed but not assigned to that specific task; and general discouragement, by unpaid persons lacking a personal tie or occupational responsibility. (2003: 1)

The same could apply to all kinds of prevention activity, not just 'discouragement', and could cover organisations as well as individuals. For example, all employees could be required to undertake security-related tasks like maintenance of passwords.

The Clarification and Location steps shouldn't simply be viewed as a superficial exercise in social engineering. Whoever undertakes these activities must appreciate how and why society divides labour for undertaking the basic actions of care, control, collaboration and conflict resolution (Ekblom, 2004b); and how these tasks can be reassigned and recombined into new arrangements where competence, responsibility, and coverage on the ground are embodied in appropriate institutional settings and furnished with suitable checks and balances.

Once suitable preventers for task or role are located, the action shifts to them:

3. ***A**lert them that their activities, products or services could be causing crime, or that they could help stop crimes more widely.* The former covers obvious cases where, say, a car manufacturer is producing insecure vehicles, or parents are letting their children engage in illegal drinking (as in Moonshine). The latter covers instances where there is no direct causal or moral responsibility but where, say, 'good neighbour' surveillance could make a difference to crime risk.
4. ***I**nform them of the nature of the crime problem, its harmful consequences, how it is caused, the part they play in causation and/or could play in prevention or mitigation.* This could include disabusing people of incorrect assumptions about the nature of the crime problem and its causes and effective interventions (e.g. that the police are the only ones that can tackle crime, that all shoplifters are professionals, that displacement will inevitably neutralise preventive efforts). Any of these may inhibit their participation or misdirect their action.
5. ***M**otivate them to change their ways.* Motivation is achieved, or at least attempted, by diverse means (see for example Home Office, 2006a; Dolan et al., 2010; Scott and Goldstein, 2005). These include:
 - Hard or soft incentives like fines and 'polluter-pays' taxes or a reputation of corporate social responsibility;
 - Assuaging and practically addressing anxieties (for example that crime prevention will jeopardise profit or that reporting crime to the police will have unpleasant repercussions);
 - Exploiting existing motivation to be individual good citizens or show community spirit; naming and shaming;
 - Awakening consumer expectations and pressures (for example that mobile phone manufacturers should make their products secure); and
 - Imposing insurance costs or liability in civil law.

Sustaining motivation is challenging (Sutton, 1996), the classic example being the fading of interest among Neighbourhood Watch members. Rich practice knowledge must exist alongside that from formal research of what works and what doesn't, where and with whom, but needs capturing and organising.

6. ***E**mpower them to undertake the tasks and roles.* Practical empowerment includes *capacity building* actions like supplying preventers with education, guidance on intervention (such as 'how to handle your teenage son'), or tools (such as property-marking kit). Less directly, empowerment also covers alleviating practical, social or legal *constraints* such as difficulties in obtaining planning permission for installing CCTV cameras. It also has broader aspects. These include giving organisations and individuals *moral or legal authority* to undertake particular actions (such as challenging antisocial behaviour in the street or citizens' arrest); generic empowerment in the form of developing

collective efficacy; and more *political* empowerment in awakening people's awareness of crime-related problems and issues and helping them to get organised to do something about them (Sutton, 1996).

7. ***Direct them to act and/or how to do so.*** Coercive direction is relatively rare in crime prevention outside the judicial setting, or in formal private security organisations or branches, but examples do exist such as legal obligations on parents to stop their children from truanting. Some countries have legal requirements on drivers to lock cars. But regulations relating to privacy or anti-vigilantism may be more broadly applied to stop people or private companies taking crime prevention beyond acceptable limits and clashing with other values. Direction may also take the form of standards (such as BSI or CEN) and targets.

To touch briefly on what might be called '*demobilisation*', all the above actions might be employed in reverse to lull, confuse or keep in ignorance, deter or discourage, disempower or restrict the resources of crime promoters, or direct them to become preventers. Where actual or potential offenders are recruited to become crime preventers (as with reformed computer hackers turned into defenders; or young people switched from committing disorder to helping the maintenance of order and conflict resolution, as in the Dutch '*Stadswacht*' scheme (Jacobson and Saville, 1999)), the AIMED actions can be applied to them too.

All the CLAIMED tasks embrace subsidiary *intelligence* actions, researching who is out there, what their motives are: mapping stakeholders or dutyholders and their potential competencies, motives and so forth. Again, all will require practical methods to be implemented; all will work via causal mechanisms that need realisation through plans and designs, and which perhaps can be synthesised into theories. In fact, the AIMED actions are pretty much cast in mechanism language already. Common to all the AIMED actions too is the subsidiary task of *communication*, about which much practice knowledge, and research on effectiveness, can be assembled. Brown and Goldstein (2005) suggest there is plenty of knowledge to refine and share on this topic alone. Finally, a *human factors* approach to security performance (Sasse et al., 2007) introduces an additional dimension to all the AIMED actions – for example how to ensure potential preventers are alerted to risks, understand and trust the preventive advice, and maintain their motivation. In a formal security context, Sasse et al. (2007) note the challenge of moving on from managing the human element through the traditional command-and-control approach to something more like self-motivated expertise, a theme that chimes with the '*practitioner as consultant*' vision embraced here. Their headings '*awareness, education and training*' are rather close to '*Alert, Inform and Empower*'.

While the above analysis has focused on the practice of how to get people to do crime prevention, it's worth noting that, when applied to '*native*' preventers and promoters, these mechanisms of mobilisation and demobilisation can be incorporated within CCO. (Thus for example preventers as inhibitors of crime can be understood

in terms of the preventive tasks and roles they undertake, their awareness of the crime problem and how informed they are about it, their motivation and their capacity to respond.) The mobilisation mechanisms can also be linked to, and may enrich, CCO's map of the causes of criminal events operating via the *offender*: standing decisions to offend, readiness to offend, resources to offend and to avoid offending, and the awareness of crime opportunities.

Although the 5Is approach to understanding and replicating mobilisation is analytic, it is not intended to be atomistic. All the CLAIMED tasks are interrelated, and cannot be restricted to a linear sequence. For example, Location includes looking ahead – finding individuals/organisations with the right resources (Empowerment) and interests (Motivation) to effectively and acceptably take on responsibility for the task or role. Nor can specific actions always be undertaken in isolation. All the enablers and their constraints interlock and may form a self-reinforcing system which is hard to shift from a constraining to an enabling state without a concerted approach simultaneously addressing a number of agents, regulations and resources.

Taken as a whole, the CLAIMED actions must be done in step with public and commercial understandings and expectations. Practitioners can passively adapt to the 'Involvement context' – for example, by adjusting the type of Neighbourhood Watch activity promulgated in localities with more or less social cohesion (Laycock and Tilley, 1995). Or they can seek to actively influence the context via community-building and deliberate *climate-setting* activities as previously described. But there is a political dimension here. According to Sutton (1996) no discussion of crime prevention can be complete unless it takes account of the *interests* affected by preventive action, and the resistance encountered. How far practitioners, alert to these issues, are empowered to raise them, and whether in an administrative or a political context, depends on their own particular working environment and in particular their institutional setting.

Once mobilised, people or agencies must then get on with the tasks and roles, which is Implementation. The mobilisation must be maintained, monitored and perhaps modified or eventually terminated.

Partnership structure and process

Where the relationships between the various institutions and individual people initiating this process are one-sided, mobilisation is the appropriate concept. Where there is a more symmetrical relationship of mutual decision-making, task and role specification and sharing of responsibility, then *partnership* is the preferred term. Many crime prevention/community safety actions combine elements of each. In fact there is a growing trend in social action of all kinds towards participation, engagement or co-design, to use some of the many terms that apply. Once a partnership is initiated, of course, the actions of this new entity may include


mobilising other agents, and indeed it may jointly undertake the entire 5Is process in generating individual projects or services.

Given the focus of 5Is on the *process of generating interventions* rather than the *process of creating and operating organisations capable of generating those interventions*, partnership is mainly a contextual issue. Our interest is confined to how the relevant partnership environment helped, and/or directed, the creation and performance of the individual project or service. However, where partners come together specifically to enable a particular intervention to be made, describing it becomes more focal.

Much has been written about partnership from both practice and governance perspectives (see Gilling, 2005 for a review; Council of Europe, 2003; Ekblom, 2004b). The UK Home Office (Home Office, 2007) produced a comprehensive guide to effective partnership working which is process-based. Key dimensions of partnership which 5Is descriptions may need to cover are suggested in the contents section of this chapter.

The whole ‘zoom-structure’ of 5Is is illustrated, with Involvement, in Figure 14.1.

[Figure 14.1 The zoom structure of 5Is] [hi-res artwork on separate file]



Involvement methods, mechanisms, theories and evidence

Involvement comprises some quite distinctive processes of influencing the behaviour, perceptions and attitudes of *crime preventers and promoters*. In this, the task stream resembles that of Intervention, whose purpose is to exert equivalent influences more directly on *offenders*. We can therefore use similar language in talking about principles, methods and mechanisms of Involvement (see for example Pawson's (2006) approach to *evidence-based policy*). For example, an Irish project demobilised crime promoters – parents and grandparents of joyriders who had been accustomed to provide a receptive audience for their sons driving stolen cars round their housing estate – by showing them a film of joyriding accidents. This persuaded them to desist by alerting them to aversive consequences that they personally cared about. One would therefore expect to see develop an evidence and a theory base of Involvement beyond the reams that have been written specifically on partnership. Unfortunately this is currently rather patchy. Within crime prevention itself, the Campbell Collaboration Library⁴⁴ so far lists no such topics under crime although some concern direct ways of influencing native preventers such as parents or neighbourhood watch members. From a policy and delivery stance, the UK Home Office (Home Office, 2006a) produced a major review of the use of incentives, broadly defined to encompass pretty much all the issues under Motivation above. Finally, Bottoms (2002) has developed a theoretical framework for mechanisms of compliance with the law. Other domains do include aspects of mobilisation, and it's to these we should look for importable practice knowledge, research and theory. For example Ritter et al. (2006) review the effectiveness of volunteer tutoring programmes in welfare.

The purposes of reporting Involvement in action descriptions

Acting via other people and organisations constitutes much of the work of crime prevention practitioners. More such agents make up the *context* of Intervention, both internal and external to the project or service delivering the action. Clearly, then, even the most technological of interventions needs a detailed description of how people were mobilised, engaged in partnership or consulted; and how an appropriate climate was created. Users of a knowledge base would face enormous risk of implementation failure – in particular Involvement failure – if they ignored these factors in selection, replication and innovation of action.

The structure and content of descriptions of Involvement

Many of the issues of describing Involvement are similar to those for Implementation. But a particular challenge comes from depicting the potential complications of chains, networks and climate-setting arrangements, whether these are central to the action or part of the contextual background. With the possible exception of a basic managerial checklist, no fixed format for capturing this

information could ever hope to progress beyond the superficial or confusing. It may therefore be best to use free text systematically covering the ground with standardised terminology. (As said in the previous chapter, it may even be appropriate in some circumstances to organise the entire account of Implementation, Intervention or even Intelligence around who is Involved and how. This is because the actions and intentions of people and agencies supply a natural, readable narrative framework.) Nonetheless, the ground to be covered must be marked out, so the following section does so using topic headings, though the ordering of these when converted into free text is a matter for the individual contributor or consolidator.

By convention, purely *commercial* transactions (like the purchase of goods) should come under Implementation rather than Involvement. However, other aspects of involving trade and industry (for example influencing them as preventers, or operating in public-private partnerships) would come under Involvement.

Existing knowledge frameworks give some cover, though little structure, to aspects of Involvement. On the Problem-Oriented Policing side, Scott and Goldstein (2005) have produced a practical Response Guide on ‘Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems’ and Barthe (2006) on crime prevention publicity campaigns. A framework related to SARA, CAPRA, used by the RCMP explicitly describes itself as ‘a method of service delivery that focuses on providing the best quality service by reflecting an understanding of clients’ needs, demands and expectations and, where possible, using partnership approaches.’⁴⁵ It usefully distinguishes between *direct* clients (people and agencies that practitioners routinely engage with in service delivery or problem-solving situations) and *indirect* ones, otherwise affected by the outcome of the police efforts, including business communities, interest or cultural groups and even taxpayers. The ‘setting-oriented approach’ in Québec (Maurice et al., 2008) is worth a look, and see also Jamieson (2008) for a broad framework for mobilisation practice. However, 5Is is the first attempt to systematically structure the domain of Involvement as a whole, to do so in detail, and indeed to name it.

The content of Involvement

The map-level headings under Involvement have evolved somewhat in the writing of this book so the 5Is illustrations that follow are again rather limited. The newer concepts set out at various points above, nonetheless appear in the ‘master-list’ of headings at the end of the chapter.

Partnership

In Project Moonshine, a wide range of partners was involved; much of the description simply comprised stating who they were and what tasks or roles they contributed. This could perhaps be called ‘practical’ rather than ‘practice’ knowledge, but in selecting and replicating action it is useful to know the *kinds* of

partner organisation and the scale of partnership-creating or -exploiting actions needed in this kind of project.

The main organisations and communities involved in this project were as follows. In some cases partnership was supplemented by consultation; in others, consultation was the sole form of Involvement.

Hampshire Police Force

A crime reduction officer and police beat constable formed the core project co-ordinating team. They:

- Identified and monitored changes in antisocial behaviour (ASB) offences and ‘Crime & Disorder Act’ incidents [see Chapter 11].
- Offered advice on crime preventive measures to the other key partners.
- Chaired the steering group/committee meetings.
- Located sources of funding for the project.
- Local basic command unit – carried out targeted police patrols involving a mixture of covert and overt observations of the crime/ASB problem.

Test Valley Borough Council (TVBC)/ Eastleigh Borough Council

- Supplied a community safety officer and representatives of relevant services who attended project committee meetings.
- Funded alterations to the local community centre.
- Offered to support additional services for youths offered at the leisure centre.
- Provided the supporting use of neighbourhood wardens.
- Involved in representing the local council’s views at the committee meetings.
- Were consulted on issues concerning developing council owned land.
- Were also willing to support ABC contracts and ASBO.
- ASBO officers presented video footage of offending to the parents.

Neighbourhood Wardens

- Established credibility in the community through direct interaction. Specifically they knocked on doors of the local residents and discussed their role and projects being carried out by the police confronting ASB.
- High visibility policing.

- Cleaning and tidying local environment.
- Engaging with youths to get them involved in local activities.
- Liaising with the police, feeding back observations and public concerns.
- Helped to seize alcohol from youths – although this was initially detrimental to their relationship with the youths.

Residents Association

- Involved in representing the local community views at the committee meetings.
- Also distributed newsletters containing quarterly updates on the progress of the project.

Youth Service

- Although it took three months to fully engage with the local youth services, they then offered educational and social services to the youths
- Their main role was to identify what the young people required to modify their anti-social behaviour.

Local Landowners – of the parade of shops

- Consulted by the project team about environmental re-design (the flowerbed).
- Consulted shop tenants on their views of changing the adjacent environmental design

Parish Council

- Represented the parishioners' views at the committee meetings.

Partnership *processes* centred around committee steering groups – involving the police, the local authority, the parish council, the local media, the local residents association and representatives from the local community and retailers. The meetings highlighted problems and discussed potential solutions.

An interesting additional observation concerned *collective efficacy*. Having established contact with these partners, the links remained active and there was a certain carryover to other projects the police were involved in.

A rather richer description of partnership action was in the Stirchley burglary project:

The police and the city council were the main partners in this project, working through a wider steering group also involving residents (this was primarily consultative rather than decision-making). Once the project was under way, it is thought that the council was drawn into more active involvement because the residents' *expectations* of action had been awakened, and they were becoming impatient due to delays.

Problems in partnership working arose because of a) lack of clarity over the funding between police and local council; b) lack of prior experience of police and council organisations and individuals in partnership working; c) initial reluctance of council officers to deal directly with police officer of 'only' sergeant rank, in the absence of senior police involvement.

An example from CCTV (Gill et al., 2005b) showed not just who was involved and what the preventive tasks/roles were, but how the partnership working contributed to the successful implementation of the project:

The retail radio system produced regular exchanges of information between the operators and retail security staff. The extension to the existing CCTV system enhanced the operators' ability to track offenders and provide the police and retail security with intelligence. A representative from the control room attended regular meetings with the retail radio users, and a folder containing mug shots of known offenders was updated and regularly sent to all the users. These measures meant that good practice and intelligence were shared between the users of the system. (2005b: 12)

A final example of partnership practice knowledge is from the Bradford intensive supervision project, although one imagines that rather more could have been usefully extracted:

A problem identified by both the YOT co-ordinator and YMCA manager in the early days was [that] of a statutory and a voluntary agency working together. The two organisations have different ways of working and different viewpoints which can clash. There are also differences in rates of pay between the two agencies. However the coordinator and programme manager appeared then to have mutual respect and a determination to overcome the difficulties. (Adamson, 2004: 7)

Experiences gleaned from the Irish youth centres yielded nuggets of partnership practice knowledge:

- *Maintaining parental mobilisation/creating partnership with parents* – if a child has a problem, meetings with their parents are managed using the

‘compliment sandwich’: for every negative issue raised, the staff ensure they discuss three positives first.

- *Partnership as context* to individual operational actions – each local youth centre had connections with the wider ‘justice family’ of agencies e.g. via presence of staff on the management committee of the local probation project. Discussions between agencies established what activities were to be done on whose premises.
- *Partnership needing some separation between the participating agencies* – e.g. over enforcement versus welfare approaches. This may be expressed in specific practice domains such as establishing ‘safe havens’ for young people. One centre had an agreement with the local Garda (police) that no young person was to be picked up whilst on youth centre activity or at the centre itself. This was a means of preserving trust between the centre and its members.
- Separation also featured in defining *boundaries of institutional competence* – One centre was firmly aware of the need to focus on its role as a community-based probation project, which required it to identify clear space between that project and other local institutions.

Mobilisation

In Moonshine, the boundary between partnership, consultation and mobilisation was blurred; indeed, the Involvement processes together seemed also to contribute, as an *intervention*, to reassurance:

The steering group meetings helped to quell the fear of crime perceived by the general public, as the community members attending propagated reassuring messages (‘Something has been done’) principally through the resident newsletter. Community champions were also identified at these meetings, which allowed the police to show the problem was one to be shared, not just for the police to tackle alone.

The project co-ordinator decided to apply some quick win interventions before engaging wider public support. This was to pre-empt a perception that nothing was being done by the police. However, the public became aware of the partnership committee, recruiting people through leaflets and disrupting, en masse, a committee meeting to get their views heard. Quick reaction by the police and the crime reduction officer turned this from near-riot to a constructive occasion. To help maintain public involvement, follow-up was emphasised – they made sure to return calls to answer their questions and deal directly with concerns. They also invited the local police commander to attend the next public meeting in order to acknowledge the seriousness of the problem, field questions and deliver promises, and to demonstrate support from the top down.

Newsletter

The residents' association newsletter, produced and distributed quarterly to 3,500 local residents, covered articles on project progress and acted as a strong link between the project team and local community. An article was run called 'Do you know where your children are?'.

Local newspapers

Information about the progress of the project was also fed to the local newspapers. In fact, they attended the steering groups. This served to reassure and inform the public that the police in tandem with the local council were carrying out measures against ASB. Specific information provided to the media included information on basic achievable crime prevention techniques for individuals, what the partnership was achieving, plans for the future and seeking help from the local residents.

A more systematic account of aspects of the process of mobilisation was given in the 5Is description of a CCTV-enhancement scheme in Slough Trading Estate (STE) (Home Office, 2002c):

Mobilisation of occupiers to be actively involved in crime reduction measures

The crime reduction tasks implemented by the occupiers

There were two crime reduction tasks carried out in the implementation phase:

- To implement specific *crime reduction interventions* e.g. attend to their own security, conduct surveillance and report suspicious sightings etc; and
- To *support professional crime reduction* by supplying subscription funds.

Location of crime preventers

- The business occupiers were considered key players for the obvious reasons of presence on the ground, motivation and responsibility for protection of their own premises and (latent) collective self-interest in security.

Alerting, informing, motivating and empowering the crime preventers

- A general awareness campaign was run, alerting tenants of STE, which aimed to highlight the presence of the control room and Business Watch team and the security measures that were currently in place.
- A quarterly newsletter was sent out to the members of Business Watch. Information in the newsletters covered facts about specific types of offence experienced on the Estate; emerging crime issues that had been

highlighted through data analysis and observation; modifications to the security systems; and knowledge about crime reduction measures. It also informed the members how to work effectively with the Business Watch Team to help reduce offending on the Estate through surveillance, target hardening and reporting of incidents.

A very specific and complex Involvement issue arose in the Stirchley burglary project. This was the need to secure collective agreement among residents to install communal alley-gates to block burglars' access to the back of houses.

The most significant aspect of Involvement in this project (and arguably the most significant distinguishing feature of the project as a whole) was the need to establish residents' *collective agreement on action*. One un-gated alleyway or one gap in the fencing could leave a vulnerability in the target enclosures that affected the interests of all. Not all residents initially favoured the gates or fencing. Agreement on gates required political will. It was achieved by meetings, and in particular the involvement of a local elected councillor with experience of gating, good links to business and contacts with/ influence on council officials. The gates, on private land, needed signed individual agreements with the residents/property owners, some of whom did not wish the gates imposed on them. The fencing, on public land, could be erected without this agreement (although meetings were arranged to try to establish consensus); but they did require planning permission, which was obtained. A *wider climate of understanding and support* was created by a range of public meetings and the newsletters. This and [a parallel] property-marking initiative alerted/*motivated/empowered* residents to act as preventers, but both methods were conceived primarily as means of creating and maintaining [a climate of] *credibility for continued collaboration* in the face of delays with gates and fencing. Involvement of the local Neighbourhood Watch coordinator, the local elected councillor and the chair of an existing residents' group were instrumental in getting ordinary residents involved and in securing agreement. It is possible their efforts also generated some additional 'social capital' which supported a more general *collective efficacy*.

Once again, the Irish youth centre visits, rather than yielding detailed case studies, offered up some specific nuggets of practice:

- Mobilisation was often *flexible*: the youth centre team would only involve a young person's family in the intervention, or in creating a supportive context for intervention, in response to *crisis* events.
- In an example of *outreach to offenders*, there was a presenting problem of 'a group causing mayhem on the street'. The staff met the young people on the street and offered to make space at the youth centre. Once there, they were able to start work with them.

- It was the practice to build up *trust* with young people before any intervention: first get them aboard, make them feel safe and comfortable being at the centre, and get them to believe that the centre is primarily interested in their welfare.
- On the other hand, there were *limits to voluntary mobilisation*. Mobilising *parents* to get their children to participate in extreme circumstances needed extreme pressures: to gain the cooperation of one particular family, a youth centre offered to stay the threat of eviction against them.
- *Practical/legal dilemmas of outreach*. If the street workers see the young people they know doing illegal thing, how should they respond so they maintain trust? One practice was simply to ask in a non-condemnatory, non-directive way, ‘should you really be doing that?’
- It was the practice to get participants to join the centre *voluntarily* rather than making attendance a forcible condition of, say, cautioning by the police.
- Another practice was the *anticipatory mobilisation of clients*: this meant building relationships with young people judged to be at risk of offending, so that the youth centre staff had emotional ‘handles’ that can be pulled on if a youngster started to offend.

Climate-setting and consultation

Operation Moonshine had some issues in this domain, and some apparently successful practice:

The project team discovered the importance of *managing the public’s expectations* – through admitting it would take some time for results to become noticeable. Deadlines were of course necessary to take action forward at the steering group level. But some of these were deliberately not made public. This allowed both a degree of flexibility and sufficient time to obtain funding. ‘NIMBY’ issues were anticipated for the siting of the youth shelter, but careful advance persuasion led residents to see the shelter as a solution rather than a problem.

The South City case study of CCTV (Gill et al., 2005b) revealed how climate-setting actions can prepare the ground for, and remove obstacles to, partnership:

The project team were aware that police support for the scheme was vital if the scheme was to be effective. They ensured that the police became increasingly involved in the project through the implementation phase and into the operational stage of the project. A member of the project team stated: *As the implementation process has progressed, different agencies and parties have come on board. Once the scheme had secured Home Office funding, and*

things started moving, the police became more interested in the scheme. The planning stage still saw very little interest from groups outside the local council...If the police were more involved and had a financial stake they would have been more willing to put other resources in to making sure it works. They have been very slow to support CCTV as they did not want to contribute financially to the scheme. (2005b: 11)

The Irish youth centres visited revealed a range of climate-setting actions on different scales and with different target populations:

- One of the centres noted the importance of action to establish favourable relationships between young people and various crime preventers before intervention proper could be implemented. Examples included camping weekends with Gardai (police) before undertaking the intervention proper (in this case, painting a mural to raise self esteem).
- More generally climate-setting was judged vital to establish the conditions for mobilisation of volunteers, and to help get families and the community on-side (and keep them there) whilst interventions were undertaken with their children. Practical, material gestures, such as making the youth centre's hall available for use by the wider community, helped to build trust and credibility.
- There was also much climate-setting and maintaining to do *between the different agencies* to create/maintain working partnerships and mutual credibility that can cope, with and even exploit for collective benefit, the diversity of organisational aims, values and philosophies – especially the welfare versus enforcement issue. This also occurred *within* the Garda – efforts to align the community officers and the Juvenile Liaison Officers required tact, and this improved through experience some of which presumably could be captured.
- One centre practised climate-setting on wider scale. It managed to bypass the local media's bias towards publishing negative stories about troublesome young people including the centre's own clientele, by using new bottom-up media such as You-Tube to spread positive achievements of the centre and its participants, such as winning a fishing trophy.

Finally, Moonshine illustrates some more generic headings for Involvement as a whole:

Risks and blockages to and from Involvement

- Following active participation of youths in the steering committee meetings, conflict between elderly people and local youths (who had differing needs and lifestyles) was resolved through mediation with a view to building a

mutual understanding. Some progress was indicated by the older residents attending the opening of the youth shelter.

Sustainability of involvement

Quite a few shops in Valley Park were undergoing changes in management. It was thus felt essential that the new retailers were advised on the sale of alcohol to youths, and that they were monitored for compliance.

- The project team drafted an exit strategy, where the roles and responsibilities of each partnership member were defined, to continue the actions without central control by the project team.

Involvement: master-list of headings

4. Involvement

4.1. Communication Communication pervades the Involvement task stream and will need to be described at various points throughout the description: with whom, for what purpose/s, by what media and methods; successes and failures; obstacles, issues and tradeoffs, and how they were resolved in practice

4.2. Intelligence actions to guide and support Involvement processes Includes identifying stakeholders/ dutyholders to mobilise, and suitable partners; and what motivates or demotivates them, what enables or constrains, including 'human factors' in influencing performance.

4.3. Demand

4.3.1. Initiation: conceptually belongs here but often best described under main Intelligence task stream (see 1.2)

4.3.2. Recruitment of crime prevention for other aim e.g. economic regeneration

4.4. Partnership

4.4.1. Structural issues

- Purpose of partnership in outcome terms (e.g. reducing crime, increasing community safety, urban renewal)
- Whether partnership is operational (delivering interventions), strategic (providing environment in which interventions are planned, designed and delivered) or providing infrastructure (e.g. protocols for exchanging information or resources)
- Composition (which agencies/ individuals/ groups engaged) and structure including leadership, balance of power between member agencies, and whether operating on multiple levels (e.g. an operational team and a strategic advisory board)
- Geographical scope
- Pooling of resources: which agencies contribute what, how they complement or synergise
- Governance issues: responsibility, authority and accountability; inherent structural strains e.g. over welfare versus security or justice
- The environment of the partnership, which may include other agencies or partnerships; even higher-level strategic partnerships

4.4.2. Process issues:

- Practical creation of partnership: including Intelligence for planning the partnership
- Creation and maintenance of partnership climate: including building mutual understanding and trust; handling differences of perspective, values and priorities of partner organisations (e.g. security v welfare)
- Handling boundaries, both geographical and of responsibility
- Which of the operational 5Is tasks the partnership undertakes; and task-specific issues such as codes of practice on information exchange, service-level agreements on handling offenders etc
- Partnership operations: how it works on a day-to-day basis, including inter-partner communications, decision-making and tactical coordination; partnership management (including performance management) and leadership
- The working relationship between tactical and strategic levels
- Sustainability of partnership
- Dismantling or disengagement of partnership

4.5. Mobilisation

4.5.1. For each agent mobilised to support the objectives of the project or service, supply the following information based on the CLAIMED framework:

- Who they are and what sort of entity (individual, group, organisation or community): including offenders mobilised through *outreach* to participate in their own treatment
- What roles they play, tasks they carry out, responsibilities they bear or decisions they take in implementing or supporting crime prevention, community safety or security: clarify whether they normally act as crime preventers (to be mobilised) or promoters (to be demobilised)
- Why they were especially chosen for the role (e.g. their competence, numbers, legitimacy) and how they were identified

Mobilisation methods, principles and theories:

- How they were Alerted to the part they could play in crime prevention (e.g. publicity, personal approach)
- How they were Informed about the problem or case, its nature, consequences and causes
- How they were Motivated (e.g. regulations, legal duty, self-interest, naming and shaming, incentives)
- How they were Empowered (e.g. capacity-building including training, equipment, information, guidance, money; legal powers; alleviation of constraints)
- How (if relevant) they were Directed (e.g. codes of conduct for confidentiality, performance standards, crime reduction targets)

Beyond initiation:

- Sustainability of mobilisation: issues and practices in maintaining participation, and specifically alertness, informedness, motivation etc
- How and why any mobilisation was brought to an end

4.5.2. Multiple mobilisations

- Implementation chains: how the various agents (and their tasks/roles) connect, ultimately to the 'business end' of the chain in influencing preventers and promoters in the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity

- Systems of involvement: how diverse agents work together to execute and/or support intervention; or how an interlocking system of agents resistant to crime prevention was disrupted
- ‘Gateway’ mobilisations e.g. referral of client victim or offender to other agency: structure and process

4.5.3. Conflicts, constraints and issues (including ethical issues) in any of the above: their nature and how resolved

4.5.4. Outreach

- Who is ‘reached out to’, by whom, using what techniques, and for what preventive purpose

4.6. Consultation With whom, over what issues (e.g. crime prevention/priorities), by what methods and media; at what stage/s in the planning and execution of interventions

4.7. Accountability With whom (internally or externally), over what issues (e.g. crime prevention priorities, performance), by what methods and media; at what stage/s in the planning, execution and review of interventions and the project or service as a whole

4.8. Building collaborative capacity Actions prior to setting up specific partnerships or undertaking specific mobilisation exercises, intended to create, for example, a residents’ or a traders’ association or wider social cohesion, as a context within which specific interventions can be implemented, and specific agencies, groups, communities or individuals can be involved

4.9. The wider climate of opinion in which the action was implemented

4.9.1. Describe whether the local climate was initially *hostile/suspicious* or *supportive/accepting* of the preventive action; and how, if relevant, a positive climate was encouraged and a negative one dispelled; assess whether the methods of Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation and Involvement employed in the present action only work in a *supportive* climate

4.9.2. More generally, describe other issues of awareness, expectation and interest in the action, and issues of public attitudes and beliefs about the crime problem, to offenders and to community safety; and how these affected the design and performance of the action

4.10. Risks and blockages to and from Involvement Possibilities of failure or of undesirable outcomes: including aroused and disappointed expectations, stigmatisation, breakdown of trust, and exacerbated conflict. How these are identified and managed are important practice knowledge.

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 15 Impact – and process evaluation

Introduction

5Is centres on *describing* preventive action; but it also sets the scene for *evaluating* that action, in terms of both *impact* and *process*. I say ‘sets the scene’ deliberately. Although 5Is descriptions provide, and organise, important material on which evaluations are based, it doesn’t inherently comprise or contain a methodology for impact evaluation, merely citing the results of impact evaluations at the end of the description. Earlier versions were also somewhat underdeveloped on the process evaluation side. This chapter presents a more systematic incorporation of evaluative dimensions within the framework.

5Is *itself* can be assessed against the Specification for a crime prevention knowledge framework in Chapter 6, and evaluated against the purposes of that framework in improving performance; but that’s another matter, revisited in Chapter 16.

The scope of evaluation within 5Is

Impact evaluation predominantly supplies Know-what works knowledge and is principally useful for *selection* of preventive action to replicate. Process evaluation contributes, via Know-how, mainly to *replication and innovation*. As ever, the distinctions aren’t entirely watertight. For example, a practitioner or policy-maker may not only select action on the basis of what is effective, but on what is practically deliverable.

The ‘Impact’ heading of 5Is has in previous manifestations incorporated process evaluation – almost, I must admit, as an afterthought. But on reflection I have arrived at the following definitive position. The Impact section of 5Is descriptions will henceforward focus on just that: impact evaluation and its results. Process evaluation, by contrast, is intended to be spread over all the headings and subheadings of the 5Is descriptions. The exception to this is the need, at the start of the Impact evaluation, to document an overview of the outputs that Implementation and Involvement have achieved – or failed to achieve.

One reason for this stance is a realisation that confining process evaluation to a small and distinct enclave of a report is *not* the way to encourage systematic reporting of informative practice experience. Knowledge bases of practice typically provide a brief, unstructured, tail-end space in a project-reporting form for contributors to supply information on ‘lessons learned’, which is intended to cover the entire process. Consequently, they either capture very little; or, if rich and

plentiful material is occasionally supplied, it's hard to search and retrieve efficiently (Bullock and Ekblom, in press).

A second reason is the existence of a growing trend towards quality standards, assessment and assurance of *all* the tasks of preventive action. This is exemplified by the Beccaria Programme⁴⁶ and the Youth Justice Board in England & Wales (2010); and by a related interest in *benchmarking*. What's appropriate for a 5Is description of some preventive action isn't necessarily appropriate for a description of the 5Is framework itself. This chapter covers first, process evaluation and then impact evaluation. The latter coverage takes a similar form to the presentation of the other Is, namely, ending up with a single master-list of headings to address. But the former presents a 'detachable' module of generic process evaluation topics that can apply to any task at any point under each of the other Is.

The *inputs* to process and impact evaluation come from every other 5Is task stream. Information also comes from sources further afield: for example from analysing crime figures in comparison areas; or observing what happens to young people after mentoring. The knowledge *products* that are the outputs of evaluative processes linked to 5Is variously contribute to Know-what works, Know-how, Know-where, Know-who and Know-why in the terms introduced in Chapter 3.

These products have various uses. Outputs of *summative* evaluations (those conducted retrospectively, or at least where the results are only communicated to the practitioners after the evaluation is complete) can help *knowledge harvesters* select what accounts of action are worth incorporating in a good practice knowledge base. They can help subsequent *users* of the knowledge base to select, replicate, and (on the basis of extracted principles and practical 'know-how' elements) to innovate. Outputs of *formative* evaluations can additionally supply immediate feedback to the 'home' practitioners which they can use to adjust the action while still underway.

5Is and process evaluation

Process evaluation can be defined as the action of evaluating a particular process, against criteria of *achievement* and/or *quality*. This would be a pretty feeble definition if we didn't also define *process*: an organised sequence of actions which together take inputs of various material, human and informational resources and lead via intermediate stages and transformations to desired outputs. Process evaluation covers all the 5Is tasks.

There is an interest both in the process as a whole, and in the individual subsidiary actions that make it up. Each of the latter will have its own inputs, intervening processes and outputs, and process evaluation can zoom in on these as appropriate. This is important because knowing whether individual subsidiary tasks have worked can support the 'recombination' of action elements to meet new requirements. It also helps to diagnose any causes of failure of the action as a whole – which task was the weakest link?

Establishing where process evaluation stops and impact evaluation begins isn't straightforward. If professional preventers are installing secure locks on people's homes then the process evaluation could be said to stop when the locks are fitted. But what about the performance of the householders in properly *operating* the locks when they go out shopping? Are these mobilised individuals part of the Implementation/Involvement process or is their security behaviour part of an intermediate outcome? The effect of the fitted locks on crime is clearly impact evaluation territory; but even here, the *sight* of the lock-fitters' vans or the *rumour* of a security initiative may have an impact that precedes the *physical blocking* effect of the locks (Smith et al., 2002). In reality, the boundary between process and impact evaluation is less about specific preventive actions reliably falling under one or other category, and more about perspective. Process evaluation addresses inputs, processes and outputs; impact evaluation outputs and outcomes; both have an interest in the causal mechanisms that underlie the connections in each case. Additional exercises such as assessment of cost-effectiveness span the domains of process and impact by linking quantitative inputs, outputs and outcomes.

Process mapping

As said, wherever there is a process, it can be evaluated, learned from and improved. A process evaluation requires, as a first step, *mapping out the processes to be evaluated*. For this 5Is offers a ready-made outline map, which the evaluator can flesh out with the particularities of the project or service under scrutiny.

Achievement

The most elementary form of process evaluation is documentation of *achievement* (or failure). This covers whether the intended output was delivered; how efficiently; and with what, if any, side-effects. For example, an attempt to mobilise local people to act as mentors might have succeeded in obtaining 30 volunteers of whom 20 stayed the training course and 15 were judged to give good quality mentoring; or alternatively, the attempt failed to obtain any volunteers because the right motivating conditions were not created or the publicity was distributed to the wrong target audience.

Much information on achievement would fall under Implementation and Involvement headings, centring on outputs delivered to, and in, the real world. However, one could equally report on *internal* achievements. For example we could assess whether an Intelligence analysis had accurately guided Intervention; an Intervention process had delivered clear, actionable plans and designs; and an Impact evaluation had successfully avoided measurement failure to deliver clearcut findings.

Quality

Assessment of *quality* covers how *well* the actions were done, perhaps in relation to standards (for example, was a survey methodologically-sound and conducted ethically?). Both achievement and quality can be assessed from research or managerial/ accountability perspectives. The former will be more rigorous and searching; the latter more routine and of limited scope and effort. Obviously, the former is more likely to produce new and transferable knowledge, usually of greater reliability and validity. The whole field of *benchmarking* can be brought to bear here. Benchmarking generally involves comparing like with like, and again the benefit of 5Is is that it provides a detailed and organised structure of pigeonholes into which comparable actions can be put. For example, methods of mobilising young people through outreach actions can be brought together across diverse projects and services and their quality and achievement compared.

But benchmarks aren't for resting on. The Australian review of crime prevention practice (AGD, 2004) makes a strong case for continuous *improvement* processes contributing to the establishment of *new* benchmarks rather than a situation where practitioners merely attempt to live up to existing ones. Being designed to grow and evolve new knowledge structures, 5Is supports this approach.

The purposes of reporting process evaluation in action descriptions

Documenting process evaluation findings has several purposes:

- Supporting *replication*. Once a generic intervention method has been selected and the user is occupied with designing the practical details, the requirement is to supply reliable information about the kinds of specific actions and choices to make, and the risks and opportunities to watch out for in each case.
- Supporting *innovation*. Having information on the performance of individual action elements enables these to be independently transferred and combined in new ways to meet new requirements. More generally having information on contextual constraints and enablers prompts thinking about new ways of overcoming the former and exploiting the latter.
- In formative evaluations, supporting the *management* function on quality assurance, troubleshooting etc.
- Guiding *improvement* in process, where the learning involved can
 - be internal to the delivery team;
 - feed into the transfer and evolution of practice knowledge more widely;
 - be used by delivery/programme managers to systemically address the constraints and enablers identified (for example in improving infrastructure or practitioners' career structure);

- be considered by policymakers and programme planners more strategically in terms of deliverability of mainstreamed action or policy conflicts.

The way in which 5Is can be used for internal process evaluation will depend on whether it is part of a formative or summative approach; likewise, whether it is applied one-off, or as part of a continuous progress and performance documentation system. On the latter, recall that, while 5Is can be used purely in a context of *managerial* performance monitoring, its main purpose is broader, namely generating new, useful and transferrable practice knowledge.

Other, more generic purposes for documenting evaluations are covered under Impact, below.

Evaluation and evidence: the position on process evaluation methodology

The ideal to which 5Is aspires, but doesn't yet reach, is that descriptions of process under each preventive task stream are accompanied by some evaluative assessment to help users choose what actions to select, how to replicate and which need innovative solutions. Chapter 5 noted how process evaluation was often the 'poor relation' of impact evaluation in terms of the rigour and sophistication of methodology. Although in principle this needn't be so, the potentially huge number of processes that it would be theoretically possible to evaluate in any given preventive project or service mean that time, human and financial constraints will limit this in practice. Planning in advance which processes to evaluate at what levels of sophistication is therefore a sensible alternative to the usual 'retrospective grab' of whatever information happens to be available. However, such planning isn't always possible. In any case spare capacity should be incorporated for reactive coverage of issues that emerge, during the action, as important for successful performance.

In most cases brief speculation about what went right or wrong may be all that's supplied. Where some process turns out to be mission-critical, or novel and potentially worth replicating widely, it may be worthwhile devoting more effort and rigour to its evaluation. Whatever the case, it would be desirable to document the evidentiary quality of the process evaluation itself. Where process *standards* are significant (where a programme of offender treatment is premised on closely-specified interventions, say), it will be important to assess and to report on these, for managerial as well as knowledge-transfer purposes.

The structure and content of descriptions of process evaluation

As explained above, process evaluation is intended to be dispersed throughout 5Is descriptions (wherever there's an identifiable process, there could be an evaluation). Therefore, the evaluation findings could simply be located alongside the relevant process. For improvement purposes it may, however, be helpful to

summarise process evaluation results in recurrent ‘lessons learned’ modules, say after every map-level heading; and as said, a ‘denouement’ section setting the scene of what was achieved, to feed into the impact evaluation.

The content of process evaluation descriptions will reflect the terminology used under the previous headings. At its most basic it will amount to a bare record of the achieved implementation of the task of interest. At its most advanced, it will comprise a searching analysis of performance, diagnosis of reasons for good and bad performance and suggestions for improvement. This could be organised as follows:

- The *success or failure of implementing* each task, including whether any targets or quality standards were met or missed.
- Whether the task, if successfully implemented to adequate quality, delivered the desired *result*. This could be an *internal* result (like successfully mobilising a young person to join the youth centre), or an *output* to the external world (such as the young person leaving the centre with employment-facilitating skills; in impact evaluation terms this would also count as an intermediate outcome).
- Whether the task, in achieving or failing in its immediate objectives, engendered positive or negative *side-effects*. These could be in *crime* (for example, simply targeting a youth for intervention could give them a ‘badge of honour’ among peers, confirming criminal identity); or in *other spheres* (CCTV could, depending on context, attract or deter commercial tenants in a shopping centre).
- The *enablers and constraints, conflicts, tradeoffs and synergies, collaboration and competition* behind the successes and failures of implementation and its result, that would need addressing in making the task work better/or even work at all. How these issues related to the *context* of the action described and – if replicated elsewhere – what conditions would be conducive to their successful handling.
- How the process problems encountered were *resolved* or *avoided*, and how benefits were *capitalised* on.

The last three items are more process evaluation than managerial monitoring. They would involve ‘investigatory’ analysis and could yield considerably richer knowledge. For example, the existence of implementation chains may necessitate some digging to reveal the ultimate causes of failure, which may be quite complex (a publicity action may have failed to be implemented because there was a *prior* Involvement failure to mobilise volunteers to distribute the leaflets; and there was inadequate managerial monitoring of progress, nor any backup plan for distribution). Such investigations if done in a research context may involve the generation and testing of hypotheses, which could help build theoretical knowledge of mobilisation mechanisms and lead to codification of practical principles.

- Finally, it’s important to describe any specific *methods* of process evaluation itself. This is for purposes of credibility; for understanding possible biases within

the findings; and for transfer of any useful knowledge of how to undertake such evaluations.

Illustrations of process evaluation descriptions

Examples of systematic reporting of process evaluation findings as suggested above are not yet available within the 5Is framework. However, the Bradford Trident intensive supervision project illustrates the range of types of information identified above. The report (Adamson, 2004) describes:

- Numbers of young people successfully mobilised to take part in project (97-98 per cent engaged)
- Average number of hours supervision per client (regularly exceeded the target 200 hours)
- Further indications of quality (lower than normal levels of breaches of supervision conditions; some clients staying on longer than formally required)
- Interpretation of success (staff thought lower breach rate was because they used a more proactive approach, with personal home visits to clients instead of posting letters when appointments missed)
- Ways of handling failing cases (for example the minority of clients unwilling to cooperate with the supervision were given surveillance, kept occupied and kept away from the others)
- Investigatory/quality monitoring techniques (evaluative feedback forms completed by clients and their parents on completion or on client's receipt of poor appraisal)
- Practical constraints (such as problems caused by insufficient phone lines, or Asian clients unwilling to be supervised by Christian workers at the YMCA – resolved by finding alternative staff and meeting places; employment of local staff meant in turn that additional training was required to get them used to structured work)
- Tradeoffs (for example, benefits of using local people as staff may be countered by clients not wanting to work with them if they attend the same mosque)
- Conflicts and confusions (for example over messages between project workers and police concerning clients – resolved by nominating a specific contact officer in the police; over local staff being approached by clients at home – resolved by code of practice where contacts were encouraged to take place at project office; and over switch in roles from youth worker to probation officer)

- Side benefits for the service itself (the employment of local staff helped establish the service in the community)

Although the report of this project listed all the above under Impact, the structuring of 5Is now suggested would suggest that they could each be described under the relevant task stream. In many cases this would be Involvement and Implementation. But summaries remain useful. With electronic documents, mark-up applications like HTML could enable easy switching between summaries of recommendations, and findings presented task-by-task.

The Hawkeye case study of CCTV in a London Underground station car park (Gill et al., 2005a: 15) identified diverse *constraints* on proactive use of the cameras:

- Across the entire car park system there was an average of only two incidents logged per day
- There was a high camera to operator ratio, which meant that operators could view only a few cameras at any one time
- The cameras were static, which were difficult for an operator to monitor for sustained periods of time
- There were communication difficulties between the [Management Information Central Control] and the control room operators, so there was no immediate police response to incidents

The first could be related to Intelligence and the design side of Intervention. Regarding the last three, the report notes elsewhere that there was a broader trade-off between speed of competitive tendering, price and quality which set significant constraints on what could be supplied and how well it meshed with the rest of the Underground systems and procedures. Thus performance constraints could be seen to have stemmed from the Involvement and Implementation processes. Other sources of Involvement failure stemmed from the clash of procedural requirements between the contracting CCTV installers and London Underground, for example over access to cables for maintenance; and unclear division of responsibility for the technical quality assurance of equipment.

Operation Moonshine had a section of 'lessons learned from the implementation process'. This highlighted various enablers, constraints and resolutions:

- The project started before the Problem Oriented Policing Approach had been fully instigated by Hampshire Police Force. Initially crime reduction management worked on a trial and error basis, drawing from intelligence gathering and responding intuitively to the problems as they presented themselves. Learning from errors and implementation failure was a useful tool before more defined work practices were introduced.

- Support from the police senior management was felt to be important, especially where (in an initially tense situation over the ASB problem) the public paid little heed to the beat police officer and civilian police staff.
- Legislation increasing police powers was cited as boosting the project over the three years. Section 59 of the Police Reform Act⁴⁷ (granting police powers to retain vehicles) was mentioned in particular as having impacted on anti-social use of cars.

How well a given preventive project or service addresses such strategic implementation issues is germane to process evaluation. Similar considerations cover, for example *responsiveness* (how closely the action can be targeted on crime, security and safety problems, and on their causes) and *deliverability* (how readily and reliably the action can be replicated either locally or within a programme, with an acceptable level of success in relation to investment). The utility of this information in selection at both practitioner, delivery and policy levels, and its absence from many evaluations, was noted in Chapter 5.

Process evaluation – master-list of headings

As said, the headings of process evaluation aren't intended to appear in one single location in a 5Is description but to *reappear* at points throughout the various task streams wherever it is appropriate and convenient to present evaluative findings. The listed headings, therefore, don't follow the same number format as the rest.

- a. *Success and failure* of implementing each task, including whether any numerical *targets or quality standards* were met or not met
- b. Whether the task, if successfully implemented to adequate quality, delivered the desired *result*. This could be an *internal* result passed to the next task, or an *output* to the external world
- c. Whether the task engendered positive or negative *side-effects* in *crime* or *other spheres*
- d. The *enablers and constraints, conflicts, tradeoffs and synergies, collaboration and competition* behind the successes and failures of implementation and its result; how these issues related to the *context* of the action described
- e. How the process problems encountered were *resolved* or *avoided*, how benefits were *capitalised* on and failures *coped with*
- f. Generic qualities of implementation such as *adaptability* and *improvement, responsiveness* and *deliverability*
- g. Existing *benchmarks* applied and/or new ones indicated
- h. Task-specific *techniques* for evaluating and quality-assuring particular processes (e.g. mentoring)

Generic aspects of process evaluation which aren't task-specific may also require documentation.

- i. Overall methods of process evaluation/quality assurance themselves (e.g. observation, interview, document analysis) and how rigorous they were
- j. The relationship between evaluators and practitioners, including independence and whether formative/summative evaluation

These will normally be covered under Impact evaluation (e.g. 2.2-2.3) especially in instances involving external evaluators, since the same team usually cover process and impact.

5Is and impact evaluation

The Specification (Chapter 6) indicated that knowledge frameworks should align with theory-and mechanism-oriented approaches to evidence without sacrificing rigour or a systematic approach. It's particularly important therefore to incorporate more rigorous and informative material from impact evaluations into knowledge bases of good practice (Ekblom 2007a; 2006b).

But the headings for impact evaluation under the original version of 5Is were relatively limited. This can partly be traced to the need, in the context of the EU Crime Prevention Network where 5Is originated, to have a relaxed attitude to evaluation methodology. The intention then was to be as inclusive as possible to participating practitioners and policymakers from member states who were relative novices in intervention and evaluation. But to be honest, efforts to secure well-evaluated but rich descriptions of practice were equally challenging within the UK, despite our long experience of prevention and evaluation. The same limitation plagues Problem-Oriented Policing despite considerable efforts (e.g. Eck, 2002c) to encourage and guide practitioners in the need for, and the means of, evaluation.

Impact evaluation can be defined as the process of making reliable and valid causal attributions about whether some purposefully designed and implemented action had intended and/or unintended effects in the real world. It can further cover quantification of impact and assessment of cost-effectiveness. 5Is also follows the Specification in aligning itself with impact evaluation proper rather than performance assessment.

The language and concepts of impact evaluation

The field of evaluation is rife with alternative meanings for key terms – for example, aims, objectives and goals. 5Is (somewhat optimistically) seeks clarity and consistency, by adopting its own convention. 5Is Impact evaluation terms fit with those set out, in Chapter 14, for Implementation.

Thus the *ultimate aim* of preventive action is the desired crime prevention, safety or security *outcome*. Outcome is a measure of *change in outcome variables* such as crime counts or survey responses indicating fear or reassurance. The change must be causally attributable to the intervention.

Outcome refers to what is inferred about the real world on the basis of measurement, whilst aim refers to intention, whether this is expressed as, say, a desired ‘10 per cent fall in burglary’ or a less quantified equivalent such as ‘a reduction in burglary’. Of course, aims can be positive (seeking) and negative (avoiding) and outcomes can be desirable and undesirable. Undesirable outcomes may either be a change in the wrong direction (e.g. increased fear from CCTV cameras) or a side-effect (such as stigmatisation of a neighbourhood targeted for preventive action).

In circumstances where there may be displacement, diffusion of benefit or offender replacement, it’s important for impact descriptions to declare whether they are referring to *gross* or *net* attributable outcomes. For example, preventive action may be followed by a 25 per cent absolute fall in crime in the action area. But because some of this fall was due to a coincidental background trend, it is reduced to a 15 per cent attributable gross fall in crime in the action area. This in turn may be countered by an increase in the neighbouring area due to partial displacement, meaning that the *overall* net attributable fall covering both action and neighbouring areas is only 10 per cent. In most cases it will be helpful to present the absolute numbers of incidents alongside percentages to indicate both the scale of achievement and reliability. The same principles will broadly apply to more advanced measures of impact like effect size. How far these finer distinctions can be reported depends on the expertise and resources devoted to a given evaluation exercise.

Intermediate outcomes relate to changes made in the real world which are causally downstream of the outputs of preventive action, but upstream of the ultimate outcomes. There are counterpart *intermediate aims* too (‘aims’ are used to refer to desired real-world changes; ‘objectives’ refer to internal process goals). Some of these will relate to changes in the offender (such as changed attitudes to theft) or the crime situation (such as increased proportions of cars which are secure). Others will relate to successfully mobilising people to take responsibility for implementing the intervention.

Additional quantitative terms can also be defined,⁴⁸ such as *efficiency* (output divided by input), *cost-effectiveness* (attributable outcome divided by input) and *benefit-to-cost ratio*. A useful distinction for consideration during the selection of preventive action is that between efficacy and effectiveness, discussed in Chapter 2. *Efficacy* describes ‘theoretical’ performance, measured by results of tightly-controlled trials and perhaps expert practitioners; *effectiveness* by evaluation of practice as it happens in real settings with ordinary, local implementers and weaker influence on the rest of the implementation chain.

A wider picture of performance: evaluation on multiple dimensions

Important though effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and the like may be, when it comes to selection of what preventive action to replicate, these measures aren't the whole story. Chapter 5 proclaimed the need for evaluative assessments of preventive action to supply a wider range of information for comparative purposes. Strictly speaking much of the information in question isn't directly about impact or outcome, and is in some respects more practical, even process-oriented; but it is about *performance in the real world of the preventive action as a whole*. Hence it's appropriate to cover it here. These other comparative dimensions of performance comprise:

- Being *responsive* and *scalable* to crime/safety problems, including:
 - *Prioritisation* of action in terms of severity of *consequences* of crime/safety problems (and perhaps in line with wider policy targets).
 - Accurate *targeting* on needs of victim and wider society – intervening universally, indicatively or selectively as appropriate; and on causes of crime/safety problem – intervening at appropriate levels from local to international.
 - *Coverage* on the ground, in terms of what *proportion* of a given crime problem the policy aims to tackle. Here, context knowledge is especially important. It may sometimes be most cost-effective to target only the worst-hit areas or the most serious crimes, but there are benefits from interventions which can protect more targets of crime or influence more offenders, even if less efficiently. Ekblom et al. (1996) illustrate this choice in relation to the evaluation of the Safer Cities Programme.
 - *Scope*, in terms of the range of different crime problems that are tackled in the sphere of responsibility of the policymakers – from 'juvenile crime' to 'bag theft in bars'.
 - *Adaptability* to changing circumstances (e.g. technological/social change or criminals' countermoves – Ekblom 1997, 1999, 2005a).
- Taking action over *appropriate timescales* – short, medium, long term.
- Pursuing policies that are *sustainable* in themselves over the desired timescales and don't consume human/financial resources which could serve other community safety priorities.
- Avoiding undesirable *side-effects* of action such as stigmatisation of areas or people, and balancing or creatively optimising *tradeoffs*: for example, interference with other values and policy areas including privacy or environmental sustainability, inequity of provision or even displacement of crime onto more vulnerable victims.

- Maximising *legitimacy or acceptability* of preventive actions, within the wider population, within minority subgroups, or even among offenders themselves.
- Ensuring policies are *deliverable*. Although policymakers don't need to get immersed in detail of delivery their decisions must take account of the *likelihood* of policy action successfully delivering appropriate action on the ground, and of that action then successfully producing the desired policy outcome.

These dimensions interact. For example, legitimacy influences effectiveness because actions seen as legitimate are more likely to be supported, and thus to work. There may also be tradeoffs – for example, narrow coverage of the worst crime hotspots may give greater cost-effectiveness (Ekblom et al., 1996) but make less impression on overall crime figures. And performance may be judged relative to expectations – for example, that a particular developmental intervention will take a decade to deliver measurable benefit.

The purposes of reporting impact evaluation in action descriptions

As stated, the obvious primary purpose of reporting impact evaluation findings in a knowledge base is to help practitioners to select what works and (on the basis of the additional performance measures just listed) what is more widely suited to implement for their problem and context. Impact evaluation results are therefore important both in terms of the *content* of the answer (yes, no or maybe) and the *credibility* of the answer (is this evaluation sufficiently reliable for me to act on, by replication or avoidance?). The selection process may apply higher up the scale to delivery managers and policymakers; also for research and theory. But other purposes exist beyond selection. These may be external or internal to the preventive action, and include the following.

Decision-making on existing action

The local project or service managers will wish to decide whether to cease, modify, continue or replicate the existing action. Their more strategic seniors (delivery managers and policymakers) will want information from several such evaluations to help them decide whether to scale the action up to a programme, or to extend, modify, or abandon an existing one.

Local feedback

Innovation, and replication in new contexts, can't guarantee success first time, no matter how carefully-designed and evidence-based the action is. Feedback and adjustment is fundamental to the design process, and depending on the allowable timescale and the nature of the intervention (proximal or distal) this may extend to

real-world trials using intermediate or ultimate outcome measures. To the extent that the action is an explicitly-planned pilot this may be formalised with some kind of impact evaluation design.

Accountability

Funders and other stakeholders obviously wish to know whether the action they have supported has worked.

Supporting impact evaluation itself

5Is descriptions gather evidence useful in the design, conduct and interpretation of impact evaluation itself, for example:

- Documenting initial levels and trends of crime under Intelligence;
- Recording, under Intervention, the rationale of cause and effect which can help specify intermediate and ultimate outcome measures;
- Stating possible principles/mechanisms of Intervention, and documenting the causal context, which can together guide Scientific Realist evaluations in particular;
- Recording what exactly was Implemented, when and where, so this can be linked to the timing and location of outcome indicators;
- Identifying, under Involvement, which individuals or agencies should have been mobilised in an implementation chain for effect to be attributable to cause in a succession of intermediate outcomes;
- Recording, under each of the Is, key dimensions of the *context* of action which may have contributed causally and practically to success or failure.

These contributions are especially useful where the descriptions are produced *with evaluation prospectively in mind* (usually meaning greater detail and rigour), but even limited 5Is accounts may help *retrospective* evaluators. Many of the contributions will also serve the less demanding task of performance assessment.

Failure analysis

Post-mortems will, unfortunately, remain important in impact evaluation whatever the future benefits of a rich, rigorous and retrievable knowledge management system for improving performance. 5Is can help interpret negative findings, for all the purposes set out above – but especially for improvement, building on Rosenbaum's (1986) distinctions, between theory failure, program or implementation failure, and measurement failure. For these we can substitute and extend to cover Intelligence failure, Intervention failure, Implementation failure, Involvement failure and Impact evaluation failure.

Likewise Read and Tilley (2000) used a modified SARA framework (ProCTOR) to extend SARA's ability to draw lessons from failure at each stage of the process, expressed in terms such as 'weaknesses in identifying the problem'. However, the further advantage of 5Is in this forensic guise is that, of course, it provides a framework for progressively more detailed investigation (was the Involvement failure a failure to mobilise, and if so a failure to clarify the crime prevention task, to locate the appropriate organisation or individual...?).

But failure isn't the only occasion for investigation and exploration. Ambiguous evaluation results need to be clarified, and even *prima facie* evidence of apparently successful impact needs to be thoroughly checked to be sufficiently certain that intended cause did lead to intended effect. And once this test has been passed, as Eck (2005) argues, there is little point in knowing *whether* an intervention succeeded if we don't also know *how*. In particular it's useful to know whether a particular ingredient, or a contextual factor, contributed a boost to impact, or was a necessary precondition without which the action would not work at all. The related distinction between interactive, contradictory and combined (merely additive) effects of interactions (Tilley et al., 1999) is also useful. The richer detail of 5Is descriptions and the focus on mechanisms can simultaneously raise the level of internal and external validity of the conclusions of an impact evaluation.

Evaluation and evidence: the position on impact evaluation methodology

As stated, 5Is doesn't in itself constitute or directly include impact evaluation methodology. It therefore doesn't specify a particular *process* of undertaking the Impact evaluation task stream, although as will be seen it has a clearer view of the *product* of that action.

5Is does, though, have a *view* on impact evaluation methodology. As described in earlier chapters there has been much contention between 'classic' experimental approaches as often encountered in Systematic Reviews, and the Scientific Realist approach. However, some rapprochement has emerged in which rigour and transparency are combined with an interest in context, mechanism and theory, and a more considered balance between internal and external validity (van der Knaap et al., 2008).

The 5Is position is that context and mechanism are important in undertaking, interpreting and applying evaluation (and this thread also runs through Intelligence to Involvement); and that inferential rigour in experimentation should be strongly and progressively encouraged. However, as Chapter 5 argued, the need for detailed accounts of practice far outstrips the number of high-quality evaluations of impact which we can afford, or for which professional evaluation researchers have the capacity to undertake. And many practical interventions, being highly localised and context-customised, aren't always susceptible to classic experimental techniques (Eck, 2002a,b; 2005). At risk of retaining too much bathwater relative to the numbers

of babies saved, given the present state of crime prevention the preference is for a practice-related knowledge base to be inclusive and to include a rating of evaluation quality, rather than apply a rigid quality criterion for admission. This is particularly important where valuable process knowledge can be gleaned even in the absence of clear impact results. However, we should maintain the pressure on practitioners, funders and policymakers to support progressive improvement in evaluation quality. Indeed we should require policymakers to show more leadership and make greater investment in evaluation (Bullock and Ekblom, 2011).

One particular inferential problem follows from the pursuit of the 5Is ‘evaluative ideal’ – namely, obtaining rich information on context and mechanism through prospective evaluations, involving expert evaluators, and which are intrusive and may be formative. Generalising to replications of the project or service which *lack* such influence and input from evaluators may be hazardous. But this is what one would expect to happen in a move from pilot to programme roll-out. An extreme example of this was in the failed replications of the successful Kirkholt Project described in Chapter 5. In the original project, the academic evaluators were not just acting formatively, but were themselves part of the team designing and implementing the action. This overall problem makes it especially important that in such circumstances 5Is accounts describe, in as detached a way as possible, the role of the evaluators and the contribution of the ‘boosted’ evaluation activity itself to the wider preventive process. The account should also present informed speculation on what the action might have achieved in the *absence* of the formative evaluators; and perhaps too, what vital elements of the evaluators’ contributions should be replicated in more routine roll-out. The concept of ‘research-like’ practice introduced earlier is consistent with the need to extract this information.

The structure of descriptions of Impact evaluation

If the preventive action being described comprises a number of discrete methods then it may be appropriate to give separate accounts of the impact evaluation of each, at least as far as their individual *intermediate* outcomes. But *ultimate* outcomes will best be described as a unified whole especially given that any individual methods in the package will all be making a collective contribution to this end. Methodologically, too, ‘package uncertainty’ (Ekblom, 1990; Ekblom and Pease, 1995) may make it impossible to identify the active ingredients.

The key content of descriptions of Impact evaluation obviously relates to the results; but for reasons already given it’s also important for the methodology to be reported, perhaps in abbreviated form referencing full accounts elsewhere; and likewise the thread of inferential logic, including statistical inference, by which the methodology connects observations to conclusions.

The results themselves comprise two elements.

- A report on the success or failure of Implementation and Involvement, describing whether or not key *output* objectives were achieved in terms of both quantity (numbers of houses secured) and quality (secured to a particular standard). If there has been significant failure, then here is the place to describe and diagnose it (under Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation or Involvement and their respective subheads) and to give an overview of practical lessons learned.
- If Implementation was sufficient, then the description continues with the *outcome* findings of the Impact evaluation. Even with Implementation/Involvement failure, though, there may still be useful knowledge to record on Impact evaluation technique.

Describing impact evaluation methodology, quality and independence

Description of *evaluation methodology* will include information on the evaluation design (e.g. measurement taken before and after, in action and comparison sites, or random allocation of offenders to treatment conditions); measurements (reflecting intermediate and ultimate outcome variables such as recorded, surveyed or self-reported crime); and analysis techniques, statistical testing and known *limitations* on validity and reliability of the results. *Measurement or Impact evaluation failure* (due, say, to low statistical power or sheer bad luck) is especially important to describe and explain. Some kind of evaluation quality rating system could be incorporated here, as in the ‘Maryland scale’ (Farrington et al., 2002) although that may not be appropriate for all kinds of preventive project or service (Eck, 2002a).

It will always be important to state whether the evaluation was conducted by the project or service implementation team themselves, other in-house people (e.g. the crime analysis department of the police), or independent evaluators. The basis of any non-academic motivation should be declared (for example, if a security company or insurance firm has sponsored the study).

Illustrations of impact evaluation descriptions

As noted, the original 5Is map-level headings for impact evaluation were pretty rudimentary, and a more developed suite was required. This means the balance between presenting illustrations of 5Is Impact descriptions (here) and spelling out the more developed headings (in the final section of the chapter) will favour the latter.

Aims

The Hawkeye CCTV evaluation (Gill et al., 2005a:11) stated the aims of the project clearly thus:

- To reduce the incidence of vehicle crime in the car parks by 55% by March 2003.
- To improve the level of detections and the provision of intelligence on criminal behaviour.
- To improve personal safety for car park users.

Design

The Moonshine description reported a modest retrospective evaluation design in which

- Formal outcome measures included recorded crime and ‘Crime and Disorder Act’ incidents (mainly nuisance as described in Chapter 12)
- Comparisons were conducted in separate time series for concentric areas: the target area, the ‘buffer’ zone (used to assess displacement/diffusion of benefit) and the rest of the district (used to identify and filter out background trends and used to generate expected falls in crime and incidents in the target and buffer areas).

Limitations to the evaluation were presented in a separate text box.

Overview of Implementation/Involvement

Depressing though it is, an example of documenting Involvement failure using 5Is comes from a project to reduce bag theft in bars using specially-designed clips beneath tables (Ekblom, in prep). Despite awareness of the risks and concerted and repeated action by the project team to address them, customers failed to use the clips; bar staff failed to point them out (indeed resisted use of purpose-designed card ‘hangers’ advertising the clips’ presence and purpose), or otherwise encourage their use; bar staff and management kept changing post or leaving the job; their communication with the (supportive) regional management of the bar company seemed poor; and regional management gave only disappointing inputs to the design of the clips. This cascade of mobilisation failures could be further analysed using the CLAIMED framework. It was, eventually, joined by a failure of partnership, in that the bar company pulled out of the entire project apparently due to the recession.

Outcome results

It’s not intended to present impact results for the exemplar evaluations, as 5Is doesn’t add to the presentation of these beyond standardisation of terminology. Rather, the intention is to give an idea of the range of formats compatible with 5Is.

- Moonshine presented its results in full in text and graphical format. The Home Office used the 5Is format for resumes of the findings of more sophisticated prospective evaluation and assessment of cost effectiveness conducted for the UK national Crime Reduction Programme (e.g. Osborn et al., 2004). In both cases the formal impact evaluation results were supplemented by some less rigorous interpretations of cause and effect, and plausible additional outcomes which had not been assessed with the same degree of sophistication.
- The Trident Intensive Supervision service presented summary impact findings on a range of outcome measures, though it was not fully clear which were ultimate and which were intermediate. These included effects on education (including levels of attendance at school) and employment, changes in behaviour (such as reduced impulsivity and getting on better with adults), reduction in (re)offending, and a tentative indication of attributable falls in area crime figures although this was offset by offending by young people entering from neighbouring deprived areas, and uncertainty in attributing desired outcomes to this action or to other related action in the locality.

Mechanisms

Hawkeye successfully reduced the incidence of crime in the car parks, especially criminal damage to vehicles. Detailed considerations suggested that the CCTV impact mechanisms must have centred on deterrence rather than interception.

Evidence included:

- High visibility of the system via leaflets, signage etc, making deterrence immediately possible (unlike with a covert system).
- A control room that was predominantly reactive, with little proactive monitoring of the cameras and hence few interceptions and arrests.

Adverse side effects

- The Hawkeye CCTV system increased the workload of the police Vehicle Crime Squad, because intelligence (in the form of video recordings) had now become available for all offences. This meant the police were obliged to pursue each piece of evidence and act on it.

Limitations and improvements

The Hawkeye evaluation identified limitations on the effectiveness of the CCTV system due to:

- Loss of evidence from the short retention time of tapes.

- Reduced quality of evidence from uneven lighting in car parks, wind shake due to installation of cameras on lampposts, and no facility for clearing rainwater off the static cameras.

Cost effectiveness

- The Hawkeye evaluation suggested the CCTV system, although effective, was run uneconomically. While there were three control rooms, each staffed for sixteen hours a day, only one or two offences were statistically likely to occur per day. The operators were unlikely to spot these because of limitations of displaying images from the cameras and absence of interactive control of the cameras themselves. If they did spot an incident, difficulties in communication with the police control room prevented an immediate police response.

Impact evaluation: master-list of headings

The following headings don't imply a particular sequence for the write-up of an impact evaluation, which may be dictated by the presentational requirements of specific instances. Rather, they list the kinds of content users of the findings should see when selecting preventive methods to replicate or when reviewing performance for wider delivery or policy purposes.

The headings have been drafted assuming a professional researcher has undertaken the evaluation. Where more modest evaluations by practitioners are documented, a less technical treatment will be more appropriate, though obviously the evidentiary status of the knowledge will be weaker.

5. Impact evaluation

5.1. Aims

- 5.1.1. Restatement of intermediate and ultimate aims of intervention, in terms of measurable outcomes
- 5.1.2. How they connect causally to the outputs of the intervention

5.2. Context of evaluation

- 5.2.1. Evaluation is internal or external to the implementing organisation
- 5.2.2. Evaluation is independent or not independent
- 5.2.3. Type of evaluators – academic, commercial consultant, practitioner

- 5.2.4. Formative or summative evaluation
- 5.2.5. Routine evaluation or a one-off exercise
- 5.2.6. Orientation – whether evaluation covered impact, process or both
- 5.2.7. Issues of achieving a climate of understanding and acceptance of impact evaluation with stakeholders in advance at planning stage, maintaining it during execution, and in retrospect when presenting results

5.3. Methodology of evaluation

- 5.3.1. Approach – e.g. Realistic, Theories of Change, Experimental, qualitative
- 5.3.2. Design, e.g. before-after x action-control (and perhaps how this relates to methodological quality scales e.g. Maryland scale)
- 5.3.3. Basic parameters such as output measures, and intermediate and ultimate outcome measures (e.g. self-reported offending, police recorded crime figures) sample size and units (e.g. individuals, families, neighbourhoods), time periods
- 5.3.4. Statistical testing – methods and their justification, power considerations etc
- 5.3.5. Problems, issues and tradeoffs in the above, and any practical resolutions worth sharing

5.4. Implementation and Involvement overview

This is where to report on successes and failures in Implementation and Involvement.

- 5.4.1. What were the *outputs* achieved by the intervention? Were planned output objectives met in terms of quality and quantity?
- 5.4.2. What were the ingredients of successful Implementation and Involvement?
- 5.4.3. What were the causes of failure – were they failures of Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation or Involvement and if so, of which subsidiary tasks?

5.5. Results of impact evaluation

The results of evaluations can be presented in headline form, alone or accompanied by an account in greater depth, showing the logic of inference between observation and conclusion. The following headings embody the latter alternative, building on questions suggested by Ekblom and Pease (1995).

- 5.5.1. Was there a statistically significant *change* in (intermediate or ultimate) outcome measures relating to crime, safety and other benefits? If so:
- 5.5.2. To what extent can this change be *attributed* to the outputs of the preventive intervention as opposed to background trends, coincidental events and ‘masking or mimicking’ effects such as increased reporting of crimes, regression to the mean and maturation? Depending on the sophistication of the evaluation this can involve simply relying on a ‘control’ design, presenting a few elementary cross-checks or a thorough exploration of alternative explanations.
- 5.5.3. With multiple sites and/or individuals studied, were the effects confined to *subsets* e.g. only to highly-cohesive areas, or only to offenders with supportive families?
- 5.5.4. Were there any *adaptive reactions* to the intervention e.g. by offenders showing diffusion of benefit, displacement, longer-term evolution of countermoves and offender replacement (i.e. arrest Mr Big the drug dealer and Mr Notsobig takes his place)? Did other parties adapt such as potential victims showing ‘conservation of risk’ (for example relaxing their guard on where to park, in the belief that their immobiliser would protect their car from theft)?
- 5.5.5. How did the intervention *work* – by what *mechanisms* and dependent on what *contextual contributions*? Were the latter *essential* or did they merely *boost* impact?
- 5.5.6. With multiple interventions, which ingredients were *essential* to any impact? Which *boosted* impact?
- 5.5.7. Were there *harmful side effects* – on crime and safety (e.g. the intervention made another crime type easier, widened the net for involvement of young people in criminal justice system or increased fear or inconvenience); and beyond (e.g. conflicting with other policy aims such as sustainability or inclusion)?
- 5.5.8. Were there any *beneficial side effects*? Did these come from the Intervention method itself or from Implementation and Involvement actions? Assembling a cumulative list of possible harms and benefits can facilitate designs of future

- interventions and future evaluations. In *improvement* terms, did the trial suggest how harmful side-effects could be reduced or avoided and benefits increased?
- 5.5.9. How big and how cost-effective was the *gross attributable change*? The attributable change *net* of offender adaptations and other side-effects on crime?
- 5.5.10. How did these changes translate into *benefits* – at the very least the public and private cost-savings on crimes prevented, and perhaps knock-on benefits of education or area regeneration? Approaches to identifying and quantifying costs and benefits were systematically elaborated in the UK’s Crime Reduction Programme 1998-2003 (see Dhiri and Brand, 1999, and endnote 49).
- 5.5.11. How *durable* or *sustainable* was the impact? Did investigation of mechanisms indicate likely durability of Intervention (e.g. CCTV that works by arrest and conviction may have a longer lasting effect than if it worked by merely deterrence), and sustainability of Implementation (e.g. how long could payment of extra police overtime be maintained?) or Involvement (e.g. would neighbourhood watch members lose interest if crimes were rare?)?
- 5.5.12. If there was *no* significant change in the intended direction in the outcome measures, was this attributable to failure of Impact evaluation, Implementation and Involvement, Intervention or Intelligence (and to specific, subsidiary tasks within each of these, interpretable through process evaluation or at least process monitoring)? Are any of these susceptible to *improvement*?
- 5.5.13. How far did the intervention meet its *aims* and any *targets*?
- 5.5.14. What were the *limitations* on performance and how might these be alleviated through *improvements*?

5.6. Wider performance/selection measures

5.6.1. How *responsive* and *scalable* to crime/safety problems was the action?

5.6.1.1. *Prioritisation* of community safety action in terms of severity of *consequences* of crime/safety problems (and perhaps in line with wider policy targets).

5.6.1.2. Accurate *targeting* on *needs* of victim and wider society – intervening universally or selectively as appropriate; and on *causes* of

crime/safety problem – intervening at appropriate levels from local to international.

5.6.1.3. *Coverage* on the ground, in terms of what *proportion* of a given crime problem the policy aims to tackle.

5.6.1.4. *Scope*, in terms of the range of different crime problems tackled.

5.6.2. Over what *timescale* did the Implementation occur, did the Intervention take effect, did the Impact reliably become apparent?

5.6.3. How *legitimate or acceptable* were the preventive actions, within the wider population, within minority subgroups, or even among offenders?

5.7. Learning on evaluation methodology

5.7.1. If the evaluation was inconclusive, was this due in some way to failure of the design or execution of the evaluation (*Impact or measurement failure*)?

5.7.2. What can be learned on *evaluation methodology itself* – things which worked, which failed or were too expensive in relation to the benefit to knowledge? Significant unresolved uncertainties? Trade-offs e.g. between increased statistical power from measuring in more sites, and quality of implementation? Solutions to this and other methodological problems? Practical issues of cost, human resource input and timing (time to implement, time to take effect, time for effect to be measurable)?

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Chapter 16 Conclusion

We've almost reached the end of our odyssey through the world of knowledge management and application in crime prevention, community safety and security. Here, we revisit the issue of complexity and simplicity, discuss the *process* of knowledge capture, contemplate wider uses of 5Is and how we might evaluate the impact of 5Is on performance, then finally consider how to make it happen.

Complexity and simplicity in crime prevention

In this book I've made much of the issue of complexity in crime prevention. I hope I've made a convincing case for those with an interest in the field to reconsider the deeply-entrenched assumption that simplicity alone can deliver good performance. Crime prevention is both *complicated* (it has lots of practice-relevant detail to handle) and *complex* (even the simplest intervention is a perturbation of a complex adaptive system of diverse stakeholders, honest and dishonest, pursuing their own interests with their own resources, and anticipating and adapting to the perceptions and responses of the other players). Any experienced practitioner should recognise this picture of their world.

Hopefully the rich detail of the illustrations of 5Is descriptions in Chapters 11-15 has also supported this contention. And as I reflected on my first attempt to document a project using 5Is, for the European Crime Prevention Network good practice conference 2002:

I think that the most surprising thing about the Stirchley example was this. Here was a *very simple* set of crime prevention methods, using simple and well-researched principles. The focus of the method could be described in a single sentence – blocking burglars' access to the rear of houses by putting gates on the alleyways. But the *range and complexity* of the action and support needed to convert the idea into reality was enormous – a full five pages' worth of systematic description to guide replication. (Ekblom 2002c: 96; original emphasis)

In fact, the 'not rocket science' claim (Read and Tilley, 2000) can be turned on its head. The science and the underlying technical principle of rocketry are actually dead simple – feed fuel and oxidant into a chamber, stand well back, ignite, apply Newton's laws of motion, and whoosh! What is difficult are the detailed, practical engineering and control systems required to reach the sky alive and not plough into a nearby hillside. Just like crime prevention.

Down to Earth again, a reassuring message from this book is that while crime and its prevention are undoubtedly complex, the complexity can be tamed provided we develop suitable frameworks and languages to handle it within research and practice. In broad terms, this has required contemplation of changes in crime

prevention theory; how we conceive of knowledge of practice; how we collect that knowledge through impact and process evaluation; how we communicate it; and the working context of that knowledge. Heuristic frameworks like SARA or the Crime Triangle, easy to teach and to use, can take practitioners so far. But they soon hit limits, whether in their capability of *retrospectively* describing, articulating and organising for retrieval the many subtle aspects of action, or in *prospectively* guiding it towards plausible, innovative solutions to new contexts and new problems.

As Ashby's (1957) Law of Requisite Variety suggests, the way to handle complexity in the real world is paradoxically to develop a more complex model of that reality. The concept of *appropriate complexity*, introduced in Chapter 5, follows this approach. The complexity of the framework – in distinguishing between Response tasks of Intervention, Implementation and Involvement for example – maps closely onto the complexity practitioners see and negotiate every day from their 'driving seats'. The intention is that practitioners, once familiar with 5Is, should find it *easier* to understand, plan and communicate about crime and crime prevention practice at this more sophisticated level.

The Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity is more complex than alternatives like the simple list of risk and protective factors for offending; or the Crime Triangle, the Routine Activities triad, and Rational Choice Theory. But when one assembles these individually simple frameworks as an entire functional suite (as practitioners must currently do every time they use them) the *net* complexity of having to resolve the inconsistencies, overlaps and gaps in terminology and concepts is much greater and more burdensome than a single, unified framework of causation and intervention that serves the same purposes and more.

So the critical issue is whether, from the practitioner's perspective, the benefit from learning and using the 5Is suite significantly outweighs the effort. As Chapter 1 noted, medicine chose to go down this path, devoting much attention to collectively structuring, defining and articulating the field for practice knowledge transfer. While interventions in crime prevention are rarely as sophisticated as those in medicine can be, the Implementation and Involvement context is more varied and demanding.

Simple, newspaper-style descriptions of success are vital to convince audiences like ordinary citizens, businesses and politicians of the value of crime prevention, and should be encouraged. But this is an entirely different task. For sharing good practice in ways that help replication and innovation such descriptions are simply not enough for something that aspires to become a *professional discipline*. Nor do many 'academic-style' write-ups of practice entirely make the grade.

Those aspiring to develop a *crime science* (e.g. Laycock, 2005; Pease, 2008), should acknowledge that the science can't simply reside in the hard science and technology with which they wish to connect: the social research side must become more scientific too. Close connection between research, evaluation and practice is a core value of academics working in the Situational Crime Prevention/Problem-Oriented Policing field. But the leading edge of research and theory should not be

blunted by adherence to inappropriate simplicity. In particular, advanced researchers shouldn't feel obliged to make *all* their writings immediately transparent to practitioner, policymaker or fresher audiences, as often happens in that domain of crime prevention. Basically, as with any other sphere of science such as medicine we should be ready to get as complex and sophisticated as we need to among ourselves, whilst ensuring that the knowledge we share with practitioners, policymakers and public is sufficiently simplified to be communicable without being misleadingly simplistic. Consider as a model the range of medical guidance, from home first aid kits to advanced brain surgery manuals. This is expressed at different levels of sophistication but all ultimately stem from the one complex medical scientific model.

The process of knowledge capture: the practice of improving practice

Recursion strikes again! If 5Is is about improving the performance of crime prevention practice, we should sometimes detach ourselves from this concern, and consider, at a higher level, how we can improve the way we improve that performance. This section covers the diversity of existing experience of 5Is knowledge capture, considers new possibilities, discusses the who, when and how of capture, and finally addresses the issue of selectivity and quality of information.

Existing experience of capture using 5Is

5Is descriptions have so far been captured in several ways, each revealing different practical issues of knowledge capture:

- From major project evaluation reports written by academics (e.g. the Stirchley burglary reduction project (Ekblom, 2002c; Home Office, 2004)). Although the reports were comprehensive and prepared to high standards this revealed major difficulties in actually locating the relevant information which was scattered throughout the lengthy documents, and gaps in key details which only emerged by virtue of having a structured and systematic approach to knowledge capture.
- From brief project reports written by practitioners (e.g. car theft reduction in the Metro Centre, Newcastle⁴⁹). In practice, these had to be supplemented by telephone queries and retrospective impact evaluation by researchers.
- As entries for EU Crime Prevention Network best practice conferences 2002-4, submitted in response to a format which allowed compilers to select whether to use the message, map or methodology-level headings. The entries were of variable quality as the framework itself was novel, the experience of crime prevention was novel for many delegates and contributors, and the English-only version was constraining. Unfortunately the entries appear to have been deleted by EUCPN following a regime change – a bad case of knowledge-mismanagement!

- As online submissions by practitioners of case studies, on the Respect website.⁵⁰ The case studies were prompted by 5Is Message-level headings with a limited explanatory text. The Australian Institute of Criminology are also exploring online compilation of knowledge using 5Is (see Anderson and Tresidder, 2008).⁵¹
- As a basis, at Message level, for the application form for local funding bids submitted to the Swedish National Crime Prevention Council,⁵² and subsequent practitioner reports and workshops; and for presentation during a police ‘results analysis’ session (following the UK National Intelligence Model). This used a ‘5Is lite’ form developed with the police, to guide the officers doing the reporting; it appeared to make sense both to the compilers, and to those in the tactical tasking and coordinating group who received the presentation. It was subsequently developed as a schedule to take practitioners systematically through their project (Kent, 2006), for the UK Home Office’s fledgling IPAK system of knowledge capture.⁵³ Sadly, work on IPAK has stalled.
- During an extended depth-interview with the practitioner team originating the project (Operation Moonshine, as documented in Chapters 10-15), using 5Is as a semi-structured schedule. As said, this extracted, reflected and articulated a great wealth of often tacit knowledge surprising not just the researchers but the practitioners themselves.
- During a series of informal focus groups each involving youth centre team members and their immediate local partners in police and probation service (Irish Youth Justice Service visits as documented in Chapters 10-15), again using 5Is as a semi-structured schedule. The course of each discussion was somewhat chaotic (requiring much post-discussion reorganisation of the information captured) but the flexibility of the schedule enabled reasonably thorough coverage in the time available. The exercise was undertaken with enthusiasm and dedication, and revealed the advantage of focus on highly specific practice and delivery issues. The fact that 10 such groups were held over the course of two intensive days enabled myself as facilitator to build up (virtually from scratch) some knowledge of generic issues in this field, and to contribute reflections, contrasts and comparisons to the discussions; also to begin to identify what was, and wasn’t newsworthy and hence worth pursuing for national knowledge-harvesting purposes.
- Prospectively, during process-evaluation research on case studies (as with the CCTV studies documented in Chapters 10-15).
- As a failure-mode analysis of a project to prevent bag theft through clips on tables in bars (Ekblom in preparation).

In all these instances, the knowledge capture process was quite hard, concentrated effort, particularly at the early stages when I was developing the framework whilst simultaneously applying it. This required both familiarity with the (evolving) terms and structures of 5Is, and an appreciation of the underlying

principles of the knowledge management mission, so instant ‘policy’ decisions could be made on whether to assimilate some item of practice to the existing 5Is framework, or accommodate the framework to some new distinction. Although the core of this work is done, the familiarisation requirement remains for any novice knowledge harvester. And since 5Is is intended as a perpetual learning engine, the assimilation/accommodation process must continue as new material raises issues the existing framework can’t handle.

The implication of all this is that knowledge harvesting requires considerable training in 5Is, systematic application and resourcing, and can’t be left to serendipitous discovery. Furthermore, if knowledge-harvesting through 5Is is to become widespread, and if it continues to evolve as described, this implies the need for some sort of organisation like the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing to maintain consistency of concepts and terms, and perhaps quality of descriptions. Otherwise what began as an attempted *lingua franca* could share the fate of Latin after the fall of Rome.

Further possibilities in knowledge capture methods

Further alternatives for structured knowledge capture exist and should be actively explored. *After Action Reviews* were developed in the US Army.⁵⁴ A specially-designed team meeting is held to review good and bad aspects of each operation, and pass the knowledge gleaned up to HQ. *Thematic focus groups* of practitioners with diverse experience could meet (physically or via a weblog) to discuss and refine knowledge of a quite specific practice topic, for example methods of obtaining insurance for outdoor activities for young people. So-called *double-loop learning* (for example Sasse et al., 2007) is a strategy for moving beyond tackling an immediate failure (‘single-loop’) but analysing the causes of that failure and adjusting underlying systems to reduce the risk of recurrence.

Who undertakes the capture, when, and how?

Retrospective collection of 5Is information is possible – but not ideal. Experience shows that even in the best process evaluation reports, the relevant information may be incomplete (the disadvantage of not working to a systematic framework). The ideal condition would be where a project and its evaluation was planned with the knowledge capture framework in mind.

Bullock and Ekblom (2011), in their critique of ‘good practice’ knowledge bases, identify significant limitations of a purely ‘bottom-up’ approach that simply invites practitioners to submit their own entries. In the instance studied in depth the limitations were compounded by the lack of guidance in completing the online forms. The content was highly variable in quality, quantity and retrievability, and there was little provision for searching by themes beyond the limited ‘type of crime’, ‘type of place’ etc. The scrutiny of this facility, and familiarity with similar ones

across the world, led us to suggest a two-level knowledge management system. The practitioners could continue to submit entries at a fairly elementary level, albeit boosted by better online guidance and some limited structuring by 5Is or equivalent. Professional ‘knowledge harvesters’ of the kind suggested by the British Standards Institution (BSI, 2001) would sift through the entries (they could also forage for knowledge more proactively). These should be academics, professional consultants and/or experienced practitioners all capable of analytic thinking, a familiarity with crime prevention and what is newsworthy, and a familiarity with 5Is itself. The ability to assess the quality of impact evaluations (or even to guide or conduct an elementary evaluation if missing) is also important, as is the capacity to place themselves in the position of a practitioner wanting to understand and use the description.

Such knowledge harvesters could:

- Cover material systematically (both holistically and broken down into elements of practice).
- Articulate generalisations which fit the structure and terminology of the knowledge framework (or indicate a requirement to modify it), and link to theory.
- Identify what’s newsworthy in the mass of detail, in terms for example of new crime problems tackled, new methods, new contexts, new implications for theory.

In ‘live’, face-to-face capture, the harvesters could act as *facilitators*, with additional benefits:

- To help practitioners become reflective;
- To hold the ring in group meetings, especially in the face of possible tensions in an After-Action Review or equivalent;
- To feed back the experience of others in exchange for knowledge received.

Above, I described the challenges of the pioneering work developing and illustrating 5Is. The undergrowth is now cleared but the task could still be made easier. In particular, a computerised guidance system could give interactive, stage-by-stage help to people collecting the information, besides capturing and storing the text electronically. This would be like a computer-assisted survey but providing definitions and examples to help the discussion.

Selectivity – redundancy and quality

Practical action is often rich and complex. Even the simplest project can generate vast amounts of information – but only a limited proportion will be useful. It’s therefore vital to be selective in describing preventive action. There’s little point in repeatedly documenting essentially the same findings to the same level of detail

across many similar projects. On the other hand, some degree of redundant or multiple documentation of detail can be beneficial. *Within* a given description, beyond the utilitarian function of guiding selection, replication and innovation, extra detail can help set the contextual scene, tell or explain the story, and establish credibility. *Across* descriptions it can help establish a reliable picture of the wider pattern of implementation; support a quantitative analysis to determine critical features for management of implementation risks (see for example the tables of risk-relevant implementation features in Bowers and Johnson 2006); and provide raw material for generating and testing middle-range theory.

How long should a 5Is description be? This depends on how complicated are the preventive action's history, crime problem tackled and methods deployed; and on how much of the action is worth sharing. Electronically searchable material could however contain extra detail without sacrificing retrievability.

The other aspect of selectivity is of course *quality of information*, and especially quality of *evaluation*. This particularly applies in *peer-to-peer* knowledge-sharing systems. A recent facility was called an 'effective practice' database. But as Bullock and Ekblom (2011) note, unfortunately the entries, submitted by practitioners with minimal moderation from the web managers, were supported by few evaluations (one project submitted had not even been implemented at the time!), and even fewer that were remotely methodologically adequate. This example, typical of others worldwide, has obvious implications for the need for professional moderation, and it cautions against simple peer-to-peer sharing of knowledge. Peer-to-peer is valuable in principle, and suits the 'networking' world of today, but has limitations in practice. As Scott (2001) noted in the context of Problem-Oriented Policing, a tradition of 'oral transmission' of knowledge imparts limited and perhaps inaccurate information. Here, use of a framework like 5Is can make the moderators' task easier if practitioners' submissions are required to contain the right information in a comprehensible structure and language. And if practitioners are themselves 'schooled-up' in the need for quality and the use of a framework which supports that quality, then peer-to-peer sharing of practice knowledge can become better in many respects.

Mindset and culture of knowledge capture

None of the above ideas for knowledge capture will work well without a very particular ingredient – a *mindset* among individual practitioners and researchers of knowledge capture and reflection; and a wider *culture* of sharing knowledge, learning and improvement (AGD, 2004). For example, we should aim to prime ourselves, every time we encounter a new practice solution, to ask – what's the problem? Where is it on the map – is it an Intervention problem or one of Involvement, say? What exactly is the solution? How does it work? What are the tradeoffs and how do they balance in different contexts? Does the process operate well, and does the solution deliver the desired outcome? Likewise, whenever we

encounter an unsolved problem, we should pose it as a particular gap in the knowledge space of practice, flag it for research and consider initiating some development process. To the extent that our gap is clearly articulated within a process map like 5Is, the specification for a solution becomes clearer and the task more focused. If we're responsible for delivery, the same mindset can lead automatically to thoughts of training requirements and other supportive infrastructure. The organisational culture should also be prepared to accept the risks of innovation, to learn from failure and to share that learning too.

Wider uses of 5Is

This book has focused on capture and retrieval of knowledge of individual preventive actions, and their replication. But once we have a comprehensive and detailed process model for prevention like 5Is it can make many other contributions to improving performance in crime prevention. Some of the following have been mentioned previously; others are new.

Appraisal and management of projects

The typical knowledge base is used *retrospectively* to collect information after the implementation and evaluation of a project. However, the same framework could be used *prospectively* as a business-planning and appraising tool, at several stages during project development and implementation. It can guide the design and planning of projects, and assessment of proposals for funding. (A version of 5Is is used for this purpose by the Swedish National Crime Prevention Council, and informal impressions from Council staff have been that the quality of submissions has improved since its introduction.) Once the proposals are accepted the framework can guide quality assurance of implementation, and monitoring of progress. If practitioners need learn only one schema for all this, they are saved much effort. Moreover, the utility of the framework at all stages to practitioners themselves (as opposed to merely serving the interests of fundholders or delivery managers) may raise the quality of practitioners' entries. We all know cases where management information systems are hastily filled in by the project administrator at the very finish of the work following dire threats from the funders. The approach envisaged here chimes with the Beccaria Programme's⁵⁵ concern with quality-assurance of all stages of prevention, from planning to documentation (Eklom 2005c). It fits well with the 'Dynamic Project Lifecycle' approach to management (Brown, 2006 and Chapter 13). I even have a 'virtual acronym' for the holistic arrangement envisaged: PADMIS – Planning And Developmental Management Information System.

Synthesis of principles and theories/Complementing systematic reviews of evidence of impact

There is much value in using individual case-study descriptions as raw material to feed the synthesis of principles and middle-range theories (Pawson 2006).

For education and guidance of practitioners, extracting and synthesising knowledge from many projects is probably more efficient for organising that knowledge than a purely case-study approach, though electronic media let users flip easily between instance and abstraction. Generative principles and theories are especially important given the need, emphasised throughout this book, for the *capacity to innovate* to address existing crime problems in new contexts, adaptive offenders and new kinds of crime.

Such synthesis is also an important extension to *systematic reviews* (van der Knaap et al., 2008). Like practitioners, policymakers and delivery-managers need resolution where, for example, different evaluations of similar interventions give opposing results. This could be due to error, the operation of fundamentally different Intervention principles or simply interaction of interventions with different contexts.

The synthesis of 5Is knowledge can extend beyond Intervention to cover methods of *Intelligence, Implementation or Involvement*, and the *contextual factors* that make these easier or more costly, challenging and risky to undertake. This can help turn high-level preventive strategies based on very generalised what-works reviews into practical plans. In terms of *deliverability* it can even help select strategies having a good chance of successful realisation on the ground; identify the *infrastructure* and *climate* necessary to support that implementation; and inform how to *mobilise* the relevant people and organisations. In this it meets some of the criticisms made by Pawson (2006) of classical social science systematic reviews.

Education and training

Given the complex nature of preventive action, the diversity of preventive principles, the contextual variability of the solutions, and the practical tradeoffs involved in designing them, the amount of theoretical and practical knowledge of crime prevention that fully-functional, experienced practitioners should have at their disposal is undoubtedly enormous. Embracing complexity in crime prevention practice requires simultaneous action on two fronts: designing our frameworks to handle it in as user-friendly and efficient a way as possible, whilst trying to raise the level of complexity that practitioners can cope with. The latter can be done by a combination of selection and education.

The vision I hold is that practitioners should be more like *consultants* with research-like skills and generative principles and processes at their fingertips, and plenty of knowledge of the diversity of preventive methods; and less like *technicians* with a limited diagnostic skill and equally-limited repertoire of responses. If we don't fashion our preventive practitioners in this way to operate at this level of sophistication, poor performance is only to be expected.

Some have long since abandoned this mission. To paraphrase the former chief executive of a major UK crime prevention organisation (in personal conversation), the most we can ever aspire to convey to practitioners is *a few limited slogans*. This patronising view is in my experience quite widely shared among senior delivery managers, and some academics. *I don't believe it's ever been tested*. Curiously, the further away from practice on the ground an administrator or policymaker is, the more they seem to adhere to this view. Without doubt practitioners in the police, for example, routinely digest and apply huge amounts of specialist knowledge, terminology and practice within the legal field – so why not within civil crime prevention? It's also my experience that unrealistic oversimplification is actually harder for people to handle (have you never been forced to answer a yes/no questionnaire item where you really wanted to respond 'yes, but no, but'?). Provided the complexity of the frameworks being offered is that which reflects the *natural* complexity of the job that practitioners daily have to address, I believe they can cope with it, and appreciate its necessity.

To raise the level of complexity that practitioners can cope with, education and training must be appropriate in terms of level, content and quality. The content of education and training materials for practitioners can be supplied by 5Is case studies and syntheses. But our theoretical models of crime causation and preventive intervention, our process models and capacity for generating and describing action through appropriate language must form an integrated mental *schema* (Ekblom, 2002a, 2008b; Bloch, 2000). The *schema* itself embodies the fundamental principles and concepts. As such, it can provide a *syllabus* and an organised *progression* of learning built around the process model of crime prevention. In this, it's suitable for *foundation training* – once practitioners have the schema in their heads, it should simply become their way of looking at the crime prevention world, structuring how they think when addressing new problems. The learning of the schema is reinforced and refined with every use.

To the extent that practitioners' ingestion of the schema succeeds, its possession renders them capable of adaptive learning, Piaget-fashion (Chapter 5) – assimilating new knowledge of practice to their existing framework, and where necessary adapting that framework to take in challenging new issues. In this process we see an echo, at the individual practitioner level, of the adaptive learning that the framework itself should be continually and collectively undergoing. In effect, these are personal and public learning engines. Ingestion of the schema also lightens the load of on-the-job guidance: much of the knowledge is already in the practitioners' heads.

Fostering communication and collaboration

5Is can foster communication and collaboration between practitioners from diverse agencies and disciplines, and different countries, through clearly-defined

standard terms and concepts. It can help articulate and share what was previously tacit knowledge.

Aiding comparison and transfer

A common framework, built on underlying, analytic concepts and modular tasks rather than superficial features and lists, can help compare like-with-like, whether for the purpose of evaluation or transfer of operational capacity.

For research

5Is was originally designed as a practice-centred framework, but it soon became clear it could be used by researchers:

- As a map to reveal gaps in knowledge, generating a systematic checklist of things that process evaluations should attend to, and organising the resulting report to maximise retrievability. My own experience in retrospectively converting the Stinchley burglary reduction project report into 5Is format revealed both missing items (which a checklist may have prompted the researchers to investigate and/or to report on) and those that were present, but hard to locate. The case-study evaluations of CCTV schemes (Gill et al., 2005a-c) were planned and conducted in the light of guidance from 5Is and the lead investigator maintained (personal communications, Martin Gill, 2007) that this was helpful as a complete ‘crib’ for process evaluation. Professional academic-standard evaluations, whether process or impact, are costly and time-consuming, hence rare. 5Is can make the most of the investment.
- As a rigorously-defined and consistent suite of concepts, useful for thinking, retrieval and communication. Agreement on a common ‘controlled vocabulary’ is, after all, a central feature of a science. Even if argument rages around particular definitions, concepts or paradigms, this basic scholarly work is vital for integrating knowledge and understanding, sharpening thinking and articulating disagreements. As the concepts and definitions evolve, learning-engine fashion, so does the science itself.
- Following on from the last, as a structure and a data source for developing and accumulating middle-range theory of processes like mobilisation or partnership.

Failure mode analysis

Police and other practitioners notoriously don’t learn from their mistakes, continually reinventing the flat tyre. Since implementation failure is so pervasive in crime prevention, it’s important that we learn from it, squeezing the maximum of accurate, informative knowledge out of all the investment in cost, human resources and hope that has gone into a failed project or service. Normally, not everything goes

awry. As Chapter 15 indicated, the modular, task-oriented nature of 5Is can diagnose failure in detail, supply richer, more structured feedback than merely, say ‘implementation failure’ and salvage positive experiences from the wreckage (for example, if the intervention method failed, mobilisation methods may still have succeeded). The next logical step in exploiting failure information is to develop ways to *anticipate* the risks of failures in future actions and counter them

Risk assessment

Risk assessment is the *prospective* counterpart of failure mode analysis – what *could* go wrong, in each 5Is task or sub-task, with what probability and harm?

One attempt to learn constructively from failures and to design more resilient action was made by Bowers and Johnson (2006). They presented a typology of different kinds of preventive action, which could be characterised by different profiles of failure. These were based around type of *scheme* (such as innovative versus tried and tested), type of *target* (such as randomly-selected or risk-based), who is doing the *implementation* (such as high or low community involvement) and how ‘*intense*’ is the scheme (in terms for example of quantity of people, equipment or training, and concentration in space or time). Practitioners could use the typology in planning their own action in relation to how they wanted to play the risk – safe but unadventurous, or risky, innovative and challenging. Combining an approach like this with the systematic and detailed coverage offered by 5Is tasks and sub-tasks could yield a rich and organised experience-base enabling practitioners and delivery managers to systematically make good-quality decisions under uncertainty.

Wider crime prevention futures

Futures work tries to anticipate change, and the impact of change, on a far broader front than risk assessment, and to help design systems, procedures and products that are robust and resilient across a range of possible futures which they may experience during their operational lifetime. At its best it’s a systematic and reasonably rigorous exercise, and can be made more so with frameworks like the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity and 5Is.

CCO can be used, quite simply, to ask systematically, which of the 11 causes of crime it identifies might change in the future, with what consequences for crime and for the causal context of prevention (Ekblom, 2002b, 2005b, 2006c). 5Is is of course designed *itself* to be adaptive and to help give *practitioners* the capacity to keep up with social and technological change and adaptive offenders. But once we have a detailed process model of crime prevention like 5Is, we can go further to envisage the impact of possible changes upon the performance of every task and sub-task – for example, ‘how might reductions in neighbourhood cohesiveness affect practitioners’ ability to mobilise residents as preventers?’ or ‘how might changes in websites, such as tag-mapping of crime sites, facilitate Intelligence?’⁵⁶

Looking further ahead

5Is is currently about *operational action* to plan, design and implement interventions, and the wider Implementation context provides a necessary backdrop whose driving, enabling and constraining influences are important, and require documentation where significant, but are not central. Subsequent development may take 5Is further into the delivery domain, especially where experience grows in applying it in service contexts rather than from a purely project perspective; but the foundations for this have been laid here.

And now for something completely different. The field of Design Against Crime is developing its own process model centring on the ‘user friendly/abuser unfriendly’ conflict (Ekblom, 1997) and balancing ‘practice-led research’ against ‘research-led practice’ (Thorpe et al., 2009). 5Is itself has been applied in the design context although mainly in retrospective paper exercises (see Ekblom 2005). Indeed, CLAIMED, the Involvement procedure for mobilisation of crime preventers, was abstracted from understandings gleaned from an earlier Design Against Crime review (Design Council, 2000; Learmont, 2005). Aspects of 5Is are being incorporated in the design process model (see Ekblom, in prep) but the focus may differ. Application in that context may in turn introduce changes in ‘mainstream’ 5Is.

Evaluating the impact of 5Is on performance

5Is aspires to improve the performance of crime prevention. This means less crime, less harm from crime, slower growth and evolution in crime; greater cost-effectiveness and durability, greater responsiveness to problems, greater adaptability to changing conditions, greater coverage and scope, fewer side effects on other policy areas and greater acceptability to the public.

How could such improvement be evidenced? At present, this is largely a hypothetical question because take-up of the framework is so far limited. But none of those frameworks in widespread use, like SARA and the Crime Triangle, have had their contribution to the quality or quantity of performance systematically evaluated. A major problem in any evaluation, of course, is the confounding effect of self-selection: methodological enthusiasts are more likely to adopt such frameworks, and methodological enthusiasts may do better crime prevention anyway. Random assignment of practitioner teams to ‘5Is’ and ‘Not 5Is’ training conditions might be required to help resolve matters; though whether the comparison was to be 5Is versus nothing, or 5Is versus SARA, say, is a moot point. In any case, evaluating improvements in *capacity* is more challenging than individual project evaluations. This is because it rests on inferences about consistent improvements in performance of whole suites of projects or sets of service delivery.

There’s greater scope for evaluating intermediate outcomes of 5Is usage, and internal processes within 5Is. *Intermediate outcomes* might cover the quality and

quantity of preventive plans generated. There is modest anecdotal support here from the Swedish experience of using Message-level 5Is for guiding/assessing practitioners' bids for funding and the subsequent project report. The impression of the local action team at the Swedish National Crime Prevention Council, as of late 2009, is that use of these headings has improved the quality of applications; and informal feedback from practitioner workshops (e.g. January 2010) that the (Swedish-adapted) 5Is framework has improved the depth of thinking and understanding of the local teams attending and discussing their work. (Practitioners apparently stated that using 5Is was more challenging, but worthwhile – exactly equivalent to an anecdotal response from an English practitioner – ‘it’s worth the frown time’.)

Internal processes can cover the quality of the *process* of each 5Is task stream or subsidiary task, and the quality of the *products* in helping practitioners to select, replicate and/or innovate. Research on Problem-Oriented Policing, for example (e.g. Bullock et al., 2006) revealed familiar shortcomings in the process of analysing crime patterns and the evaluation of the impact of the local projects. Might practitioners educated in 5Is do better? A far more modest and informal assessment of usability of 5Is descriptions occurred when staff of the (now defunct) Home Office Crime Reduction Centre exposed 29 practitioners in Birmingham to descriptions of burglary projects using 5Is. Their judgements were largely positive. 83 per cent agreed the case studies were clearly presented, 86 per cent agreed they were easy to read and 79 per cent that they were easy to understand. (However only 35 per cent thought there was enough information to choose whether or not to replicate a given case study, indicating that even more detail could be helpful.)

A wider assessment of process and product could compare the realisation and use of 5Is with the original Specification on which it was based (Chapter 6). How well does it generate innovation, for example? How well does it articulate and communicate tacit knowledge? The same Specification could be used to assess alternative frameworks too.

Making it happen

It could be argued that, with this book and with the diverse experience of practical applications that it has described, 5Is has now reached a state of intellectual readiness for wider use. By this I mean ready to become a practical system that is widely used nationally and internationally; and of continuing to improve, evolve and extend as a collective asset. Experience in marketing 5Is has however revealed *obstacles* to its reaching ‘take-off’ point. Some relate specifically to 5Is; others could inhibit the adoption of *any* new system of knowledge management. Indeed, a brave attempt at something similar, but more broadly-based – the National Anti-Crime Strategy Australia (AGD, 2004) – didn’t take off. The obstacles, and possible remedies, are as follows.

Complexity of 5Is

The distinctive feature of 5Is relative to alternative frameworks is its own *complexity*. Many researchers and practitioners are coming to acknowledge complexity as an issue which they, and existing frameworks for practice, must address. So far, though, they have failed to confront the need for change. Of course, things can be done (below) to make 5Is as easy to use, and as user-relevant, as possible. Training has already been mentioned, and the vision of practitioners as consultants more than technicians, committed to a preventive career rather than just passing through. But serious and potentially contentious issues are whether we're seeking the right kind of person, with the right kind of education and career aspirations, to be practitioners in this highly demanding field; and indeed whether the police can ever provide the right intellectual organisational/cultural context.

Investment

Likewise, 5Is requires 'investment to deliver' (Homel et al., 2004). This means not only supplying a framework and its immediate supporting structures and facilities such as provision of accredited foundation education, training, peer mentoring, but also organisational reward and career paths. This contains obvious risks for those making the investment call, since currently, 5Is' claim must rest on the known fact of implementation failure, plus the plausibility of the arguments I've put forward. It has yet to acquire a track record of improved performance and faces a Catch-22 in doing so. A way round this might be to bootstrap wider, more substantial investment by supplying sufficient evaluative evidence of improvement in a localised domain (a limited number of individual projects, a small programme).

Incumbency

The *incumbency* of existing simple, robust but limited frameworks like SARA and the Crime Triangle means that many people have invested in developing concepts, creating materials and maintaining websites; and at practitioner level, in learning to use them (although as evidence has shown, not always very well). There appears to be a powerful 'comfort zone' for producers and consumers of crime prevention knowledge alike, which many are unwilling to leave. (Even more worryingly, others still find even the Problem-Oriented approach and its equivalent frameworks in, say, youth justice, beyond *their* comfort zone.) Perhaps there are advantages to gradualism (marketing people have a concept of designs which are the 'Most Advanced Yet Acceptable'⁵⁷), but the problem here is that 5Is is a *package* with a minimum workable set of components. However, its multi-level design does offer the prospect of starting with '5Is-lite' at the Message level and then continually raising the bar.

Reducing barriers to change

There's a paradox in forcefully supporting a single, cumulative, constructive approach to the knowledge and science of crime prevention whilst seeking to overturn existing frameworks. But there are times when other considerations outweigh the benefits of continuity. Tactics for reducing the barriers to change include:

- *Making 5Is useful to practitioners* in obtaining funds and in their daily work (as with the PADMIS vision described above) rather than as an after-thought and chore of documentation/evaluation. It should motivate them *positively* by stimulating, challenging and encouraging them to feel part of a significant, collective knowledge-gathering and -sharing exercise.
- *Building on the familiar* and *maximising backward compatibility* with existing materials and training, for example through use of prior terminology (which 5Is has sought to do, particularly with Problem-Oriented Policing and Situational Crime Prevention). Transferring from SARA to 5Is is straightforward because there's effectively no detailed structure within the former that needs unlearning.
- Having a *simple and robust entry level*, which smoothly leads users (whether new trainees or old hands changing frames).into *progressive complexity*.
- *Making 5Is easier to acquire and to use* by creating IT and graphic communications for learning, on-the-job guidance and the routine of data entry and retrieval. *This will be the next step of development*.
- *Achieving critical mass and maintaining momentum* for supporting, choosing and implementing change. This is difficult. Crime prevention is a field notorious for shifts of administrative and political priority and fashion. It's also subject to the pervasive problem of short-term posting of staff, which induces collective amnesia (Kransdorff, 1998; see also Brown and Scott, 2007); rapid dispersal of critical mass of influential supporters, and constant effort to rebuild it; and a lack of career motivation among senior staff to support, and gain personal career reward, from setting up and steering a system which may take some years to come to fruition, before which they will have long since moved on.

Yet knowledge frameworks do occasionally emerge which become self-sustaining – for example the Campbell Collaboration, Communities That Care and the Problem-Oriented Policing approach. What is it about them? Some clues come via a curiously convoluted route. Lacoste and Tremblay (2003) sought to understand *criminal* innovation. They cited Rogers' (1995:15-16) list of characteristics of successful innovations:

- *Relative advantage*, or the degree to which an innovation is perceived as more useful than what it is designed to supersede;

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- *Compatibility*, or its consistency with existing values, past experiences and needs of potential adopters;
- *Complexity*, or the degree to which an innovation, or its uses, is readily understood by most members of a social system;
- *Triability*, the degree to which an innovation can be experimented with on a limited basis;
- *Observability*, or the degree to which the results of innovation are visible to others.

Surely we can beat the *criminals* at this game?

Final thoughts

The philosophy behind 5Is is that a high level of *investment* in concepts, knowledge, training, guidance and other infrastructure is necessary for a high *yield* in terms of successful *performance* in crime prevention. The big question about 5Is is whether practitioners, delivery managers and programme builders are prepared to make that investment, and to grasp the nettle of complexity. If they are, 5Is could become a major collective asset for preventing crime, increasing community safety and improving security. Who will take up the challenge?

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework

Paul Ekblom

Endnotes

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¹ www.popcenter.org

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<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090106142604/http://www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/page.asp?id=531>

³ www.popcenter.org

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www.yjb.gov.uk/Publications/Scripts/prodList.asp?idCategory=51&menu=item&eP

=

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http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereducti.on.homeoffice.gov.uk/learningzone/lz_learning.htm

⁶ Respectively

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereducti.on.homeoffice.gov.uk/>, www.eucpn.org/goodpractice/index.asp, www.crime-prevention-intl.org/en/strategies-policies-tools/policies-strategies.html.

⁷ Respectively www.yjb.gov.uk/en-gb/practitioners/ and www.scopic.ac.uk.

⁸ www.skillsforjustice.com/websitefiles/7%20appendices.pdf see p101.

⁹ www.popcenter.org.

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<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereducti.on.homeoffice.gov.uk/>

¹¹ www.campbellcollaboration.org/library.php.

¹² The quotation from Einstein is ‘Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler’. This is on dozens of quotation websites but none cites source.

¹³ www.yjb.gov.uk/en-gb/practitioners/youthjusticethescaledapproach/

¹⁴ www.popcenter.org

¹⁵ Unfair to parrots? See www.alexfoundation.org/index2.html

¹⁶ See e.g. www.controlledvocabulary.com

¹⁷ www.designcouncil.org.uk/about-design/How-designers-work/The-design-process

¹⁸

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereducti.on.homeoffice.gov.uk/ipak/ipak01.htm>

¹⁹ Respectively

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereducti.on.homeoffice.gov.uk/tilley/tilley2010.htm>,

www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/, www.eucpn.org/eucp-award/index.asp.

²⁰ www.beccaria-standards.net/

²¹ This and other 5Is documentation mentioned here are downloadable via <http://5isframework.wordpress.com> and www.designagainstcrime.com/files/5Is_updated_detailed_document.doc

²² www.popcenter.org/responses/

²³ www.beccaria-standards.net/

²⁴ www.hetccv.nl/english

²⁵

<http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/>

²⁶

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/gp/gppw02.htm>

²⁷

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/regions/regions00.htm>

²⁸

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/ipak/evidencebase/burglary005.htm>

²⁹ Still available on

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk>

³⁰

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/learningzone/cco.htm>

³¹ At www.popcenter.org.

³² On www.popcenter.org

³³ Previously ‘social levels’ in CCO (e.g. Ekblom, 2000).

³⁴ A draft interview schedule based on CCO is available from the author.

³⁵ A presentation and a formal descriptive report of Moonshine are at

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/gp/gpps05.htm> and also the Respect website at

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.asb.homeoffice.gov.uk/members/case-studies/article.aspx?id=8634>

³⁶

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/burglary/burglary60.htm>

³⁷ www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ccaps-spcca/capra-eng.htm

³⁸ www.beccaria-standards.net/

³⁹ For brevity, ‘and protective’ is usually omitted

⁴⁰ For example

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/toolkits/db00.htm>

⁴¹ www.yjb.gov.uk/en-gb/practitioners/YouthJusticeTheScaledApproach/

⁴² <http://ncadi.samhsa.gov/features/ctc/resources.aspx>

⁴³ See 'crime frameworks' section of www.designagainstcrime.com

⁴⁴ www.campbellcollaboration.org/library.php

⁴⁵ www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ccaps-spcca/capra-eng.htm

⁴⁶ www.beccaria.de

⁴⁷ See www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020030.htm

⁴⁸ State-of-the-art quantification and costing is at 'Mainstreaming Methodology for Estimating Costs of Crime', www.costsofcrime.org

⁴⁹

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/iex/uploaded/1070360923/TueDec21028432003_5Is%20EUCPN%20Metro%20Gateshead%20vehicle%20final1.doc

⁵⁰ Project Moonshine is at

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.asb.homeoffice.gov.uk/members/case-studies/article.aspx?id=8698>

⁵¹ www.aic.gov.au/documents/4/A/4/%7B4A4DCFBD-BCC5-4304-BCE4-0D917A75BBCF%7D2008-03-WACrimePrevention.pdf

⁵² [www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=Riktlinjer för ansökan om](http://www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=Riktlinjer%20f%C3%B6r%20ans%C3%B6kan%20om%20ekonomisktst%C3%B6d%C3%A5r2009&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/090518/93050a4af0dea7acd0df56f659dc2140/Ek%255fst%255fd%255frik%255friklinjer%255fht%255f09.pdf)

[ekonomisktstödår2009&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/090518/93050a4af0dea7acd0df56f659dc2140/Ek%255fst%255fd%255frik%255friklinjer%255fht%255f09.pdf](http://www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=Mall%20f%C3%B6r%20%C3%A5terrapportering&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/050602/16ef38509948f36165849873adc35a71/MallSlutrapp.pdf)

and for final project report

[http://www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=Mall%20f%C3%B6r%20återrapportering&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/050602/16ef38509948f36165849873adc35a71/MallSlutrapp.pdf](http://www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=Mall%20f%C3%B6r%20%C3%A5terrapportering&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/050602/16ef38509948f36165849873adc35a71/MallSlutrapp.pdf)

⁵³ Improving Performance through Applied Knowledge. See

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/ipak/ipak01.htm> for description of IPAK and

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/ipak/evidencebase/burglary005.htm> for 5Is document

⁵⁴ See e.g.

www.mvr.usace.army.mil/PublicAffairsOffice/2003AnnualReport/DistrictHighlights/AAR%20Guide.doc and in UK National Health Service

www.library.nhs.uk/knowledgemanagement/ViewResource.aspx?resID=70306

⁵⁵ www.beccaria-standards.net/

⁵⁶ see for example <http://tagmaps.research.yahoo.com/> and

<http://bikeoff.beta.tagmap.co.uk/>

⁵⁷ Originating with Raymond Loewy: www.raymondloewy.com/about/bio.html

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